

DOES POLITICS STOP AT THE WATER'S EDGE? THE STATE AS A
UNITARY ACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE
EFFECT OF PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS ON SELECTED
NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

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University of Missouri-Kansas City, 2012

ABSTRACT

Structural realists argue the nation-state is a unitary actor that conducts foreign policy without regard to domestic politics. Anarchy, the lack of any controlling authority, is the dominant fact of life for states within the international system. Operating within this self-help situation, each state continually weighs the balance of power between itself and others. Foreign policy is principally a reaction to the changes of relative capabilities of other states.

Preservation of national security consisting of territorial integrity and unadulterated sovereignty is the ultimate goal of any state action. Territorial integrity is the preservation of the national government's control of territory and unadulterated sovereignty is understood as complete freedom of action. Leaders reserve to themselves the decision as to what constitutes the national interest and pursue this interest without regard for domestic political pressures. The realist concept of the unitary state has been applied principally to matters of national security.

In Defending the National Interest, Raw Material Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy Stephen Krasner produces a fully realized demonstration of the unitary actor thesis in a matter of national security.

This study will test the “unitary actor” contention by examining the effect of seven presidential transitions between competing political parties since the end of World War II on American policy towards nuclear weapons and oil. An examination of the continuity or change in policy from one administration to its successor will illuminate the degree to which foreign policy is a reaction to the international situation without regard to domestic political considerations.

The military issue examined is nuclear arms control between the United States and the Soviet Union and its successor the Russian Federation. The economic issue considered is access to and the price of crude oil from Saudi Arabia.

First, the study will review the policy of each outgoing President. Next, the study will review the policy choices of each incoming President. Differences or similarities in policy choices will be established and a conclusion will become visible which reflects either the accuracy or folly of the structural realist description of the state as a unitary actor in international relations.

The faculty listed below, appointed by the Dean of the School of Graduate Studies, have examined a dissertation titled “Does Politics Stop at the Water’s Edge? The State as a Unitary Actor in International Relations and the Effect of Presidential Transitions on Selected Foreign Policy Behaviors,” presented by Edward Barnett Rucker, candidate for the Doctor of Philosophy degree, and certify that in their opinion it is worthy of acceptance.

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my beloved wife and best friend Harriett Ann Plowman. In my life, she is the anchor and center of our family who makes all good things, including this degree, possible.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The Realist Unitary Actor Assumption

On January 10, 1945, from the floor of the United States Senate, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Republican from Michigan, then the senior Republican and later the Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, delivered a speech that contained an important message to Democratic President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The President would no longer have to contend with isolationist opposition from the Senator, on matters of national security. Confronting the new reality Vandenberg acknowledged “Our oceans have ceased to be moats which automatically protect our ramparts.”¹ In a realist assessment of the motives of nations Vandenberg declared that. “I am not so impractical as to expect any nation to act on any final motive other than self-interest. I know of no reason why it should. Indeed that is what nations are for.”² Having endorsed a realist view of the actions of nations in the world at large, Senator Vandenberg, as the leading Republican foreign policy voice in the Senate, set the stage for a post-war consensus foreign policy led by the president. Vandenberg later virtually coined the phrase, “Politics stops at the water’s edge.”

A realist in international affairs, Mr. Roosevelt followed a long tradition of American foreign policy based on the national interest, a position first articulated by

¹ Senator Vandenberg of Michigan, speaking on Foreign Policy, “Unity is Indispensable,” on January 10, 1945, to the Senate U.S., Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record*, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.: 164-167

² Vandenberg, “Unity is Indispensable.”

President George Washington. In *His Excellency George Washington*, Joseph Ellis writes that:

Most elementally he was a thoroughgoing realist. Though he embraced republican ideals, he believed that the behavior of nations was not driven by ideals but by interests. This put him at odds ideologically and temperamentally with his secretary of state, since Jefferson was one of the most eloquent spokesmen for the belief that American ideals *were* American interests.³

Mr. Washington set out "...what turned out to be one of the earliest and most forceful statements of the realist tradition in American foreign policy:

Men are very apt to run into extremes; hatred to England may carry some into excessive Confidence in France...; I am heartily disposed to entertain the most favorable sentiments of our new ally and to cherish them in others to a reasonable degree; but it is a maxim founded on the universal experience of mankind, that no nation is to be trusted farther than it is bound by its interest; and no prudent statesmen of politician will venture to depart from it⁴

Mr. Washington's message deserves recognition as a seminal statement of the realist tradition in American foreign policy. Again from Joseph Ellis, here are the key words:

There can be no greater error to expect, or calculate upon real favours from Nation to Nation. 'Tis an illusion which experience must cure, which a just pride ought to discard." Washington was saying that the relationship between nations was not like the relationship between individuals which could periodically be conducted on the basis of mutual trust. Nations always had and always would behave solely on the basis of interest."⁵

The realist position, viewing the world as it is and not as we would like it to be, begins with the premises that national interests will control actions more than affection. Looking backward, we find Mr. Washington linked with the classical analysis of Thucydides in the Melian Dialogue. Looking forward, Mr. Washington's attitude is reflected in the foreign

³ Joseph J. Ellis, *His Excellency George Washington* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 209

⁴ Ellis, *George Washington*, 123.

⁵ Ellis, *George Washington*, 235.

policy advocated by the likes of Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan and Henry Kissinger.

From George Washington we received,

...a vision of international relations formed from experience rather than reading, confirmed by early encounters with hardship and imminent death, rooted in a relentlessly realistic view of human nature.⁶

Since 1945, if Senator Vandenberg was correct, politics should stop at the water's edge and the United States would, in world affairs act with an essential unity. Pursuant to the realist model of international relations, the nation would function as a unitary actor in international affairs. Foreign policy in matters of national security would be directed to protecting and preserving the national interest without regard to domestic politics. National decision makers would respond to changes in the increased or decreased capability of other states in creating and executing American foreign policy in matters of vital national security. This study will test that idea.

What follows is a brief description of the unitary actor assumption. As tested here, the theory holds that: States, defined as the society's central decision making roles and institutions; operating within the anarchical international environment function as unitary actors, by identifying and pursuing a policy in national security issues based on an assessment of the capabilities and intentions of other states, without regard to domestic political influences, interest groups or pressures.

The working definitions of the critical terms as used in this study must be clear to the reader so that the analysis which follows is viewed in the intended context. The definitions are:

⁶ Ellis, *George Washington*, 236.

1. Anarchy: absence of an effective supervisory authority which can create and enforce rules and substantively resolve disputes.
2. Capabilities: ability to influence the behavior of other states or non-state actors.
3. National Security: national survival issues, war or peace, and access to critical raw materials.
4. Policy: exercise or restraint from exercise of national capabilities.
5. State: society's central decision making roles and institutions which speak through an executive who represents the state outside its borders.
6. Unitary: the state functioning in the national interest without regard for the agenda preferences of domestic constituents.

The premises which underlie the use of the unitary actor assumption as used in this study are:

1. Anarchy is the fundamental condition of the international environment
2. Issues of national survival exist for all states. They are issues of:
 - a. war and peace, and
 - b. access to critical raw materials.
3. Each issue tested also posits the existence of a second state in the system in response to which foreign policy is made. Such other or opposing states appear in two contrasting situations:
 - a. Other states making and executing their foreign policy, often in an overtly or potentially hostile manner. or

- b. Foreign states experiencing or demonstrating changing capabilities.
4. Each state possesses a clear and identifiable agency of foreign policy decision making. For the United States, the President and to a lesser extent the National Security Council and the Departments of State and Defense make and execute foreign policy.
5. Foreign policy is made and executed in public. All other observers, states and decision makers can readily see the results of the decision if not the decision itself.
6. The articulation and performance of a foreign policy choice may involve the:
 - a. Use of a capability
 - b. Restraint from the use of a capability
7. Confirmation of the Unitary Actor Assumption is demonstrated by evidence that supports the conclusions that:
 - a. Central decisions maker's perceptions of changes in other states capabilities or intentions drove the foreign policy action; and,
 - b. Domestic political influence is ineffective, or, of little consequence as a cause of the policy.

For examining the unitary actor assumption in the context of the behavior of the United States, we make the following clarifying statements.

1. The President through the constitution, custom, and practice is the voice of the United States.

2. Foreign policy on national security issues may be articulated at the National Security Council or the departments of State or Defense\, but it is not American policy if the President does not direct or authorize it.
3. Foreign policy on national security issues is the unavoidable responsibility of the President.
4. No change in foreign policy on national security issues can occur without the President.

As a predictive theory, the Unitary Actor Assumption holds that states will act when the international equilibrium is disrupted by:

1. Changes in capabilities of other states;
2. Changes in other states military deployment outside their borders;
3. Changes in expected behavior by other states.

An example of the change in capabilities of other states was the launching of Sputnik, the first artificial earth satellite by the Soviet Union on October 4, 1957. An example of the change in force deployment outside the country driving foreign policy was the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962. An example of a change in expected behavior of other states was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980. If the international situation is not disrupted, a state's behavior in the international arena will remain consistent with existing policy even if a change in leadership produces new leaders who speak as if the current foreign policies were going to change. An example here is the policy of President Barack Obama from 2009 to 2011, concerning the situations in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Detention Facilities at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba.

Methodology and Sources

The research question examined in this study is: Does the nation-state function as a unitary actor in international affairs, and acting in pursuit of its national interest respond, principally to changes in the capabilities, actions and perceived intentions of other states, or do internal stakeholders (voters, interest groups) possess an effective voice in designing and implementing foreign policy? Stephen Krasner defines the “national interest” as the preferences of American central decision makers that are “related to general societal goals, persist over time, and have a consistent ranking of importance.”⁷ When a state acting through its central decision makers pursues interests and goals whose importance and ranking persist over time, regardless of the domestic political affiliation or ideology of the principal decision maker, that the state is demonstrating a unitary actor behavior. Put another way, does our experience of foreign policy continuity or lack thereof in transitions between presidents of competing political parties verify or falsify the unitary actor assumption?

Why should we examine this subject at this time? Since the very beginnings of the American experiment, the United States has made foreign and defense policy in the shadow of the struggle between the realists exemplified by George Washington and the idealists personified by Thomas Jefferson. The crashing failure of Woodrow Wilson’s idealism in the rubble of the Second World War, together with the creation of the Atom Bomb in 1945 and the emergence of a Cold War from 1946-1989;⁸ created an unprecedented situation in the

⁷ Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest, Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 13.

⁸ For this study the Cold War begins with the escalating tensions between the Soviet bloc and the Western allies at the end of World War II as described by Winston Churchill in his Iron Curtin speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri on March 5, 1946. The Cold War ends on November 9, 1989 with the fall of the

life of the nation and the world. The global position of the United States in 1945 was new to the nation, and, its dominant position on every continent and in every realm of human political and economic activity; was unprecedented in world affairs. The United States had never before sought or taken a leadership role in world affairs in peace time. In 1945, the global reach of American power backed by atomic weapons dwarfed any empire in the past, the British, the Romans or the Chinese.

This situation presents us with the opportunity to test the proposition that states function primarily as unitary actors within the international arena by examining United States national security issues on a relatively clean slate. Such a “clean slate” is provided by two specific developments. The first is the unprecedented nature of the American position in the world as the first nuclear armed superpower and after about 1960 as only one of two such powers with the actual capability to destroy human civilization. The second development is the increasing dependence of a world straddling superpower on foreign suppliers of a vital, strategic raw material, oil.

For a working politician in a position of national leadership, whether or not a state is a unitary actor is not a vital question. What is of value to national leaders, is an understanding of the behavior of states, and it is the behavior of states, examined in a narrow range of issues, i.e., national survival on an existential level, which we are studying here. A state, particularly a democratic one, must balance domestic political interests against each other. What we are testing here is not whether those forces influence foreign policy but whether the state also has a life of its own that must be also taken into account to make sense

Berlin Wall the preeminent symbol of that struggle. Others may mark the end of the Cold War with the dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991.

of foreign policy behavior, and whether on issues of national security, the interest of the state weighs most heavily of all competing interests.

The answers to this inquiry may prove useful for policy makers and interested observers in sorting through the cacophony of news, information and voices seeking to identify what data will actually inform, predict and explain state behaviors within the context of an anarchic international system.

In this study, we need to be clear about the terms “state,” “nation,” “nation-state” and “anarchy.” “State” refers to a legal entity asserting control over its borders, political primacy within those borders, a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within those borders, and a position of such equality within the international system as its actual capabilities (power) will command. “Nation,” often used interchangeably with state, refers to a group of persons with a specific national identity. A nation may be more or less contiguous with a state (Germany), span multiple states territories (the Kurds in Iran, Iraq and Turkey, or the Basques in Spain and France) or be a dispossessed group seeking a homeland, (the Palestinians of today or the Jews before 1948). A “nation-state” refers to a congruence between the national identity of the people and the borders of the legal authority by which they govern themselves and relate to the world beyond their own borders. In common practice the word “state” or “country” is frequently a synonym for nation-state. “Anarchy” means the lack of a comprehensive power which can regulate the behavior of all members of the international system. Anarchy is not the functional equivalent of chaos, and this analysis is not offered as an explanation for behavior within a chaotic arena.

We begin with the assertion that foreign policy is essentially created, executed and evaluated in public. An interested observer can get a fairly accurate understanding of a state's position in international affairs from the public pronouncements of heads of state and those government departments devoted to foreign affairs. Thomas Mowle write that, "One must define foreign policy in terms of observable behavior, not unobservable goals."⁹ "Public statements, an observable behavior, can be aggregated to discover trends in policy stances."¹⁰

While some of the research here will focus on national security documents not readily available at the time they were important and active expressions of U.S. foreign policy; a review of the public statements of the president and his chief advisors will provide a balance in reviewing the active public record. Mowle continues, "Because 'foreign policy is a public enterprise...one can meaningfully refer to publicly-expressed problem representations.'"¹¹

Beginning with the creation of the National Security Council in 1947, the staff began producing four basic kinds of documents. They are: 1) comprehensive policy statements about specific national security issues, 2) situational or geographic profiles, 3) studies along functional line such as arms control, energy or economic situations, and 4) reports on the

⁹ Thomas S. Mowle, "Worldviews in Foreign Policy: Realism, Liberalism, and External Conflict," *Political Psychology* 24, no. 3 (Sept. 2003): 564.

¹⁰ Mowle, "Worldviews in Foreign Policy," 564.

¹¹ Mowle, "Worldviews in Foreign Policy," 564.

internal organization of the policy process.¹² These products of the Nation Security Council are not required to be published in the Federal Register.¹³ Generally a president's signature indicates approval of the proposed policy.¹⁴ Under each president considered in this study, the National Security Council documents (by whatever designation the individual administration used) are internal policy decisions. As described in a 1992 Government Accounting Office report to Congress, "National Security, The Use of Presidential Directives to Make and Implement U.S. Policy," these are not Executive Orders of the President but they

- embody foreign and military policy making guidance rather than specific instructions,
- are classified,
- are usually directed only to NSC and the most senior executive branch officials, and
- do not appear to be issued under statutory authority conferred by congress and thus do not have the force and effect of law.¹⁵

It is also important to note what sources are not crucial to this study. The volumes of material available to researchers make possible a lengthy work on the negotiation of one single arms control agreement such as SALT I. Using that material, a compelling story may

¹² Harold C Relyea, "Presidential Directives: Background and Overview, CRS Report for Congress order code 98-611 GOV," Congressional Research Service, (November 26, 2008) CRS-8.

¹³ Relyea, "Presidential Directives," CRS-9.

¹⁴ Relyea, "Presidential Directives," CRS-9.

¹⁵ Joseph E Kelley, "National Security the Use of Presidential Directives to Make and Implement U.S. Policy, Report to the Chairman, Legislation and National Security Subcommittee, Committee of Government Operations," House of Representatives, United States General Accounting Office (GAO/NSIAD-92-72 January 14, 1992) 1.

be told of the negotiations, personalities and drama surrounding one such issue in the term of one president. But, staff level discussions and this level of detail do not provide direct and relevant data to answer this research question. This study is based on the premises that examination of broad and consistent presidential policy behaviors in vital national security subject matters will support or undermine the unitary actor theses. Consequently this study will focus on a set of sources that revolve around a president's public statements, both pre-presidential political and policy materials and then, while in office, statements, speeches, strategies and policy as formed and expressed from inside the Executive Office of the President primarily within the National Security Council.¹⁶

This study will examine two fundamental national security issues. The first issue is one of war and peace, the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union and its successor, the Russian Federation over nuclear weapons and efforts control of those weapons. The second issue is economic and resource oriented -- the price and stability of supply of oil from Saudi Arabia.

Since the beginning of human civilization, competition for raw materials and natural resources such as oil has been a serious issue of national security. A consideration of these problems was a part of international relations when the first border was drawn and the water, land or timber, were more plentiful or of better quality on one side of the border than the other. At the other end of the spectrum, the unique and unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons created an entirely new problem in international relations. It was now

¹⁶ The National Security Council was established by the National Security Act of 1947 (PL 235 - 61 Stat. 496; U.S.C. 402), amended by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (63 Stat. 579; 50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.). Later in 1949, as part of the Reorganization Plan, the Council was placed in the Executive Office of the President. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/>.

conceivable that the nation could win a war on the battlefield, and yet suffer such massive internal damage, that for the people the war was essentially lost. This unwinnable nuclear war was a new phenomenon in human conflict and a new issue in international relations.

This inquiry will proceed in the following manner. The independent variable is the political party affiliation of the President of the United States. The dependent variable is the policy of the United States: a) towards the Soviet Union/Russia on the issue of nuclear weapons; and b) towards Saudi Arabia on the issue of the price and stability of the supply of crude oil. We will use the following analytic process. Through relevant public documents, the archives of the presidents in the presidential library system, other governmental sources the press, current histories, academic literature, we will establish the policy of each outgoing President. Next the policy choices made by each incoming President will be examined for evidence of consistency with or departures from the predecessor's policy. The differences or similarities in policy choices between outgoing and incoming Presidents will be established. This process and the data examined will test the accuracy of the realist description of the state as a unitary actor in international relations.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Political science has to start somewhere, and I want to acknowledge a relatively positivist perspective. This is a positivist paper. By that I mean to say I am aware of the defects of positivism and proceed nonetheless, recognizing that a totally neutral observation of a world in which the observer lives is not entirely possible. A post-positivist approach focusing on constitutive questions seems of little real use for understanding the world around us. Our subject here is the world as it is. In political science it is necessary to pick a beginning in terms of history and in terms of theory. Realism is the dominant intellectual framework for the study of international relations. The unitary actor thesis examined here is a component of realist thought. Accordingly we begin with a review of major realist authors and principles.

Thucydides and the Melian Dialogue

The Melian Dialogue is the principal ancient example of the timelessness of realist thinking where power is always the key factor. The rights or wrongs on the situation enter only briefly into the conversation since each side believes it is “right” and the other is “wrong.” The Athenians are clear and direct. Surrender or be destroyed. They tell the Melians:

Athenians. For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with specious pretenses- either of how we have a right to our empire because we overthrew the Mede, or are now attacking you because of wrong that you have done us- and make a long speech which would not be believed; and in return we hope that you, instead of thinking to influence us by saying that you did not join the Lacedaemonians, although their colonists, or that you have done us no wrong, will aim at what is feasible, holding in

view the real sentiments of us both; since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.¹⁷

In the dialogue we come to the point that it is not merely the existence of power, but the perception of power, that is of concern to the antagonists. The Athenians refuse friendship, insisting on slavery, fearing that friendship might make them look weak even if they are not.

Melians. And how, pray, could it turn out as good for us to serve as for you to rule?
Athenians. Because you would have the advantage of submitting before suffering the worst, and we should gain by not destroying you.

Melians. So that you would not consent to our being neutral, friends instead of enemies, but allies of neither side.

Athenians. No; for your hostility cannot so much hurt us as your friendship will be an argument to our subjects of our weakness, and your enmity of our power.¹⁸

Since Thucydides, wrote “The Melian Dialogue” the attitude and outlook of what we call “Realist” thought has been a staple of international relations. Even the most optimistic liberal or the most determined constructivist considers themselves realist in the common usage of the term in their analysis and understanding of international affairs.

Thomas Hobbes and Anarchy

Thomas Hobbes had a realist view if ever anyone did. Even the critics who ultimately disagree with his conclusions acknowledge that Hobbes thought is at some level a basis for realist thinking. For Hobbes, life in the original state of nature was “solitary poor,

¹⁷ Thucydides, *History Of The Peloponnesian War* Chapter XVII Sixteenth Year of the War - The Melian Conference - Fate of Melos, 431 BC <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/melian.htm>.

¹⁸ Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*.

nasty brutish and short.”¹⁹ In the international realm he found the same war of all against all, a precursor to the analysis of anarchy in the international system:

But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of warre one against another; yet in all times, Kings and Persons of Sovereigne authority, because of their Independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns, upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their neighbours; which is a postulate of War. But because they uphold thereby, the Industry of their Subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men²⁰

Two broad descriptions of the realist tradition are noteworthy here at the beginning of this exercise. In the words of Stephen Walt:

1. Realist theories seek to explain politics as it *really* is, as opposed to normative theories that offer prescriptions for how politics ought to be.²¹
2. The realist tradition also tends to emphasize the continuity of historical experience and is skeptical of efforts to transcend the competitive nature of political life.²²

E. H. Carr and the Refutation of Idealism

E. H. Carr was an early realist writing in England. His primary addition to the literature and understanding on international relations is set out in his book, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*.²³ This book was an early attempt to define international relations in theoretical terms, rejecting the utopian idealism championed by Wilson that led from Versailles to Munich to World War II.

¹⁹ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1651/1983), 64.

²⁰ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 65.

²¹ Stephen Walt, “The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition,” in *Political Science The State Of The Discipline*, ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), 199.

²² Walt, “Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition,” 199.

²³ E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London: Macmillan 1945).

Carr argues that effective scholarship and policy making must not ignore empirical evidence or pursue the illusory promise of an idealistic norm which has not been tested. This overemphasis on harmony and idealism led to the error of failing to acknowledge the role power played in the international arena and interpreting Hitler's ambition and aggressiveness as merely an assertion of self-determination by an ethnic group which would end with the establishment of all the German peoples under one greater German nation. While Carr correctly predicts the rise of international structures, he does not offer any overarching theory or entertain elaborations on abstract principals. His refutation of Wilson's idealism is his key contribution to the realist side of the theoretical debates about international relations.

Hans Morgenthau and Classical Realism

Hans Morgenthau is regarded as the modern founder of the realist school of thought in international relations. In this study, the intellectual progeny of Hans Morgenthau defines the realist school of thought. It is in Hans Morgenthau's 1948 classic, *Politics Among Nations, The Struggle for Power and Peace*,²⁴ that we first encounter an attempt at a consistent and coherent theoretical framework of international relations that has become the standard reference setting forth the realist framework for analysis.

First published in 1948 and updated four times, *Politics Among Nations* presents a set of realist principals upon which scholars have built for 60 years. Kenneth W. Thompson summarizes Morgenthau's work as follows:

²⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations, The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th Ed. (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1973).

The focus of Morgenthau's search is the relation between power or national interest and morality...He brought to the United States an understanding of the classic problems of power and foreign policy derived from European experience...that the first duty of the state was to defend itself and that only then was it possible to talk of law... diplomacy had to be linked with power if international stability and harmony were to be achieved.²⁵

Also important in his scholarship are two additional works. In his book, *In Defense of the National Interest* (1951) he contended that moral principles must be linked with the national interest. This approach is reminiscent of Thomas Jefferson but inconsistent with the realism of George Washington. Morgenthau argues that general moral principles must be filtered through the national interest if an effective political morality is to be attained.

In *The Purpose of American Politics* (1960) he reviewed the influence of transcendent purpose on American foreign policy from the beginnings of the Republic. By the mid-1960s he had emerged as the foremost early critic of the Vietnam War, warning that nations must never place themselves in a position from which they cannot retreat without a loss of face and from which they cannot advance without unacceptable risk.²⁶

But it is his six principles of political realism that are the crucial core of his intellectual contribution and for which he is known as the founder of the "Realist" school of thought in international relations:

1. "Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature." Morgenthau's realism believed in the "possibility of developing a rational theory that

²⁵ Kenneth W Thompson, *Masters of International Thought* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980) 87.

²⁶ Encyclopedia of World Biography, "Hans J Morgenthau Biography," <http://www.bookrags.com/biography/hans-j-morgenthau>.

reflects ... these objective laws (and) in the possibility of distinguishing between truth and opinion.”²⁷

2. “The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power.”²⁸ Morgenthau cites with approval Lincoln’s distinction between the *official duty* of a statesmen to act in terms of the national interest and his *personal wish* to see his own moral values and principles realized throughout the world. “Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible-between what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place.”²⁹

3. “Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all.”³⁰ “Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over

²⁷ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 4.

²⁸ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 5.

²⁹ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 7.

³⁰ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 8.

man...from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another “³¹

4. “Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is also aware of the ineluctable tension between the moral command and the requirements of successful political action...Realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract formulation, but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place.”³²

5. “Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. As it distinguishes between truth and opinion, so it distinguishes between truth and idolatry... There is a world of difference between the belief that all nations stand under the judgment of God, inscrutable to the human mind, and the blasphemous conviction that God is always on one’s side...it is exactly the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from both that moral excess and that political folly.”³³

6. “Intellectually the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere, as the economist, the lawyer, the moralist maintain theirs... the

³¹ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 9.

³² Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 10.

³³ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 11.

political realist asks "How does this policy affect the power of the nation?"³⁴

"Political realism is based on a pluralistic conception of human nature. Real man is a composite of 'economic man,' 'political man,' 'moral man,' 'religious man,' etc. A man who was nothing but "political man" would be a beast, for he would be completely lacking in moral restraints."³⁵

Morgenthau seeks then to develop a theory of political behavior, and thus "political man" must be separated from other aspects of human nature in order to be studied on his own merits.

Kenneth Waltz responded that while elements of a theory are present in Morgenthau's work, he never created theory. According to Waltz, Morgenthau never developed a concept of the whole and "confused the problem of explaining foreign policy with the problem of developing a theory of international politics. He then concluded that international political theory is difficult if not impossible to contrive."³⁶

Morgenthau utilizes a narrow definition of power as the object of political activity between nations. For him not every activity between nations is a political activity, driven by a desire to obtain or a need to expend power. In *Politics Among Nations* he states,

... not every action that a nation performs with respect to another nation is of a political nature. Many such activities are normally undertaken without any consideration of power, nor do they normally affect the power of the nation undertaking them. Many legal, economic, humanitarian and cultural activities are of this kind.³⁷

³⁴ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 12.

³⁵ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 14.

³⁶ Kenneth Waltz, *Realism And International Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 71.

³⁷ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 28.

In analyzing the struggle for power Morgenthau divides imperialism into three types, military, economic and cultural. In economic imperialism the first item of trade he mentions is oil. This economic imperialism may change the power relations between the imperialist nation and others not by conquest of territory but by economic control.³⁸

For Morgenthau

A state is not an artificial creation of a constitutional convention ... superimposed on whatever society might exist. On the contrary the state is part of the society from which it has sprung... (and) far from being a thing apart from society is created by society.³⁹

A nation is not “an empirical thing.”⁴⁰ A nation according to Morgenthau is “an abstraction from a number of individuals who have certain characteristics in common and it is these characteristics that make them members of the same nation.”⁴¹ Clearly this realist view is in contravention with the idealistic assertion of the American national identity that America is a set of ideas, a devotion to the rule of law and the principles of the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights and the United States Constitution. Wilson would be appalled, but Morgenthau would claim he is only trying to defend the same country with a clearer eye focused on the world as it is.

National power according to Morgenthau is divided into elements which are relatively stable, such as geography and natural resources; and elements that are easily subject to change, such as the quality of a national government, diplomacy or national

³⁸ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 63.

³⁹ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 499.

⁴⁰ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 107.

⁴¹ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 107.

morale.⁴² Technological change can revise the distribution of power as demonstrated in the case of oil. Since the advent of the oil economy, Russia (then the first among the constituent parts of the Soviet Union) has enjoyed a relative increase in national power due to plentiful reserves of oil while Japan, which must import all of its oil, has seen its international position weaken.⁴³

Finally, we should not forget that Morgenthau also suggests a coherent system of irrationality in international politics. He identifies five factors in the pathology of international politics:

1. The imposition upon the empirical world of a simplistic and *a priori* picture of the world derived from folklore and ideological assumptions, that is, the replacement of experience with superstition;
2. The refusal to correct this picture of the world in light of experience;
3. The persistence of a foreign policy derived from the misperception of reality and the use of intelligence for the purpose of not adapting policy to reality but of interpreting reality to fit policy;
4. The egotism of the policy makers widening the gap between perception and policy on the one hand and reality on the other;
5. The urge to close the gap at least subjectively, by action, any kind of action, which creates the illusion of mastery over a recalcitrant reality.⁴⁴

⁴² Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 117.

⁴³ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 123.

⁴⁴ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 7.

Kenneth Waltz and Structural Realism

Kenneth Waltz brings a new dimension to realist theory by developing a theory placing more emphasis on the nature of the international system and its ever-present anarchy, replacing Morgenthau's focus on objective laws of politics grounded in human nature with an outlook based on international structure.

In *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* Waltz proposed a three-image view of looking at international relations behavior. The first image was the individual and human nature and the second image the nation-state. The third image focused on the role of systemic factors and the effect situational anarchy exerted on nations on the international stage. "Anarchy" here means a context where there is no compelling force or authority that governs the actions of nations. These images also became known as "levels of analysis".⁴⁵

In *Theory of International Politics*⁴⁶ we find the core principles of neorealist, also called "structural realism," international relations theory. Waltz adopts a structural perspective that sets him apart from earlier (classical) realists like E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau.

In his theory of structural realism, Waltz argues that actions of individual nations can be explained by understanding the forces exerted on them by competition in the international arena where their options are limited and bounded by the structure of the competition itself. Waltz begins with the fact that on the world stage there is no compelling central authority to impose order, thus every nation is on its own in a perpetual state of anarchy. Each state must

⁴⁵ Kenneth Waltz, *Man The State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954) see also the explanation at http://www.bookrags.com/wiki/Kenneth_Waltz.

⁴⁶ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979).

act in a way that ensures its own security, and reliance on the goodwill of other states is foolish. In this respect Waltz and Morgenthau are in agreement.

The distinction between structural realism and classical realism is that the classical realist emphasis on human nature (an urge to dominate others) as the starting point for analysis is replaced in structural realism by a description of the international system itself as anarchic. Structural realism holds that the anarchic international environment shapes, limits and constrains state behavior without regard to human nature.

Waltz is not proposing a predictive theory to anticipate a particular state's action in a given situation. Waltz claims only to be able to describe certain behaviors that reappear with regularity in the international arena such as balancing or bandwagoning in response to a perceived threat, restraining the exercise of power, or participation in an arms race.

Critics of Waltz have pointed out that his theory of a stable bipolar world balanced between two competing superpowers, each on their respective sides of the planet, fails to explain the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union and the events of the 1990s since the fall of the iron curtain. Waltz responds that the idea of stability was misconstrued by the critics and that the bipolar system was stable as it never resulted in a war between the superpowers. The critics, Waltz argues, have confused the peaceful stability of a situation with the duration of that situation over time.

A criticism of both classical and structural realism is their alleged inability to explain the lasting peace in Europe and the world since the end of World War II. Theories that emphasize the roles of institutions, and international behavioral expectations and norms have risen to prominence.

Waltz suggests that explanation rather than prediction should be the goal of a social science theory. Due to the obvious fact that social scientists cannot run controlled experiments that give the natural sciences so much predictive power, explanation is the reasonable goal.⁴⁷ Studying politics especially international relations is not the same thing as investigating a phenomena of nature which can lend itself to repeated experimentation in a controlled environment and generating results that other researchers can reproduce and verify. In *Man the State and War* he writes that:

The study of politics is distinguished from other social studies by concentration upon the institutions and processes of government. This focuses the political scientist's concern without constituting a self-denying ordinance against the use of materials and techniques of other social scientists ... for international relations are characterized by the absence of truly governmental institutions which in turn gives a radically different twist to the relevant processes.⁴⁸

Waltz also refused to be drawn into the trap of proposing a theory that must anticipate and predict every eventuality:

Theory obviously cannot explain the accidental or account for unexpected events. Theories deal in regularities and repetitions and are possible only if these can be identified....A theory is a description of the organization of a domain and the connections among its parts. A theory indicates that some factors are more important than others and specifies the relations among them....Theory isolates one realm from all others in order to deal with it intellectually. To isolate a realm is a precondition to developing a theory that will explain what goes on within it.⁴⁹

For Waltz, understanding international politics begins and ends with structure. He writes, "It is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside of states. If

⁴⁷ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 6.

⁴⁸ Kenneth Waltz, *Man The State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), 11.

⁴⁹ Kenneth Waltz, *Realism And International Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 71.

the aims, policies and actions of states become matters of exclusive attention or even of central concern, then we are forced back to the descriptive level; and from simple descriptions no valid generalizations can logically be drawn."⁵⁰ Waltz finds great continuity in the history of international relations. He compares the events in First Maccabees with the struggles between Israel and its enemies in the twentieth century.⁵¹ For Waltz, "the texture of international politics remains a highly constant pattern for events repeat themselves endlessly.... the enduring anarchic character of international politics accounts for the striking sameness and the quality of international life throughout the millennia..."⁵²

His theory holds that the state is a unitary actor in foreign affairs. This was first articulated in his book *Theory of International Politics*. As Waltz is the primary author of the idea tested in this dissertation, a review of his explanation of the theory is necessary to frame the test put forward in later chapters.

Waltz begins his analysis by differentiating between the key terms of "theory" and "law". For Waltz, a "law" establishes a relationship between variables, variables being concepts that may have different values. Waltz writes that:

Rather than being a mere collection of laws, theories are statements that explain them. Theories are qualitatively different from laws. Laws identify invariant and probable associations. Theories show why those associations obtain... theories contain theoretical notions. Theories cannot be constructed through induction alone for theoretical notions can only be invented not discovered.⁵³

⁵⁰ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 65.

⁵¹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 66.

⁵² Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 66.

⁵³ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 5.

For Waltz, the key consideration is that while laws may be discovered, a theory must be constructed. Waltz believes that theories are made creatively.⁵⁴

Waltz offers the following definition of a theory:

theory is a picture, mentally formed, of a bounded realm or domain of activity. A theory is a depiction of the organization of a domain and of the connection among its parts... A theory indicates that some factors are more important than others and specifies relations among them.⁵⁵

For Waltz, in order to move from speculation as to cause, to a theoretical explanation requires a simplification. Waltz posits four methods of simplification: isolation, abstraction, aggregation and idealization.⁵⁶

Waltz also writes that theories embody making theoretical assumptions; he notes that in one of his assumptions he is “defining nations as unitary and purposive actors.”⁵⁷

Waltz sets out a seven stage program to test a theory:

- 1) State the theory being tested.
- 2) Infer a hypothesis.
- 3) Subject the hypothesis to experimental or observational test.
- 4) In taking step two and three above is the definition of terms found in a theory which you are testing.
- 5) Eliminate or control any perturbing variables.
- 6) Devise a number of distinct and demanding tests.

⁵⁴ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 9.

⁵⁵ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 8.

⁵⁶ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 9.

⁵⁷ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*,10.

- 7) If the test is not passed ask whether the theory fails completely, needs repair and restatement, or requires a narrowing of the scope of its explanatory claims.⁵⁸

In this study, the theoretical assumption being tested is whether the state is a unitary actor in international relations as Waltz claims. The hypothesis is that, if the state is a unitary actor, the transition in the United States Government from Presidents of one political party to Presidents of the opposing political party will not change basic American policy as it relates to national security issues of foreign policy. The issues studied here are: 1) nuclear weapons policy in relation to the Soviet Union, and, 2) the access of the United States to oil from Saudi Arabia. To test this hypothesis, we look at seven changes in presidential administrations, both Democrat to Republican and Republican to Democrat, in the United States from 1953 to 2001.

Waltz acknowledges that the first big difficulty lies in “finding or stating theories with enough precision and plausibility to make testing worthwhile.”⁵⁹ Waltz sees the study of international politics as an examination of reductionist or systemic theories. He believes the systemic theory offers greater explanatory power and greater insight than a reductionist theory. Waltz’ systemic theory finds the cause of nation-state behavior in international relations to lie at the international systems level.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 13.

⁵⁹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 14.

⁶⁰ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 18.

Waltz describes the systems approach as: "a system is then defined as a set of interacting units. At one level, a system consists of the structure, and the structure is a systems level compounded that makes it possible to think of the units as forming a set as distinct from a mere collection. At another level, the system consists of interacting units. The aim of systems theory is to show how the two levels operate and interact and that requires marking them off from each other... any approach or theory if it is rightly termed "systemic" must show how the systems level, or structure, is distinct from the level of interacting units."⁶¹

For Waltz, theory is either reductionist or systemic depending on how the examiner determines to arrange the materials. A theory which explains international outcomes in terms of elements located at national or sub-national levels is reductionist. The reductionist theory is about the behavior of the parts. For Waltz, these theories are insufficient and he proposes a systemic theory in which nation-state behaviors are driven by international structure itself.⁶²

Waltz sets forth a thorough argument for the need for systems-based approach to international relations with these words,

Low-level explanations are repeatedly defeated, for the similarity and repetition of international outcomes persist despite wide variations in the attributes and the interactions of the agents that supposedly caused them... The repeated failure of attempts to explain international outcomes analytically -- that is, through examination of interacting units -- strongly signals the need for a systems approach. If the same effects follow from different causes then these constraints must be operating on the independent variables in ways that affect outcomes. One cannot incorporate constraints by treating them as one or more of the independent variables

⁶¹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 40.

⁶² Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 60.

with all of them at the same level, because the constraints may operate on all of the independent variables and because they do so in different ways as systems change. Because one cannot achieve that incorporation, reductionist not possibly adequate and an analytic approach must give way to a systemic one.⁶³

Waltz goes on to argue that, "propositions at the unit level do not account for the phenomena observed at the systems level. Since the variety of actors and the variations of their actions are not matched by the variety of outcomes, we know that systemic causes are in play."⁶⁴

As Waltz elaborates his theory that the structure of the international arena affects the behavior of the units or nations which exist within that arena, he begins a process that eliminates domestic political considerations from the analysis of the international scene. "We know what we have to omit from any definition of structure, if the definition is to be used theoretically. Abstracting from the attributes of units means leaving aside questions about the kinds of political leaders, social and economic institutions, and etiological commitment states may have."⁶⁵ At this point, you can see that Waltz has decided that, "nations and their actions in the international arena must act with regard to the pressures, changes and inertia that exist within the international arena, rather than the stated desires of political leaders, factions, or parties, to achieve one specific foreign-policy or another."⁶⁶

For Waltz, "the structure is defined by the arrangement of its parts. Only changes of arrangement are structural changes. A system is composed of the structure and of

⁶³ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 68.

⁶⁴ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 69.

⁶⁵ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 80.

⁶⁶ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 80.

interacting parts. Both the structure and parts are concepts related to but not identical with real agents and agencies."⁶⁷ When attempting to define structure, Waltz notes that, "political scientists cannot ask about personalities and interest of the individuals occupying various offices... they leave aside the qualities, the motives, and the interactions of the actors... because they want to know how people's behavior is molded by the offices they hold."⁶⁸

As a realist, Waltz believes in international anarchy. "The parts of the international political system stand in relation of coordination. Formerly, each is the equal of all the others. None is entitled to demand; that is required to obey. International systems are decentralized and anarchic."⁶⁹ For states existing in the anarchic international system, domestic and international politics are starkly contrasted. "National politics is the realm of authority, of administration, and of law. International politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and accommodation. The international realm is preeminently a political one."⁷⁰

In this international system, states are sovereign. To Waltz, sovereignty means that a state "... decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and external problems, including whether or not to seek assistance from others and in doing so limit its freedom and making commitments to them... states are alike in the tasks they face but not in their abilities to perform them. The differences are of capability not function."⁷¹

Waltz begins with the premise that *realpolitik* is:

⁶⁷ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 80.

⁶⁸ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 81.

⁶⁹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 88.

⁷⁰ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 113.

⁷¹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 96.

...the methods by which foreign-policy is conducted and provides a rationale for them. Structural constraints explain why the methods are repeatedly used despite differences in the persons and the states who use them. Balance of power theory purports to explain the result that such methods produce. If there is any distinctively political theory of international politics, balance of power theory is it.⁷²

For Waltz his description of the state as a unitary actor in a balance or power theory of foreign affairs is succinct. He writes, "A balance of power theory, properly stated, begins with assumptions about states: they are unitary actors, who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination."⁷³

Waltz acknowledges that testing theories in social or political science, non-experimental science is different than testing a theory in physics or chemistry. For such non-experimental fields, he suggests that scholars "exploit all the ways of testing I've mentioned -- by trying to falsify, by devising hard confirmatory tests, by comparing features of the real and the theoretical world, by comparing behaviors in realms of similar and different structure."⁷⁴

Nations, according to Waltz, act according to what they perceive as their national interest. Waltz' description of the driver for appropriate state action, relates not to any individual ideological or domestic political consideration, but only to the international or structural situation in which a particular state must act to survive in the anarchic environment of international affairs. For Waltz, "nations are composed of differentiated parts that become integrated as they interact. The world is composed of like units to become

⁷² Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 117.

⁷³ Kenneth Waltz, "Anarchic Orders And Balances Of Power," in *Neorealism And Its Critics*, ed. Robert Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 117

⁷⁴ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 124.

dependent on one another in varied degrees."⁷⁵ The like units Waltz writes about are the nation states which participate as unitary actors in the anarchic international environment. But, "because states are like units, interdependence among them is low as compared to the close integration of the parts of a domestic order. The states should not interact with one another as the parts of the polity do."⁷⁶ He continues:

...because of their similarity, states are more dangerous than useful to one another. Being functionally undifferentiated they are distinguished primarily by their greater or lesser capabilities for performing a similar task...The structure of a system changes with the changes in the distribution of capabilities across the system's units. As international structure changes, so does the extent of the interdependence. As political systems go, the international political one is loosely knit."⁷⁷

Waltz mentions oil in this analysis. He understands that the control of supply and price by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries creates the possibility of future raw material scarcities.⁷⁸ For Waltz, raw materials are a matter of national security. Waltz notes the United States is able to make policy concerning the 1973 to 1974 oil embargo, and the Yom Kippur war, based on political and military calculations. Oil then was not yet a matter of national security. "Importing but 2% of its total energy supply from the Middle East, we did not have to appease Arab countries that we would have as we would have had to do if our economy had depended heavily on them and we lacked economic or other leverage."⁷⁹

⁷⁵ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 143.

⁷⁶ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 144.

⁷⁷ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 144.

⁷⁸ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 146.

⁷⁹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 153.

"Between parties within a self-help system, rules of reciprocity and caution prevail. Their concern for peace and stability draws them together; their fears drive them apart. They are rightly called friendly enemies and adversary partners."⁸⁰ One of Waltz' 1979 predictions for future American and Russian relations was, "the pressures of a bipolar world strongly encourage them to act internationally in ways better than their characters may lead one to expect...[and]...that cautious optimism is justified so long as the dangers to which each must respond are so clearly present."⁸¹

Waltz notes that the phrase "security dilemma" describes "the condition in which states, unsure of one another's intentions, arm for the sake of security and in doing so set a vicious cycle in motion."⁸² Having armed for the sake of security, states feel less secure and buy more arms. An increase in the military security of one state is perceived as a threat to another state, which then must in its turn respond by increasing its military capacity as well.

Waltz believes that "great powers are never "Masters with a free hand", but are always "Gullivers" more or less tightly tied... their involvement in wars arises from their position in the international system, not from their national characters. When they are at or near the top, they fight; as they decline they become peaceful."⁸³

According to Waltz, in the international system, power does four things. First, it "provides the means for maintaining one's autonomy in the face of force that others wield."

⁸⁰ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 175.

⁸¹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 176.

⁸² Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 186.

⁸³ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 187.

Second, "Greater power permits wider ranges of action, while leaving the outcomes of action uncertain." Third, wider margins of safety in dealing with less powerful are enjoyed by those possessing more power in the international system. Fourth, "great power gives its possessors and big stake in their system and the ability to act for its sake."⁸⁴

In discussing the difference between absolute and relative gains, Waltz writes that:

Absolute gains become more important as competition lessens. Two conditions make it possible for the United States and the Soviet Union to be concerned less with relative gains and more with making absolute gains. The first is the stability of the two-party balance, a stability reinforced by second-strike nuclear weapons.... the second condition is the distance between the two at the top and the next most powerful state, a distance that removes the danger of other states catching up. The United States gained relatively when OPEC multiplied oil prices by five between 1973-1977. The other non-Communist industrialized countries suffered more than we did."⁸⁵

John Mearsheimer, Offensive Realism

John Mearsheimer's most important book as a theoretical contribution is *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, a statement of his ideas of offensive realism.⁸⁶ Like Defensive Realism, Offensive Realism maintains that the competition for safety and security between major powers is the result of the anarchical nature of the international arena. This is a distinct departure from the classical realism of Hans Morgenthau which begins with an emphasis on human nature. In contrast to Kenneth Waltz' defensive realism, Mearsheimer posits that a nation is never satisfied with any amount of power but always seeks a hegemonic position to enhance its own security. In *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* he argued that:

⁸⁴ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 194.

⁸⁵ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 195.

⁸⁶ John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001).

Given the difficulty of determining how much power is enough for today and tomorrow, great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power. Only a misguided state would pass up an opportunity to become hegemon in the system because it thought it already had sufficient power to survive.⁸⁷

For Mearsheimer, there is no such thing as a status quo power; any major power with an advantage over a rival should behave aggressively since it possesses the incentive and capability to do so.

Mearsheimer begins with five bedrock assumptions to replace the 6 principals of Morgenthau. The five bedrock assumptions of offensive realism are:

1. ...the international system is anarchic, which does not mean that it is chaotic or riven by disorder...it is an ordering principle, which says that the system comprises independent states that have no central authority above them.⁸⁸
2. ...great powers inherently possess some offensive military capability which gives them the ability to hurt or possibly destroy each other. States are potentially dangerous to each other...⁸⁹
3. ...states can never be certain about other states intentions. Specifically no state can be sure that another state will not use its offensive military capacity to attack the first state.⁹⁰
4. ...survival is the primary goal of great powers. Specifically states seek to maintain their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order.⁹¹
5. ...great powers are rational actors. They are aware of their external environment and they think strategically about how to survive in it.⁹²

⁸⁷ Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 35.

⁸⁸ Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 30.

⁸⁹ Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 30.

⁹⁰ Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 31.

⁹¹ Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 31.

Mearsheimer is clearly writing within a “unitary actor” framework even if he is not explicit in his use of the concept.

Stephen Walt, Balance of Threats

In the journal International Security in an article entitled *Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power*; Stephen M. Walt proposed a “balance of threat”⁹³ theory. The balance of threat theory was a modification of the balance of power theory in the neorealist school of international relations. Under the “balance of threat” theory, any states' perception of the threat that state faces from any other state or states, is the determining factor in that states foreign affairs behavior in the area of alliance formation. Generally states should attempt a balance of power by allying with one another in the face of a threat but a weaker state is more likely to go along with (bandwagon) with the rising threat to protect its interests.

In the article Walt sets for the four factors policy makers use to evaluate a possible threat posed by another state:

1. Aggregate strength;
2. Geographical proximity;
3. Offensive capabilities;
4. Offensive intentions.⁹⁴

⁹² Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 31.

⁹³ Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” *International Security*, 9 (Spring 1985): 2-43.

⁹⁴ Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” 9.

Aggregate strength means land mass in size, population, natural resources and economic/industrial capabilities. The greater the capability, the greater ability to field a military force which may do harm to a neighbor.⁹⁵

The ability to extend power or to use that power declines over distance with lengthened supply lines come a greater price tag, greater problems with weather and greater possibility that an opponent may find a way to disrupt the supply line. Also the concern of a population about the actions of a country half a world away are less immediate than the behavior of a neighbor just across the border.⁹⁶

The larger the state's offensive capabilities, the more likely that the neighbor will react with an alliance in response, but the results are variable. A so called "sphere of influence" may also form.⁹⁷

Often the hardest factors to judge accurately, the offensive intentions of a state are crucial. It is the willingness to make trouble for your neighbor that makes for a bad neighbor far more effectively than the capability to do so.⁹⁸

Walt's "Balance of Threat" theory further sharpened realism and structural realism by separating threat and power into two distinct entities for analysis. In traditional balance of power theory, states acted to balance against other states when the power of that state increased. Implicit was the idea that, greater power reflected greater aggressive actions in

⁹⁵ Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," 9.

⁹⁶ Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," 10.

⁹⁷ Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," 11.

⁹⁸ Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," 12.

the immediate future or at least greater intentions to be aggressive if the rising state did not get what it wanted in the relationship with the weaker state. According to Walt this pattern was not reflected in the historical/empirical record. As an example, during the Cold War the United States increased its offensive military capabilities, but other states still chose to ally with the United States because it displayed intentions that were not aggressive to them or contrary to their national security. Throughout this analysis one can see the implicit analysis of state action within the “unitary actor” framework.

Stephen Krasner

In *Defending the National Interest, Raw Material Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy*,⁹⁹ Stephen Krasner analyzed raw materials procurement under the unitary thesis as a matter of national security. For Krasner the state is a unitary actor in the international arena. He defined the state-centered or “realist” paradigm as follows: “that states (defined as central decision making institutions and roles) can be treated as unified actors pursuing aims understood in terms of the national interest.”¹⁰⁰

In his influential 1999 book, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, Krasner made extensive contributions on the topic of state sovereignty; defining some clearly-drawn rules in the international system:

1. A state has the exclusive right to have control over and area of governance, and people.

⁹⁹ Stephen Krasner, *Defending The National Interest, Raw Material Investments And U.S. Foreign Policy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978)

¹⁰⁰ Krasner, *Defending The National Interest*, 12.

2. A state has a legitimate exercise of power and the interpretation of international law.

In the same book, Krasner sets out four kinds of sovereignty:

1. International Legal Sovereignty, which is how each state recognizes all other states as independent territories.
2. Interdependence Sovereignty, which is the ability of public authorities to regulate the flow of ideas, goods, people pollutants information and capital across the borders of the state.
3. Domestic Sovereignty is the standard definition referring to state authority structures and political control within the state.
4. Westphalian Sovereignty refers to political organization based on the exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a given territory.¹⁰¹

Different types of sovereignty Krasner tells us can change at different times.

Sovereignty can develop or erode as a result of interaction with other states.¹⁰² In a realist perspective the idea of shifting sovereignty is something that scholars and policy makers should pay attention to lest they be surprised. Krasner's definition of "domestic sovereignty" is the domestic half of the definition of national security used in this study. His definition of other types of sovereignty is a useful expansion on the concept. For the purposes of this

¹⁰¹ Stephen Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1999) 3

¹⁰² Krasner, *Sovereignty*, 4

study we shall assume that national policy makers seek to maintain all four forms of Krasner's sovereignty inviolate.

One of Stephen Krasner's aims in *Defending the National Interest* is to challenge the prevailing academic explanations, especially in the international realm, that view government behavior as "the outcome of a series of pressures that emanate from society."¹⁰³ "The state has not been seen as autonomous actor, but rather as a mirror reflecting particularistic societal interests."¹⁰⁴ According to Krasner, the profession had gotten the cart before the horse so to speak. He writes, "Most of what has passed for political science in recent years, at least in the United States, has really been political psychology. It has dealt with the impact of the society on government not with the impact of the state on society."¹⁰⁵ He continues "The theoretical orientation offered in this book, it is hoped, will be part of a general movement to take the state seriously again, to recognize that even in democratic politics it is not merely a passive reactor, but rather a creator, in some measure, of its own social environment."¹⁰⁶

Krasner begins with "a basic analytic assumption that there is a distinction between the state and society."¹⁰⁷ Krasner argues for "a statist image of foreign policy" in which the state is viewed as an "autonomous actor."¹⁰⁸ Krasner rejects both liberal and Marxist

¹⁰³ Krasner, *Defending The National Interest*, xi.

¹⁰⁴ Krasner, *Defending The National Interest*, xi.

¹⁰⁵ Krasner, *Defending The National Interest*, xi.

¹⁰⁶ Krasner, *Defending The National Interest*, xii.

¹⁰⁷ Krasner, *Defending The National Interest*, 5.

¹⁰⁸ Krasner, *Defending The National Interest*, 5.

perspectives which “explain the actions of public officials in terms of private pressures or needs.”¹⁰⁹

Krasner is clear at the beginning in his “statist image of politics” he makes “a critical assumption: that it is useful to conceive of a state as a set of roles and institutions having particular drives, compulsions, and aims of their own that are separate and distinct from the interests of any particular societal group.”¹¹⁰ In examining the role of United States foreign policy, as it affects raw materials investments by U.S. and multinational firms, Krasner begins with “an intellectual vision that sees the state autonomously formulating goals that is then attempts to implement against resistance from international and domestic actors.”¹¹¹

Krasner starts with and “ultimately attempts to defend, the basic premises underlying what has become known as the state-centric or realist paradigm; namely, that states (defined as central decision making institutions and roles) can be treated as unified actors pursuing aims understood in terms of the national interest.”¹¹²

From an analytical perspective that treats the state as autonomous actor, but one constrained by domestic as well as international structures, there are two central problems of foreign policy analysis: identifying the objectives of central decision-makers, and analyzing their ability to accomplish these aims.¹¹³

¹⁰⁹ Krasner, *Defending The National Interest*, 5.

¹¹⁰ Krasner, *Defending The National Interest*, 10.

¹¹¹ Krasner, *Defending The National Interest*, 10.

¹¹² Krasner, *Defending The National Interest*, 12.

¹¹³ Krasner, *Defending The National Interest*, 13.

Krasner inductively defines the “national interest” as the preferences of American central decision makers” which are “related to general societal goals that persist over time, and have a consistent ranking of importance.”¹¹⁴

Liberalism, Krasner writes, begins with the view of society wherein “politics is viewed as the competition among organized interests.”¹¹⁵ “Liberal conceptions of politics have little use for the notion of the state as an autonomous actor motivated by drives associated with its own need for power or with the wellbeing of society as a whole. Government institutions merely process inputs and outputs. The state is seen as a set of formal structures, not an autonomous actor.”¹¹⁶

In *Defending the National Interest*, beginning with the assumption that states are unitary actors in international relations, Krasner writes that: “The differences between the analytical assumptions of this study and those of a liberal perspective are very sharp. First a pluralist perspective rejects the utility of treating the state as an autonomous actor whose motivations and resources are qualitatively different from those of any other institution of society. Second, it rejects the concept of a national interest that transcends individual interests of members of the society. Third, insofar as the government has any substantive role to play it is identified with creating a structure within which individuals can freely

¹¹⁴ Krasner, *Defending The National Interest*, 13.

¹¹⁵ Krasner, *Defending The National Interest*, 26.

¹¹⁶ Krasner, *Defending The National Interest*, 28.

exercise their own preferences, rather than striving to protect the power resources of the state and the wellbeing of society.”¹¹⁷

Krasner argues, “There are two basic ways to study national interest: logical deductive and empirical inductive. A logical deductive formulation assumes that states will pursue certain objectives—in particular preserving territorial and political integrity.”¹¹⁸

Further he argues that, in the empirical inductive route, “...the national interest is induced from the statements and behavior of central decision makers. If their preferences meet two basic criteria they can be called the national interest. First the actions of leaders must be related to general objectives, not to the preferences or needs of any particular group or class, or to the private power drives of officeholders. Second the ordering of preference must persist over time.”¹¹⁹

For Krasner, there are three themes to follow, he writes, “foreign raw materials policy is concerned with 1) minimizing costs for the American consumer, 2) insuring security of supply for the American economy, and 3) furthering broad foreign policy objectives.”¹²⁰ “In summary, a statist approach to the study of foreign policy must begin by identifying the national interest.”¹²¹ In the study at hand the national interest is somewhat easier to define at least in terms of avoiding nuclear war.

¹¹⁷ Krasner, *Defending The National Interest*. 30.

¹¹⁸ Krasner, *Defending The National Interest*, 35.

¹¹⁹ Krasner, *Defending The National Interest*, 35.

¹²⁰ Krasner, *Defending The National Interest*, 53.

¹²¹ Krasner, *Defending The National Interest*, 53.

For Krasner, “The distribution of power in the international system is the critical variable in determining the broad foreign policy goals sought by American central decision-makers.”¹²²

In terms of American foreign policy from a historical perspective Krasner notes a “shift from interest-oriented to ideological goals was the result of the growth of America’s global growth position.”¹²³ We should note here that the maturing of the American nation and the effects of World War II produced a change in America’s global capabilities that accompanied the change in the global environment as it became clear at the end of the Second World War that the rise of the Soviet Union was the beginning of a new kind of ideological, political and economic struggle, the Cold War.

Krasner concludes that the case studies he examined, “...reveal is that the general aims of American policy have moved from a concern with territorial and political integrity and with security of supply before World War II (with the exception of Woodrow Wilson’s presidency) to an emphasis on ideological goals after 1945.”¹²⁴ From our current vantage point, twenty years after the end of the Cold War, reviewing this study published in the third decade of that struggle, (an existential conflict with the Soviet Union that obsessed United States policy makers for two generations,) the broad strategy set out in the doctrine of containment as the first principle of United States foreign policy of that era; such a shift makes sense for the highest priority of foreign policy making, national survival.

¹²² Krasner, *Defending The National Interest*, 15.

¹²³ Krasner, *Defending The National Interest*, 15.

¹²⁴ Krasner, *Defending The National Interest*, 334.

According to Krasner, foreign policy without the effect of the unitary actor thesis becomes, “Decision-making is seen as a morass of conflicting interests extending from the society through the ostensibly hierarchically oriented central bureaucracy of the state. In addition, the state-centric model used in international relations seems at odds with the most prevalent approaches to domestic politics. At least in the United States a pluralist image has dominated politics. The behavior of the state is seen as a product of societal pressures.”¹²⁵ Krasner argues that, “...the state has purposes of its own. The national interest does have an empirical reality if it is defined as a consistent set of objectives sought by central decision makers. The cases analyzed in this book suggest that there has been a clear rank-ordering of goals for American policy related to foreign raw material investments. In order of increasing importance the ranking has been: 1) maximize the competitive structure of the market and thereby reduce prices; 2) increase security of supply; 3) secure general foreign policy objectives.”¹²⁶

George F Kennan, Containment

Next we come to George F. Kennan whose mark on the world came not as a scholar but earlier in his career in the United States Department of State both in Moscow and again in Washington D.C. Kennan was a realist and almost a geographic determinist who in 1936 wrote about national behavior as governed by permanent factors beyond the control of politicians and policy makers. In *The Wise Men, Six Friends and the World They Made*, Isaacson and Thomas report about Kennan’s early writings that

¹²⁵ Krasner, *Defending The National Interest*, 329.

¹²⁶ Krasner, *Defending The National Interest*, 331.

The most striking of these was a 1936 paper titled "Some Fundamentals of Russian-American Relations." In it Kennan propounded a deterministic view of history that he was to hold throughout his life. Relations between nations, he argued, "are always governed in the long run by certain relatively permanent fundamental factors arising out of geographical and historical conditions." Because of this, He concluded, there is "little future for Russian American- Relations other that a long series of misunderstandings, disappointments and recriminations on both sides."¹²⁷

In the "Long Telegram"¹²⁸ and again in an article The Sources of Soviet Conduct¹²⁹ published under the pseudonym "X" in *Foreign Affairs*, Kennan is the author of the most far reaching and effective diplomatic strategy in the 20th century, known simply by one word, "Containment." Implicit in his understanding and analysis is a unitary actor nation state where the Soviet Union acts and responds to the international situation based on the strength or weakness of the Western response to Soviet actions. Kennan writes of the Soviet leadership fears of "capitalist encirclement" and their retention of power in the Kremlin as resulting from their view of a menace to their society from abroad.¹³⁰ The international behavior of the Soviet Union was driven by a "concept of Russia as in a state of siege, with the enemy lowering beyond the walls."¹³¹ This Soviet behavior drove Kennan's core recommendation, "In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and

¹²⁷ Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men, Six Friends and the World They Made* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968) 167.

¹²⁸ George F. Kennan, "The Long Telegram," George Washington University, *The National Security Archive: Cold War: Documents*. <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm>.

¹²⁹ George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* (July 1947): 566-582.

¹³⁰ Kennan, "Sources of Soviet Conduct," 570.

¹³¹ Kennan, "Sources of Soviet Conduct," 571.

vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”¹³² Kennan implicitly adopted the unitary actor theory believing also that the Soviet system could be pressured from outside the country and that pressure would directly affect Soviet foreign behavior, “...the United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet power must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection that it has had to observe in recent years.”¹³³

Other Uses and Critics of the Unitary Actor Assumption

Peter Katzenstein describes the unitary actor theory as part of the realist paradigm in the study of international relations focusing on government action and viewing the state as “a unitary actor undivided by class conflict, social tension, cultural fragmentation and most importantly, bureaucratic rivalries and stalemate.”¹³⁴ This is an overstatement since nothing in the realist paradigm denies the existence of class, culture or bureaucracy but it does assert that those factors are of little use in assessing state behavior in an anarchic environment where national security is the chief interest of national leaders. Katzenstein notes that in the realist paradigm the prism on international action is one of diplomatic bargaining between states where the interdependence of those states is a central focus and the issues of security and prosperity share the center of attention.¹³⁵ Katzenstein is a critic of the realist paradigm

¹³² Kennan, “Sources of Soviet Conduct,” 575.

¹³³ Kennan, “Sources of Soviet Conduct,” 582.

¹³⁴ Peter Katzenstein, “International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States,” *International Organization* 30 no. 1 (Winter 1976): 8.

¹³⁵ Katzenstein, “International Relations and Domestic Structures,” 7.

noting in his view that the “pattern of asymmetric dependencies which define the politically most volatile and interesting features of the international state system... may have been an adequate starting point for analysis in the 1950s and 1960s when security concerns were overriding.”¹³⁶ His concern is that the growth in the importance of economic issues and the proliferation of government agencies undermined the realist paradigm. His assessment is unconvincing as nothing he cites changes the anarchic conditions of the international system of the classic definitions of national interest.

Steven Weber writes, “Structural realism starts from the axioms that the international system is anarchic and that states are compelled by the harsh imperative of self-help to provide for their own security and wellbeing.”¹³⁷ Regarding testing realism he goes on to say that the “postwar U.S.-Soviet relationship ought to be a relatively easy test for neo realism, the theory should be able to capture the dynamic of the intensely bipolar relationship between two great powers that have a high level of conflicting interests and a low level of interdependence.”¹³⁸

Other critics see the unitary actor thesis as a useful “ideal type, but it provides little useful guidance to policy makers who face a web of overlapping and competing domestic players.”¹³⁹ Of course this remark contains in it the presupposition that the unitary actor

¹³⁶ Katzenstein, “International Relations and Domestic Structures,” 9.

¹³⁷ Steven Weber, “Realism, Détente and Nuclear Weapons,” *International Organization*, 44 (Winter 1990) 58.

¹³⁸ Weber, “Realism, Détente and Nuclear Weapons,” 58.

¹³⁹ Simon Collard-Wexler, 2008. Review of *Foreign Affairs Strategy Logic for American Statecraft*, by Terry L. Diebel. *International Journal* (Winter 2008-09): 293

assumption tested here is not an accurate description of the behavior of nation-states in matters of national security.

In the post 09-11 environment other scholars have focused attention upon religion and criticized the realist unitary actor assumption of state behavior as inadequate. Reviewing *Bringing Religion Into International Relations*, Ali G. Dizboni writes that, “this picture has proven somewhat inadequate; increasingly manifestations of religion have chipped away at the foundations of realist assumptions.”¹⁴⁰ For our purposes here it is worth noting that the unitary actor assumption remains the benchmark against which new theories are evaluated and thus it deserves the test in this study as well.

Robert Keohane states that “Institutional theory accepts three basic realist assumptions: (1) states are the primary actors in world politics; (2) they can be analyzed as if they were rational; and, (3) they are not altruistic but, rather, are broadly ‘self-interested.’”¹⁴¹ Keohane writes that he agrees with the assertion of the neo-realists that state strategy is based on the distribution of power and adds, “strategies are also affected by the institutional configuration, which affects transaction costs of collective action and by information conditions.”¹⁴² We should note here that both the issues of “transaction costs” and the “conditional distribution of information” are present in an anarchical environment and neither situation contradicts the unitary actor assumption. These contributions serve to

¹⁴⁰ Ali G. Dizboni, 2008. Review of *Bringing Religion Into International Relations*, by Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler. *Canadian Journal Of Political Science* (June 2008): 497.

¹⁴¹ Robert O. Keohane, “Institutional Theory In International Relations,” in *Millennial Reflections of International Studies*, ed. Michael Brecher and Frank P Harvey, (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2002): 161

¹⁴² Keohane, “Institutional Theory In International Relations,” 160.

enhance our understanding of the atmosphere in which national leaders in nation-states operate, but they do not contradict the unitary actor in an anarchic environment which is tested here.

Legro and Moravcsik assert that in realism at its center is the belief that the key players, states, are “rational unitary political units in anarchy.”¹⁴³

Finally, we should also acknowledge that many scholars study and believe in the pluralist image of foreign policy making. For instance see Ole R. Holsti in *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*¹⁴⁴ and *Making American Foreign Policy*,¹⁴⁵ and Gabriel Almond in *The American People and Foreign Policy*¹⁴⁶ and “Public Opinion and National Security.”¹⁴⁷ The purpose of this mention of competing points of view is not to engage in a theoretical debate. The results of this study will shed light on the credibility of the realist unitary actor theory and make it more useful or not to policy makers and scholars alike.

National Security Defined

For our purposes in this study the definition of “national security” follows the classic post-World War II formulation as (1) the preservation of absolute territorial integrity of the nation state, and (2) the maintenance of complete freedom of action in the international

¹⁴³ J. W. Legro and A. Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still A Realist?” *International Security*, 24 (1999): 12-17.

¹⁴⁴ Ole R. Holsti, *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004).

¹⁴⁵ Ole R. Holsti, *Making American Foreign Policy* (New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2006).

¹⁴⁶ Gabriel Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy*, (New York, Praeger, 1950).

¹⁴⁷ Gabriel Almond, “Public Opinion and National Security,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 20 (1956) 317-378.

arena.¹⁴⁸ The phrase “complete freedom of action” refers to the maximum amount of freedom to act the state can avail itself of based on its own resources and must not be taken literally. Territorial integrity may be breached by military invasion, illegal or uncontrolled migration of immigrants, blockade of a coast or port, or imposition of a “no fly” zone over national airspace by a foreign power. Freedom of action in the international arena is a slippery concept. The lack of freedom of action when a state is under the military economic and political coercion of a foreign power is easy to see in the policies of the certain members of the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. Those states followed the positions laid out by the Soviet Union, which was also maintained by significant military forces within the borders of the Warsaw Pact members. However, a lack of freedom of action is also present in the situation where a state is intimidated or coerced by a neighbor but not directly occupied, as for example the case of Finland next to the Soviet Union.

Sean Kay offers an expansive definition of security as, “...the absence of threat to the stability of the international system, to countries or individuals.”¹⁴⁹ For Richard Ullman the definition of national security is grounded in the absence of threat. He writes that:

A threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private non-governmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸ Michael Sheehan, *International Security, An Analytical Survey*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005) 6.

¹⁴⁹ Sean Kay, *Global Security in the Twenty First Century*, (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2006) 2.

¹⁵⁰ Richard Ullman, “Redefining Security” *International Security* 8 (Jan. 1983) 135.

While Kay and Ullman both offer extremely broad definitions covering real and perceived dangers involving issues from war and economics to the fate of the environment, for purposes of this test of the unitary actor theory each definition does effectively include the core realist concepts of secure territory and freedom of action on the state level.

Powers and Limitations of the President in Foreign Policy

First we will examine the constitutional and statutory sources and limits of Presidential power in foreign policy. Second we examine the political, structural and cultural sources of presidential authority in foreign policy. We begin with the legal framework of power and the recognition of the generally accepted notion that, “In theory and appearance, the President under our system of separation of powers has almost unlimited initiative and influence in foreign affairs.”¹⁵¹

Constitution / Vesting Clause

The “vesting clause” is the first Article II grant of authority to the president. It is broad but not particularly well defined. The grant is of the “the executive power” of the United States which is vested in the President. The sentence is simple, stating, “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”¹⁵²

The imprecision and breadth of this language affects policy struggles both domestic affairs and foreign policy, although the Constitution sets out a few definite grants of power which are directly applicable to foreign policy as set forth below. The very vagueness of the phrase “the Executive power” creates an opportunity for an ambitious and effective

¹⁵¹ Theodore Sorensen, “Foreign Policy in a Presidential Democracy,” *Political Science Quarterly* 109, no. 3 (Special Issue 1994): 516.

¹⁵² U.S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 1.

politician serving as president to push hard against the other two branches of government and assert real control over every area of foreign policy. Often the “executive power” discussed here manifests itself in the President’s ability to speak first on an issue and speak for the country as head of state and head of government. The vesting clause is just one source of the problem. “The constitution makes-and the courts have delineated-no clear distinction between foreign and domestic issues.”¹⁵³

Constitution / Commander in Chief

The second grant is the president’s authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces¹⁵⁴ which has been interpreted in expanding terms over the life of the country. Narrowly read as a designation for the president to exercise command of the armed forces and to achieve the national war goals when Congress declares war, it is now understood as enabling the president to authorize military action in the self-defense of the United States when Congress is unable to respond promptly. The powers granted a commander in chief, to deploy the armed forces, set the terms on the engagement, and appoint and remove commanders as he sees fit, are broad and far reaching. In 1982 President Reagan ordered the Marines into Beirut Lebanon as part of a multinational force to stabilize the City and demonstrate the support of the United States for Lebanon as an independent nation. The bombing of the Marine barracks and the damage done to American prestige by the Marines’ withdrawal from Lebanon just 2 years later with no improvement in the situation all landed

¹⁵³ Paul E. Peterson, “The President’s Dominance in Foreign Policy Making” *Political Science Quarterly* (November 1994): 219.

¹⁵⁴ U. S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2, (The original text designates the Army Navy and Militia but is now understood to comprise all the military services, hence common phrase “the Armed Forces of the United States.”)

on Reagan's desk. President Clinton sent United States military forces to liberate Haiti in 1994. In 1962 President John F. Kennedy led the United States to the brink of nuclear war exercising his powers as Commander in Chief, ordering U-2 spy flights over Cuba and a naval blockade of the island nation to force the withdrawal of Russian missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons to the United States mainland from Cuba. The power as commander in chief is not unlimited but it seems that often when the circumstances conspire to force a president to use such authority, they also create a set of circumstances where the broadest possible definition of such authority is accepted across the political spectrum with little or no effective opposition.

Constitution / Receive Ambassadors of Foreign States

The constitution authorizes the president to receive ambassadors,¹⁵⁵ which has become in reality the authority of the president to recognize the legitimacy of a foreign government without congressional action.

There are two important examples of the use of this authority since the end of World War II. The first was on May 14, 1948 when President Harry Truman extended recognition to the State of Israel immediately following the expiration of the British Mandate for Palestine consistent with United Nations Resolution 181 partitioning Palestine and creating a Jewish state. Truman's simple and direct statement, uttered without formal consultation with Congress and in the face of substantial opposition within his own administration, is a plain example of the power of a President to speak first, to speak for the nation as a whole, and to make opponents both domestic and foreign react to a presidential act.

¹⁵⁵ U.S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 3.

The second example is President Jimmy Carter's recognition on January 1, 1979 of the People's Republic of China (the Communist government in Beijing) as the legitimate government of China.¹⁵⁶ In doing so Carter abrogated the mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China (the government on the island of Formosa). This was challenged in federal court by Senator Barry Goldwater who won in the district court, was overturned in the Court of Appeals and finally lost on the issue of "standing to sue" in the Supreme Court, effectively ceding to the President the authority to revoke this treaty, unilaterally.¹⁵⁷

Constitution / Nominating Ambassadors

The power to nominate an ambassador¹⁵⁸ has lost some of its significance in this age of electronic and mass communication. As originally conceived the ambassador would speak for his country with only the written and untimely guidance of his government. As such, ambassadorial appointments such as Benjamin Franklin to France in the Revolutionary War were of the greatest importance, and their nomination was an eighteenth century counterpart to the modern-day saying, "personnel is the policy" a reflection of the concept that appointment of like-minded reliable and doctrinaire adherents to the policy preferences of the appointing authority will effectively promote policy closely aligned to the ideology they share with the President.

¹⁵⁶ Jimmy Carter: "Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and the People's Republic of China United States Statement." December 15, 1978. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30309>.

¹⁵⁷Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).

¹⁵⁸ U. S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2.

Statutory Grants of Authority

Statutory grants of power to the president in foreign affairs are relatively inconsequential when compared to other sources of presidential power in foreign affairs. The reasons for such rare designations of authority are complex. While reasoning to prove the negative is always difficult to determine, in examining the history of the United States two things become clear. First, the president often does not need a statutory grant of authority before taking action in the international arena. Often follow-on grants of authority are almost a housekeeping detail instead of an honest congressional debate about the policy. For instance few members of Congress were inclined to vote against the Gulf of Tonkin resolution granting the president the power to wage war in Viet Nam after the attack on U.S. naval vessels in the Gulf in 1964 barely three months before a general election. Second, the need for such authority is not readily apparent. There are few if any examples of situations in world affairs where results were not what the United States wanted or needed where the analysis by the press and the academic communities was that “if only the president had been granted authority to do X” then the result would have been more favorable to the United States. Presidents it seems do not wait, they act; and Congress almost always follows the President’s lead in such situations.

Treaties and Executive Agreements

Pursuant to the Constitution Article II Section 2 treaties are negotiated and entered into by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate. Ratification takes a 2/3rds vote of the Senate for any treaty negotiated by the president. Only when ratified does the treaty become law for the United States. But it is not that simple. The President may

negotiate a treaty and direct the executive branch to abide by some or all of its terms and conditions even when the Senate will not ratify the treaty.

We should note here that while the text gives the President the power to negotiate treaties with other nations, it does not specifically limit the president to treaty making as the only kind of international agreement. “The text of the Constitution does not say that the "treaty- making" process is the exclusive method of making international agreements, and in practice it has not been so.”¹⁵⁹ The text is silent as to what a president must call a treaty and what other agreements may be made with other nations. In a footnote Wright notes the lack of a clear line between treaties and executive agreements writing “it impossible to define "treaties" and "executive agreements" except by the statement "treaties" are international agreements submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent and "executive agreements" are all other international agreements made by the United States.”¹⁶⁰

Budget

The President’s power over the budget, in the preparation and submission of the proposal and in directing the spending that congress authorizes, is a significant power in foreign affairs. The ability to select a foreign aid recipient for an increased appropriation or to suggest a reduced or eliminated appropriation can command attention and even suggest the price of dissent to the president’s competitors in the process of shaping foreign policy. For nations, international organizations and nongovernmental actors who look to the United States for funding, a presidential budget is a good first look at where they stand with the

¹⁵⁹ Quincy Wright, “The United States and International Agreements,” *The American Journal of International Law* 39 (July 1944): 342.

¹⁶⁰ Wright, “The United States and International Agreements,” 345.

administration. Congress makes itself heard with considerable impact as it “grants or denies funds for foreign policy.”¹⁶¹

Fast Track Negotiating Authority

“Fast Track Negotiating Authority” is based in statutory enactments and deals most often with trade treaties.¹⁶² Such power is only occasionally granted and all such grants of power have now expired. This is an example of what is possible and occasionally necessary in the case of complex international agreements. The power of the Senate to approve a treaty and the complexity of recent agreements on trade or the environment have led presidents to request from Congress so called fast track negotiating authority wherein the Congress agrees before the negotiations begin to approve or disapprove the deal negotiated by the President and his aides within certain parameters, but not to amend or filibuster the agreement. The intent is to assure other negotiation partners that negotiation is not in vain but that the proposed agreement will receive an up or down vote. Such authority is more likely be requested and become important to the process when different political parties control the presidency and the Congress. The last grant of fast track authority expired on July 1, 2007. During its lifetime it had resulted in the passage of NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreement Act and several bilateral trade agreements.

Advice and Consent

¹⁶¹ Louis Fisher, “Foreign Policy Powers of the President and Congress,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 449 (September 1968): 156.

¹⁶² Fast track negotiating authority is found in the Trade Act of 1974, Public Law 93-618 93rd Cong. 2nd sess. (January 3, 1975) and the Trade Act of 2002, Public Law 107-210, 107th Cong., 2nd sess. (August 6, 2002).

“He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”¹⁶³ While the Constitution gives the President the power to make treaties with other nations, the requirement that such treaty be approved by 2/3rds of the Senate is a significant check on that power. For instance the Senate voted twice on President Woodrow Wilson’s signature foreign policy achievement, the Treaty of Versailles. On November 19, 1919 the treaty failed by a vote of Yeas=38; Nays=53. Upon reconsideration 5 months later a majority of the senators’ voting in the affirmative Yeas=49; Nays=35 the treaty still fell 7 votes short of the required 2/3rds.¹⁶⁴

The President’s power to nominate ambassadors and the heads of his departments is also limited by the requirement that the Senate consent to that appointment. Senate consent may be lost for any number of reasons, some wholly unrelated to the ability of the nominee to do the job in question. Recent events have shown the issue of taxes and personal behaviors may undo a confirmation as the Senators reflect the reactions they hear from the press and the public, some of whom are repelled by wealthy Washingtonians who pay their taxes late and only when nominated for a new Federal position, for instance Tom Daschle, whose nomination to head the Department of Health and Human Services for President Obama was derailed by such a tax issue.

War Powers Act

The War Powers Act is an attempt to rein in the use of the President’s authority as Commander in Chief to commit the armed forces to battle without a declaration of war from

¹⁶³ U.S. Constitution, art. 2. sec.2.

¹⁶⁴ United States Senate, “Treaties, Chapter 4: Rejected Treaties,” United States Senate, <http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Treaties.htm#5>,

Congress. In the absence of a declaration of war the President must submit a report to Congress within 48 hours of committing US forces to action.¹⁶⁵ The President shall the report at least every 6 months during the duration of the conflict.¹⁶⁶ Within sixty days of the required report the President must withdraw the forces unless Congress has declared war, extended the sixty day time period, or is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack on the United States.¹⁶⁷ The original war powers resolution was vetoed by President Nixon and passed over his veto.¹⁶⁸ Presidents treat the War Powers resolution as unconstitutional but the pattern of activity in committing forces to the conflict in Iraq indicate that presidents are at least sensitive to the importance of congressional consultation before beginning a war of choice.

The Judiciary

Interference by the judicial branch of government in the conduct of foreign affairs is rare but when it occurs it can be an effective brake on a President's power in foreign policy. Generally the courts treat the power to make foreign policy as shared between Congress and the President.¹⁶⁹ The Supreme Court has recognized the "supreme role which both congress

¹⁶⁵ War Powers Resolution, Public Law 93-148, 93rd Cong. 1st Sess. (1973) codified at U. S. Code 50 Sec. 1541.

¹⁶⁶ War Powers Resolution, section 1543 (c).

¹⁶⁷ War Powers Resolution, section 1544 (b).

¹⁶⁸ President Richard Nixon vetoed the War Powers Resolution on October 24, 1973. The House overrode the veto on November 7, 1973 by a vote of 284 yeas to 135 nays. (119 Cong. Rec. 36202, 36222). The Senate overrode the veto on November 7, 1973 by a vote of 75 yeas to 18 nays. (119 Cong. Rec. 36198)

¹⁶⁹ Fisher, "Foreign Policy Powers of the President and Congress," 151.

and the executive play” in this policy arena.¹⁷⁰ Generally the courts are very reluctant to enter into the foreign policy arena. In 1948 the Supreme Court refused to get involved in a foreign policy issue, concluding that the issue was out of its purview and that foreign policy decisions are “wholly confined by our Constitution to the political departments of our government, Executive and Legislative.”¹⁷¹ The underlying legal reasoning which keeps the courts out of such disputes is simple; often there is no plaintiff who has standing to bring an action. Courts only decide matters which constitute an actual case or controversy involving a damaged party with real harm, not the speculative harm of a citizen complaining about an allegedly “foolish” foreign policy. Courts generally do not substitute their political or foreign policy judgments for those of the Executive or Congress.

In *Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, the case which ruled on President Truman’s seizure of steel plants during the Korean War, Justice Robert Jackson crafted a sliding scale in his concurring opinion to weigh the Presidents latitude in foreign affairs and the limits of that authority. Justice Jackson wrote that:

Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress. We may well begin by a somewhat over-simplified grouping of practical situations in which a President may doubt, or others may challenge, his powers, and by distinguishing roughly the legal consequences of this factor of relativity.

1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty. If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks power. A seizure executed by the

¹⁷⁰ *Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society*, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 2866 (1986).

¹⁷¹ *C & S Airlines v. Waterman Corp.* 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)

President pursuant to an Act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it.

2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.

3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter....¹⁷²

This is the clearest and most practical analysis in the case law of the sliding scale of deference the courts will offer to a President in the field of foreign affairs. This structure also rewards acting first and without consultation of Congress lest some resolution, statute or congressional act of any other nature intrude on the freedom to act set forth in Jackson's second set of circumstances as described above.

Interest Groups

Interest groups, for our purposes, are the organized, professionally run, dues-based, policy advocacy organizations, usually based in Washington, D.C., which promote themselves as speaking about a specific set of political issues with authority and credibility. They are both promoters and brakes on the foreign policy initiatives of presidents. Most often one interest group may be a promoter and another group a dedicated opponent of the same specific policy. Consider selling military aircraft to Saudi Arabia. The military

¹⁷² *Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer* 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)

contractors and trade unions and free trade groups are supportive and the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) will be opposed. Both groups have the ability to inflict upon the president a political cost for a policy they oppose and reward policy they like with verbal support and campaign resources, both in terms of money and volunteers.

Elite and Mass Public Opinion

Elite opinion is the opinion of the media, academic and political communities to whom presidents turn for advice from time to time. It can be a brake on the train of events but is rarely an insurmountable obstacle. Elite opinion may often be an element affecting an early policy choice rather than an impediment to action in a crisis. Elite reaction to a policy choice may indicate to a president that a specific course of action requires a large amount of time and attention in explaining the policy choice to the nation.

Mass public opinion as measured by public opinion polls is a gauge of the public mood but not an indicator of responsible public policy. It is a brake on a president's freedom of action although at times of crisis or in a rapidly developing situation it may be more of a distraction than a seriously considered item of consequence in the president's calculations. It can serve as a serious brake on an unpopular policy, especially when the Congress begins to sense it will result in the loss of seats in the midterm elections.

Concurrently with mass public opinion is the problem of domestic communities with a particular ethnic or religious affiliation to a homeland. Americans of Catholic, Cuban, Greek, Irish, Chinese and Jewish communities have created potent political voices that may serve as a goad or a brake on a President's desired course of action. While structural realists may dispute the existence of such communities' real impact on foreign policy, few political

operatives will take lightly the opinions of the Chinese-American community on linking trade with China to human rights issues, or positions of AIPAC on the Middle East peace process.

The sources of power for President in foreign affairs are scattered, murky, legally confusing and when view constitutionally, maddeningly vague. But, these powers dwarf anything enjoyed by either the legislative or judicial branches of government. Phillip Trimble puts it this way. “Notwithstanding congressional power and influence, the President is still the dominant force in foreign policy.”¹⁷³ Additionally, according to Trimble, “Presidential power [in foreign affairs] was accumulated pursuant to law, even congressional initiative.”¹⁷⁴ Thus whether the drafters of the constitution intended this result or not, the President is and will continue to be the center of formulating and executing American foreign policy.

It is the central role of the president in foreign affairs, which makes possible a test of Waltz’s “unitary actor” theory of state action in the international arena. We proceed by examining certain national security issues in the framework of transitions of power between presidents of different political parties.

Theories of Presidential Power

Richard Neustadt in his book Presidential Power sets out the standard reference for modern consideration of the presidency as a study in relationships as the foundations of

¹⁷³ Phillip Trimble, “The President’s Foreign Affairs Power,” *The American Journal of International Law* 83 no. 4 (Oct. 1989): 751.

¹⁷⁴ Trimble, “President’s Foreign Affairs Power,” 752.

presidential power.¹⁷⁵ This emphasis occurs as a behavioral revolution was sweeping throughout political science as an academic discipline. Neustadt defines power as “personal influence of an effective sort on governmental action.”¹⁷⁶ Neustadt sees a great gap between “what is expected and the capacity”¹⁷⁷ to carry through to the desired result. Neustadt believe there are two ways to study the Presidency. The first is to study the tactics of a situation, for instance, how to get a bill through Congress. The second approach is to study “influence in its more strategic terms, what is its nature and what are its sources.”¹⁷⁸ Neustadt pursues the second approach. For Neustadt a president in foreign affairs must always be thinking “down the road” and must in every decision, be concerned with not only how it affects the nation today but also, how it impacts the power of the presidency today and tomorrow.

Neustadt’s primary theory of the presidency posits a weak position created not to exercise power but to share it; whose occupant must always be on guard for the preservation of the current power of the office and aware of how an action in the daily grind of political affairs may impact the powers of the office in the future in ways which are both predictable and unpredictable. If Neustadt is correct, then presidents in national security issues may have a difficult proposition responding to changes in the international situation and various capability changes between states if their attention is diverted and

¹⁷⁵ Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power And The Modern Presidents*, (New York: McMillan Publishing, 1990).

¹⁷⁶ Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, ix.

¹⁷⁷ Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, ix.

¹⁷⁸ Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, 4.

their actions affected by the domestic concern of preservation or enhancement of the political power of their office over the long term.

Jeffery Tulis offers the concept that the presidency changed when presidential statements become the essence of presidential leadership.¹⁷⁹ This rise of leadership as interpretation predates Franklin Roosevelt and is ascribed to Woodrow Wilson. For our purposes is it sufficient to note that it occurred prior to all the transitions reviewed here. It is important to note here that other scholars including Philip Abbott have disputed the concept of the rhetorical presidency, but for our purposes here the validity and usefulness of this theory does not bear directly on the framework of this study.¹⁸⁰ As it is, Tulis' work may add some value to the argument that public speeches and pronouncements of the president are a valuable source material. It is a major addition to the literature of the presidency but it does not confirm or rule out the hypotheses tested here.

There are three basic elements to the bully pulpit which taken alone are formidable and when used effectively in combination are sufficient to allow a president to frame the debate about a foreign policy issue in a manner most likely to generate the outcome the president seeks.

The first element is the ability of the president to react with speed and decisiveness to a development in the international arena. Before Congress can get its leadership together, or before congressional leaders or committee chairs can check with the members of their own party, the president, aided by the resources of the executive branch, has formulated a

¹⁷⁹ Jeffery K. Tulis, *The Rhetorical Presidency* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

¹⁸⁰ Philip Abbot, "Do Presidents Talk to Much? The Rhetorical Presidency and its Alternative," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 18, (Spring 1988).

response and taken command of a situation. Congress must ask for information from the intelligence agencies, or the state and defense departments, while the president receives intelligence information automatically and sets the questions asked of these executive branch agencies. In today's environment all of those agency leaders understand they serve the President first and serve at his pleasure.

The second element derives from the first. When the president moves first he forces Congress to react to his policy. Congress is then a reactive commentator and not an initiator of policy. In the reactive mode Congress is always hamstrung by the options excluded from consideration simply because the president moves first.

The third element is that the President is the only actor elected in his own right by the entire nation. Each member of Congress has a home constituency that must be satisfied or the member will not serve long enough to move into a leadership position. In the presidency the competing interests of the nation as a whole are subsumed into a national interest far more effectively than in a Congress which is always within 2 years of 586 individual elections.

These three elements form the bully pulpit from which a president can frame the terms of the debate, examine the alternatives, and select a course of action. The mobilization of the executive branch to turn the policy into effective government action will often force skeptics and opponents into a debate on the matter on the president's terms.

The bully pulpit is a major presidential tool; it helped President Franklin Roosevelt to nudge the United States into preparedness for World War II in the face of substantial isolationist opposition. Thus, after a hard fought vote the United States entered into

December 1941 with a lend lease program aiding Britain and a draft system in place. Used by a President determined to force events his way without a thoughtful and detailed consideration so the facts it can lead to mistakes. Consider how President George W. Bush intimidated the Congress to vote for a war in Iraq many opposed but in the end voted to authorize simply to preserve their own political careers.

James David Barber posits four kinds of psychological presidencies: 1) active-positive presidents who see productiveness as a good and flexibly respond to situations in order to advance toward clear and long held goals, 2) active-negative presidents who strive and seem ambitious but are personally unsatisfied, 3) passive-positive presidents who are responsive to other people and seeks rewards from others instead of asserting himself and his agenda, and 4) passive-negative presidents who may not enjoy politics and are doing the job because they ought to do it and for whom protecting the process as more important than the outcome.

For Fred Greenstein, individuals also matter. For the president, certain important personal and political skills can be divided into six areas that determine the success of the administration. Those skills or characteristics are: 1) effective communication; 2) administrative/organizational capacity; 3) political skills; 4) vision, inspiration and a consistent point of view; 5) cognitive style; and 6) emotional intelligence.¹⁸¹

¹⁸¹ Fred I, Greenstein, *The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to George W. Bush*. 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) 217-223.

Stephen Skowronek examines presidents through the prism of political time.¹⁸² The cycles of history repeat and each president operates in a reasonably understandable political environment which directly affects performance in office. Skowronek types presidents and their times in four cycles. First, are reconstructive presidents who are elected to make a big change and overcome the standard institutional pressure to continue the old tired ways of the past. Examples are Andrew Jackson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Ronald Reagan. Second are the articulators who follow the reconstructors and continue the policies and vision of their predecessors. Examples are George H.W. Bush and Harry Truman. Third are the preemptive presidents, political wild cards who upset the applecart appearing in the middle of a reconstituted regime, often as a result of a failed attempt at being a reconstructive president. Richard Nixon is an example here. Disjunctive presidencies mark the end of the old order and are succeeded by a reconstitutive success. The example here is John Quincy Adams preceding Andrew Jackson, or Herbert Hoover preceding Franklin Roosevelt. Skowronek's emphasis on the environment in which a President operates is reminiscent of the realist attention to the anarchic international situation.

In the literature on the study of the presidency, approaches to presidential decision making fall into two principal patterns of analysis. The first emphasizes an institutional approach, covering internal government politics, including bureaucratic politics and organizational process models, and the new institutionalism. This line of analysis suggests that, in every administration, the nature of decision making is, for all intents and purposes basically the same. A second approach based on the presidential management model, holds

¹⁸² Stephen Skowronek , *Presidential Leadership In Political Time* 2nd ed. (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2008).

that the unique leadership style of each individual officeholder is the critical element in determining the decision making process.

Newman argues that considering these two approaches as mutually exclusive is:

...an obstacle to understanding presidential decision making... As a result of institutional pressures, the structure of national security decision making follows a distinct pattern of evolution over the first term of any presidential administration. Each administration begins with a standard National Security Council-based interagency process. Decision making then evolves in a predictable manner. Presidents will eventually use three concurrent structures to make decisions: a formal structure (the standard interagency process); an informal structure, in which the senior advisers meet with and without the president on a regular basis outside the interagency process; and a confidence structure, in which the president relies on one or two select advisers. The latter two are added to the decision making mix after the administration has been in office for a time.¹⁸³

For the purposes of this study it is sufficient to note that whether the structure of the decision making varies or not, the thesis tested here is unaffected by the structure. However an understanding of the theories of presidential decision making does allow us to narrow the area of inquiry in the vast array of presidential documents. Since the test of the unitary actor theory administered in this study is not concerned with how the policy decision is made, but only that the policy actually is, an examination of the vast array of information detailing an administration's internal deliberations before a decision is made is not necessary here. However testing the unitary actor assumption by an examination of the decision making process behind a significant policy shift appears to be a promising area for further inquiry by both critics and defenders of structural realism.

¹⁸³ William W. Newmann, "The Structures of National Security Decision Making: Leadership, Institutions, and Politics in the Carter, Reagan, and G. H. W. Bush Years," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 34 (June 2004): 273.

Finally, this section must acknowledge the controversial theory of the presidency pushed forward relentlessly during the administration of George W. Bush, principally by Vice President Richard Cheney and his principal legal advisor David Addington. They took the position that the President was vested by the constitution with all executive powers without exception and that no other branch of government could limit the powers when the activities referred to took place within the executive branch. Thus the president might do whatever he felt necessary to do with executive branch personnel to protect or defend the nation in a time of national peril. Examples of the broad assertion of power under this unitary executive theory are often found in the signing statements that Mr. Bush issued upon the signing of particular legislation. For example the signing statement which accompanied the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for 2003 said in part

Regrettably, the Act contains a number of provisions that impermissibly interfere with the constitutional functions of the presidency in foreign affairs, including provisions that purport to establish foreign policy that are of significant concern.

The executive branch shall construe as advisory the provisions of the Act, including sections 408, 616, 621, 633, and 1343(b), that purport to direct or burden the conduct of negotiations by the executive branch with foreign governments, international organizations, or other entities abroad or which purport to direct executive branch officials to use the U.S. voice and vote in international organizations to achieve specified foreign policy objectives. Such provisions, if construed as mandatory rather than advisory, would impermissibly interfere with the President's constitutional authorities to conduct the Nation's foreign affairs, participate in international negotiations, and supervise the unitary executive branch.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸⁴ George W. Bush: "Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003", September 30, 2002. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=63928>.

Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo describe the unitary executive theory of presidential power they find in the Vesting Clause of Article II of the constitution in sweeping terms:

The Constitution gives and ought to give all the executive power to one, and only one, person: the president of the United States. According to this view, the Constitution creates a unitary executive to ensure energetic enforcement of the law and to promote accountability by making it crystal clear who is to blame for maladministration. The Constitution's creation of unitary executive eliminates conflicts in law enforcement and regulatory policy by ensuring that all of the cabinet departments and agencies that make up the federal government will execute the law in a consistent manner and in accordance with the president's wishes.¹⁸⁵

Their unitary executive theory reads as a roving grant or assertion of power, which they claim all presidents have shared.¹⁸⁶ In a broad assertion of power their president is not a prisoner of the constitution but instead

The president's powers go beyond those specifically enumerated in Article II, Sections 2 and 3, and include at least some implied, residual executive powers, like the removal power as well.¹⁸⁷

But, Calabresi and Yoo do not entirely endorse the political uses of the unitary executive theory in the practices of the administration of President George W Bush. For them as scholars the issues are the right of the president to direct the actions of and fire at will those executive branch officials wielding executive authority, As long as the removal power is intact and the power to direct subordinates in complete and unfettered, then

¹⁸⁵ Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo, *The Unitary Executive Presidential Power From Washington To Bush* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008) 3.

¹⁸⁶ Calabresi and Yoo, *The Unitary Executive*, 4.

¹⁸⁷ Calabresi and Yoo, *The Unitary Executive*, 4.

The classic theory of the unitary executive is quite agnostic on the question of whether the president possesses implied, inherent powers in foreign or domestic policy.¹⁸⁸

This view is a far more restrictive view of a unitary executive than the position taken by Berkley law professor John Yoo whose work is the theoretical basis of much of the Bush (43) administration's most far reaching claims. Indeed in reviewing the limited "appointment and removal powers" formulation of a unitary executive as described by Calabresi and Yoo, John Yoo (no relation) asserts boldly that, "Article II vests powers of substance that come to the fore during crises."¹⁸⁹ He describes the theory and its origins

The very theory of constitutional interpretation that established the idea of a unitary executive-that Article II Section 1's Vesting Clause grants all of the federal executive power to the president alone, subject only to narrow, explicit exception in the text itself- did not arise in the context of the removal power. Under the pseudonym of Pacificus, Hamilton advanced the theory in defense of President George Washington's declaration of neutrality in the wars of the French Revolution. The authority to proclaim neutrality did not depend on the president's power of removal, but on an implicit executive authority to set and conduct foreign policy on behalf of the nation.¹⁹⁰

John Yoo's unitary executive theory has now fallen on hard times in the wake of the failure of the Bush administration. For the purposes of this study it is worth noting that Yoo's theory is consistent with a vision of the president as the supreme policy maker acting in the national interest without legal impediments from other sources of domestic authority. It is not a legal reflection of the unitary actor assumption but it does claim the same kind of freedom of action without internal political limits that would parallel the unitary actor

¹⁸⁸ Calabresi and Yoo, *The Unitary Executive*, 20.

¹⁸⁹ John Yoo, review "Unitary, Executive, or Both? The Unitary Executive: Presidential Power from Washington to Bush by Steven G. Calabresi; Christopher S. Yoo," *The University of Chicago Law Review*, 76, no. 4 (Fall 2009): 2018.

¹⁹⁰ Yoo, "Unitary Executive of Both?" 1938.

assumption in the international arena. The unitary executive theory, in either its mild “appointment and removal power” or its extreme “all executive power without limit” form is consistent with, but does not predict, the unitary actor assumption examined herein.

The realist conception of the nation-state as a unitary actor is well-settled in the study of international relations and American foreign policy. The concomitant idea that states act on their interests in preference to their ideals has an even longer history especially in the foreign policy of many presidents of the United States. It does not appear from the literature that the unitary actor assumption has been directly tested in the context of partisan presidential transitions and national security issues in foreign policy. This study will conduct that test.

CHAPTER 3

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE SOVIET UNION, OIL AND SAUDI ARABIA

Issues and Foreign States Considered

Within the context of national security this study will examine the relationship of the United States with two countries on two separate issues. The first issue is a military matter, the competition in nuclear weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union and its successor the Russian Federation and the efforts to control the destabilizing dangers and proliferation of those weapons. The second issue is an economic matter, the access of the United States and the western economies to crude oil from Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf.

Both of these issues present a new circumstance in the life of the United States. Both issues became matters of national security after the end of World War II. Nuclear weapons were developed by the United States through the Manhattan Project and used only twice during that war. Nuclear weapons have not been used in combat since the end of the war. After World War II, the Soviet Union and then other nations, some allies and some opponents of the United States, also obtained and deployed nuclear weapons.

Gradually after the end of World War II the United States became dependent on imported oil. After the end of the war Saudi Arabia developed sufficient oil infrastructure to access its enormous reserves. Once that infrastructure was in place the Saudis, by controlling their oil production, gained the ability to exercise enormous influence over the world price for oil.

During the time period covered by this study the Soviet Union changed from a putative ally of the United States at the end of the Second World War to a dangerous opponent, until it dissolved in 1991. At the end of the Soviet Union's existence, it transformed itself into the Russian Federation and 14 other independent nations, nations far less hostile and less dangerous to the United States.¹⁹¹ In contrast, since 1945, Saudi Arabia has been, and through three oil embargos has remained, a friend of the United States.

The time span of 67 years since the end of World War II is relatively brief in the historical sense. Both the issues, nuclear weapons and oil, and the bilateral relationships , the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia, examined in this study give us the ability to study a specific issue from the time it first became a national security concern to the present day.

Nuclear Weapons and the Soviet Union

A review of some of the early thinking about nuclear weapons illustrates the unprecedented nature of this issue for national leaders beginning in 1945. The atomic bomb, “was a revolutionary development which altered the character of war itself.”¹⁹²

The first nuclear explosion, code named Trinity, was detonated on July 16, 1945 at the White Sands Proving Ground in New Mexico. The only use of nuclear weapons during the war came on August 6, 1945 and again on August 9, 1945 with the destruction of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States. The Soviet Union

¹⁹¹ The Soviet Union dissolved on December 25, 1991. In its place emerged the Russian Federation and the newly independent nations of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

¹⁹² Frederick Dunn, “The Common Problem” in *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order*, ed. Bernard Brodie, (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1946) 4.

detonated its first nuclear explosion on August 29, 1949 and by the end of 1951 it had successfully tested three weapons including an aerial bomb drop.¹⁹³

From a military standpoint, the effective possession and deployment nuclear weapons presents two significant technical problems. The first problem is the construction of a mobile nuclear device of such size and weight that it can be delivered to a target. The first thermo-nuclear (H-Bomb) explosion was produced by a machine that weighed 82 tons.¹⁹⁴ Reduction in the size and weight of the nuclear device so that it could be incorporated into a weapon delivered by a manned aircraft or an intercontinental ballistic missile was one of the first priorities of the weapons designers during the Cold War.

The second problem is the development of a delivery system or systems capable of surviving a first strike and in response hitting an enemy's homeland with sufficient destructive power that the inevitable retaliation makes a first strike politically and militarily useless. Manned bombers are difficult to keep on constant alert. A constant alert status will inevitably degrade the effectiveness of the pilots and crew. Ballistic missiles may be kept on constant alert, but keeping an early generation liquid fuel missile constantly fueled is dangerous. The time from launch in Russia to a missile silo in North Dakota is approximately 30 minutes. If the missile is kept empty, the fueling time of approximately 30 minutes makes the weapon vulnerable to a first strike. The earliest radar warning would not provide enough time for the crew to fuel and launch a missile. This necessitated the

¹⁹³ USSR Nuclear Weapons Tests and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions: 1949 through 1990; The Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy, and Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation; ed. V. N. Mikhailov; 1996, quoted in Soviet Nuclear Test Archive at: <http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Russia/Sovtestsum.html>

¹⁹⁴ The Nuclear Weapon Archive, "Operation Ivy," Nuclear Weapon Archive, <http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Tests/Ivy.html>

development of the Minuteman solid fueled missile, a weapon that could be launched within in three minutes.

The need to preserve a retaliatory strike capability also drove the creation of the triad strategy creating nuclear strike options from three platforms, manned bombers, missiles sheltered in hardened buried silos spread across the American west far from population centers, and missiles launched from submerged submarines.

Another strategic change was the new timing of war. In a nuclear age the length of a war would be measured in days, not years. As Bernard Brodie writes,

In fact the essential change introduced by the atomic bomb is not primarily that it will make war more violent—a city can be as effectively destroyed with TNT and incendiaries—but that it will concentrate the violence in terms of time. A world accustomed to thinking it horrible that wars should last four or five years is not appalled at the prospect that future wars may last only a few days.¹⁹⁵

This analysis will examine nuclear weapons as an issue of nation-state behavior, following the initial confrontation of two nuclear armed states, to the Test Ban Treaty, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I and SALT II), the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and ending with the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty in 2002. It will also consider nuclear non-proliferation efforts which began in 1958 and resulted in a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed on July 1, 1968 which was supplemented and expanded by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996.

From the beginning of the nuclear age, the anarchy in the international environment was a defining characteristic of the problem of controlling the new weapons of mass

¹⁹⁵ Bernard Brodie, “Implications for Military Policy” in *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order*, ed. Bernard Brodie, (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1946) 71.

destruction. In 1946, at the very beginning of the nuclear era, Frederick Dunn writing in *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order*, observed that:

One was met right at the beginning with two dilemmas of really imposing dimensions. The first of these arises out of the nature of the procedures available for the common regulation of the actions of free nations. On the one hand, any scheme for international control of atomic warfare must be put into effect by *voluntary* agreement. There is not supreme power to impose it from above. On the other hand, it seemed extremely improbable that states possessing bombs or the capacity to make them would voluntarily restrict their power to carry on atomic warfare merely on the promises of other states to do likewise.¹⁹⁶

Anticipating the tactical problem of the lack of time for any nation on the receiving end of a surprise nuclear attack to organize a response, defense or adequate home front, he continues that,

“The second dilemma arises out of the time element in the carrying on of atomic warfare. ...the speed of attack by bombs can be so great that there would not appear at first sight to be sufficient time for any mechanism of international collective action to operate successfully.”¹⁹⁷

No one found a magic formula to put the nuclear genie back in the bottle and most of the immediate post war proposals for control of the atomic bomb had the same vision and the same practical problems. Dunn writes that:

The post war popular proposals for control have been those which envisaged a treaty eliminating the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes and supporting this by a worldwide inspection system as a means of continuous reassurance that no preparations were under way to evade it.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁶ Dunn, “The Common Problem,” 6.

¹⁹⁷ Dunn, “The Common Problem,” 6.

¹⁹⁸ Dunn, “The Common Problem,” 13.

From the very beginning of discussions about international agreements to control these unprecedented weapons, the verification of a state's compliance with any such agreement was the critical problem:

This suggests that the basic problem is not just getting rid of bombs; it is rather that of making faithful participation in an international control scheme highly profitable and its evasion or violation exceedingly unprofitable.¹⁹⁹

The international environment was directly impacted by nuclear weapons, although anarchy remained its predominant condition:

The development of the atomic bomb has wrought profound changes in three major fields: (1) in the military affairs of nations, (2) in their political relationships, and (3) in the organized international machinery for peace and security.²⁰⁰

Dunn was also correct in predicting that the new weapon would have a significant effect on the international arena and from the vantage point of 67 years of peace in Europe since the end of World War II, his writing in 1946 seems surprisingly prescient about its effects.

At any rate, we know it is not the mere existence of the weapon but rather its effects on the traditional patterns on war which will govern the adjustments which states will make in their relations with each other.²⁰¹

For defense theorists and president alike, from the very beginnings of the nuclear age proliferation was a matter of real concern. In October 1945, President Harry Truman told Congress that:

Scientific opinion appears to be practically unanimous that the essential theoretical knowledge upon which the discovery is based is already widely known. There is also

¹⁹⁹ Dunn, "The Common Problem," 15.

²⁰⁰ Dunn, "The Common Problem," 17.

²⁰¹ Dunn, "The Common Problem," 23.

substantial agreement that foreign research can come abreast of our present theoretical knowledge in time.²⁰²

Deterrence of nuclear aggression was on the agenda as a goal for policy makers from the very beginning of the nuclear age. Bernard Brodie wrote that:

Thus, the first and most vital step in any American security program for the age of atomic bombs is to take measures to guarantee to ourselves in case of attack the possibility of retaliation in kind.... Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment was to win wars, from now on its chief purpose will be to avert them.²⁰³

The concept of a "balance of power," as a necessary element of any treaty to control these new nuclear weapons, was present in these early considerations of the new nuclear age:

But without the existence of the state of balance-in terms of reciprocal ability to retaliate in kind if the bomb is used-any treaty purposing to outlaw the bomb in war would have thrust upon it a burden far heavier that such a treaty can normally bear.²⁰⁴

Arnold Wolfers agreed that in the absence of a comprehensive answer to the problem of control of nuclear weapons, parity was the path to the future of arms control:

Once again parity may become the watchword of disarmament negotiations, only this time bearing on the atom bomb and Soviet-American relations rather than on the naval strength of Britain and the United States.²⁰⁵

Brodie also anticipated the enormous pressure to stockpile nuclear weapons which would seriously influence weapons spending throughout the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union:

²⁰² Harry S. Truman: "Special Message to the Congress on Atomic Energy.," October 3, 1945. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12327>.

²⁰³ Brodie, "Implications for Military Policy," 77.

²⁰⁴ Brodie, "Implications for Military Policy," 87.

²⁰⁵ Arnold Wolfers, "The Atomic Bomb in Soviet-American Relations" in *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order*, ed. Bernard Brodie, (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1946) 114.

But the idea that a nation which had under-gone days or weeks of atomic bomb attack would be able to achieve a production for war purposes even remotely comparable in character and magnitude to American production in World War II simply does not make sense, The war of atomic bombs must be fought with stockpiles of arms in finished or semi-finished state.²⁰⁶

A nuclear arms race was in our future:

If existing international organizations should prove inadequate to cope with the problem of controlling bomb production, --and it would be premature to predict that it will prove inadequate especially in view of the favorable official and public reception to the Board of Consultants report of March 16, 1946- a runaway competition in such production would surely bring new forces into the picture.²⁰⁷

The predicted new force to restrain the arms race was actually a very old one, cost.

While some voices on the fringes called for unilateral nuclear disarmament, the idea was rejected almost before it could be offered. In the new nuclear age there was no feasible path to return to the non-nuclear past:

No scrapping of American plants and stockpiles could return the world to the happier days of the pre-atomic age. The “know-how,” and therefore the potential existence of atomic weapons is here to stay. By ridding itself of all atomic power the United States would expose itself to the danger that the Soviet Union or some other country might violate its commitments and emerge as sole possessor of the bomb.²⁰⁸

Arnold Wolfers predicted a stalemate and a situation where the prevention of nuclear war was far more important than any prospect for military success in such a conflict:

If and when the Soviet Union – and perhaps other countries – gains access to the means of conducting atomic warfare, a truly revolutionary change will have occurred on the military position of this country. While it may still prove capable of avoiding defeat, never again will it be able to fight a major war without being exposed to vast destruction. No international agreements however stringent will remove this threat entirely. With every day that passes we are moving gradually from a position of unusual safety to a kind of earthquake zone which will be

²⁰⁶ Brodie, “Implications for Military Policy,” 89.

²⁰⁷ Brodie, “Implications for Military Policy,” 107.

²⁰⁸ Brodie, “Implications for Military Policy,” 122.

rendered livable for our urban population only by the hope and confidence that the outbreak of another war will be prevented.²⁰⁹

An arms race in the new weapons was a real possibility he contended,

...it would be a mistake to overlook the other possibility, if not probability, that our fear of Russian bombs and their fear of American bombs will prove more powerful than our common anxiety about the atomic bomb in general. If that should turn out to be the case, the new weapon will tend to strain the relations between the two countries rather than to associate them in a common enterprise. Those who take this second and more pessimistic view incline toward the belief that Russia's possession of the bomb will unleash a dangerous and unbridled Soviet-American armament race which will further strain and poison relations between the two countries.²¹⁰

The relative stability of the bi-polar world that became a hallmark of the Cold War was only barely visible in 1946:

...if the Russians fear that we might attack them someday, they too will seek to deter us not merely by holding themselves ready for retaliation in kind but by depriving us of the hope of ultimate victory. Efforts by both countries along this same line, if equally successful, would bring about a situation in which a war ending in stalemate would appear most likely... It would not be surprising, therefore, if a high degree of Soviet-American "equality in deterring power" would prove the best guarantee of peace and tend more than anything else to approximate the views and interests of both countries."²¹¹

From the very beginning of the nuclear age, some of the basic situational constraints limiting alternatives available to national leaders were plainly understood. If this early emerging consensus of opinion accurately describes the policies followed by presidents of opposing parties and political views, throughout the course of the Cold War, then the conclusion must be that the unitary actor assumption has demonstrated its validity in predicting the actions of national leaders dealing with issues of national survival.

²⁰⁹ Wolfers, *The Atomic Bomb in Soviet-American Relations*, 125.

²¹⁰ Wolfers, *The Atomic Bomb in Soviet-American Relations*, 129.

²¹¹ Wolfers, *The Atomic Bomb in Soviet-American Relations*, 135-6.

Attached in the appendices is a list of treaties concerning nuclear weapons and non-proliferation efforts and a copy of “A Report to the National Security Council, NSC-68.” NSC-68 is the blueprint for American strategy in the Cold War. The reader may wish to refer to NSC-68 to understand the pervasive concerns of American policy makers at the beginning of the Cold War. Today, 23 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, NSC-68 can help the reader understand the international environment in which the largest part of this test of the unitary actor assumption is conducted.

Oil and Saudi Arabia

A lengthy review of the United States relationship with Saudi Arabia and the dependence of the United States economy on oil from the Persian Gulf is not necessary to set up a test of the unitary actor assumption concerning oil imports as a national security issue. In this test of the unitary actor assumption, oil from Saudi Arabia, and that includes Persian Gulf oil, either flows into the world oil market or it does not. For purposes of the national security of the United States, the destination of a particular barrel of oil sailing past the Strait of Hormuz is not as important as the safe passage itself.

The problem of access to and price of foreign crude oil to support the United States economic engine appears to be resource issue of unique scale. Since 1972 the United States sustained its position as a global superpower while at the same time experiencing an increasing dependence on a critical raw material whose price is primarily influenced by a foreign and very different power, a nation whose society, values, religion, and background are vastly dissimilar from ours, Saudi Arabia.

The oil economy that fueled the growth of the United States to the status of global superpower at the end of the Second World War was fueled by domestic petroleum supplies. Commercial use of petroleum began as a replacement for whale oil due to the scarcity of whales in the 1850s.²¹² Over the next 100 years the uses of oil expanded as did the economic engine it made possible:

By 1950 crude oil had completely transitioned from a source of lamp oil to a transportation fuel, with gasoline, diesel, residual fuel oil and jet fuel/kerosene accounting for about two thirds of crude oil consumption.²¹³

During World War II American defense planners were aware that their domestic oil capacity was insufficient to meet future needs. As they became aware of the scope of the Saudi oil reserves, a consensus emerged that this prize must be held, if not directly in American hands, then in hands friendly to and aligned with the interests of the United States in that region:

By the end of World War II, the exploitation of Saudi Arabia's vast petroleum reserves had become a major foreign policy objective. "In Saudi Arabia," the head of the State Department's Division of Near Eastern Affairs informed President Truman in 1945, "the oil resources constitute a stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes in human history."²¹⁴

As early as 1948 American defense planners believed that a major war with the Soviet Union would probably result in drive by Soviet armed forces, "toward the oil-bearing

²¹² Morgan Downey, *Oil 101* (Albany: Wooden Table Press LLC, 2009) 1.

²¹³ Downey, *Oil 101*, 7.

²¹⁴ Gordon Merriam, "Draft Memorandum to President Truman" undated (August 1945), in 8 *Foreign Relations of the United States 1945*, 45, quoted in Michael T Klare, *Blood and Oil*, (New York: Metropolitan Books Holt and Company, 2004) 32.

areas of the Near and Middle East."²¹⁵ In 1949 the year the Soviet Union became the second member of the nuclear club, the United States produced 276.5 million metric tons of crude oil while the USSR and countries in its European orbit produced only to 38.9 million metric tons of oil.²¹⁶

The United States government's involvement with Persian Gulf oil sources entails a long history of ensuring American companies access to the region's oil, but, allowing the private companies to operate in the open market with regards to the price:

Washington chose to collaborate with rather than supplant the giant American oil companies, spurring their efforts to gain concessions in the region and providing them with diplomatic and military support when deemed useful. The result was what David S Painter of Georgetown University has termed a public-private partnership in foreign oil development. "Even though private interests rather than government agencies were given primary responsibility for implementing U.S. foreign oil policy, the U.S. government was nevertheless deeply involved in maintaining an international environment in which the private companies could operate with security and profit"²¹⁷

The growth of Saudi Arabia as an oil supplier between 1946 and 1976 was startling.

As Michael Klare describes it,

In 1946, the first year of the post war era, Saudi Arabia produced a mere 60 million barrels of oil-just 3 percent of the amount extracted from wells in the United States. But Saudi production grew so prodigiously that in 1976 the Kingdom's wells delivered 3.1 billion barrels- fifty two times the 1946 amount. By that point Saudi Arabia had become the world's number three producer of petroleum (after the United States and the Soviet Union) and its number one exporter.²¹⁸

²¹⁵ National Security Council, "NSC-68, United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, A Report to the President Pursuant to the President's Directive of January 31, 1950," (Washington, April 7, 1950) <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm>.

²¹⁶ NSC-68, 10.

²¹⁷ David S Painter, *Oil and the American Century* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) p. 1 quoted in Michael T Klare, *Blood and Oil*, (New York: Metropolitan Books Holt and Company, 2004) 35.

²¹⁸ Michael T Klare, *Blood and Oil*, (New York: Metropolitan Books Holt and Company, 2004) 37.

The Texas Railroad Commission, (TRC) which had the authority to set production restrictions that allowed it to control the amount of crude oil produced in Texas oil fields, was, by virtue of that power, the arbiter of global oil prices from 1931 through 1971.²¹⁹

During the 1960s, OPEC did not have any power, firstly, because western oil majors controlled production in OPEC countries via concessions, and secondly, but more importantly, the TRC (Texas Railroad Commission) still controlled global pricing as the U.S. had surplus production capacity since Dad Joiner discovered the East Texas Fields in 1930. The TRC would add or subtract oil to manage global prices as OPEC later would do.²²⁰

This situation in which the United States controlled the price of the natural resource most important to its economic wellbeing did not last:

The global pricing ability of the TRC disappeared in 1970 when U.S. oil production peaked and began to steadily decline. In 1971, facing declining US production, the TRC gave producers in Texas, previously the only global production area with excess capacity, free reign to produce as much oil as they could.²²¹

The result of that order was to shift the ability to control the price of oil to the only supplier with enough remaining production capacity to impact the world price of oil, the Saudi Oil Ministry. Thus the power to set the price of oil moved from Austin Texas to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. In 2004 Michael Klare wrote that,

It is impossible to overstate the importance of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Not only is Saudi Arabia the leading foreign supplier of crude petroleum to the United States – accounting for approximately 18 percent of imports in Mid 2003- it is the only major supplier we can be sure will significantly increase its deliveries of oil to us in times of crisis. Because it has so much of the world’s untapped oil – some 262 billion barrels or one fourth of proven world reserves – and because it has so much capacity

²¹⁹ Downey, *Oil 101*, 9.

²²⁰ Downey, *Oil 101*, 11.

²²¹ Downey, *Oil 101*, 11.

for extra (or spare) production, Saudi Arabia can single handedly boost its deliveries enough to compensate for any cutoffs from other major suppliers.²²²

This is the environment in which Presidents must operate when dealing with the United

States' need for imported oil.

²²² Klare, *Blood and Oil*, 26.

CHAPTER 4

EXAMINATION BY TRANSITION

Truman, Democrat to Eisenhower, Republican: January 20, 1953

Truman and Nuclear Weapons

For President Harry Truman the creation of the Atom Bomb and its use heralded the beginning of a new kind of warfare and a new problem in foreign policy. The use of the Atom Bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki made the invasion of the Japanese home islands unnecessary. But the bomb and its use created the fear that should this weapon be used again, the destruction would be on a scale previously unimagined in human history, and civilization might not recover from the blow. In terms of the structural realist theory of international relations the possession of an operational Atom Bomb readily capable of delivery to an enemy target, is the single biggest change in any nation's military capability in history.

After the Potsdam conference, Mr. Truman, referring to "the tragic significance" of the atomic bomb, said it:

...is too dangerous to be loose in a lawless world. That is why Great Britain and the United States, who have the secret of its production, do not intend to reveal the secret until means have been found to control the bomb so as to protect ourselves and the rest of the world from the danger of total destruction.²²³

Truman's first attempt at a policy concerning the possession and use of the bomb came in a joint statement with British Prime Minister Clement Atlee and Canadian Prime

²²³ Harry S. Truman: "Radio Report to the American People on the Potsdam Conference," August 9, 1945. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12165>.

Minister Mackenzie King on November 15, 1945. The leaders recognized that prevention of future wars was the only real protection from atomic destruction. They signaled an understanding that, between nuclear armed states, the nature of armed conflict had fundamentally changed, including the thought that:

We recognize that the application of recent scientific discoveries to the methods and practice of war has placed at the disposal of mankind means of destruction hitherto unknown, against which there can be no adequate military defense, and in the employment of which no single nation can in fact have a monopoly.²²⁴

But when they arrived at the crux of the matter, they would keep the bomb to themselves:

We are not convinced that the spreading of specialized information regarding the practical application of atomic energy before it is possible to devise effective, reciprocal and enforceable safeguards acceptable to all nations, would contribute to a constructive solution of the problem of the atomic bomb.²²⁵

Possession and control over a usable nuclear weapons stockpile would remain a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy from that date forward. For a short while the United States held a nuclear monopoly. After the Soviet Union exploded its own atomic bomb, a nuclear stockpile became a necessity.

The only mention of nuclear weapons in the 1948 Democratic Party platform is:

We advocate the effective international control of weapons of mass destruction, including the atomic bomb, and we approve continued and vigorous efforts within the United Nations to bring about the successful consummation of the proposals which our Government has advanced.²²⁶

²²⁴ Harry S. Truman: "The President's News Conference Following the Signing of a Joint Declaration on Atomic Energy," November 15, 1945. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12290>.

²²⁵ Truman, "Joint Declaration on Atomic Energy."

²²⁶ Democratic Party Platform of 1948, from John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project* [online]. Santa Barbara, CA. Available from World Wide Web: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29599>.

The traditional pledge to keep a strong defense must be understood from the perspective of the United States in 1948; the nation stood astride the world as the sole unchallenged nuclear armed superpower:

We advocate the maintenance of an adequate Army, Navy and Air Force to protect the nation's vital interests and to assure our security against aggression.²²⁷

The platform position is an understatement as the Truman administration's internal deliberation and other actions made the broad outlines of its nuclear policy clear. First, the United States would produce and maintain a stockpile of nuclear weapons and invest in sufficient delivery capability to deter any potential enemy, especially the Soviet Union. Second, while the idea of international control of atomic weapons and energy had an idealistic appeal, the security of the nation would not be trusted to any international organization. The United States would reserve to itself exclusively any decision to use nuclear weapons in pursuit of its own self-interest.

The real fears and concerns of the United States government during these years are best revealed in declassified documents of the National Security Council. NSC 20/4, "U.S. Objectives With Respect To The USSR To Counter Soviet Threats To US Security" labeled the Soviet Union "the greatest single danger to the US within the foreseeable future" and believed that the Soviet aim was the domination of the world.²²⁸ The report concluded that "the capabilities of the USSR threaten US security," are "dangerous and immediate," and

²²⁷ Democratic Party Platform, 1948.

²²⁸ NSC 20/4 "US Objectives With Respect To The USSR To Counter Soviet Threat To US Security", Foreign Relations Of The United States, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, Department of State, 1948) 663-669 <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/coldwar/nsc20-4.htm>.

that “no later than 1955 the USSR will probably be capable of serious air attacks against the United States with atomic, biological and chemical weapons.”²²⁹

The intellectual roots of the doctrine of containment are found in George Kennan's famous Long Telegram from Moscow in 1946, and article “Sources of Soviet Conduct” published in the journal *Foreign Affairs* in 1947. The United States government's internal embrace of containment is found in NSC-68 titled “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, A Report to the President Pursuant To the President’s Directive of January 31, 1950.”²³⁰ This original analysis and statement of policy towards the Soviet Union in sets a baseline policy against which we examine the unitary actor assumption.

The President’s directive of January 31, 1950 required an examination of U.S. “strategic plans, in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union.”²³¹ The report began in a traditional realist fashion assessing the international system. The authors described two post-World War II changes in the international structure. The first change was a redistribution of power in the international system, as power gravitated towards the two new centers of influence, the United States and the Soviet Union. The second change was that, unlike any previous international players, excepting Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union was

...animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. Conflict has, therefore, become

²²⁹ NSC-20/4, "US Objectives With Respect To The USSR."

²³⁰ NSC-68.

²³¹ NSC-68.

endemic and is waged, on the part of the Soviet Union, by violent or nonviolent methods in accordance with the dictates of expediency"²³²

The planners wrote that the Soviet Union's aggressive efforts were, "directed not only to our values but to our physical capacity to protect our environment."²³³ The report further noted the realist concern of an "absence of order" among nations and sought through a "strategy of the Cold War" to induce "Soviet acceptance of the specific and limited conditions requisite to an international environment in which free institutions can flourish."²³⁴ The authors of NSC-68 understood that the core of the struggle between the United States and Soviet Union lay within the nature of the Soviet regime and wrote that they could "expect no lasting abatement of the crisis unless and until a change occurs in the nature of the Soviet system."²³⁵ For the authors, military power served the national purpose as a deterrent.²³⁶

The report in a realist analysis posits Soviet intentions and capabilities, noting that Soviet tactics were extremely flexible and "the Kremlin possesses a formidable capacity to act with the widest tactical latitude with stealth and with speed."²³⁷ The outlook for Soviet atomic capability as forecast by the Central Intelligence Agency was disturbing.

²³² NSC-68.

²³³ NSC-68.

²³⁴ NSC-68.

²³⁵ NSC-68.

²³⁶ NSC-68.

²³⁷ NSC-68.

Time Frame	Soviet Fission Bomb Stockpile ²³⁸
By Mid 1950	10-20
By Mid 1951	25-45
By Mid 1952	45-90
By Mid 1953	70-135
By Mid 1954	200

American planners believed that the threshold of 200 atomic bombs was a critical level for United States, because delivery of 100 bombs on targets the United States would seriously damage the country.²³⁹ 1954 was the year of maximum peril.²⁴⁰

In pursuit of a world environment where America could flourish, NSC-68 set out the policy of containment of the Soviet Union with four parts:

1. blocking further expansion of Soviet power
2. exposing the falsities of Soviet pretensions
3. inducing a retraction of the Kremlin's control and influence
4. fostering the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system such that the Kremlin is "brought at least to the point of modifying its behavior to conform to generally accepted international standards"²⁴¹

American planners worried about a widening gap between Soviet military preparedness and the unpreparedness of the free world in the event of war.²⁴² The authors of NSC-68 considered and abandoned a "no first strike" policy. They concluded that the Soviet Union would see such a policy as an admission of weakness and America's allies would consider it

²³⁸ NSC-68.

²³⁹ NSC-68.

²⁴⁰ NSC-68.

²⁴¹ NSC-68.

²⁴² NSC-68.

an indication of America's intent to abandon them in the event of a conflict.²⁴³ Again, working in the classic realist mode the authors wrote that, "The Kremlin would weigh the facts of our capability far more heavily than a declaration of what we propose to do with that capability".²⁴⁴

In a startlingly prescient declaration of what would unfold in the conflict over the next four decades the document summed up the problem as follows

The problem is to create such political and economic conditions in the free world, backed by force sufficient to inhibit Soviet attack, that the Kremlin will accommodate itself to these conditions, gradually withdraw, and eventually it change its policies drastically."²⁴⁵

Between 1950 and 1991 this doctrine of containment succeeded.

NSC-68 Concluded that

the United States now faces the contingency that within the next four or five years the Soviet Union will possess the military capacity of delivering a surprise atomic attack of such weight that the United States must have substantially increased general air, ground, sea strength, atomic capabilities, and air and civilian defenses to deter war and to provide reasonable assurance, in the event of war, that it could survive the initial blow and go on the eventual attainment of its objectives.²⁴⁶

The recommendation was stark:

We must, by means of a rapid and sustained buildup of the political, economic and military strength of the free world, and by means of an affirmative program intended to wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union, confront it with convincing evidence of

²⁴³ NSC-68.

²⁴⁴ NSC-68.

²⁴⁵ NSC-68.

²⁴⁶ NSC-68.

the determination and ability of the free world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its will.²⁴⁷

The Democratic Party Platform of 1952 opened with an acknowledgment of the dangers and challenges of the atomic age. Directly addressing atomic energy the platform pledged,

- (1) to maintain vigorous and non-partisan civilian administrations, with adequate security safeguards;
- (2) to promote the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in the interests of America and mankind;
- (3) to build all the atomic and hydrogen firepower needed to defend our country, deter aggression, and promote world peace;
- (4) to exert every effort to bring about bona fide international control and inspection of all atomic weapons.²⁴⁸

David Tal writes that Mr. Truman had'

...two principles that dominated U.S. nuclear weapons policy throughout his presidency, and in many ways the policy of his successor: The United States would not give up its newly acquired weapon, however devastating it was, and for as long as possible the United States should remain the only nuclear power.²⁴⁹

Further Tal reports,

Truman was deeply troubled by this reliance on atomic bombing. In May 1948, when briefed on these plans, he expressed his desire for an alternative 'without using atomic bombs.' Again, during the Berlin crisis, he vented his horror of the bomb: 'I don't think we ought to use this thing unless we absolutely have to... It is used to wipe out women and children and unarmed people and not for military uses.'²⁵⁰

²⁴⁷ NSC-68.

²⁴⁸ Democratic Party Platform 1952, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project* [online]. Santa Barbara, CA. Available from World Wide Web: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29600>.

²⁴⁹ David Tal, *The American Nuclear Disarmament Dilemma 1945-1963* (Syracuse: University Press Syracuse, 2008) 3.

²⁵⁰ Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, *Waging Peace, How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) 14.

This moral horror did not, however, alter a very clear American policy about nuclear weapons. If they must be used again, they would be.

Although never adopted, the Truman administration's proposal of the Baruch Plan to internationalize atomic technology under the supervision of the United Nations was the first concrete proposal to control the use and spread of nuclear weapons. The Baruch Plan named for financier Bernard Baruch contained in a speech made to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1946. The key elements of the plan proposed by Baruch the United States delegate to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission on June 14, 1946 were:

The United States proposes the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority, to which should be entrusted all phases of the development and use of atomic energy, starting with the raw material and including:

1. Managerial control or ownership of all atomic-energy, activities potentially dangerous to world security.
2. Power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic activities.
3. The duty of fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy.
4. Research and development responsibilities of an affirmative character intended to put the Authority in the forefront of atomic knowledge and thus to enable it to comprehend, and therefore to detect, misuse of atomic energy. To be effective, the Authority must itself be the world's leader in the field of atomic knowledge and development and thus supplement its legal authority with the great power inherent in possession of leadership in knowledge.²⁵¹

The Baruch Plan was based on the Truman administration's Acheson-Lilienthal report which proposed international control of atomic energy and such control over nuclear materials and activities as to make impossible the spread of nuclear weapons. At this time it was thought that the difficulty in obtaining nuclear materials, would, by itself, create a significant technical barrier that would slow or stop the spread of nuclear weapons. As

²⁵¹ Bernard Baruch. Speech to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission on June 14, 1946, available online: <http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/BaruchPlan.shtml>

discussed in further detail in the section examining President Johnson and the non-proliferation treaty, over the next twenty years, the relentless spread of scientific knowledge proved this assumption false. Many nations obtained the technical capability to develop a nuclear weapon. It is in the Baruch Plan's proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons from the arsenals of all nations that we see the first outlines of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty , which was finally agreed to by the major nuclear states and an additional 59 non-nuclear states in July 1968.

In summary Mr. Truman's policy concerning atomic weapons and the Soviet Union was as plain and direct as the man himself. First, the United States has and would continue to keep a stockpile of war-ready, usable nuclear weapons. Second, the United States reserved to itself the decision to use such weapons in the defense of itself and its allies. Third, the United States, while open to discussion about an international regime to control these weapons, was supremely skeptical that any such workable, verifiable, and reliable agreement was possible. Fourth, the United States would continue to develop and deploy even more destructive atomic and thermonuclear bombs and even more powerful and accurate delivery systems such that the military might of the United States was at least equal to the arsenal of any other nation.

Truman and Oil

As President, Mr. Truman rarely addressed the supply and price of imported oil as a national security issue. Oil has been a strategic commodity since World War I in which Winston Churchill oversaw the conversion of the British Navy from coal-powered ships to oil-powered ships which made the British fleet a faster and more agile counter to the

German navy.²⁵² For this analysis of the unitary actor assumption, the story of the American relationship to Saudi Arabia and its vast reserves of oil must begin with Mr. Truman's predecessor Franklin Roosevelt, through whom the American relationship with the House of Saud first began.

In 1932 Abdul Aziz ibn Saud formally declared the territory he had conquered to be the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and in 1933 the United States recognized the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.²⁵³ That same year King Abdul Aziz awarded the first oil concession in Saudi Arabia to SoCal (Standard Oil of California) a predecessor of Aramco (Arab-American Oil Company) which became a principal actor in Saudi –U.S. relations for the next two decades.²⁵⁴

That part of the Arabian Peninsula now under Saudi control, and where the great oil reserves are located, has never been colonized or subjugated.²⁵⁵ In the contest to secure the rights to explore Saudi Arabia for oil, the Americans had an advantage over their closest competitor in the area, the British

...what Abdel Aziz found attractive in the newly arriving Americans was that they were not colonialists like the British and therefore were uninterested in restructuring Saudi domestic politics.²⁵⁶

²⁵² Rachel Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil, America's Uneasy Partnership With Saudi Arabia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 15.

²⁵³ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 33.

²⁵⁴ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 17-18.

²⁵⁵ Thomas W. Lippman, *Inside The Mirage, America's Fragile Partnership With Saudi Arabia* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2004) 3.

²⁵⁶ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 33

The first large scale commercial oil strike in Saudi Arabia came on March 4, 1938 at the Dammam-7 well, which “blew” and began producing more than 1,500 barrels of oil per day.²⁵⁷ The King’s first royalty check was for over \$1.5 million dollars.²⁵⁸ Dammam-7 produced 32 million barrels of oil from 1938 until the end of its service in 1982.²⁵⁹

On February 14, 1945, on his way home from the Yalta conference, President Roosevelt met with Saudi King Abdul Aziz onboard the USS Quincy on Egypt’s Great Bitter Lake.²⁶⁰ At this meeting that the modern relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia began. King Abdul Aziz asked for nothing but American friendship and sought no monetary assistance.²⁶¹ The King and the President did discuss Palestine and Jewish immigration, the King maintaining that because the Germans were responsible for the suffering of the Jews, the Germans should be responsible for putting things right and the burden should not be placed on the people of Palestine. The best the King could get from Roosevelt on this issue was a statement that the president would "do nothing to assist the Jews against the Arabs and would make no move hostile to the Arab people."²⁶² Believing this was a commitment from the United States Abdul Aziz was greatly angered when, less than three years later, Truman recognized the new Jewish state of Israel immediately after the United Nations vote for the partition of Palestine.

²⁵⁷ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 18.

²⁵⁸ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 19.

²⁵⁹ Lippman, *Inside The Mirage*, 24.

²⁶⁰ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 36

²⁶¹ Lippman, *Inside The Mirage*, 27-29.

²⁶² Lippman, *Inside The Mirage*, 27-29.

Saudi Arabia had looked favorably upon the United States since 1919 when Saudi Prince Faisal attended the Paris Peace Conference at the end of World War I. Faisal had been impressed with President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, principally the emphasis on self-determination and decolonization.²⁶³ Indeed many Saudis remember and point to the U.S. resistance to colonialism as a foundation for the U.S.-Saudi friendship. In 2002 Saudi businessman Hassan Yassin wrote in the Los Angeles Times,

None of us have ever forgotten that during World War I, when the countries of the Middle East were still subjected to British and French imperialism, the U.S. supported our struggle for self-determination and independence and continued to do so until those dreams of independence were realized.²⁶⁴

Following Mr. Roosevelt's death in 1945 the Truman Administration within the context of the beginning of the Cold War continued the basic framework of U.S.-Saudi relations. That framework lasted for the next 65 years.

Although Abdul Aziz felt angered and betrayed by Truman's recognition of Israel, he nevertheless pursued good relations with Washington on all other fronts and offered political support for American initiatives in the Middle East (with the exception of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.) While not yet an economic security issue the U.S. military was concerned with access to the Persian Gulf oil fields from the very beginning of the Cold War

²⁶³ Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, "Chronology of Saudi-U.S. Relations," Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, <http://www.saudiembassy.net/files/PDF/Reports/Saudi-US-chronology-08.pdf>.

²⁶⁴ Hassan Yassin, "U.S.-Saudi Rift Rewards Terrorists," *Los Angeles Times*, August 21, 2002. <http://articles.latimes.com/2002/aug/21/opinion/oe-yassin21>.

... the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared in October 1946 that it was “to the strategic interest of the United States to keep Soviet Influence and Soviet Armed forces as far as possible from oil resources in Iran, Iraq and the Near and Middle East.”²⁶⁵

The story of the United States Air Force base at Dhahran illustrates the growing cooperation between Washington and Riyadh. From 1945 and 1949 American concern over Soviet intentions in the Middle East increased. The Dhahran base became a natural place to counter rising Soviet capabilities in the area. In 1949, Dhahran was the only airfield in the region that could handle the B-29, the United States’ front line strategic bomber.²⁶⁶

Washington and Riyadh found they needed each other. The pattern emerged consisting of: 1) U.S. military support and Saudi local cooperation, 2) no American interference in Saudi domestic affairs, (as compared to the alternative model of British colonialism), 3) stable oil supplies and a stable oil price managed first by Aramco and then later the Saudi Oil Ministry, and 4) the compartmentalizing of the Arab-Israeli question. This pattern lasted even after the September 11, 2001 al-Qaeda attacks on the United States in which 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi citizens.²⁶⁷

In 1949 Aramco and Saudi Arabia oversaw the creation of a 50/50 agreement whereby they would split the oil revenue evenly. This grew out of an untenable situation when in 1949 Aramco had paid more to the United States treasury in taxes, \$43 million

²⁶⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Memo to the U.S. Department of State,” October 12, 1946, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, vol. 7, pp. 529-32 quoted in Michael T Klare, *Blood and Oil*, (New York: Metropolitan Books Holt and Company, 2004) 39.

²⁶⁶ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 49.

²⁶⁷ The Associated Press, “15 of 19 September 11 Hijackers were Saudi,” *USA Today* February 2, 2002, <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2002/02/06/saudi.htm>.

dollars; than it did to the Saudis in royalty and fees, \$39 million dollars.²⁶⁸ For the Truman administration the price of Saudi oil was not an issue, but the preservation of the Near East free of Soviet domination was a concern.²⁶⁹

Eisenhower and Nuclear Weapons

General Dwight Eisenhower was a senior member of the American national command authority since his appointment as Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Forces in 1943. The reasoning behind his decision to seek the presidency is illustrative of a bipartisan realist foreign policy consensus that persisted at the highest levels of the American government since his arrival as a member of the club. Eisenhower soundly rejected both appeasement and a return to the pre-war isolationism. In his inaugural address he said of appeasement:

...common sense and common decency alike dictate the futility of appeasement, we shall never try to placate an aggressor by the false and wicked bargain of trading honor for security. Americans, indeed, all free men, remember that in the final choice a soldier's pack is not so heavy a burden as a prisoner's chains.²⁷⁰

His rejection of isolationism is a more interesting and revealing story. Eisenhower ran for president in 1952 to ensure a continued American presence in NATO and to support the collective security efforts which he believed were necessary to the defense of Western Europe. Those views reflected the consensus of the postwar foreign policy establishment.

²⁶⁸ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 55.

²⁶⁹ NSC-68.

²⁷⁰ Dwight Eisenhower, Inaugural Address January 20 1953, accessed on March 17, 2011 at John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project* [online]. Santa Barbara, CA. Available from World Wide Web: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9600>.

Eisenhower's fear that presumptive Republican nominee Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio would return the United States to its pre-war isolationism was a key element in his decision to run. But first, he tried to make a deal.

In 1951 at a meeting at the Pentagon with Taft, Eisenhower made Taft an offer. If the senator would support an internationalist view of NATO and the principle of collective security in the defense of Western Europe, he Eisenhower, would not run for president. Taft replied he could not make such a commitment as it would go against his public statements and his principles.²⁷¹ Eisenhower, eventually seeing no other course that would ensure the United States remained involved in collective defense of Western Europe and under great pressure from his friends, finally announced his candidacy on March 12, 1952.

Eisenhower's acceptance speech at the 1952 Republican National Convention in Chicago speech does not mention the words "Soviet Union," "Russia," "atom bomb" or "nuclear weapons." Neither did the acceptance speech of his Democratic opponent Governor Adlai Stevenson use those words or address those issues. The new president entered office with a definite internationalist outlook but with few public promises to circumscribe his dealings with the Soviet Union.

By 1956 both major party nominees are aware of and responsive to the dangers of nuclear war and both pledged in their acceptance speeches to avoid such war. Eisenhower said

We are in the era of the thermo-nuclear bomb that can obliterate cities and can be delivered across continents. With such weapons, war has become, not just tragic, but

²⁷¹ Herbert Brownell with John Burke, *Advising Ike, The Memoirs Of Herbert Brownell*, (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1993) 95.

preposterous. With such weapons, there can be no victory for anyone. Plainly, the objective now must be to see that such a war does not occur at all.²⁷²

Governor Stevenson, once again the Democratic nominee said in his acceptance speech that,

Other forces, growing yearly in potency, dispute with us the direction of our times. Here more than anywhere guidance and illumination are needed in the terrifying century of the hydrogen bomb. Here more than anywhere we must move, and rapidly, to repair the ravages of the past four years to America's repute and influence abroad.

We must move with speed and confidence to reverse the spread of Communism. We must strengthen the political and economic fabric of our alliances. We must launch new programs to meet the challenge of the vast social revolution that is sweeping the world and turn the violent forces of change to the side of freedom.

We must protect the new nations in the exercise of their full independence; and we must help other peoples out of Communist or colonial servitude along the hard road to freedom.

And we must place our nation where it belongs in the eyes of the world -- at the head of the struggle for peace. For in this nuclear age peace is no longer a visionary ideal. It has become an absolute, imperative necessity."²⁷³

At the beginning of Eisenhower's term in office he confronted an international situation with uncertain and war weary allies, determined efforts by former colonies to obtain their freedom and an ongoing confrontation with the Soviet Union fraught with misunderstanding, mistrust and danger. American forces had been involved in heavy fighting with communist North Korean and Chinese forces on the Korean peninsula for two

²⁷² Dwight Eisenhower, "Speech Accepting the Republican Nomination for President," August 23, 1956. Online by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10583>.

²⁷³ Adlai Stevenson, "Speech Accepting the Democratic Party Nomination for President," August 17, 1956. Online by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=75172>.

and one half years. Fighting had surged back and forth across the peninsula, from just short of the North Korean border with China at the Yalu River to the Pusan perimeter in the south.

A wartime commander, Eisenhower entered office as a wartime president. Almost without any real discussion of alternatives, Eisenhower continued the policy of the Truman administration that the Korean conflict was not sufficiently threatening to the vital interests of the United States such that it was worth the risk of using nuclear weapons. There is some discussion that Eisenhower may have sent covert threats to the Chinese that he might expand the war or use nuclear weapons to finish the conflict. The Miller Center at the University of Virginia reports that

Nuclear weapons played a controversial role in some of Eisenhower's diplomatic initiatives, including the President's effort to end the Korean War. As promised, Eisenhower went to Korea after he was elected but before he was inaugurated. The trip provided him with no clear solution for ending the war. But during the spring of 1953, U.S. officials sent indirect hints to the Chinese government that Eisenhower might expand the war into China or even use nuclear weapons. Some historians think that these veiled threats may have encouraged the Chinese to reach a settlement, yet there is also reliable evidence that the Soviet leaders who came to power after Stalin's death in March 1953 worried about U.S. escalation and pressed for an end to the war. Both sides made concessions on the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war, and the armistice went into effect in July 1953. Korea remained divided along the 38th parallel, roughly the same boundary as when the war began in 1950.²⁷⁴

If this contention is true it marks a variation from Truman's policy. There is no indicator Truman ever considered using the atom bomb again. It may have been a bluff, and if so, it worked.

²⁷⁴ The Miller Center, "American President: Dwight D. Eisenhower," The Miller Center, <http://millercenter.org/president/eisenhower/essays/biography/5>

America in 1953 understood itself as a nation in peril, not a hegemonic power bestride a world still recovering from the ravages of 7 years of world war. Within the past four years, the Soviets had obtained the atom bomb and China had been lost to Mao Zedong's communists. Eisenhower's State of the Union address on February 2, 1953 recommended a civil defense program because America has "incontrovertible evidence that Soviet Russia possesses atomic weapons."²⁷⁵

In the fall of 1953, Eisenhower received A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on National Security Policy, referred to as NSC 162/2. The president approved the policy recommendations on October 30, 1953. Continuing NSC-68's gloomy assessment of the Soviet Union, NSC 162/2, completed after Stalin's death on March 5, 1953, described the United States situation with regard to the Soviet Union as follows:

The Soviet Threat to the United States...

2. The primary threat to the security, free institutions, and fundamental values of the United States is posed by the combination of:
 - a. Basic Soviet hostility to the non-communist world, particularly to the United States.
 - b. Great Soviet military power.
 - c. Soviet control of the international communist apparatus and other means of subversion or division of the free world.²⁷⁶

From a military perspective the outlook was bleak:

²⁷⁵ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.," February 2, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9829>.

²⁷⁶ National Security Council, "NSC 162/2, A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on Basic National Security Policy," (Washington, October 30, 1953) <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-162-2.pdf> and <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/doc18.htm>

The capability of the USSR to attack the United States with atomic weapons has been continuously growing and will be materially enhanced by hydrogen weapons. The USSR has sufficient bombs and aircraft, using one-way missions, to inflict serious damage on the United States, especially by surprise attack. The USSR soon may have the capability of dealing a crippling blow to our industrial base and our continued ability to prosecute a war. Effective defense could reduce the likelihood and intensity of a hostile attack but not eliminate the chance of a crippling blow.²⁷⁷

In a subsection titled *Defense against Soviet Power and Action* the report sets forth the crucial language describing the willingness of the administration to use nuclear weapons:

39. a. In specific situations where a warning appears desirable and feasible as an added deterrent, the United States should make clear to the USSR and Communist China, in general terms or with reference to specific areas as the situation requires, its intention to react with military force against any aggression by Soviet bloc armed forces.

b. (1) In the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions. Where the consent of an ally is required for the use of these weapons from U.S. bases on the territory of such ally, the United States should promptly obtain the advance consent of such ally for such use. The United States should also seek, as and when feasible, the understanding and approval of this policy by free nations.

(2) This policy should not be made public without further consideration by the National Security Council.²⁷⁸

Adding to the burden of a leader of the free world, only the United States could make the financial and military commitments necessary to ensure the continuation of the policy of containment and the Cold War:

Within the free world, only the United States can provide and maintain, for a period of years to come, the atomic capability to counterbalance Soviet atomic power. Thus, sufficient atomic weapons and effective means of delivery are indispensable for U.S. security. Moreover, in the face of Soviet atomic power, defense of the continental

²⁷⁷ NSC 162/2.

²⁷⁸ NSC 162/2.

United States becomes vital to effective security: to protect our striking force, our mobilization base, and our people. Such atomic capability is also a major contribution to the security of our allies, as well as of this country.²⁷⁹

Against this pessimistic internal outlook, beginning in 1953, Mr. Eisenhower also pursued a public campaign for the peaceful use of atomic energy and attempted to draw the Soviet Union into an international community effort to put atomic power to peaceful uses. In a speech commonly known as “Atoms for Peace” delivered on December 8, 1953 to the General Assembly of the United Nations, he outlined a vision for the peaceful uses of atomic energy and addressed the unprecedented strength of atomic weapons. He acknowledged the immense danger these weapons posed to the future of the world especially when the Soviet Union and the United States appeared stuck in an escalating nuclear arms race. Mr. Eisenhower reached out to the Soviet Union on the issues of the threats to peace from atomic energy, which he described as a discussion in the new language of atomic warfare. He noted that in the size and variety of the United States arsenal “atomic weapons have virtually achieved conventional status within our armed services.”²⁸⁰

This is the first effort by any world leader to begin the discussion about the control of nuclear weapons and it is worth quoting at length to describe adequately the original nuclear standoff and world situation:

If at one time the United States possessed what might have been called a monopoly of atomic power, that monopoly ceased to exist several years ago. Therefore, although our earlier start has permitted us to accumulate what is today a great quantitative advantage, the atomic realities of today comprehend two facts of even

²⁷⁹ NSC 162/2.

²⁸⁰ Dwight Eisenhower, “Address Before the General Assembly of the United Nations on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy,” December 8, 1953 Online by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9774>.

greater significance.

First, the knowledge now possessed by several nations will eventually be shared by others—possibly all others.

Second, even a vast superiority in numbers of weapons, and a consequent capability of devastating retaliation, is no preventive, of itself, against the fearful material damage and toll of human lives that would be inflicted by surprise aggression.”²⁸¹

But let no one think that the expenditure of vast sums for weapons and systems of defense can guarantee absolute safety for the cities and citizens of any nation. The awful arithmetic of the atomic bomb does not permit of any such easy solution. Even against the most powerful defense, an aggressor in possession of the effective minimum number of atomic bombs for a surprise attack could probably place a sufficient number of his bombs on the chosen targets to cause hideous damage.²⁸²

It is not enough to take this weapon out of the hands of the soldiers. It must be put into the hands of those who will know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace... peaceful power from atomic energy is no dream of the future. That capability, already proved, is here—now—today. Who can doubt, if the entire body of the world's scientists and engineers had adequate amounts of fissionable material with which to test and develop their ideas, that this capability would rapidly be transformed into universal, efficient, and economic usage.

To hasten the day when fear of the atom will begin to disappear from the minds of people, and the governments of the East and West, there are certain steps that can be taken now.²⁸³

Mr. Eisenhower called on

The Governments principally involved, to the extent permitted by elementary prudence, to begin now and continue to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an International Atomic Energy Agency. We would expect that such an agency would be set up under the aegis of the United Nations.

The Atomic Energy Agency could be made responsible for the impounding, storage, and protection of the contributed fissionable and other materials. The ingenuity of

²⁸¹ Eisenhower, “Address on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.”

²⁸² Eisenhower, “Address on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.”

²⁸³ Eisenhower, “Address on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.”

our scientists will provide special safe conditions under which such a bank of fissionable material can be made essentially immune to surprise seizure.

The more important responsibility of this Atomic Energy Agency would be to devise methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. Experts would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs of agriculture, medicine, and other peaceful activities. A special purpose would be to provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world. Thus the contributing powers would be dedicating some of their strength to serve the needs rather than the fears of mankind.²⁸⁴

He finished by pledging the cooperation of the United States in any such efforts provided the Soviet Union pledges the same,

The United States would be more than willing--it would be *proud* to take up with others "principally involved" the development of plans whereby such peaceful use of atomic energy would be expedited. Of those "principally involved" the Soviet Union must, of course, be one.²⁸⁵

While Eisenhower urged that atomic energy be directed to peaceful uses, and that there be created an International Atomic Energy Agency to direct those efforts on an international level, he does not call for the elimination of nuclear weapons, offer any American disarmament proposals or renounce the first use of nuclear weapons in the event of armed conflict. Even so, it was a breathtaking proposal and an attempt to break the nuclear deadlock that continued to strangle the superpowers in an atmosphere for fear insecurity and mutual distrust.

In the aftermath of the Soviet rejection of the "Atoms for Peace" offer, Stephen Ambrose writes that:

A great opportunity had been lost. Eisenhower's proposal of atoms for peace was the most generous, and the most serious offer on controlling the arms race ever made by

²⁸⁴ Eisenhower, "Address on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy."

²⁸⁵ Eisenhower, "Address on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy."

an American president. All previous offers and all that followed contained clauses about on-site inspection that the Americans knew in advance were unacceptable to the Russians. But it was the strength of Eisenhower's proposal, the measure of his genius, and the proof of his readiness to try something new to get out of the arms race that Atoms for Peace seemed to have a real chance of acceptance. It was not loaded against the Russians. Eisenhower believed that, to the contrary, the proposal had to be tempting to them.²⁸⁶

But the opportunity was short lived and the Soviets never actually pursued the chance to get off the nuclear treadmill that Mr. Eisenhower had offered.

Some discussion had occurred inside the Eisenhower administration about the use of nuclear weapons during the first term. The policy, as it emerged, was to decline the use of nuclear weapons in tangential instances not directly involving the existence and fate of the United States. In the spring of 1954 in a major war scare based on the events in Vietnam, Mr. Eisenhower addressed the issue of preventive war at a news conference. He commented on the idea being bandied about in Washington and within his own administration about a preventive nuclear war to reporters,

I don't believe there is such a thing; and, frankly, I wouldn't even listen to anyone seriously, they came in and talked about such a thing. It seems to me that when, by definition, the term is just ridiculous in itself, there is no use in going any further.²⁸⁷

But the pressure to use nuclear weapons as a cheap and powerful alternative to conventional forces continued. Stephen Ambrose reports that,

Five times in 1954, virtually the entire NSC, JCS, and State Department recommended that he intervene in Asia, even using atomic bombs against China. First, in April, as the Dien Bien Phu situation grew critical. Second, in May, on the eve of the fall of Dien Bien Phu. Third, in late June, when the French said the Chinese were about to enter the Indochina conflict. Fourth, in September, when the Chinese began shelling Quemoy and Matsu. Fifth, in November, when the Chinese

²⁸⁶ Stephen Ambrose, *Eisenhower Soldier and President*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990) 343.

²⁸⁷ Ambrose, *Eisenhower Soldier and President*, 369.

announced prison terms for the American flyers. Five times in one year, the experts advise the president to launch an atomic strike against China. Five times, he said no.²⁸⁸

It was becoming clear in the early years of the nuclear age that an unspoken line was emerging: nuclear weapons would not be used in the proxy struggles between the superpowers. Before the end of his first term Mr. Eisenhower tried once more for a breakthrough on the arms control issue with a new idea. The "Open Skies" proposal was offered as a "Statement on Disarmament Presented at the Geneva Conference" on July 21, 1955. He said:

The American people are determined to maintain and if necessary increase this armed strength for as long a period as is necessary to safeguard peace and to maintain our security.

Therefore the United States government is prepared to enter into a sound and reliable agreement making possible the reduction of armament.

No sound and reliable agreement can be made unless it is completely covered by an inspection and reporting system adequate to support every portion of the agreement.²⁸⁹

Mr. Eisenhower set forth the central question of verification in arms control agreements. There are not only structural and operational issues of reliability, but also the remedies for a breach of the agreement. Into the hostile relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1955 he dropped a dramatic proposal:

I propose, therefore, that we take a practical step, that we begin an arrangement, very quickly, as between ourselves--immediately. These steps would include:

²⁸⁸ Ambrose, *Eisenhower Soldier and President*, 379.

²⁸⁹ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Statement on Disarmament Presented at the Geneva Conference," July 21, 1955. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10306>.

To give to each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments, from beginning to end, from one end of our countries to the other; lay out the establishments and provide the blueprints to each other.

Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country--we to provide you the facilities within our country, ample facilities for aerial reconnaissance, where you can make all the pictures you choose and take them to your own country to study, you to provide exactly the same facilities for us and we to make these examinations, and by this step to convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing tension.²⁹⁰

These issues were addressed in an environment where any failure of the verification mechanism or the remedies in an arms control agreement could lead to a complete loss of national security and freedom of national action. He framed the questions as: "Is certainty against surprise aggression attainable by inspection? Could violations be discovered promptly and effectively counteracted?"²⁹¹

Just as with the original Atoms for Peace proposal, Open Skies went nowhere. The Soviet Union, afraid of being exposed as vastly weaker than it appeared, could not afford to permit the Americans access to such information or allow them to understand the real nature and amount of Soviet military strength. The combined policy formulation of deterrence and containment continued unabated.

The basic American military posture, deterrence, was clear and it permeated the Eisenhower administration to the extent that it appeared in numerous public statements even ones not meant as a major policy address from the president. In a public announcement, "Statement by the President Reviewing the Government's Policies and Actions with Respect

²⁹⁰ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Statement on Disarmament Presented at the Geneva Conference

²⁹¹ Eisenhower, "Statement on Disarmament Presented at the Geneva Conference."

to the Development and Testing of Nuclear Weapons” issued October 24, 1956, Mr.

Eisenhower stated:

America has repeatedly stated its readiness, indeed its anxiety, to put all nuclear weapons permanently aside--to stop all tests of such weapons--to devote some of our huge expenditures for armament to the greater cause of mankind's welfare--to do all these things whenever, and as soon as, one basic requirement is met. This requirement is that we, as a nation, and all peoples, know safety from attack.

In this spirit and in this awareness, we as a nation have two tasks. First: we must--and do--seek assiduously to evolve agreements with other nations that will promote trust and understanding among all peoples. Second: at the same time, and until that international trust is firmly secured, we must--and do--make sure that the quality and quantity of our military weapons command such respect as to dissuade any other nation from the temptation of aggression.

Thus do we develop weapons, not to wage war, but to prevent war.²⁹²

Shorn of the political rhetoric, Eisenhower’s description of United States policy about nuclear weapons is quite clear:

America has repeatedly stated its readiness... to put all nuclear weapons permanently aside ...as soon as, one basic requirement is met...that we, as a nation... know safety from attack...until that international trust is firmly secured, we must--and do--make sure that the quality and quantity of our military weapons command such respect as to dissuade any other nation from the temptation of aggression.²⁹³

Speaking at a news conference on June 5, 1957 Mr. Eisenhower discussed disarmament and the emerging concept of a ban on the testing of new nuclear weapons.

Q. Chalmers M. Roberts, Washington Post: In speaking, sir, of your desire for what I believe you call the total and complete ban on tests under disarmament agreement, do you mean, sir, that you would be willing to agree to such a ban under this first step agreement, as part of this first step agreement, with the Soviet Union?

²⁹² Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Statement by the President Reviewing the Government's Policies and Actions With Respect to the Development and Testing of Nuclear Weapons.," October 24, 1956. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10667>.

²⁹³ Eisenhower: "Statement With Respect to the Development and Testing of Nuclear Weapons,"

THE PRESIDENT. Only you could do that, I think, in toto the way I expressed it there, in a complete thing. You could do that only if the same agreement were so couched, so made, that you could see there would be no more atomic bombs used in war.

Q. Mr. Roberts: But it could be as part of the so-called first step if it were firm enough?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, only if it brought in that other part, though, that we were going to eliminate these things as weapons of war, and there were an inspection system that could make sure that that was coming about; otherwise, you couldn't do it.

Q. Mr. Roberts: I am not clear, sir. Are you speaking of the so-called fourth country problem?

THE PRESIDENT. No, not at all. Other fourth countries have got a right to do as they please. I am saying that we couldn't enter into any program which forever banned tests unless we also had a system which we knew would and could be convinced would forever ban the use of these weapons in war.²⁹⁴

Over the course of his administration, Mr. Eisenhower's nuclear weapons policy was impacted by technical changes in the scientific subject matter of nuclear weapons while the international situation remained fairly static. Technology in the form of bigger bombs and better delivery systems moved ahead, but the lines between East and West were stable during his administration and after the armistice in Korea in the summer of 1953, the two sides faced each other in a Cold War.

Eisenhower presided over two revolutions in strategic weapons systems: the advent of nuclear plenty, including the hydrogen bomb, and the emergence of the ballistic missile for both sides.²⁹⁵

²⁹⁴ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "The President's News Conference," June 5, 1957. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10807>.

²⁹⁵ Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, *Waging Peace, How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 4.

Mr. Eisenhower oversaw a huge expansion in America's nuclear arsenal to a reported 18,000 nuclear weapons when he left the White House.²⁹⁶ He approved the development and production of the B-52, a manned eight-engine strategic nuclear bomber designed to reach targets deep in the Soviet Union, and the submarine-fired Polaris missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.²⁹⁷

As the nuclear stalemate dragged on some attention turned to the issue of nuclear testing in the atmosphere. A test ban was discussed where all nuclear weapons capable states would cease to test their weapons, which had become physically smaller and easier to deliver and yielded a larger and more powerful explosions.

Especially frustrating was the problem of a test ban. The American position, that the United States would cease testing nuclear weapons only when the Soviets simultaneously accepted a ban on further weapons production, had been consistently turned down by the Russians. Instead, Bulganin proposed, on December 10, 1957, a two or three year moratorium on nuclear tests.²⁹⁸

The original test ban idea had been floated as a separate agreement independent of a universal arms control agreement by the Soviet Union in 1955. The United States, Britain and France resisted this idea insisting that it was unenforceable and unverifiable in the absence of a more complete agreement.

On October 17, 1956 the Soviets tried again with a public letter from Nikolai Bulganin, Chairman of the Soviet Union's Council of Ministers, to which Eisenhower took offense as an unwarranted attempt to interfere in the middle of the United States general

²⁹⁶ Howard Jones, *Crucible of Power A History of American Foreign Relations From 1945* (Lanham Maryland: Roman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009) 64.

²⁹⁷ Jones, *Crucible of Power*, 64.

²⁹⁸ Ambrose, *Eisenhower Soldier and President*, 457.

election campaign. Mr. Eisenhower's insistence on verification and reliability was plain in his response

The United States has for a long time been intensively examining, evaluating and planning dependable means of stopping the arms race and reducing and controlling armaments. These explorations include the constant examination and evaluation of nuclear tests. To be effective, and not simply a mirage, all these plans require systems of inspection and control, both of which your Government has steadfastly refused to accept. Even my "Open Skies" proposal of mutual aerial inspection, suggested as a first step, you rejected.²⁹⁹

In 1959 the United States and Britain reversed this position and opened the way to treaty banning nuclear weapons tests if an acceptable verification method could be found.³⁰⁰

The Soviet Union demonstrated two significant changes in its capabilities during the Eisenhower administration. The first was the launch of the Soviet Union's Sputnik, the first artificial earth satellite in 1957. The second was the May 1, 1960 shooting down of an American U-2 spy plane by Soviet air defenses deep inside Soviet territory. The emotional and mental challenge of the Sputnik launch caused an American a crisis of confidence and opened the question of the "missile gap." Americans feared the Soviets were building ICBMs on a crash basis. Mr. Eisenhower rejected the idea of a missile gap.

The problem was that his access to U-2 intelligence information which informed his opinion was not something he could share without revealing the U-2 program itself which

²⁹⁹ Dwight D Eisenhower: "Letter to Nikolai Bulganin, Chairman, Council of Ministers, U.S.S.R." October 21, 1956. Online by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10663>.

³⁰⁰ Department of State, "Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests In The Atmosphere, In Outer Space And Under Water," Online by Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/ltbt1.html>

would result in furious Soviet protests. In the end Mr. Eisenhower insisted the U-2 program be kept secret.³⁰¹ At the end of his second term in 1960, Mr. Eisenhower had decided that a test ban treaty as a first step towards disarmament would be a priority for the rest of his term.³⁰² In February he announced he would accept a treaty on all tests, atmospheric, and underground tests "which can be monitored."³⁰³

In 1960 as he prepared to go to Paris to meet Khrushchev, Mr. Eisenhower was hopeful that a genuine breakthrough in talks with the Soviets on nuclear testing and eventual disarmament was possible. The shooting down of the U-2 made the secrecy of that program unnecessary, but the resulting damage to US-Soviet relations made any real arms control progress during Mr. Eisenhower's administration impossible.

For Mr. Eisenhower, consistently and throughout his presidency, the key to any arms control or disarmament proposal were intertwined problems of verification and reliability. As he told the Soviets in a letter to Nikolai Bulganin, Chairman, Council of Ministers, on January 13, 1958, "The capacity to verify the fulfillment of commitments is of the essence in all these matters..."³⁰⁴

Mr. Eisenhower's policy consistently reflected the realist assumption that nations act on interests, and that foreign policy at the level of national security must be driven by the assessment of the capabilities and intents of other states in an environment dominated by

³⁰¹ Ambrose, *Eisenhower Soldier and President*, 504.

³⁰² Ambrose, *Eisenhower Soldier and President*, 504.

³⁰³ Ambrose, *Eisenhower Soldier and President*, 504.

³⁰⁴ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Letter to Nikolai Bulganin, Chairman, Council of Ministers, U.S.S.R.," January 13, 1958. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11345>.

systemic anarchy and national self-help. Being the second most powerful nuclear weapons state was never an option. This approach distorted in the atmosphere of the Cold War and nuclear arms race produced a unique defense logic of its own described by Stephen Ambrose as:

Thus did the logic of the nuclear arms race takeover. It was a logic unique to itself, with no connection to experience our reality. Everyone agreed that the sole purpose of making atomic weapons was to deter the enemy from aggression. All agreed to deter you need only be in a position to threaten to destroy one major city.³⁰⁵

Eisenhower and the Americans wanted -- demanded -- a clear American superiority. How they would use that lead -- except to ensure deterrence, which could be achieved with 100 bombs anyway -- they did not know.³⁰⁶

Eisenhower and Oil

On the issue of Saudi Arabia and its oil Mr. Eisenhower essentially began where Mr. Truman left off and the minimal national security implications remained much the same. As Aramco gained in power and position within Saudi Arabia, the company itself became a concern of the U.S. State Department. A February 1951 State Department memorandum suggested that Aramco should be carefully guided and watched. The company could do a great deal of good in the battle against communism and the promotion of American interests in the area.³⁰⁷ But, State was behind the curve in Aramco-Saudi relations, and Raymond Hare, who arrived as U.S. Ambassador in 1950 found that he had little to do with Aramco or oil issues. Aramco was autonomous in many ways and able to do things like helping with

³⁰⁵ Ambrose, *Eisenhower Soldier and President*, 344.

³⁰⁶ Ambrose, *Eisenhower Soldier and President*, 344.

³⁰⁷ Lippman, *Inside The Mirage*, 46.

sanitation that might have proved embarrassing coming from the embassy itself, while on the other hand Aramco was more than happy to let the embassy deal with the Saudis' anger over Israel.³⁰⁸

Mr. Eisenhower understood the significance of the Middle East and less than two months after his inauguration met with the Prince Faisal, Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, at the White House on March 2, 1953. The statement issued after the meeting said,

President expressed his great pleasure at having the opportunity of receiving so distinguished a representative of a country with which the United States enjoys especially close relations. He expressed his concern over some evidence that there had lately occurred a deterioration in relations between the Arab nations and the United States. He stated that it would be his firm purpose to seek to restore the spirit of confidence and trust which had previously characterized these relations and he hoped that the Arab leaders would be inspired by the same purpose.³⁰⁹

During the 1950's Saudi foreign policy was also driven by an increasing struggle for the hearts and minds of the Arab and Muslim world with Egypt's leader Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser had emerged as the undisputed leader of Egypt after the 1952 coup that overthrew King Farouk.³¹⁰ Saudi Arabia was pulled further into the American orbit as Egypt looked to the Soviet Union for help. An "Arab Cold War" resulted with Egypt playing the role of revolutionary leader of the anti-colonial and often anti-western forces and the Saudis organizing resistance to Egypt and Nasser along religious lines.³¹¹

³⁰⁸ Lippman, *Inside The Mirage*, 47.

³⁰⁹ Dwight Eisenhower, Statement Following Discussions with Prince Faisal, Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia. *March 2, 1953*, Online by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9689>.

³¹⁰ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil* 70.

³¹¹ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil* 70.

As early as 1955 the Eisenhower administration was acknowledging the importance of oil to our national economy but in a way unfamiliar to us in the 21st century. In a Memorandum for Arthur S. Flemming, Director of Defense Mobilization, Concerning the Distribution of Petroleum Supplies Dated October 12, 1956, the President requested “plans that will be helpful in assuring the efficiency and adequacy of the distribution of petroleum supplies in the foreseeable future in the free world.”³¹² He further states that,

The study should proceed, of course, on the assumption that plans which are developed are to be consistent with the requests that you have made to oil importers to voluntarily keep imports of crude oil into this country at a level where they do not exceed significantly the proportion that imports bore to the production of domestic crude oil in 1954.³¹³

The president was concerned with the supply of oil in the world market but, his concern about price was not the price of gasoline we follow today, but that oil imports not undercut the price of domestic crude oil by oversupplying the market.

The Republican Party Platform in 1956 acknowledged the strategic importance of oil from Saudi Arabia and the Middle East with these words,

The Middle East has been strengthened by the defensive unity of the four "northern tier" countries—Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan—which hold gateways to the vast oil resources upon which depend the industry and military strength of the free world.³¹⁴

³¹² Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Memorandum for Arthur S. Flemming, Director of Defense Mobilization, Concerning the Distribution of Petroleum Supplies," October 12, 1956. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10637>.

³¹³ Eisenhower: "Memorandum for Arthur S. Flemming,"

³¹⁴ Republican Party Platforms: "Republican Party Platform of 1956," August 20, 1956. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25838>.

Oil and the Middle East, as security issues were fairly quiet during Mr. Eisenhower's first four years but all that changed in 1956. The Suez Crisis commenced with an Israeli attack on Egypt aimed at securing the Suez Canal, with the support of Britain and France on October 29, 1956. This placed Saudi Arabia in a very difficult position. King Saud felt he was losing the support of the Arab world to Nasser. Eight days into the crisis the King acted and Saudi Arabia embargoed all oil shipments to Britain and France, which, given the distribution of refining capacity and distribution facilities in Western Europe, turned out to be an embargo against the entire continent. This was the first time Saudi Arabia had used oil as a political weapon, and it would do so two more times in the ensuing 20 years, in 1967 after the Six Day war with Israel and 1973 after the Yom Kippur war as well.³¹⁵ This first oil embargo did not cause the impact on the United States that the 1973 embargo produced, because, in 1956, the ability to set the world market price of oil still rested with the Texas Railroad Commission and would not move to the Saudi Oil Ministry until 1971.

But the Suez Crisis did indicate to the president the need for clarity in United States policy in the Middle East and the significant risks of misunderstanding that emanated from the absence of a clear statement on American interests and intentions in the region. Thus was created the Eisenhower Doctrine concerning the Middle East, which was contained in a speech to a Joint Session of Congress on January 5, 1957.

The United States, Mr. Eisenhower declared, would render,

³¹⁵ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*. 71.

...such assistance and cooperation to include the employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid.³¹⁶

Any country opposed to Communism would be eligible for aid in various forms. In the president's words, his proposal,

...would, first of all, authorize the United States to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

It would, in the second place, authorize the Executive to undertake in the same region programs of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations which desires such aid.³¹⁷

Oil was of course one of the key considerations, and Mr. Eisenhower directly acknowledged that in his speech, saying of the Middle East,

It contains about two thirds of the presently known oil deposits of the world and it normally supplies the petroleum needs of many nations of Europe, Asia and Africa. The nations of Europe are peculiarly dependent upon this supply, and this dependency relates to transportation as well as to production! This has been vividly demonstrated since the closing of the Suez Canal and some of the pipelines.³¹⁸

Reporting on the situation to the nation again in February 1957, he continued to stress much the same themes,

With reference to the passage into and through the Gulf of Aqaba, we expressed the conviction that the Gulf constitutes international waters, and that no nation has the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf. We announced that the United States was prepared to exercise this right itself and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right... The Middle East is a land-bridge between the Eurasian and African continents. Millions of tons of commerce are transmitted

³¹⁶ Dwight Eisenhower: "Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East," January 5, 1957. Online by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project* <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11007>.

³¹⁷ Eisenhower, "Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East,"

³¹⁸ Eisenhower, "Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East,"

through it annually. Its own products, especially petroleum, are essential to Europe and to the Western world.³¹⁹

On March 10, 1959 the President signed a Proclamation Governing Petroleum Imports. The program was designed to address the problem of oversupply.

During the past few years, a surplus of world producing capacity has tended to disrupt free world markets, and, unquestionably, severe disruption would have occurred in the United States and elsewhere except for cutbacks in United States production under the conservation programs of the various state regulatory bodies.³²⁰

To insure a steady price of oil for domestic producers the president sought a program “restricting imports to a level that does not threaten to impair security.”³²¹ It was oversupply that was the problem, and in realist terms the threat to the United States petroleum industry was literally the enormous capacity of foreign oil producers to oversupply the market and crash the price of oil.

On oil, Mr. Eisenhower had charted a course only slightly different than his predecessors. More freely than presidents before him, Mr. Eisenhower allowed corporate interests to represent American interests. The Eisenhower administration,

...promoted private initiative as an enlightened way of doing business, as a means to differentiate the American presence abroad from that of the Europeans and the Soviets and as a way to advance economic growth and pacify Arab Nationalism.³²²

³¹⁹ Dwight Eisenhower, “Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Situation in the Middle East,” February 20, 1957. Online by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10980>.

³²⁰ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Statement by the President Upon Signing Proclamation Governing Petroleum Imports," March 10, 1959. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11676>.

³²¹ Eisenhower: "Statement Signing Proclamation Governing Petroleum Imports,"

³²² Nathan Citino, *From Arab Nationalism To OPEC: Eisenhower King Saud And He Making Of US Saudi Relations*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002) 15.

But, by the end of the Eisenhower administration American policy in relation to the Saudi oil fields was still consistent with Mr. Truman's policy eight years before. Saudi Arabia's oil fields were to be kept in friendly hands; Soviet influence in the Middle East oil fields was to be opposed at every turn; and the supply of Saudi oil would not be allowed to undercut prices set by domestic American producers.

Analysis: Truman to Eisenhower

On the issues of nuclear weapons and containment of the Soviet Union the policy of the United States in the context of the transition from Mr. Truman to Mr. Eisenhower appears seamless and consistent. Indeed Mr. Eisenhower ran for office to prevent a return to prewar isolationism. Anarchy continued as the defining condition of the international order. Neither the United Nations nor any other international structure served as anything more than a forum for discussions between states who were indisputably their own masters. Both Mr. Truman and Mr. Eisenhower controlled the policy, and, in both administrations, on matters of national security the President spoke for the nation. The United States possessed clear and identifiable decision making for the creation and execution foreign policy, through the President and the National Security Council and the Departments of State and Defense. The foreign policy activities examined here were made and executed in public. Mr. Truman and Mr. Eisenhower both treated nuclear weapons as a vital national security issue.

While this analysis examines the behavior of the United States, we acknowledge here that this test also posits the existence of a second unit in the international arena in response to whom foreign policy is made and executed. Both the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia constitute the second nation necessary for the test in these situations. The analysis also

reflects the interrelation of the overall United States policy of containment of the Soviet Union with the actions taken by the United States in its relationship with Saudi Arabia and the Middle East in response to the Soviet Union's attempts to expand its influence in the Persian Gulf with an aim of achieving dominance of the Saudi oil fields.

The relative capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union did change over the years from 1945 to 1961. In 1945 at the beginning, the United States had a nuclear monopoly and relied on a propeller driven subsonic manned bomber for a delivery system. By 1952 both nations possessed deliverable nuclear weapons, a parity of capability that remained through Eisenhower's term. Any nuclear war fighting would be conducted with manned bombers. Missile delivery systems were pursued by both countries and the launch of Sputnik while shocking display of scientific and technical capability on the part to the Soviet Union did not demonstrate that they had developed a nuclear armed intercontinental ballistic missile, only that it was only a matter of time before such capability became a reality. Both nations developed that capability in stages in the late 1950's and into the early 1960's. Thus for both the United States and the Soviet Union the ability to influence the behavior of other states or each other remained relatively stable and the world was locked into a system of two mutually hostile superpowers dominating the international arena.

Evidence which seems to confirm the Unitary Actor Assumption as an effective predictive theory is found in two major developments in the capabilities of other states in the international system during the Eisenhower administration. The first major change in capability comes on October 4, 1957, with the Soviet launch of Sputnik, the first artificial Earth satellite. Sputnik came as a surprise to the United States and President Eisenhower. He

was surprised by the intensity of the American response to Sputnik. He understood the fear that Sputnik created but he was unready for the way Sputnik simply swept aside what had been basic American assumptions of national technical competence and caused a nationwide crisis of self-confidence. Sputnik demonstrated a technical capability in Soviet missile design and construction that American intelligence had previously underestimated. This led to concern about a "missile gap." America raced to catch up with the Soviet achievement in space.

The second change in capability came in May 1960 with a demonstrated ability of the Soviet Union to shoot down the U-2; a Central Intelligence Agency operated reconnaissance aircraft flying 70,000 feet over the Soviet Union. Previously, American intelligence had flown at these altitudes over the frustrated Soviets with impunity. After Major Francis Gary Powers, U-2 reconnaissance flight was brought down by a Soviet surface-to-air missile; the United States entered a period of substantial concern and uncertainty about Soviet intentions and capabilities. This lasted until space based reconnaissance satellite imagery finally met and then exceeded the capacity of the U-2 to show American intelligence analysts what was happening on the ground inside the Soviet Union.

Thus during the eight years of the Eisenhower administration, he confronted three significant changes in Soviet capabilities, 1) the accumulation of a stock of deliverable nuclear weapons, 2) the launch of Sputnik, the first artificial earth satellite, and 3) the demonstrated ability of the Soviets to shoot down the U-2 high altitude spy plane. However, none of these events precipitated a change in United States policy towards the Soviet Union

and nuclear weapons. Indeed in the posturing that followed these events, the basic three pronged policy seemed to harden into the national consciousness. At the end of the Eisenhower administration the policy about nuclear weapons was consistent with the policy at the end of Mr. Truman's presidency which can be summarized as:

1. The United States has nuclear weapons at the ready, and without absolutely reliable, verifiable inspections to ensure against any cheating by any party, will not give them up.
2. The United States will use nuclear weapons if attacked.
3. To ensure the destruction of any foe after a surprise attack, the United States will maintain a nuclear arsenal superior in strength and numbers over any prospective enemy.

A minor inconsistency is that Mr. Eisenhower did not develop American conventional forces to the extent contemplated as necessary in 1948 by NSC-68. For essentially budgetary reasons, he relied on a nuclear deterrent to contain the Soviet Union. While the Eisenhower administration's bellicose Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, publicly derided containment, he practiced it.³²³ On the issues of containment and nuclear weapons policy in relation to the Soviet Union the evidence is clear, that the transition from Mr. Truman to Mr. Eisenhower did not greatly affect the international behavior of the United States which result tends to verify the unitary actor assumption.

The issue of Saudi Arabia and the security of its oil fields as a source of supply for the western democracies rose in importance in the period from 1945 to 1961 as the birth of the Eisenhower Doctrine demonstrates. There is no indication that the Eisenhower Doctrine is anything other than a response uncertainty in the Middle East and distrust of Soviet

³²³ Jones, *Crucible of Power*, 63.

intentions. The Eisenhower Doctrine was not a result of domestic political pressures within the United States.

During the early years of his presidency, Mr. Eisenhower was quite consistent with Mr. Truman's minimal involvement in the region. As the decade progressed, worries about the spread of communism into the area through Egypt or Iran led to the Eisenhower doctrine as part containment of communism and part a desire to keep the Persian Gulf oil fields open to the United States.

During the 1950's, Saudi foreign policy was also driven by an increasing struggle for the hearts and minds of the Arab and Muslim world, with Egypt's leader Gamal Abdel Nasser in the "Arab Cold War." The Suez Crisis had emboldened Nasser. Britain and France were no longer the stabilizing forces in the region. On direct oil issues, Mr. Eisenhower allowed corporate interests to represent American interests. Throughout the course of the decade Saudi Arabia was pulled further into the American orbit.

On access to oil and the U.S. Saudi relationship the evidence is less plentiful. Mr. Eisenhower's pro-business policies had a larger presence in administration policy about oil than on nuclear issues. For our purposes it is sufficient to note Mr. Eisenhower's concern about foreign producers was the possibility that an oversupply caused by their production would undermine the price of oil on the world market. American access to a steady supply of imported oil at a world market price had not yet become an issue of national security significance. Coupled with the Eisenhower Doctrine the pattern of acting on national interests in response to international events is clear.

This analysis of the Truman to Eisenhower transition, in terms of nuclear weapons, disarmament proposals and the Soviet Union, and in the context of American policy towards Saudi Arabia and Saudi oil tends to verify the unitary actor assumption.

Eisenhower, Republican to Kennedy, Democrat: January 20, 1961

Kennedy and Nuclear Weapons

Often the presidency of John F. Kennedy is thought of as the height of the Cold War. From the Bay of Pigs to the Cuban missile crisis to the atmospheric Test Ban Treaty, the struggle with an aggressive Soviet Union and international communism defined America and America's goals in the world community. From the beginning of the Kennedy presidency and awareness of the dangers of nuclear weapons and nuclear arms race, permeated political atmosphere in which the administration operated. Even before his election, Mr. Kennedy knew his place in history might well be defined by his handling of the issues of nuclear war, nonproliferation and relations with the Soviet Union.

The Democratic Party Platform of 1960 set forth the party's concern with the issues:

A fragile power balance sustained by mutual nuclear terror does not, however, constitute peace. We must regain the initiative on the entire international front with effective new policies to create the conditions for peace.³²⁴

That platform stated that arms control was indeed on the table as an issue as well:

A primary task is to develop responsible proposals that will help break the deadlock on arms control. Such proposals should include means for ending nuclear tests under workable safeguards, cutting back nuclear weapons, reducing conventional forces, preserving outer space for peaceful purposes, preventing surprise attack, and limiting the risk of accidental war.³²⁵

³²⁴ Democratic Party Platform 1960, Online by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25839>.

³²⁵ Democratic Party Platform 1960.

As a candidate Mr. Kennedy believed that the United States lived in a dangerous world in which the Soviets held a technical advantage in rocketry and that the missile gap, illustrated by the Soviet Union's first successful launch of an inter-continental ballistic missile, followed closely by the Soviet Union's first successful launch of an artificial satellite orbiting Earth, Sputnik, was real and dangerous. That loss of technical leadership had to be promptly addressed if the West was to defend itself against international communist aggression. The "missile gap" became a campaign issue for Kennedy in 1960. Kennedy found fertile ground in America's shaken self-confidence following Sputnik and the collapse of the Paris summit between Mr. Eisenhower and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in May 1960, a diplomatic disaster driven by the Soviet Union's successful downing of an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft piloted by Major Francis Gary Powers, deep inside Soviet territory on May 1, 1960. The Democratic Platform had a plank promising to restore American leadership in Atomic energy which they argued had been lost under four years of Republican rule:

Atomic Energy

The United States became pre-eminent in the development of atomic energy under Democratic Administrations.

The Republican Administration, despite its glowing promises of "Atoms for Peace," has permitted the gradual deterioration of United States leadership in atomic development both at home and abroad.

In order to restore United States leadership in atomic development, the new Democratic Administration will:

...

7. Provide a balanced and flexible nuclear defense capability, including the augmentation of the nuclear submarine fleet.³²⁶

³²⁶ Democratic Party Platform 1960.

The 1960 Republican Party Platform also addressed the problems of nuclear weapons and disarmament:

We are similarly ready to negotiate and to institute realistic methods and safeguards for disarmament, and for the suspension of nuclear tests. We advocate an early agreement by all nations to forego nuclear tests in the atmosphere, and the suspension of other tests as verification techniques permit... We have deep concern about the mounting nuclear arms race. This concern leads us to seek disarmament and nuclear agreements. And an equal concern to protect all peoples from nuclear danger, leads us to insist that such agreements have adequate safeguards.³²⁷

Once again the fundamental lack of trust between the United States and the Soviet Union led to an American insistence on safeguards and verification techniques which presented a stumbling block in negotiations between the superpowers from the very beginning. In an oblique response to the concerns about a "missile gap" the Republican Platform pledged that American technology would never lag behind any adversary for any reason:

As rapidly as we perfect the new generations of weapons we must arm ourselves effectively and without delay. In this respect the nation stands now at one of the new points of departure. We must never allow our technology, particularly in nuclear and propulsion fields, to lag for any reason until such time as we have dependable and honest safeguards of inspection and control.³²⁸

Neither party platform in 1960 mentioned oil imports, or Saudi Arabia, although both made obligatory mention of the need to keep the Middle East free from Soviet influence.

³²⁷ Republican Party Platform 1960, Online by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25839>.

³²⁸ Republican Party Platform 1960.

Kennedy's acceptance speech at the Memorial Coliseum in Los Angeles on July 15, 1960, directly addressed the nation's fears about nuclear weapons, the "missile gap" and a Cold War that seemed to be favoring communist expansion on many fronts:

Abroad, the balance of power is shifting. There are new and more terrible weapons--new and uncertain nations--new pressures of population and deprivation. One-third of the world, it has been said, may be free--but one-third is the victim of cruel repression--and the other one-third is rocked by the pangs of poverty, hunger and envy. More energy is released by the awakening of these new nations than by the fission of the atom itself. Meanwhile, Communist influence has penetrated further into Asia, stood astride the Middle East and now festers some ninety miles off the coast of Florida.³²⁹

During the presidential debates on October 13, 1960 Kennedy gave this answer directly addressing disarmament and the "missile gap" tying together the crosscurrents of American defense and foreign policy; seeking enough military strength to be secure and second-to-none while searching for opportunities to lessen tension and military spending though negotiated agreements about nuclear weapons and arms control.

...then I believe that we should move full time on our missile production, particularly on Minuteman and on Polaris. It may be a long period, but we must - we must get started immediately. Now on the question of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, I must say that I feel that another effort should be made by a new Administration in January of 1961, to renew negotiations with the Soviet Union and see whether it's possible to come to some conclusion which will lessen the chances of contamination of the atmosphere, and also lessen the chances that other powers will begin to possess a nuclear capacity.³³⁰

³²⁹ John F. Kennedy: "Address of Senator John F. Kennedy Accepting the Democratic Party Nomination for the Presidency of the United States - Memorial Coliseum, Los Angeles," July 15, 1960. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25966>.

³³⁰ Presidential Candidates Debates: "Presidential Debate Broadcast from New York and Los Angeles," October 13, 1960. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29402>.

The persistent distrust between the superpower rivals led to a consistent American emphasis on verification of any agreement with the Soviets, an emphasis that the Soviets were unwilling to accommodate. As a matter of consistent national policy an insistence on reliable and dependable verification by the United States is non-negotiable. The details and mechanism of the inspection system may be a subject for discussion but the insistence on an inspection system that works is a consistent part of American policy. In this next October 13, 1960 debate answer Mr. Kennedy used the carrot of negotiation and the stick of resumed nuclear testing to leave himself room for maneuver on the details of the system:

The Soviet Union may not agree to an inspection system. We may be able to get satisfactory assurances. It may be necessary for us to begin testing again. But I hope the next Administration - and if I have anything to do with it, the next Administration will - make one last great effort to provide for control of nuclear testing, control of nuclear weapons, if possible, control of outer space, free from weapons, and also to begin again the subject of general disarmament levels.³³¹

In his Inaugural Address Mr. Kennedy met the Cold War challenge head on with language designed to tell America and the world that he would pursue a confident and assertive policy of confronting communism wherever it was found and that nothing was more important than that confrontation. He said:

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.³³² In the long history of the world, only a few generations have been granted the role of defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger. I do not shrink from this responsibility--I welcome it³³³

³³¹ Presidential Candidates Debates: October 13, 1960.

³³² John F. Kennedy: "Inaugural Address," January 20, 1961. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8032>.

³³³ Kennedy: "Inaugural Address,"

But also contained in the speech was the first call for arms control negotiations between the superpowers in an inaugural address:

Let both sides, for the first time, formulate serious and precise proposals for the inspection and control of arms--and bring the absolute power to destroy other nations under the absolute control of all nations.³³⁴

Mr. Kennedy was concerned that Mr. Eisenhower's penny pinching reliance on nuclear weapons and deterrence alone would leave an American president with the untenable position of a nuclear response to a non-nuclear threat. This disproportionate set of capabilities needed correction. In the January 11, 1962 State of the Union address to Congress he said:

But our strength may be tested at many levels. We intend to have at all times the capacity to resist non-nuclear or limited attacks--as a complement to our nuclear capacity, not as a substitute. We have rejected any all-or-nothing posture which would leave no choice but inglorious retreat or unlimited retaliation.³³⁵

In August 1961 the President's efforts at arms control suffered a serious setback when the Soviet Union announced a decision to resume nuclear testing The White House statement attacked the Soviet decision as "complete hypocrisy" and as being,

... a hazard to every human being throughout the world by increasing the dangers of nuclear fallout. The Soviet government's decision to resume nuclear testing is in utter disregard of the desire of mankind for a decrease in the arms race.³³⁶

³³⁴ Kennedy: "Inaugural Address,"

³³⁵ John F. Kennedy: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," January 11, 1962. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9082>.

³³⁶ John F. Kennedy: "White House Statement on Soviet Resumption of Nuclear Weapons Tests", August 30, 1961. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8295>.

Negotiations had been proceeding in Geneva for three years without a single nuclear test to disrupt the moratorium that had emerged in 1958. The President's disappointment was clear as the White House statement laid out the surprise with which the world was taken with the Soviet announcement.

For three years world attention has centered on the negotiations in Geneva for a treaty to secure an end to nuclear testing. Until last March it appeared that slow but encouraging progress had been made. At that time, the Soviet Union reversed its own earlier positions on key issues, refused to discuss seriously the genuine efforts made by the United States and the United Kingdom to meet known Soviet views, and blocked the path toward a nuclear test ban treaty. In order to avoid missing any possible opportunity to arrive at an agreement, the United States and the United Kingdom remained at the negotiating table. Only this week Ambassador Dean has made additional proposals in the hope of moving toward a test ban under effective international control. Urgent discussion of this issue had been scheduled at United States initiative at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly in the hopes that constructive debate could show the way to surmount the impasse at Geneva.³³⁷

The next major effort to renew negotiation on nuclear arms control came with Mr. Kennedy's unilateral declaration of a moratorium for atmospheric nuclear testing in his speech at the commencement ceremonies at American University in June 10, 1963.

To make clear our good faith and solemn convictions on the matter, I now declare that the United States does not propose to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere so long as other states do not do so. We will not be the first to resume. Such a declaration is no substitute for a formal binding treaty, but I hope it will help us achieve one. Nor would such a treaty be a substitute for disarmament, but I hope it will help us achieve it.³³⁸

He succeeded on getting the negotiation back on track and the final conclusion of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty on August 5, 1963 was the culmination of an effort dating

³³⁷ . Kennedy, "Statement on Soviet Resumption of Nuclear Weapons Tests."

³³⁸ John F. Kennedy: "Commencement Address at American University in Washington," June 10, 1963. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9266>.

back five years to the original Soviet offer of a testing moratorium and the positive response from the United States and British governments. The original offer of a testing moratorium undertaken on a unilateral basis in 1958 was the first successful effort to slow the arms race if only marginally effective. Although the undoubted propaganda benefits of the announcements certainly contributed to the motivation of the parties, the desire to avoid a violent end to the superpower nuclear standoff was also real. The moratorium was an on-again, off-again arrangement depending on the current position governments involved and always vulnerable to rejection. Its tenuous nature demonstrated the necessity for an international agreement for even so small a goal as the elimination of atmospheric nuclear testing which all parties understood threatened human health and the environment.

Formally known as the “Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, In Outer Space and under Water,” the treaty was signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963. It was ratified by the U.S. Senate on September 24, 1963 and became effective on October 10, 1963. The treaty is of unlimited duration and was signed by the foreign ministers of each of the three “Original Parties,” the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.

The treaty itself is only 805 words long. The substance of the agreement is found in the Preamble and Article One which state:

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the "Original Parties,"

Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons,

Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:

(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or under water, including territorial waters or high seas; or

(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is understood in this connection that the provisions of this subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a Treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the Parties have stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve.

2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article.³³⁹

The key shift giving rise to the possibility of a test ban treaty was limited nature of the tests the treaty would eliminate. Not all tests were banned; only those in the atmosphere, outer space and under water were restricted. The parties were confident of their existing scientific capability to detect nuclear explosions anywhere but underground. The technical

³³⁹ "Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, In Outer Space And Under Water," Department of State, (Washington, August 5, 1963). <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/1tbt1.html> The full text of the treaty is also set out at: John F. Kennedy: "Joint Statement by the Heads of Delegations to the Moscow Nuclear Test Ban Meeting," July 25, 1963. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9358>.

capacity to distinguish between a natural seismic event and a nuclear explosion was still unreliable. As Mr. Kennedy said in his address to the nation on July 26, 1963:

A ban on nuclear tests, however, requires on-the-spot inspection only for underground tests. This Nation now possesses a variety of techniques to detect the nuclear tests of other nations which are conducted in the air or under water, for such tests produce unmistakable signs which our modern instruments can pick up.

The treaty initialed yesterday, therefore, is a limited treaty which, permits continued underground testing and prohibits only those tests that we ourselves can police. It requires no control posts, no onsite inspection, no international body.³⁴⁰

The President went on to discuss the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons tests as a continuing goal of American policy, citing:

...our strong preference for a more comprehensive treaty banning all tests everywhere, and our ultimate hope for general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Government, however, is still unwilling to accept the inspection such goals require.³⁴¹

As he continued, Mr. Kennedy rejected the idea that the United States needed a strategic nuclear superiority in terms of the numbers of weapons or the size of those weapons, arguing that:

For in today's world, a nation's security does not always increase as its arms increase, when its adversary is doing the same, and unlimited competition in the testing and development of new types of destructive nuclear weapons will not make the world safer for either side. Under this limited treaty, on the other hand, the testing of other nations could never be sufficient to offset the ability of our strategic forces to deter or survive a nuclear attack and to penetrate and destroy an aggressor's homeland.

We have, and under this treaty we will continue to have, the nuclear strength that we need. It is true that the Soviets have tested nuclear weapons of a yield higher than

³⁴⁰ John F. Kennedy: "Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.," July 26, 1963. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9360>.

³⁴¹ Kennedy, "Address on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty."

that which we thought to be necessary, but the hundred megaton bomb of which they spoke 2 years ago does not and will not change the balance of strategic power. The United States has chosen, deliberately, to concentrate on more mobile and more efficient weapons, with lower but entirely sufficient yield, and our security is, therefore, not impaired by the treaty I am discussing.³⁴²

Cheating and evasion of the requirements in the new agreement were possible but in a statement of invoking each nation's self-interest in a classic example of realist thinking Mr. Kennedy dismissed these as matters of serious concern:

The gains of illegal testing are obviously slight compared to their cost, and the hazard of discovery, and the nations which have initialed and will sign this treaty prefer it, in my judgment, to unrestricted testing as a matter of their own self-interests for these nations, too, and all nations, have a stake in limiting the arms race, in holding the spread of nuclear weapons, and in breathing air that is not radioactive.³⁴³

In his message to the Senate recommending ratification to the treaty the president expressed the other consistent thread of United States nuclear policy since the Truman administration that the United States would always be prepared and ready to fight:

This Treaty is not a substitute for, and does not diminish the need for, continued Western and American military strength to meet all contingencies. It will not prevent us from building all the strength that we need; and it is not a justification for unilaterally cutting our defensive strength at this time. Our choice is not between a limited Treaty and effective strategic strength—we need and can have both. The continuous build-up in the power and invulnerability of our nuclear arsenal in recent years has been an important factor in persuading others that the time for a limitation has arrived.³⁴⁴

³⁴² Kennedy, "Address on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty."

³⁴³ Kennedy, "Address on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty."

³⁴⁴ John F. Kennedy, "Special Message to the Senate on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty" August 8, 1963. Online by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project* <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9370>.

Kennedy and Oil

U.S.-Saudi relations soured in the years 1960-1962. Mr. Kennedy saw the Saudi monarchy as conservative and status quo oriented, in contrast to the new administration's desire to engage reformers and nation builders in the developing world. Beginning with a letter from King Saud that Mr. Kennedy found insulting and adding to that the Saudi's refusal to renew the U.S. lease on the Dhahran air base thing went downhill.³⁴⁵ American policy on the Arab world began tilting towards Egypt while American oil executives argued that the shift was threatening both the U.S.-Saudi relationship and Aramco.³⁴⁶

In October 1962, while King Saud was out of the country on medical treatment Prince Faisal the prime minister removed several government officials and replaced them with more competent personnel.³⁴⁷ The power struggle between the two continued within the family after the King returned to his country. In November 1964 Prince Faisal and others forced King Saud to abdicate and leave the kingdom. Faisal became King.³⁴⁸ Mr. Kennedy, who remained concerned about the future direction of Saudi Arabia believed that, "...without reform the West's access to Saudi oil was vulnerable and Communists would ultimately subvert the kingdom."³⁴⁹

³⁴⁵ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 61.

³⁴⁶ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 77-81.

³⁴⁷ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 85.

³⁴⁸ Lippman, *Inside The Mirage*, 112.

³⁴⁹ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 89.

Mr. Kennedy's brief presidency was preoccupied with the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union abroad and the burgeoning Civil Rights movement at home. Oil was not yet a significant national security issue. The price of oil on the world market was then managed in Austin, Texas by the reserve requirement at the Texas Railroad Commission. Accordingly aside from a concern about Saudi Arabia's role in the Cold War, Kennedy devoted relatively little time or attention to Saudi Arabia and its oil.

Analysis: Eisenhower to Kennedy

During the terms of Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Kennedy anarchy continued as the defining condition of the international environment. Despite the existence of various international organizations, the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and others, no central organizing authority was present with the power to resolve disputes between member states. Each international organization was dependent upon the strength of member states and was unable and even unwilling to control the behavior of its most powerful members.

The United States possessed clear and identifiable decision making for the creation and execution foreign policy, through the President and the National Security Council and the Departments of State and Defense. The foreign policy activities examined here were made and executed in public. The President continued to speak for the United States in matters of national security. Both Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Kennedy treated nuclear weapons as a vital national survival issue.

The relative capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union changed little in the three years of Mr. Kennedy's tenure in the White House. The two nations' relative

military capabilities remained fairly even. The tension reached a peak in October 1962, but neither nation felt they held such a significant military advantage that they took the opportunity to commence hostilities. The Soviets had sought a significant increase in their strategic offensive capability by attempting to place of nuclear armed missiles in Cuba. In the end that effort was unsuccessful.

At the end of the Kennedy administration the policy about nuclear weapons was practically identical to Mr. Eisenhower's policy:

1. The United States has nuclear weapons at the ready, and any arms agreement must contain absolutely reliable, verifiable inspections to ensure against any cheating by any party.
2. The United States will use nuclear weapons if attacked.
3. The United States has not renounced the right to the first use of nuclear weapons.
4. To ensure the destruction of any foe after a surprise attack, the United States will maintain a nuclear arsenal sufficient for that purpose.

Here we find a small departure from Mr. Eisenhower's tenure as Mr. Kennedy had rejected the necessity of numerical superiority which was constantly advocated by the armed forces under both administrations. Mr. Kennedy made it clear that he sought a nuclear force sufficient to achieve the nation's strategic goals, and that numerical superiority was not a strategic goal of his administration. Given the increasing Soviet capability to produce nuclear weapons and missile it appears that the issue of nuclear numerical superiority first truly surfaced under Mr. Kennedy but its existence and Mr. Kennedy's response to it cannot be argued as a confirmation of the unitary actor assumption. The issue of numerical nuclear

weapons superiority is an issue of military procurement and internal defense spending. In terms of the capabilities of the United States, as judged by other nations, U.S. capability remained constant; the United States would always retain sufficient nuclear retaliatory strength to destroy any nuclear aggressor.

Saudi Arabia and its oil were a minor part of Mr. Kennedy's presidency. At the end of the Kennedy administration the policy about Saudi Arabia and its oil was basically the same and Mr. Eisenhower's policy:

1. Access to Saudi Arabia and Gulf oil by the United States was a matter of national interest although it was not yet the national security interest it would become.
2. The United States would deploy and if necessary use military force to keep the oil flowing even to the extent of commencing combat operations before the oil flow had stopped.
3. The US would use diplomatic pressure and persuasion on the Saudis over the issue of price but was unwilling to intervene with sufficient force to achieve the control necessary to allow Washington set the price at the pump.

No substantial contradictory evidence concerning the unitary actor assumption appears in this transition concerning nuclear weapons. No substantial contradictory evidence concerning the unitary actor assumption appears in this transition concerning oil.

In the context of United States policy towards nuclear weapons, disarmament proposals and the Soviet Union, the analysis of the Eisenhower to Kennedy transition supports the unitary actor assumption. Concerning the issue of Saudi Arabia and imported

crude oil the analysis of the Eisenhower to Kennedy transition also supports the unitary actor assumption.

Johnson, Democrat to Nixon, Republican: January 20, 1969

Johnson and Nuclear Weapons

Lyndon Johnson took office after the assassination of President John Kennedy on November 22, 1963, a mere 109 days after the signing of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in Moscow and just over 13 months after the Cuban Missile crisis. He pledged to continue the policies of his martyred predecessor, both in the search for new arms control agreements and in the United States military buildup to counter the Soviet Union. Five days after taking office, in his first address to a joint session of Congress on November 27, 1963, assuring the nation of his continuity with his predecessors back to Harry Truman, Mr.

Johnson pledged that:

From this chamber of representative government, let all the world know and none misunderstand that I rededicate this Government to the unswerving support of the United Nations, to the honorable and determined execution of our commitments to our allies, to the maintenance of military strength second to none, ...³⁵⁰

Speaking to the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 17, 1963 he previewed the achievement that was to become his most significant result in the field of

³⁵⁰ Lyndon B. Johnson: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress," November 27, 1963. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25988>.

nuclear weapons when he said “The United States wants to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons to nations not now possessing them.”³⁵¹

Nuclear weapons were a significant issue in the 1964 presidential campaign with the Democrats attacking Republican nominee Senator Barry Goldwater as reckless and irresponsible after when mentioned the use of nuclear weapons in Viet Nam on May 24, 1964, less than two years after the Cuban Missile crises. Goldwater’s careless speculation about the use of nuclear weapons left Mr. Johnson with a great deal of room to maneuver on the issue while appearing the careful and prudent choice for the voters.

In his acceptance speech on August 27, 1964 in Atlantic City, New Jersey Mr. Johnson reported to the nation that

Since 1961, under the leadership of that great President, John F. Kennedy, we have carried out the greatest peacetime buildup of national strength of any nation at any time in the history of the world. I report tonight that we have spent \$30 billion more on preparing this Nation in the 4 years of the Kennedy administration than would have been spent if we had followed the appropriations of the last year of the previous administration. ...under the leadership of President Kennedy brought a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere. And a hundred other nations in the world joined us. ... The only course is to press with all our mind and all our will to make sure, doubly sure, that these weapons are never really used at all.³⁵²

Goldwater had opened the subject of the possible use of nuclear weapons in his remarks in May. National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy reminded Mr. Johnson in a memo to the President shortly before a major campaign speech in Seattle that, consistent

³⁵¹ Lyndon B. Johnson: "Address Before the General Assembly of the United Nations," December 17, 1963. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26432>.

³⁵² Lyndon B. Johnson: "Remarks Before the National Convention Upon Accepting the Nomination.", August 27, 1964. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26467>.

with the Eisenhower administration, current doctrine viewed the decision about using nuclear weapons directly against a hostile military force attacking an American military unit as less serious than the decision to attack the Soviet Union directly.³⁵³

In his remarks in Seattle on the campaign trail on September 16, 1964 while discussing the problems of nuclear weapons Johnson said,

...every American President has drawn the same conclusion:
President Harry Truman said: "Such a war is not a possible policy for rational man."
President Eisenhower said: "In a nuclear war, there can be no victory-only losers."
President Kennedy said: "Total war makes no sense..."³⁵⁴

Johnson then detailed a five-point policy concerning nuclear weapons which he claimed was consistent with every president to hold office since 1945. "First, we award to avoid war by accident or miscalculation."³⁵⁵ By this he refers to the American system of command and control concerning the release of nuclear weapons, and the fact that this decision would come from the president alone. Second, "We have worked to limit the spread of nuclear weapons."³⁵⁶ "Third, we have developed ways to meet force with appropriate force by expanding and modernizing our conventional forces."³⁵⁷ Here, Johnson argued that

³⁵³ McGeorge Bundy, "Memorandum to the President, Summary of Existing plans for Emergency Use of Nuclear Weapons." September 13, 1964. *The National Security Archive*, George Washington University, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/predelegation2/pre3-1.htm>

³⁵⁴ Lyndon B. Johnson: "Remarks in Seattle on the Control of Nuclear Weapons," September 16, 1964. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26506>.

³⁵⁵ Johnson: "Remarks on the Control of Nuclear Weapons."

³⁵⁶ Johnson: "Remarks on the Control of Nuclear Weapons."

³⁵⁷ Johnson: "Remarks on the Control of Nuclear Weapons."

the United States should not need to threaten to use nuclear weapons to solve every problem.

"Fourth, we have worked to damp down disputes and contain conflict."³⁵⁸ And finally

"...fifth, we constantly work towards arms control. A test ban agreement has ended atmospheric explosions which were poisoning the atmosphere. We have established a "hot line" for instant communications between the United States and Moscow in case of any crisis."³⁵⁹

While some of Johnson's speech is clearly campaign rhetoric, designed to take political advantage of a comparison between him and the perception that Goldwater was casual and irresponsible in his approach to nuclear weapons, the outlines of a consistent American policy also show through.

In his 1964 State of the Union address to Congress, Mr. Johnson pledged to maintain a "margin of military safety and superiority," as well as to "make new proposals at Geneva--toward the control and the eventual abolition of arms."³⁶⁰ He continued to press on this issue and on June 28, 1965 in National Security Action Memorandum 335 he directed the preparation of new "program for arms control and disarmament including a proposed program for preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons."³⁶¹

At the 1966 State of the Union address, Mr. Johnson pledged to follow what he described as "continuing lines of policy that America has followed under its last four

³⁵⁸ Johnson: "Remarks on the Control of Nuclear Weapons."

³⁵⁹ Johnson: "Remarks on the Control of Nuclear Weapons."

³⁶⁰ Lyndon B. Johnson: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," January 8, 1964. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26787>.

³⁶¹ McGeorge Bundy, "National Security Action Memorandum 335." June 28, 1965, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum. Available online <http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/NSAMs/nsam335.asp>

Presidents. ... We will vigorously pursue existing proposals-and seek new ones--to control arms and to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.”³⁶²

By 1967 Mr. Johnson had grown more concerned about Soviet missiles.

The Soviet Union has in the past year increased its long-range missile capabilities. It has begun to place near Moscow a limited antimissile defense. My first responsibility to our people is to assure that no nation can ever find it rational to launch a nuclear attack or to use its nuclear power as a credible threat against us or against our allies.

I would emphasize that that is why an important link between Russia and the United States is in our common interest, in arms control and in disarmament. We have the solemn duty to slow down the arms race between us, if that is at all possible, in both conventional and nuclear weapons and defenses. I thought we were making some progress in that direction the first few months I was in office. I realize that any additional race would impose on our peoples, and on all mankind, for that matter, an additional waste of resources with no gain in security to either side.³⁶³

The push for a treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons continued. In the State of Union address in 1968, Mr. Johnson was able to report that

Because we believe the nuclear danger must be narrowed, we have worked with the Soviet Union and with other nations to reach an agreement that will halt the spread of nuclear weapons. On the basis of communications from Ambassador Fisher in Geneva this afternoon, I am encouraged to believe that a draft treaty can be laid before the conference in Geneva in the very near future. I hope to be able to present that treaty to the Senate this year for the Senate's approval. ...But despite this progress, we must maintain a military force that is capable of deterring any threat to this Nation's security, whatever the mode of aggression. Our choices must not be confined to total war-or to total acquiescence.³⁶⁴

³⁶² Lyndon B. Johnson: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," January 12, 1966. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28015>.

³⁶³ Lyndon B. Johnson: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," January 10 1967. Online by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28338>.

³⁶⁴ Lyndon B. Johnson: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," January 17 1968 Online by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project* <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28738>.

In 1967, the so-called Outer Space Treaty, formerly titled "Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies," became the Johnson administration's first successful negotiation to limit the spread of nuclear technologies. Following its predecessor, the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, this is the second of the "non-armament" treaties. Again, the effort was to create a space environment free from the deployment storage or use of nuclear weapons, and to reserve "outer space" for peaceful purposes only. The heart of this treaty is contained in Article IV which states

States Parties to treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carry nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass distraction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.

The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of the other any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden.³⁶⁵

As President, Lyndon Johnson's most significant contribution to slowing the nuclear arms race was the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The treaty was signed in Washington, Moscow in London on July 1, 1968. From the beginning of the atomic age, the idea to limit the spread of nuclear weapons had been a goal of the nuclear armed states, but initial suspicion and ambition had made achieving such a treaty impossible. Beginning with the Baruch Plan in 1946, United States of sought to forestall nuclear proliferation by placing all nuclear resources under the aegis of the United Nations.

³⁶⁵ "Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies," *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*" U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, (Washington D.C., June, 1977) 48.

One initial assumption concerning nuclear technology proved to be inaccurate. Originally the nuclear armed states believed that the difficulty in mastering the technology required for nuclear weapons, and the scarcity of nuclear materials would make proliferation of any nuclear technology difficult. That proved to be untrue. By the early 1960s, the nuclear power industry was demonstrating peaceful use of nuclear energy in the generation of electric power. By 1966, nuclear reactors were generating electric power for homes, business, and industry in five countries. More important, the estimate was that by 1985 over 300 nuclear power reactors would be operating or under construction. It was not the reactors themselves, but a byproduct of those reactors that caused a problem. Nuclear power reactors produced plutonium, a fissionable material, which when chemically separated, could be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. In 1977 the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in its publication, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*, estimated that,

By 1985 quantity of plutonium being produced would make possible construction of 20 to 25 nuclear bombs daily depending upon the level of the technology employed.³⁶⁶

This change in the capability to obtain fissionable materials and produce nuclear weapons applied to all states. As was the case with the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, efforts to create an international agreement addressing nonproliferation continued to run afoul of the parties lack of mutual trust and their aspirations for a larger, more comprehensive agreement. Consistent with bargaining pattern that led to the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, once the issue of proliferation was separated from the goal of a

³⁶⁶ U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*, (Washington D.C. June 1977) 77.

comprehensive arms control agreement, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty became an achievable result. After Mr. Johnson outlined a simple program in a January 21, 1964 message to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee meeting in Geneva, it took another four years to see a concrete result. Decoupling his suggestion from all other issues and efforts to create a more comprehensive agreement, Johnson proposed the following:

... finally, to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now controlling them, let us agree:

- (a) that nuclear weapons not be transferred into the national control of states which do not now control them, and that all transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes take place under effective international safeguards;
- (b) that the major nuclear powers accept in an increasing number of their peaceful nuclear activities the same inspection they recommend for other states; and
- (c) on the banning of all nuclear weapons tests under effective verification and control.³⁶⁷

The parties continue to negotiate and by August 1967 United States and Soviet Union were able to submit identical texts of the draft treaty to the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Conference. In this treaty the particular concerns of the non-nuclear states occurred in three major areas: 1) safeguards, 2) balanced obligations, and 3) security assurances.³⁶⁸ After lengthy consultations between the United States and its nonnuclear allies, plus a review of the treaty itself by the General Assembly of the United Nations, the

³⁶⁷ Lyndon B. Johnson: "Message to the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva.," January 21, 1964. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26009>.

³⁶⁸ U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*, 80.

treaty was opened for signature July 1, 1968. On that day, the United States, the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and 59 other countries signed the treaty.³⁶⁹

The heart of the treaty is contained in Article 1, which governs the actions of nuclear weapons states.

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.³⁷⁰

For states that do not possess nuclear weapons at the time they sign the treaty the obligations are parallel:

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.³⁷¹

Mr. Johnson was also able to announce that day that the Soviet Union and the United States would soon begin talks on the limitation of their strategic nuclear arsenals. He reported that

Now at this moment of achievement and great hope, I am gratified to be able to report and announce ...

Agreement has been reached between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States to enter in the nearest future into

³⁶⁹ U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*, 82.

³⁷⁰ U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*, 85.

³⁷¹ U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*, 85.

discussions on the limitation and the reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles.³⁷²

On July 9, 1968, Mr. Johnson submitted the treaty to the United States Senate, expecting quick ratification. But, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 delayed ratification until the following year.³⁷³

In his final State of the Union address, January 14, 1969, six days before he left office Mr. Johnson said

The quest for a durable peace ... has required us to seek a limitation of arms races not only among the superpowers, but among the smaller nations as well. We have joined in the test ban treaty of 1963, the outer space treaty of 1967, and the treaty against the spread of nuclear weapons in 1968.

This latter agreement--the nonproliferation treaty--is now pending in the Senate and it has been pending there since last July. In my opinion, delay in ratifying it is not going to be helpful to the cause of peace. America took the lead in negotiating this treaty and America should now take steps to have it approved at the earliest possible date.

Until a way can be found to scale down the level of arms among the superpowers, mankind cannot view the future without fear and great apprehension. So, I believe that we should resume the talks with the Soviet Union about limiting offensive and defensive missile systems. I think they would already have been resumed except for Czechoslovakia and our election this year.³⁷⁴

³⁷² Lyndon B. Johnson: "Remarks at the Signing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty," July 1, 1968. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28970>.

³⁷³ U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*, 82.

³⁷⁴ Lyndon B. Johnson: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," January 14, 1969. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29333>.

Johnson and Oil

As President, Lyndon Johnson changed the tone of American policy in the Middle East. Mr. Johnson saw the Middle East as an opportunity to get kicked in the shanks by both the Arabs and the Jews.³⁷⁵ Under the Johnson administration, the emphasis changed in three ways: 1) the United States reduced aid and support for Egypt; 2) the United States also reduced what little pressure it had previously applied to Saudi Arabia for internal reforms; and, 3) The United States began a program of increasing arms sales to the Saudi military forces. As Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who served both Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Johnson in the same office saw it, the Kennedy administration reformers had been replaced by a more “realpolitik-oriented group.”³⁷⁶

In June 1966 at an awkward personal meeting in Washington between Saudi King Faisal and Mr. Johnson, the realist agenda of national security issues reasserted its importance and the leaders found common ground on two issues, their mutual distrust of Egypt’s Nasser and fighting the spread of communism.³⁷⁷ In the toasts at the White House Dinner on June 21, 1966 by both Mr. Johnson and Saudi King Faisal the subject was water for the desert kingdom, not oil.³⁷⁸

The 1967 Arab-Israeli war again complicated the U.S.-Saudi relationship. The Saudis imposed an oil embargo on shipments of Saudi crude to any country that aided

³⁷⁵ Dean Rusk, *As I Saw It* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990), 387.

³⁷⁶ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 90.

³⁷⁷ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 97.

³⁷⁸ Lyndon B. Johnson: "Toasts of the President and King Faisal," June 21, 1966. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27665>.

Israel.³⁷⁹ As the United States was not yet dependent upon imported oil and still held the ability to control the price of oil, diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Saudis were not greatly affected with Mr. Johnson saying he “recognized the imperatives of King Faisal’s position.”³⁸⁰ During the Embargo, King Faisal also allowed J-9 jet fuel to continue to reach American air forces in Vietnam. The effect of the embargo was brief and the American response was to increase oil production to help the British and the Germans. The embargo was finally lifted on September 1, 1967 at an Arab league meeting in Khartoum, Sudan.³⁸¹

One additional effect of the 1967 war was that Egypt, now dependent on Saudi Arabia for financial support, withdrew 20,000 troops from Yemen ending the only military issue troubling the Saudis on the Arabian Peninsula. As a result of its defeat in the war, Egypt, long a problem for the House of Saud, had, in the course of a few months been reduced from a position of dominance in the Arab world to a state dependent on financial aid from Saudi Arabia prop up the ailing Nasser government.³⁸² The aftermath of the 1967 war also saw the rise of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the emergence of Yasser Arafat’s Al Fatah movement as the main force within the PLO. The Saudis backed Fatah as a counterweight to the Marxist groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, aligning at least some common interest with Washington by moving the major Palestinian organization and its struggle with Israel away from the Marxist elements within

³⁷⁹ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 99.

³⁸⁰ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 101.

³⁸¹ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 101.

³⁸² Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 103.

it.³⁸³ At the end of the Johnson administration a “steadier U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship,” reemerged, “one that revolved around oil and anti-Communism.”³⁸⁴

Nixon and Nuclear Weapons

In the presidency of Richard Nixon, the ultimate anti-communist Cold Warrior, we find two great surprises, the achievement of concrete arms limitation agreements with the Soviet Union, and the opening of a real relationship with China’s communist government. In the area of energy policy and imported oil, the power to set the price of crude oil on the world market moved from the United States to Saudi Arabia during the Nixon administration.

His domestic opposition allowed Mr. Nixon plenty of maneuvering room for a conservative Republican president known as a Cold Warrior and ardent anti-communist. Consider this from the platform of the Democratic Party that nominated Vice President Hubert Humphrey to oppose Mr. Nixon in the 1968 general election campaign:

We must and will maintain a strong and balanced defense establishment adequate to the task of security and peace. There must be no doubt about our strategic nuclear capability, our capacity to meet limited challenges, and our willingness to act when our vital interests are threatened... We must recognize that vigilance calls for the twin disciplines of defense and arms control. Defense measures and arms control measures must go hand in hand, each serving national security and the larger interests of peace... We must also recognize that the Soviet Union and the United States still have a common interest in avoiding nuclear war and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. We also share a common interest in reducing the cost of national defense. We must continue to work together. We will press for further arms control agreements, insisting on effective safeguards against violations... For almost a quarter of a century America's pre-eminent military strength, combined with our political restraint, has deterred nuclear war... Even in the present tense atmosphere,

³⁸³ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 108.

³⁸⁴ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 61.

we strongly support President Johnson's effort to secure an agreement with the Soviet Union under which both states would refrain from deploying anti-missile systems. Such a treaty would result in the saving of billions of dollars and would create a climate for further arms control measures. We support concurrent efforts to freeze the present level of strategic weapons and delivery systems, and to achieve a balanced and verified reduction of all nuclear and conventional arms.³⁸⁵

The consistent elements of a strong national defense sufficient to deter any aggression, a limit on anti-ballistic missiles as a costly addition to the arms race and the beginnings of the idea of a nuclear freeze are all present here. Each of these elements would find their way into policy in the Nixon administration, the result of either a domestic political consensus (something that the ultimately deeply divisive Nixon presidency did not achieve) or a realist foreign policy driven by the nation's response to events in the international arena.

One of Mr. Nixon's first acts as president concerning nuclear weapons was to request the Senate ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons negotiated by the Johnson administration. Ratification had been held up in the Senate the previous year as a reaction to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. In his message to the Senate on February 5, 1969 Mr. Nixon wrote:

...it will serve the national interest to proceed with the ratification of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accordingly, I request that the Senate act promptly to consider the Treaty and give its advice and consent to ratification.

I have always supported the goal of halting the spread of nuclear weapons. I opposed ratification of the Treaty last fall in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. My request at this time in no sense alters my condemnation of that Soviet action.

³⁸⁵ Democratic Party Platforms: "Democratic Party Platform of 1968," August 26, 1968. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29604>.

I believe that ratification of the Treaty at this time would advance this Administration's policy of negotiation rather than confrontation with the USSR.

...

In submitting this request I wish to endorse the commitment made by the previous Administration that the United States will, when safeguards are applied under the Treaty, permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply its safeguards to all nuclear activities in the United States, exclusive of those activities with direct national security significance³⁸⁶

The Senate ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty on March 5, 1970. It has now been signed by 189 nations and along with the Charter of the United Nations, continues today as a central document of stability and peace in the world. In the words of Thomas Graham, a former United States Ambassador and arms control expert, a country which is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a member of the United Nations is in "the club of civilization."³⁸⁷

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on the Seabed and Ocean Floor was a logical extension of the original nuclear weapons free zone treaties governing outer space, Antarctica and Latin America. It was executed on February 11, 1971 and became effective May 18, 1972.³⁸⁸

³⁸⁶ Richard Nixon: "Message to the Senate Requesting Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," February 5, 1969. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2152>.

³⁸⁷ Richard Rhodes, *Arsenals of Folly, The Making of the Nuclear Arms Race*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 74.

³⁸⁸ U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*, 92.

After his inauguration Mr. Nixon also followed up on Mr. Johnson's agreement to begin arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union and talks began in Helsinki Finland on November 17, 1969.³⁸⁹

In a Memorandum for the President on May 23, 1969 reporting on the National Security Council staff analysis of the strategic arms limitation proposals then under discussion National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger noted that

...the most comprehensive proposal, one that bans both MIRVs and ABMs, would leave U.S. retaliatory capability unchanged but would improve Soviet retaliatory capacity by over 70 per cent.³⁹⁰

Kissinger noted that the goals which prompted interest in the strategic arms limitation agreement were three fold. First an agreement could "freeze or codify strategic relationships in a manner which preserves 'equality' at worst or a U.S. edge at best."³⁹¹ Second the agreement may have "significant budgetary savings compared" with proceeding without an agreement.³⁹² Third an "agreement could reduce uncertainties" leaving "both sides less nervous about potential threats to ...strategic capabilities."³⁹³

In his first State of the Union address to Congress on January 22, 1970, Mr. Nixon laid out a classically realist view of the problem of managing relations with the Soviet Union:

³⁸⁹ U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*, 124.

³⁹⁰ Henry Kissinger, "Memorandum for the President, Analysis of Strategic Arms Limitation Proposals." May 23, 1969. *The National Security Archive*, George Washington University, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB60/abm01.pdf>

³⁹¹ Kissinger, "Analysis of Strategic Arms Limitation Proposals."

³⁹² Kissinger, "Analysis of Strategic Arms Limitation Proposals."

³⁹³ Kissinger, "Analysis of Strategic Arms Limitation Proposals."

If we are to have peace in the last third of the century, a major factor will be the development of a new relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union....I would not underestimate our differences, but we are moving with precision and purpose from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation. Our negotiations on strategic arms limitations and in other areas will have far greater chance for success if both sides enter them motivated by mutual self-interest rather than naive sentimentality.³⁹⁴

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) was the first successful effort to reach an agreement about the deployment of weapons systems themselves rather than the previously agreed upon nuclear free zones and the nuclear testing limitations. Previously talks on limiting and controlling nuclear weapons themselves had floundered on the seemingly insurmountable problems inherent in the search for a comprehensive settlement. Throughout the Johnson presidency the United States had sought to separate the discussions about strategic nuclear weapons from larger discussions about general disarmament. Mr. Nixon continued this approach. Both sides were developing not only offensive missiles but anti-ballistic missile systems for the defense of their land based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and national capitals. The arms race was proceeding at full throttle.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks finally began in Helsinki Finland on November 17, 1969. To facilitate free and open negotiations between the parties, the talks were conducted in secret. Offensive capabilities on both sides were rapidly changing. The mix of weapons in each country's arsenal was changing. The Soviets were overtaking the United States in land based ICBMS increasing from 1000 to about 1500 and adding huge missiles with larger warheads to their arsenal which threatened the hardened American missile silos

³⁹⁴ Richard Nixon: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," January 22, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2921>.

protecting the Minutemen II and III solid fuels missiles. On the American side, while the number of launchers had not increased, the program of substituting a single warhead with Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV) gave the United States the lead in the number of warheads which could be delivered to enemy targets, and the United States retained the lead in manned attack bombers. Both sides continued development of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) capability.³⁹⁵

Adding to the complexity of the issue was the geographic difference in the superpowers obligations to defend allies under their respective nuclear umbrellas. For the Soviet Union, all its allies (except Cuba) were on the Eurasian landmass, in close physical proximity to the source of their defense, and none of them were nuclear capable states. Furthermore it was not likely that any Soviet ally would ever have its own independent nuclear force as long as they remained under the Soviet nuclear umbrella.

For the United States the situation was far more complicated. Critical U.S. allies, including Great Britain, West Germany, France, Italy, Japan and the non-communist Chinese government of the island of Taiwan, were located on the far sides of both the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. The oceans that protected the United States before 1941 were now a geographic challenge to American desires to provide protection to allies and trading partners across thousands of miles of open water.

In Europe, Great Britain, America's the oldest and closest ally, possessed its own independent nuclear force. France nominally a member of the Western alliance charted its own path, but actively participated in the Western European market economy while

³⁹⁵ U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*, 126.

maintaining its own nuclear deterrent. To further complicate matters France refused to participate in the unified NATO command structure and occasionally had strained relations with the United States and the other democratic states in Western Europe.

Across the Pacific the United States was engaged in a war in South Viet Nam to resist what it termed aggression for the communist north supported by the Soviets and Chinese. American nuclear arms protected Japan, South Korea the Philippines and Taiwan, the last home to the non-communist Chiang Kai-Shek government.

Within this complicated international framework the Nixon Administration achieved two significant arms control successes in its dealings with the Soviet Union. The first was the “Treaty between the United States of America and the Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,” commonly called the ABM Treaty, which was signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972. At the same time, the Nixon administration also entered into an “Interim Agreement Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On Certain Measures With Respect To The Limitations Of The Strategic Offensive Arms” known as SALT I. Both of these treaties became effective October 3, 1972.³⁹⁶

In 1973 the United States and the Soviet Union reached a further understanding in the “Agreement between the United States Of America and the Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War.” This agreement was of little consequence in the arms race. It is essentially a “meet and confer” agreement wherein the parties agree that

³⁹⁶ U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*, 130 and 136.

at any time if their “relations appear to involve the risk of nuclear war, they will enter into urgent consultations and make every effort to avert that risk.”³⁹⁷

Both the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the SALT I Interim Agreement are no longer effective. By its own terms, the SALT I agreement was to last 5 years. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was a treaty of unlimited duration; however each party reserved the right to withdraw from the treaty, if “extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme national interest.”³⁹⁸ Citing concerns about a nuclear attack from a rogue state or terrorist group, the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002.³⁹⁹ Additional discussion of this decision will be found in the section discussing George W. Bush’s presidency.

The ABM Treaty limited the development of ABM technology and restricted deployment of ABM systems to two deployment areas, one to protect the national capital and one to protect a single ICBM launch area. Those ABM deployment areas must be at least 1,300 kilometers apart. The permitted areas are restricted in size and location and must be positioned so that they cannot begin to provide a nationwide missile defense umbrella. The result is that each country leaves significant parts of itself open to a retaliatory missile strike. Each side may not deploy any more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles and 100 ABM launchers. The parties also agreed to prohibit any future development of sea-based,

³⁹⁷ U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*, 154.

³⁹⁸ U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*, 135.

³⁹⁹ George W. Bush, Statement on Formal Withdrawal From the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty June 13, 2002. Online by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73037>.

air-based or space-based antiballistic missile systems. A further agreement limited the qualitative improvement of their systems, and agreed not to modify an existing launcher to create the capability to fire more than one independently guided warhead.⁴⁰⁰

In 1974, the ABM treaty was modified by a protocol signed on July 3rd, in Moscow, which reduced the number of ABM deployment areas for each party to one area only. That area could either be the national capital, or a missile field. United States chose to maintain defense of its ICBM missiles near Grand Forks North Dakota, while the Soviet Union chose an ABM defense for Moscow. In all other ways the original ABM treaty remained the same.⁴⁰¹

Verification and each side's suspicion of cheating by the other had remained a core problem throughout the negotiations. As in other discussions the inability to detect cheating and the fear that an opponent would gain an advantage that disrupted the balance was a significant concern.

Finally, the parties agreed that each nation would rely on its own surveillance capability to monitor the compliance of the other. In the language of the treaty, compliance would be assured by "national technical means of verification". The parties further agreed "not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other party" and "not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification."⁴⁰²

⁴⁰⁰ U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*,130 to 135.

⁴⁰¹ U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*,148.

⁴⁰² U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*,127.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks that resulted in the agreement known as SALT I were the first successful effort to limit offensive nuclear weapons. The result was an interim agreement that was signed May 26, 1972, and was in force for five years.

SALT I was an interim agreement, that means it was essentially a standstill agreement, which the parties hoped would lead to a fuller agreement by the time the interim agreement expired. The language in the interim agreement is plain and direct. In Article 1, the parties agree not to undertake construction of additional ICBM launchers after July 1, 1972.⁴⁰³ Article III permits only those submarine launched ballistic missiles that were operational or under construction at the date of the signature of the agreement.⁴⁰⁴ The parties further agreed to continue active negotiations in search of a more permanent agreement.

In July 1974, at the time the Nixon presidency was crumbling under the weight of the Watergate scandal, the United States and the Soviet Union concluded a new treaty known as "The Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests." Commonly referred to as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, this agreement established a nuclear threshold prohibiting any underground nuclear weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 Kilotons. This threshold was far below the 50 megaton Tsar Bomb exploded by the Soviet Union on October 30, 1961.⁴⁰⁵ This meant that any new explosive device which either side decided to test would be significantly smaller than the giant bombs tested previously. The treaty further stipulated that the parties would exchange data to assure

⁴⁰³ U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*, 138.

⁴⁰⁴ U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*, 138.

⁴⁰⁵ The Nuclear Weapon Archive, "Big Ivan, The Tsar Bomba ("King of Bombs")," Nuclear Weapon Archive, <http://www.nuclearweaponarchive.org/Russia/TsarBomba.html>.

compliance and addressed some of the uncertain technical issues surrounding the problems inherent in estimating the size of an explosion.

It is likely Mr. Nixon would have continued his pursuit of balanced and verifiable nuclear arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, which later became the SALT II process, if his presidency had not been derailed by the Watergate scandal.

Nixon and Oil

When inaugurated Richard Nixon took office in the world where the price of oil was still controlled by the Texas Railroad Commission in Austin Texas and when he left office that control had shifted to the Saudi Oil ministry in Riyadh. The shift is described succinctly by Morgan Downey:

During the 1960s, OPEC did not have any power, firstly, because western oil majors controlled production in OPEC Countries via concessions, and secondly, but more importantly, the TRC (Texas Railroad Commission) still controlled global pricing as the U.S. had surplus production capacity since Dad Joiner discovered the East Texas Fields in 1930. The TRC would add or subtract oil to manage global prices as OPEC later would do....The global pricing ability of the TRC disappeared in 1970 when U.S. oil production peaked and began to steadily decline. In 1971, facing declining US production, the TRC gave producers in Texas, previously the only global production area with excess capacity, free reign to produce as much oil as they could.⁴⁰⁶

The Nixon Doctrine became part of the United States' response to a new situation in the world oil market and the new and growing U.S. dependency on oil imports from the Persian Gulf. When President Nixon articulated the Nixon Doctrine on July 25, 1969 in Guam at a press conference, Mr. Nixon was pushing America's allies to take responsibility for their own military defense. The doctrine was laid out in three points. First, the United States would keep its treaty commitments. Second, the United States would provide a

⁴⁰⁶ Downey, *Oil 101*, 11.

military shield if a nuclear armed state threatened an ally or a country whose survival the United States considered vital to its own security. Third, in other cases, the United States would look to the nation threatened to assume responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense but would furnish assistance in accordance with treaty commitments.

The Nixon Doctrine as applied in the Persian Gulf, was to provide significant aid to both Iran and Saudi Arabia, so these allies could assume the burden of ensuring stability in their region. Michael Klare, author of *Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Petroleum Dependency* writes that the Nixon Doctrine "opened the floodgates" of U.S. military aid to allies in the Persian Gulf, and helped set the stage for the Carter Doctrine and for the subsequent direct U.S. military involvement of the Gulf War and the Iraq War.⁴⁰⁷ The transfers of advanced military weaponry was worth billions. Iran alone purchased and took delivery of 190 F-4 Phantom combat planes, 80 F-14 Tomcat air-superiority fighters, and 460 M-6-A1 tanks. Saudi Arabia ordered 60 F-15 Eagle fighter planes, 200 AH-1S attack helicopters, and 250 M-60A1 tanks.⁴⁰⁸

Throughout the early 1970s power in the world oil market shifted dramatically. The dependence of the United States economy on foreign oil continued to grow almost unmentioned or at least unaddressed by policy makers in Washington. In 1972 the United States imported 15% of its oil from the Middle East.⁴⁰⁹ America's appetite for foreign oil

⁴⁰⁷ Michael Klare, *Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Petroleum Dependency* (New York: Henry Holt, 2004), 43.

⁴⁰⁸ Michael Klare, *Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Petroleum Dependency* (New York: Henry Holt, 2004), 43.

⁴⁰⁹ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 110.

doubled in three years, from 3.2 million barrels per day in 1970 to 4.5 million barrels per day in 1972 to 6.2 million barrels per day in 1973.⁴¹⁰ This trend also reflected declining U.S. domestic oil production. In 1955 the number of oil wells drilled in the United States topped 31,000 and by 1972 that number had declined to just over 11,000.⁴¹¹

The Yom Kippur war in October 1973 led directly to the third embargo by Saudi Arabia on oil shipments to the United States and western countries friendly to Israel within 20 years. Shipments of Middle East oil measured on a daily basis went from 1.2 million barrels per day to a mere 19,000 barrels per day while between May 1973 and June 1974, while the average price of a gallon of gasoline rose forty three percent.⁴¹² The embargo was accompanied by cutbacks in crude oil production which helped drive the dramatic increases in the price of oil and gasoline. On October 8, 1973 as part of the effort to punish the west for supporting Israel in the war, the Persian Gulf oil states increased the posted price of a barrel of oil from \$3.01 to \$5.12.⁴¹³

But for Saudi Arabia the reality of the Cold War intervened and King Faisal obliquely allowed Saudi oil to flow to American military operations in Viet Nam and to fuel the American navy.⁴¹⁴ For the Saudi King, the United States remained the best bulwark against the Soviet Union's godless communists.

⁴¹⁰ William A. Simon, *A Time For Action* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1980), 64.

⁴¹¹ Simon, *A Time For Action*, 63.

⁴¹² Thomas Carson and Mary Bonk, eds. *Gale Encyclopedia Of U.S. Economic History Vol.2*, "OPEC Oil Embargo," (Detroit: Gale Group, 1999), 751.

⁴¹³ Daniel Yergin, *The Prize, The Epic Quest For Oil Money And Power*, (New York: Free Press, 1992), 604.

⁴¹⁴ Anthony Brown, *Oil God And Gold, The Story Of Aramco And The Saudi Kings*, (New York:Houghton Mifflin, 1999), 295.

In response to the Arab oil embargo Mr. Nixon proposed Project Independence on November 7, 1973 seeking to conserve available supplies and spur domestic production while exploring alternative sources in an effort make the nation energy independent by 1980.⁴¹⁵

Even as the U.S.-Saudi relationship was placed under great stress by the course of events neither side could control, we can see that the relationship was based on the national security interests of each partner. For the United States the interest was access to a stable supply (and the price) of crude oil. For the Saudi Arabia, preserving their national integrity and resisting Soviet expansion in the Persian Gulf was the dominant concern.

Events during the month of December, 1973, illustrate the strategic nature of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. At the OPEC meeting in Tehran, Iran, the Shah of Iran led an effort to increase the price of a barrel of oil from \$5.12 to \$11.66 immediately.⁴¹⁶ The Saudi leadership beginning with King Faisal recognized the ruinous effect this would have on the western economies. Moscow was already enjoying watching the “crisis of capitalism” and the specter of chaos in the West and Soviet power on the rise did not serve the interests of the House of Saud. The King organized the Arab OPEC members into a mini-cartel, increasing production. Friction with Washington over Israel was one thing, but for the Saudis, a crash of the western economies and the possible emergence of a Soviet hegemony in the Middle East was a national security issue of the first order.

⁴¹⁵ Richard Nixon: "Address to the Nation About Policies To Deal With the Energy Shortages.," November 7, 1973. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4034>.

⁴¹⁶ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 122.

Between 1972 and 1973 the United States price tag for imported oil for skyrocketed from \$3.9 billion dollars to \$24 billion dollars.⁴¹⁷ In 1974 the policy goals of the Nixon administration in regards to Saudi and Persian Gulf oil were to break the back of OPEC and to lure the so called “petrodollars” back home.⁴¹⁸ As Rachel Bronson notes:

Kissinger believed that the only thing that could truly neutralize the oil weapon was heavy Saudi investment in the U.S. economy, since an embargo that raised oil prices would only exacerbate American balance of payments problems which would in turn hurt Saudi investments in the U.S. economy.⁴¹⁹

Kissinger’s plan worked. In 1974 the Saudi’s had invested \$5 billion in the United States and by 1976 that had risen to \$60 billion. Only the United States offered an economy large enough for the Saudi’s to invest their new wealth safely, while a

...Citibank analyst involved in a study for SAMA (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency the Kingdom’s Islamic equivalent of a central bank) remembered that ‘the U.S. capital market was the only one at that time that afforded sufficient depth for them to invest significantly without overshadowing other investors and moving prices.’⁴²⁰

At this point we can see the beginnings of a strategy of defensive integration by the United States. By pushing Saudi-American economic relations into a state of interdependence, Mr. Nixon and Kissinger consciously created a bi-lateral relationship wherein each nation gains some stability in their relationship but also loses some degree of freedom of action in the international arena especially on those issues on which they disagree, principally, for the United States and Saudi Arabia, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. The benefit is an international relationship of stability and predictability, knowing who your

⁴¹⁷ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 122.

⁴¹⁸ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 124.

⁴¹⁹ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 125.

⁴²⁰ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 126.

friends are and that they can be relied on in matters of national security. It has worked well for a generation.

Analysis: Johnson to Nixon

From the description of the Unitary Actor Assumption set forth earlier, we find in the transition from Mr. Johnson to Mr. Nixon the following conditions. As in each of the prior transitions, no central organizing authority was available to resolve disputes between member states. Anarchy was the dominant fact of international life for both the Presidents involved in this transition. Every international organization was dependent upon the strength of its member states, and thus unable and even unwilling to control the behavior of its most powerful members. Within the United States government the President spoke of the nation of matters of national security. The relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union especially on the issue of nuclear weapons remained the single most important national security issue confronting the President.

The relative capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union continued their two decades long trend towards a balance of power in that each side now held sufficient nuclear forces to, as a first strike or in response to a first strike, destroy the other nation several times over.

At the end of the Mr. Johnson's presidency the policy of the United States about nuclear weapons was a smooth continuation of Mr. Eisenhower's policy:

1. The United States has nuclear weapons at the ready, and any arms agreement must contain absolutely reliable, verifiable inspections to ensure against any cheating by any party.

2. The United States will use nuclear weapons if attacked.
3. The United States has not renounced the right to the first use of nuclear weapons.
4. To ensure the destruction of any foe after a surprise attack, the United States will maintain a nuclear arsenal sufficient for that purpose.

On the surface it may appear that United States nuclear weapons and disarmament policy changed, though rather slowly, through a gradual acceptance of a numerical weapons parity with the Soviet Union. Numerical superiority was never a policy goal, deterrence was and the calculus for deterrence did not require numerical superiority, it only requires a second strike capability sufficient to deter a Soviet first strike. The evidence from this transition indicates the national security policy as set out in the four points above, remained intact and unchanged. This result tends to verify the unitary actor assumption in the context of nuclear weapons in this transition.

Before the direct examination of the Johnson to Nixon transition concerning Saudi Arabia and oil, an adjustment in United States stance towards Saudi Arabia from the Kennedy to the Johnson administrations should be acknowledged. The change from Mr. Kennedy to Mr. Johnson (a change of administrations but not between presidents of differing political parties, and therefore not a subject examined in this study) with the consequent reduction of United States concern about internal reforms in Saudi Arabia is evidence of an attitude toward a foreign state that appears on the surface to contradict the unitary actor assumption. However, Mr. Kennedy never let the issue of reform inside Saudi Arabia rise to a level of importance where it obstructed the core relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. For Mr. Kennedy the national security issue, oil and

resisting Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf clearly trumped the human rights issues concerning Saudi Arabia.

On the issue of oil, Mr. Johnson did not need to treat Saudi oil as a vital national issue because during his term of office the United States still controlled the world price of oil. Through production quotas set by the Texas Railroad Commission controlling the excess capacity existing in the Texas oil fields, the United States could control the price of oil. That control shifted to the Saudi Arabian Oil ministry during the Nixon administration. Mr. Nixon treated Saudi oil as a vital national survival issue to the point of pledging help against Soviet aggression in the Nixon Doctrine and massive arms sales to prop up allies of the United States in the Persian Gulf region, primarily Saudi Arabia and Iran.

At the end of the Johnson administration the policy about Saudi Arabia and its oil was:

1. Access to Saudi and Gulf oil by the world was an important issue. Interruption in the flow of oil would impair economic activity in Western Europe and diminish NATO's capabilities relative to the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact forces.
2. The US would use diplomatic pressure and persuasion on the Saudis over the issue of price but was unwilling to intervene with sufficient force to achieve the control necessary to allow Washington set the price at the pump

The Nixon administration the policy about Saudi Oil was:

1. Access to Saudi and Gulf oil by the United States and the world market was a vital national security interest.

2. The US would deploy and if necessary use military force to keep the oil flowing even to the extent of commencing combat operations before the oil flow had stopped.
3. The US would use diplomatic pressure and persuasion on the Saudis over the issue of price but was unwilling to intervene with sufficient force to achieve the control necessary to allow Washington set the price at the pump

In the context of United States policy towards Saudi Arabia, the analysis of the transition from the Johnson to the Nixon administrations has little to tell us about the unitary actor assumption because under Mr. Johnson the security of Saudi Arabia and its oil was not a vital national security issue. Under Mr. Nixon the security of Saudi Arabia and its oil became a vital national security issue. No substantial contradictory evidence concerning the unitary actor assumption appears in this transition concerning oil and Saudi Arabia. Taken as a whole this transition appears to verify the unitary actor assumption.

Ford, Republican to Carter, Democrat: January 20, 1977

Ford and Nuclear Weapons

During Gerald Ford's brief appointive presidency following the resignation of Richard Nixon, American foreign policy proceeded in the same trajectory as before. He served less time in the Oval Office than John F. Kennedy and followed a fellow Republican who appointed him to the Vice Presidency. Mr. Ford is of interest in this study first, as part of the Nixon/Ford foreign policy that Jimmy Carter found upon his inauguration in 1977, and second, as the presidential election campaign of 1976 outlined the possibilities and policy opportunities for the new Carter administration.

Mr. Ford continued Mr. Nixon's effort to reach a permanent nuclear weapons agreement with the Soviet Union. While the domestic oil markets were returning to a new normal after the end of Arab oil embargo which ended in March 1974; Mr. Ford pursued Project Independence to eliminate American dependence on imported oil. One clear sign of continuity in American policy was Mr. Ford's continued use of the services of Dr. Henry Kissinger. Kissinger had served Mr. Nixon as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State. On November 3, 1975 Mr. Ford promoted Kissinger's deputy, Brent Scowcroft to the post of National Security Advisor on the White House staff, but kept Kissinger as Secretary of State to concentrate his time on his duties as Secretary of State primarily responsible for Viet Nam, the Soviet Union and the Middle East.⁴²¹

Mr. Ford confronted at unprecedented political challenge when he was sworn in as an unelected president on August 9, 1974. A veteran Republican Congressman, and appointed Vice President, Mr. Ford intended to continue the policies but not the political methods of his disgraced predecessor. On August 10, 1974, a day after being sworn into office, he requested that the department heads from the Nixon administration remain in place.⁴²²

In his first address to the Joint Session of Congress on August 12, 1974, Mr. Ford pledged that, "I have fully supported the outstanding foreign-policy of President Nixon. This

⁴²¹ Gerald R. Ford: "The President's News Conference," November 3, 1975. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=5357>.

⁴²² Gerald R. Ford: "Memorandums on the Transition of the Presidency," August 10, 1974. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4631>.

policy, I intend to continue.”⁴²³ He pledged that, “American strength will be second to none” and recognized in classic realist language, “We cannot rely on the forbearance of others to protect this nation.”⁴²⁴ Speaking directly to the Soviet Union, Mr. Ford said,

I pledge continuity in our commitment to the course of the last three years... to work together in peace, for in a thermonuclear age there can be no alternative to a positive and peaceful relationship between our nations.⁴²⁵

At Mr. Ford’s first news conference on August 28, 1974, he addressed the expected resumption of the strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. The question asked whether there have been disagreements between the Pentagon and State Department and other agencies concerning the American position on the talks. Mr. Ford responded,

At the present time, there is an effort being made to bring the Department of Defense, the State Department and any others together for a resolution of our, the United States position regarding SALT Two. This decision will be made in a relatively near future. I don’t think there are any basic difficulties that cannot be resolved internally within our government. I believe that Secretary Kissinger is going to be meeting with representatives from the Soviet Union in the near future. I think in October, if my memory is correct, and we, of course, will then proceed on a timetable to try and negotiate SALT Two. I think a properly negotiated, effective strategic arms limitation agreement is in the best interests of ourselves, the Soviet Union, and a stable international situation.⁴²⁶

⁴²³ Gerald R. Ford: "Address to a Joint Session of the Congress," August 12, 1974. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4694>.

⁴²⁴ Ford, "Address to a Joint Session of the Congress."

⁴²⁵ Ford, "Address to a Joint Session of the Congress."

⁴²⁶ Gerald R. Ford: "The President's News Conference," August 28, 1974. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4671>.

Mr. Ford did have real policy options when he took office in 1974. There was an active conservative wing inside his administration centering on Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney who both opposed détente with the Soviet Union.⁴²⁷

In National Security Decision Memorandum 271 issued September 24, 1974, approved by the president and issued over Kissinger's signature (signed by his deputy and eventual successor Brent Scowcroft) setting out instructions for the SALT talks in Geneva, the delegation was instructed to:

...point to the impact that the characteristics, magnitude, and deployment rate of the Soviet strategic programs on U.S. programs and force structure, especially in the absence of an effective agreement. The future U.S. strategic force level will be determined, to a major degree, by the outcome of the negotiations. The delegation should convey the notion that the size and characteristics of the central system forces of each side are functionally related, and that the U.S. strategic force will not be less than Soviet strategic force, either in perception or reality.⁴²⁸

Kissinger wrote that the United States was seeking an agreement that provided, "a high degree of equivalence in central strategic systems," and each leg of the nuclear triad, in terms of aggregate numbers, and throw weights as well as limitations on MIRV systems.⁴²⁹

Concerns over cheating remain a significant issue. The delegation was instructed that they

...should reaffirm the principle that the provisions of any strategic arms limitation agreement must be adequately verifiable. The delegation should state that there will be a need for special measures to permit adequate verification in certain cases such as in limits MIRV deployments⁴³⁰

⁴²⁷Rhodes, *Arsenals of Folly*, 119.

⁴²⁸ Henry Kissinger by Brent Scowcroft, "National Security Decision Memorandum 217, Instructions for SALT Talks," (Washington D.C. September 24, 1974), <http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/document/nsdmnssm/nsdm271a.htm>

⁴²⁹ Kissinger, "National Security Decision Memorandum 271."

⁴³⁰ Kissinger, "National Security Decision Memorandum 271."

On November 24, 1974 Mr. Ford met with the Soviet Union's General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev at Vladivostok. The statement issued at the end of their discussions indicated the desire of the parties to have a new agreement ready in 1977 when the interim SALT I agreement was to expire. The new agreement was to last until 1985. At its core, the new agreement stated,

3. Based on the principle of equality and equal security, the new agreement will include the following limitations:
 - a. Both sides will be entitled to have a certain agreed aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles;
 - b. Both sides will be entitled to have a certain agreed aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs is equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRVs).⁴³¹

Following his return home the president had a press conference on December 2, 1974 where he went into more detail about the emerging agreement with the Soviets. The parties Mr. Ford said had, "set firm and equal limits on the strategic forces of each side."⁴³² They had agreed to "a ceiling of 2,400 each on the total number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine launched missiles and heavy bombers," and further agreed to a limit of 1320 missiles armed with MIRVs."⁴³³ The Aide-Memoire further spelled out the elements of the agreement:

- 2400 equal aggregate limit of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers) of both sides;
- 1320 equal aggregate limit on MIRV systems;

⁴³¹ Gerald R. Ford: "Joint United States-Soviet Statement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.," November 24, 1974. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4584>.

⁴³² Gerald R. Ford: "The President's News Conference," December 2, 1974. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4600>.

⁴³³ Ford: "The President's News Conference," December 2, 1974.

--ban on construction of new land based ICBM launchers;
--limits of deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms; and
--important elements of the Interim Agreement (e.g., relating to verification would be incorporated into the new agreement.⁴³⁴

Numerical balance in weapons systems was taken as a starting point but verification and trust issues remained crucial between the parties. On January 25, 1975 National Security Advisor Scowcroft writing for Secretary of State Kissinger advised the U.S. Commissioner at the Geneva arms control talks to discuss with the Soviets that,

U.S. national technical means of verification have revealed numerous examples within the USSR of concealment in connection with several of its strategic weapons programs. Activities of this nature have been observed at a variety of locations.... The U.S. is concerned about the expanding pattern of concealment measures being undertaken in the USSR. Such activities undermine the viability of existing arms control agreements and could create a major impediment to verification by national technical means of present and future arms-control agreements.⁴³⁵

In July, 1975 the American delegation was instructed to propose the Soviets the following language concerning the question of interference or impeding with verification of compliance by national technical means. The language was:

Each party undertakes not to use any measure or practice, including measures or practices associated with testing and development, which deliberately impedes verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this agreement. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul activities. The parties undertake to avoid measures or practices which result in unintended interference with national technical means of verification of the other party.⁴³⁶

⁴³⁴ Department of State, "Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Limitation Of Strategic Offensive Arms," <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/salt2-1.html>.

⁴³⁵ Henry Kissinger by Brent Scowcroft, "National Security Decision Memorandum 283," (Washington D.C. January 25, 1975), <http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/document/nsdmnssm/nsdm283b.htm>.

⁴³⁶ Henry Kissinger, "National Security Decision Memorandum 301," (Washington D.C. July 18, 1975), <http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/document/nsdmnssm/nsdm301b.htm>.

In his State of the Union address on January 19, 1976 Mr. Ford said,

A strong defense posture gives weight to our values and our views in international negotiations. It assures the vigor of our alliances. And it sustains our efforts to promote settlements of international conflicts. Only from a position of strength can we negotiate a balanced agreement to limit the growth of nuclear arms. Only a balanced agreement will serve our interests and minimize the threat of nuclear confrontation.⁴³⁷

Mr. Ford did sign one nuclear treaty with the Soviet Union, in Moscow on May 28, 1976. This was the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes. This treaty was a companion to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and was designed to monitor a nuclear explosion outside a designated nuclear test site. The treaty addressed the size of a single explosion, less than 150 kilotons and the size of an aggregate series of explosions, less than 1500 kilotons as well as addressing prior notice and verification issues.⁴³⁸ Not all these explosions could be monitored successfully by

...national technical means” (satellite) and therefore the rules concerning the privileges, immunities, living and working conditions, of the on-scene observers were addressed in Article IV of the treaty.⁴³⁹

The public theme of peace through complete military preparedness is consistent in the Nixon and Ford presidencies and Mr. Ford in his acceptance speech at the Republican convention in Kansas City on August 18, 1976 lays out this position,

⁴³⁷ Gerald R. Ford: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress Reporting on the State of the Union," January 19, 1976. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=5677>.

⁴³⁸ US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Treaty On Underground Nuclear Explosions For Peaceful Purposes," *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements* (Washington D.C. June 1977), 168.

⁴³⁹ US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Treaty On Underground Nuclear Explosions For Peaceful Purposes," 172.

The world now respects America's policy of peace through strength. The United States is again the confident leader of the free world. Nobody questions our dedication to peace, but nobody doubts our willingness to use our strength when our vital interests are at stake, and we will. I called for an up-to-date, powerful Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines that will keep America secure for decades. A strong military posture is always the best insurance for peace.⁴⁴⁰

Addressing the issue of levels of defense preparedness, the 1976 Republican platform states that,

A superior national defense is the fundamental condition for a secure America and for peace and freedom for the world. Military strength is the path to peace. A sound foreign policy must be rooted in a superior defense capability, and both must be perceived as a deterrent to aggression and supportive of our national interests.⁴⁴¹

Then directly discussing U.S. relations with the Soviet Union the platform further states,

Soviet military power has grown rapidly in recent years, and while we shall prevent a military imbalance or a sudden shift in the global balance of power, we shall also diligently explore with the Soviet Union new ways to reduce tensions and to arrive at mutually beneficial and self-enforcing agreements in all fields of international activity. Important steps have been taken to limit strategic nuclear arms. The Vladivostok Agreement of November 1974 placed a ceiling on the strategic forces of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Further negotiations in arms control are continuing. We shall not agree for the sake of agreement; on the contrary, we will make sure that any agreements yield fundamental benefits to our national security.⁴⁴²

Mr. Ford continued to support the Nixon/Kissinger policy of détente with the Soviet Union arguing in the 1976 Presidential Debate that,

THE PRESIDENT. I don't believe we should move to a Cold War relationship. I think it's in the best interest of the United States and the world as a whole that the

⁴⁴⁰ Gerald R. Ford: "Remarks in Kansas City Upon Accepting the 1976 Republican Presidential Nomination," August 19, 1976. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6281>.

⁴⁴¹ Republican Party Platforms: "Republican Party Platform of 1976," August 18, 1976. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25843>.

⁴⁴² Republican Party, "Republican Party Platform of 1976."

United States negotiate rather than go back to the Cold War relationship with the Soviet Union.⁴⁴³

In his final State of the Union address on January 12, 1977, Mr. Ford directly addressed his concerns about the long-term strategic decline of United States military forces as a result of American experience in Vietnam. As it reflects his perception of the United States national will and of American capabilities, it is worth quoting at length here as a statement of the nuclear policy of the outgoing administration:

The war in Indochina consumed enormous resources at the very time that the overwhelming strategic superiority we once enjoyed was disappearing. In past years, as a result of decisions by the United States, our strategic forces leveled off, yet the Soviet Union continued a steady, constant buildup of its own forces, committing a high percentage of its national economic effort to defense.

The United States can never tolerate a shift in strategic balance against us or even a situation where the American people or our allies believe the balance is shifting against us. The United States would risk the most serious political consequences if the world came to believe that our adversaries have a decisive margin of superiority.

To maintain a strategic balance we must look ahead to the 1980s and beyond. The sophistication of modern weapons requires that we make decisions now if we are to ensure our security 10 years from now. Therefore, I have consistently advocated and strongly urged that we pursue three critical strategic programs: the Trident missile launching submarine; the B-1 bomber, with its superior capability to penetrate modern air defenses; and a more advanced intercontinental ballistic missile that will be better able to survive nuclear attack and deliver a devastating retaliatory strike.

In an era where the strategic nuclear forces are in rough equilibrium, the risks of conflict below the nuclear threshold may grow more perilous. A major, long-term objective, therefore, is to maintain capabilities to deal with, and thereby deter, conventional challenges and crises, particularly in Europe.

We cannot rely solely on strategic forces to guarantee our security or to deter all types of aggression. We must have superior naval and marine forces to maintain freedom of the seas, strong multipurpose tactical air forces, and mobile, modern

⁴⁴³ Gerald R. Ford: "Presidential Campaign Debate," October 6, 1976. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6414>.

ground forces. Accordingly, I have directed a long-term effort to improve our worldwide capabilities to deal with regional crises.

Finally on his last morning in office January 20, 1977, Mr. Ford issued National Security Decision Memorandum 348, which called for, "a strategic balance with the Soviet Union that guarantees the United States will never be in an inferior position."⁴⁴⁴ There are three important sections in the memorandum for the purpose of this study. First the section on Strategic Forces declares that,

To be credible to the Soviets, the U.S. strategic deterrent, must be adequate for both a massive retaliatory strike against any Soviet attack as well is capable of launching varied effective responses to less-than-all-out Soviet first strike. A range of credible options is thus critical to maintaining deterrence, as well as to escalation control, satisfactory war termination, and postwar recovery.⁴⁴⁵

Second, in a preview of some emerging alternative nuclear strategies seen in the Reagan years, both the pledge of no-first-use and the concept of a nuclear freeze, Mr. Ford addresses the question of first strike capability and analyzes the question from the point of view of Soviet decision makers. He discussed the concerns with balance and an understanding of perceptions of intentions that were necessary to successful arms control negotiations. Mr. Ford wrote that,

Our strategic nuclear forces should not, however, in fact or appearance be such as to persuade the Soviets that we have come off or are seeking, a disarming for strike capability, if we perceive that this is not an objective of Soviet policy.⁴⁴⁶

Third, almost as an afterthought, at the end of the memorandum, on the last page,

⁴⁴⁴ Gerald Ford "National Security Decision Memorandum 348." (Washington D.C. January 20, 1977), <http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/document/nsdmnssm/nsdm348a.htm>

⁴⁴⁵ Ford, "National Security Decision Memorandum 348."

⁴⁴⁶ Ford, "National Security Decision Memorandum 348."

Mr. Ford addresses the issue of arms control:

It is equally important to our security that we make a genuine effort in arms control negotiations both on the strategic and regional levels, seeking a more stable balance through a series of agreements. Such agreements on an equitable and verifiable basis can provide a reduction in demand on defense resources, with no diminution in national security, while enhancing overall stability and advancing world peace.⁴⁴⁷

Ford and Oil

Mr. Ford's first significant public comments as President on the issue of imported oil came at his August 28, 1974 news conference, when asked about concerns that Aramco (Arabian- American Oil Company) and Saudi Arabia were restricting production in order to support a high price for oil. Pushing the Nixon Administration proposal for Project Independence, Mr. Ford responded,

I think this points up very vividly the need and necessity for us to accelerate every aspect of Project Independence. I think it highlights the need and necessity for us to proceed with more oil and gas drilling, a greater supply domestically. I believe it points up the requirement that we expedite the licensing processes for new nuclear reactors. I think it points up very dramatically the need that we expand our geothermal, our solar research and development in the fields of energy.

In the meantime, it seems to me that the effort that was made several months ago to put together a group of consumer-industrial nations requires that this group meet frequently and act as much as possible in concert, because if we have any economic adverse repercussions because of high oil prices and poor investment policies, it could create serious economic problems throughout the industrial world. So it does require, I believe, the short-term action by consumer nations and the long-term actions under Project Independence.⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴⁷ Ford, "National Security Decision Memorandum 348."

⁴⁴⁸ Gerald R. Ford: "The President's News Conference," August 28, 1974. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4671>.

The next afternoon, Mr. Ford met in the Oval Office with Saudi foreign minister Umar al-Saqqaf, Kissinger and Scowcroft. In this conversation the basis of the continuing relationship between the United States and the Saudi Arabia, access to oil in exchange for protection and noninterference in Saudi domestic affairs, becomes clear. Saqqaf tells the President that, "We are your friends-we know what the Soviet Union wants."⁴⁴⁹ The Saudis were concerned that everyone was leaving the area except the Soviets who has established bases in Somalia and Yemen. Later in the conversation Mr. Ford raised the issues of price and supply. While no concrete results were obtained al-Saqqaf stated that he was "ninety nine percent sure" that nothing further would happen.⁴⁵⁰ Mr. Ford also assured al-Saqqaf that he (Ford) had a good relationship with Kissinger and would continue to follow his advice.

At his first State of the Union address on January 15, 1975, Mr. Ford was blunt on the energy issue, "We depend on others for essential energy."⁴⁵¹ He identified imported oil as the culprit, "Economic disruptions we and others are experiencing stem in part from the fact that the world price of petroleum has quadrupled in the last year."⁴⁵² Mr. Ford never mentioned Saudi Arabia in his speech and sets goals in terms of domestic production,

⁴⁴⁹ Gerald R. Ford, "Memorandum of Conversation with Umar al-Saqqaf, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Saudi Arabia," (Washington D.C. August 29, 1974), <http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/document/memcons/1552770.pdf>

⁴⁵⁰ Ford, "Conversation with Umar al-Saqqaf).

⁴⁵¹ Gerald R. Ford: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress Reporting on the State of the Union.," January 15, 1975. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4938>.

⁴⁵² Ford: "State of the Union," January 15, 1975.

consumption, expanding energy technology and seeking to "end vulnerability to economic disruption by foreign suppliers by 1985."⁴⁵³

In his State of the Union address on January 19, 1976 Mr. Ford remained concerned about America's dependence on foreign energy sources. Without mentioning Saudi Arabia the largest of the OPEC producers, by name, he called again for energy independence saying,

Taking a longer look at America's future, there can be neither sustained growth nor more jobs unless we continue to have an assured supply of energy to run our economy. Domestic production of oil and gas is still declining. Our dependence on foreign oil at high prices is still too great, draining jobs and dollars away from our own economy at the rate of \$125 per year for every American.

Last month, I signed a compromise national energy bill which enacts a part of my comprehensive energy independence program. This legislation was late, not the complete answer to energy independence, but still a start in the right direction. I again urge the Congress to move ahead immediately on the remainder of my energy proposals to make America invulnerable to the foreign oil cartel.⁴⁵⁴
For a variety of reasons, Mr. Ford and the nation made no progress towards energy

independence during his 2½ years as president. As Mr. Ford reported to Congress in his final State of the Union Address on January 12, 1977,

In 1973 we were dependent upon foreign oil imports for 36 percent of our needs. Today, we are 40-percent dependent, and we'll pay out \$34 billion for foreign oil this year. Such vulnerability at present or in the future is intolerable and must be ended.⁴⁵⁵

⁴⁵³ Ford: "State of the Union," January 15, 1975.

⁴⁵⁴ Ford: "State of the Union," January 15, 1975.

⁴⁵⁵ Gerald R. Ford: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress Reporting on the State of the Union," January 12, 1977. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=5555>.

Mr. Ford did not make an explicit promise to defend Saudi Arabia or an assertion of American policy any broader or more explicit than the Nixon Doctrine. As oil imports continued to trouble the American economy, he sought a domestic solution to the energy crisis with conservation efforts, increasing domestic supply and technological innovation at the core of his policy. It did not work.

Carter and Nuclear Weapons

President Jimmy Carter entered the White House in 1977 with a foreign policy based on a call for Human Rights all over the world. His attitude towards the Soviet Union worried conservatives but followed Détente, the policy of his predecessors in seeking better relations between the superpowers. He left office as hostile to the Soviets as his successor. The United States boycotted the Summer Olympics in Moscow in 1980. Mr. Carter requested the Senate delay ratification of the SALT II Treaty signed in Moscow on June 18, 1979. In the interim the Soviet Union had demonstrated behaviors inconsistent with the spirit of détente, and a large and worrying change in the Soviet's willingness to use force to expand their influence; the invasion of Afghanistan in late December, 1979. In requesting the delay in the Senate's consideration of the SALT II treaty, the President laid the blame foursquare on the Soviet Union in a White House statement saying that,

While the President continues to believe that ratification of SALT II is in the national security interest of the United States, he has concluded that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in defiance of the United Nations Charter, has made consideration of the SALT II treaty inappropriate at this time.

The President has asked that the delay continue while he and the Congress assess Soviet actions and intentions and devote their attention to legislative and other

measures required to respond to the crisis created by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.⁴⁵⁶

Clearly, this was not the international situation Mr. Carter had imagined when his term began. Mr. Carter made no real mention of the Soviet Union in his acceptance speech at the 1976 Democratic Party convention in New York, and in his Inaugural Address he offers only that,

The world is still engaged in a massive armaments race designed to ensure continuing equivalent strength among potential adversaries. We pledge perseverance and wisdom in our efforts to limit the world's armaments to those necessary for each nation's own domestic safety. And we will move this year a step toward our ultimate goal--the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this Earth.⁴⁵⁷

At one end of the range of options open to the new president was the Committee on the Present Danger. After the election but before Mr. Carter's inauguration, the Committee on the Present Danger released a conservative opinion paper titled "Common Sense and Common Danger." In this paper, they maintained that the primary threat to American security was the unparalleled Soviet military buildup and that the solution was "higher bracket American levels of defense spending."⁴⁵⁸ The Committee feared that the United States would become the number two military power in the world facing an unremittingly hostile Soviet Union.

⁴⁵⁶ Jimmy Carter: "Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty Statement by the White House Press Secretary on the President's Request for a Delay in • Senate Consideration of the Treaty. ," January 3, 1980. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33061>.

⁴⁵⁷ Jimmy Carter: "Inaugural Address," January 20, 1977. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6575>.

⁴⁵⁸ Rhodes, *Arsenals Of Folly*, 133.

The concept of a minimal deterrent, just enough power to destroy the enemy's civilization (assuming all your weapons reached their targets and worked as designed) was also being discussed at this time. This theory of a minimum deterrent force was described by Jerome Wiesner, Science Adviser to President Kennedy and President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in a speech at Stanford in 1984:

I will give you a simple piece of calculus. For most cities, it is reasonable to equate one bomb and one city. It would take a bigger bomb for Los Angeles or New York. If you are a weapons expert, you know, you should probably use several, "pepper 'em down"; you would get a better effect. In any event, it does not take many. And ask yourself: "where would you put 300 large nuclear weapons to be most destructive?" You run out of vital cities and towns and railroad junctions and power plants before you get to 300. The same thing is true in the United States and the Soviet Union. If I was not trying to be conservative I would say 50 bombs, properly placed, would probably put a society out of business, and 300 in each of the two countries leading the arms race would destroy their civilizations.⁴⁵⁹

Carter's initial approach to the Soviet Union as described by Richard Rhodes in *Arsenals of Folly, The Making of the Nuclear Arms Race* was,

...to try to put forward to the Soviet Union a much more dramatic reduction in the total quantity and effectiveness of the nuclear weapons in our arsenals, and to bring about a comprehensive test ban to eliminate the explosion of any nuclear devices, either underground or in the air.⁴⁶⁰

At the beginning of his term, Mr. Carter's team reviewed the status of the SALT-II negotiations with the Soviet Union. In Presidential Directive/NSC-7 issued March 23, 1977, Mr. Carter set out three acceptable scenarios for the conclusion of SALT-II. The preferred option would directly address the U. S. cruise missile and the Soviet Backfire bomber issues and reduce the total number of strategic delivery vehicles to the 1800-2000 level. A second

⁴⁵⁹ Rhodes, *Arsenals Of Folly*, 123.

⁴⁶⁰ Rhodes, *Arsenals Of Folly*, 133.

option would be an agreement based the Vladivostok outline that left the cruise missile and Backfire bomber issues for the SALT III negotiations. A third, less favored option which the negotiators were not authorized to discuss with the Soviets without additional presidential authorization; was to accept an outcome of an aggregate level of 2200-2400 strategic delivery vehicles, if the Soviets agreed to a separate limit on Backfire bombers, and a dividing line between strategic and tactical cruise missiles at a range of 2500 kilometers. That agreement would last through 1985.⁴⁶¹

As to the troublesome issues of verification and trust, Carter directed that for all three alternatives,

...it is understood that an agreement will include a satisfactory resolution of the issues of MIRV verification, exchange of a data base and prohibition of deliberate concealment measures...⁴⁶²

On March 24, 1977, with regard to nuclear non-proliferation policy and the fundamental “security objective to prevent the spread of nuclear explosive – or near explosive—capabilities to countries that do not now possess them,” the President issued Presidential Directive/NSC-8 and ordered that,

...U.S. non-proliferation policy shall be directed at preventing the development and use of sensitive nuclear power technologies which involve direct access to plutonium, highly enriched uranium, or other weapons useable material in non-nuclear weapons states, and at minimizing the global accumulation of these materials.⁴⁶³

⁴⁶¹ Jimmy Carter, “Presidential Directive/NSC-7, SALT Negotiations,” (Washington, March 23, 1977) Online by *Federation of American Scientists*, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pd/pd07.pdf>

⁴⁶² Carter, NSC-7.

⁴⁶³ Jimmy Carter, “Presidential Directive/NSC-8, Nuclear Non Proliferation Policy” (Washington, March 24, 1977) Online by *Federation of American Scientists*, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pd/pd08.pdf>.

Almost from the beginning of the Cold War, much of U.S. defense and security policy had proceeded from fundamentally pessimistic assumptions about the core nature of the conflict with the Soviet Union and the relative position of the United States and its allies in that struggle. But Mr. Carter saw the United States as dealing from a position of relative strength. In Presidential Directive/NSC-18, titled U.S. National Strategy, when discussing the “risk of conflict as well as the opportunity for stabilizing U.S. Soviet relations,” Carter wrote that,

...the United States continues to enjoy a number of critical advantages: it has more creative technological and economic system, its political structure can adapt more easily to popular demands and relies of freely given popular support, and it is supported internationally by allies and friends who genuinely share similar aspirations. In contrast, though successfully acquiring military power matching that of the United States, the Soviet Union continues to face major internal economic difficulties, and externally it has few genuinely committed allies while lately suffering setbacks in its relations with China, parts of Africa, and India.⁴⁶⁴

He directed that U.S. national strategy seek to counterbalance Soviet military strength, compete with the Soviets by pursuing human rights, pursue “adequately verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements,” and maintain an “overall balance of military power” with the Soviet Union and its allies “at least as favorable as that that now exists.”⁴⁶⁵

Mr. Carter had hoped to jumpstart the arms control process by proposing to the Soviets at the beginning of his administration a significant package of agreements that exceeded the Vladivostok framework. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance took a package of

⁴⁶⁴ Jimmy Carter, “Presidential Directive/NSC-18, U.S. National Strategy” (Washington, August 26, 1977) Online by *Federation of American Scientists*, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pd/pd18.pdf>.

⁴⁶⁵ Carter, NSC-18

alternative proposals to Moscow. As Mr. Carter described the options in a session with reporters on March 30, 1977,

One of our proposals on this nuclear weapons talks was very brief and it was our second option. It was, in effect, to ratify the Vladivostok agreement that had already been reached.

The difference between us and the Soviet Union on this point is that the Soviets claim that Secretary Kissinger and my predecessors in the White House--Presidents Ford and, earlier, Nixon--did agree to forgo the deployment of cruise missiles. Our position is that we have never agreed to any such thing. But we asked the Soviet Union to accept an agreement on all other matters and postpone the cruise missile and the Russians' new bomber, the Backfire bomber, until continuing later discussion. They rejected that proposal.

The other one was much more far-reaching and has profound consequences that are beneficial, I think, to our own Nation and to the rest of the world. It was to have substantial reductions in the level of deployment of missile launchers and the MIRV'd missiles below the 2,400 level and the 1,320 level that were established under the Vladivostok agreements--substantial reductions; secondly, to stop the development and deployment of any new weapons systems. A third point was to freeze at the present level about 550 intercontinental ballistic missiles, our Minuteman and their missiles known as the SS-17, 18, and 19.

Another was to ban the deployment of all mobile missiles, their SS-16 and others, or ours--that is under the development stage, the MX.

Another one is to have a strict limit on the development of the Backfire bomber and a strict limit on the range that would be permitted on cruise missiles.

Another element of the proposal was to limit the number of test firings of missiles to six firings per year of the intercontinental range and also of the medium range missiles and to ask the Soviet Union to give us some assured mechanism by which we could distinguish between their intercontinental mobile missile, the SS16, and their limited-range mobile missile, the SS-20.

The sum total of all this proposal was a fair, balanced, substantial reduction in the arms race which would have guaranteed, I believe, a permanent lessening of tension and a mutual benefit to both our countries. The Soviets, at least at this point, have not accepted this proposal either.⁴⁶⁶

⁴⁶⁶ Jimmy Carter: "SALT Negotiations With the Soviet Union Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters.", March 30, 1977. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency*

At this point we should note that a major stumbling block in the relationship was the emerging technology of cruise missiles, non-ballistic highly accurate and hard to detect. Up to this point cruise missiles had not been a factor in either U.S. or Soviet defense plans. But, this new technology was a new capability that was as yet not fully understood by either side although the Soviets were proceeding on the assumption that the United States had a serious head start. For Mr. Carter, as well as all his predecessors, verification was a key concern and he was plain in what he wanted:

You might be interested in knowing that a few other points that we proposed were to have adequate verification, an end of concealment, and the establishment of a so-called data base by which we would tell the Soviet Union the level of our own armaments at this point, and they would tell us their level of armaments at this point, so that we would have an assured, mutually agreed level of weapon capability.⁴⁶⁷

While Mr. Carter continued to press for arms reductions in strategic weapons below the levels agreed to in 1974 at Vladivostok by President Ford, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote in Presidential Directive/NSC -20 on September 9, 1977, that the President was willing to extend the 1972 interim agreement for an undetermined amount of time while active negotiations continued in search of the new agreement.⁴⁶⁸

In his State of the Union address to Congress on January 19, 1978, Mr. Carter described his foreign policy for the United States. The first goal was to maintain national

Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7264>.

⁴⁶⁷ Carter: "SALT Negotiations With the Soviet Union."

⁴⁶⁸ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Presidential Directive/NSC-20, U.S. SALT Position" (Washington, September 9, 1977) Online by *Federation of American Scientists*, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pd/pd20.pdf>.

security which entailed maintenance of a strong military and a “strategic balance.” He sought to limit the “quality and quantity of the giant nuclear arsenals” and continued to seek to ban all nuclear testing in a verifiable agreement.⁴⁶⁹

While in pursuit of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Mr. Carter remained concerned with weapons safety and reliability issues. On May 22, 1978, in Presidential Directive/NSC-38 Brzezinski wrote that the president sought a five-year fixed duration treaty. He remained concerned that the treaty permit, “experiments in laser function and other related areas for civil energy purposes.”⁴⁷⁰

The Carter administration was pursuing both a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the SALT II agreement at the same time. Internal discussions within the administration in September 1978 are instructive concerning the complexity and relatedness of these issues. On September 2, 1978 Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Paul Warnke, the administration’s chief SALT negotiator advised the President that they believed the talks on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty should proceed expeditiously, that the nonnuclear states should be consulted in the negotiating process, and that the administration should avoid submitting a Comprehensive

⁴⁶⁹ Jimmy Carter: "The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress," January 19, 1978. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30856>.

⁴⁷⁰ Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Presidential Directive/NSC-38, Comprehensive Test Ban” (Washington, May 22, 1978) Online by *Federation of American Scientists*, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pd/pd18.pdf>.

Test Ban Treaty to Congress at a time which would complicate ratification of a SALT II agreement.⁴⁷¹

On September 19th Defense Secretary Harold Brown responded that he believed the proposal to consult other nations concerning the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would not be successful in preventing an early confrontation with Congress. Secretary Brown warned that opponents in Congress would claim as much right to be consulted concerning the treaty and to influence the text of the agreement as other nonnuclear states. Testing was a significant issue in determining the reliability of America's nuclear deterrent. Brown wrote that,

There will be testimony from the JCS and the laboratory directors that in their judgment such a treaty is not in the best interest of national security. Though others of us will be able to point out the stockpile reliability will not be degraded unacceptably in 3 or even 5 years, the whole process will in my view make severe trouble not only for CTB but also for SALT ratification.⁴⁷²

On September 20, 1978, Secretary of Energy James R. Schlesinger commenting on the Vance-Warnke memorandum on CTB procedures noted that,

In a political sense, I think it is clear that CTB can create troubles, perhaps insuperable troubles, for SALT. The reverse is not true. Therefore, if one is prepared to delay CBT submission until SALT issues are resolved, one might as well avoid costs inherent in the earlier attempt to achieve a final resolution of CTB issues.⁴⁷³

⁴⁷¹ Cyrus Vance and Paul Warnke, "Memo to President, Comprehensive Test Ban Negotiations." September 2, 1978. *The National Security Archive*, George Washington University, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb323/doc10.pdf>

⁴⁷² Harold Brown, "Memorandum for Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs," September 19, 1978. *The National Security Archive*, George Washington University, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb323/doc10.pdf>

⁴⁷³ James R. Schlesinger, "Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski, Recommendation regarding Vance-Warnke Memorandum on CTB Procedures," September 20, 1978. *The National Security Archive*, George Washington University, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb323/doc10.pdf>

In recommending that the administration defer resolution of CTB issues in favor of pursuing SALT ratification, Schlesinger sets forth concisely the constrained and complicated environment in which the President had to operate:

Testing requirements-- and therefore testing limitations-- are derivative from strategic weapons requirements; it would be far easier to persuade members of Congress that testing requirements are reduced as a consequence of a SALT agreement.

Second, the constituency for CTB is quite limited compared to the constituency for SALT. The CTB will meet strong objections on technical grounds, while the objection to SALT will be primarily on policy grounds. The issue in a CTB debate will be: what technical risks to American security are being incurred for a generalized objective of arms control? Concern will be expressed within the official family (the Chiefs, the Lab Directors). In contrast to strategic arms limitation, in no way can it be suggested that CTB will improve our security relative to the Soviets.

In summary, the opposition to CTB is stronger, the constituency for weaker, the technical case harder to defend, and the arguments in favor revolve around attitudes of third parties rather than the Soviets. I would consequently conclude that the issue of CTB should await stabilization of our arms relationship with the Soviets.⁴⁷⁴

By the time the President gave his second State of the Union address, on January 23, 1979, the SALT II negotiations were clearly the priority. The president pledged to,

...maintain our strategic capability and continue the progress of the last two years with our NATO allies with whom we have increased our readiness modernized our equipment and strengthened our defense forces in Europe.⁴⁷⁵

Concerning the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Mr. Carter maintained,

The purpose of SALT, then as now, is not to gain a unilateral advantage for either nation, but to protect the security of both nations, to reverse the costly and dangerous

⁴⁷⁴ Schlesinger, "Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski," September 20, 1978. [underlining appears in the original document].

⁴⁷⁵ Jimmy Carter: "The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress. ," January 23, 1979. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=32657>.

momentum of the nuclear arms race, to preserve a stable balance of nuclear forces, and to demonstrate to a concerned world that we are determined to help preserve the peace.⁴⁷⁶

Arguing that SALT was based on mutual self-interest, and not merely a sentiment, he promised that the American nuclear deterrent would remain overwhelming, and that the agreement would not be based on trust. He said

SALT II does not rely on trust; it will be verifiable. We have very sophisticated, proven means, including our satellites, to determine for ourselves whether or not the Soviet Union is meeting its treaty obligations. I will not sign the agreement which cannot be verified.⁴⁷⁷

Claiming that his policies were consistent with his predecessors, Carter described his approach as, "the path of arms control, backed by a strong national defense-- the path our nation and every president has walked for 30 years..."⁴⁷⁸

During 1979 the world situation changed for the worse. But, before the bad news, came the SALT II agreement which was signed in Moscow on June 18, 1979. At the signing of the SALT II Treaty Mr. Carter said

Like SALT I, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the Limited Test Ban before it, this SALT II treaty is based on the real security needs of our two nations. It will not end the continuing need for military strength and for readiness on both sides. But SALT II does place important, new limits on both the number and the quality of nuclear arms.⁴⁷⁹

⁴⁷⁶ Carter: "State of the Union" January 23, 1979.

⁴⁷⁷ Carter: "State of the Union" January 23, 1979.

⁴⁷⁸ Carter: "State of the Union" January 23, 1979.

⁴⁷⁹ Jimmy Carter: "Vienna Summit Meeting Remarks of President Brezhnev and President Carter on Signing the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. ," June 18, 1979. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=32496>.

The Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Communiqué issued on June 18, 1979 described the treaty with the following language:

This treaty sets equal ceilings on the nuclear delivery systems of both sides; to begin the process of reductions it requires the reduction of existing nuclear arms; to begin to limit the threat represented by the qualitative arms race it also places substantial constraints on the modernization of strategic offensive systems and the development of new ones.⁴⁸⁰

The basic framework for the SALT II agreement consisted of three parts: 1) a treaty based on the Vladivostok accord, 2) a three-year protocol about certain issues including cruise missile constraints, mobile ICBM limits, and qualitative constraints on ICBMs, which deferred further negotiations on these issues to SALT III, and 3) a joint statement of principles for future negotiations. This scheme fulfilled the Soviet interest in the terms agreed to at Vladivostok as a basis for agreement as well as the ambition of the United States for a more comprehensive deal.

The central elements of the SALT II Treaty limits for each side as follows:

- for strategic nuclear delivery vehicles initially a ceiling of 2,400, then lowered to 2,250 at the end of 1981;
- a total of 1,320 launchers with MIRVed ballistic missiles plus heavy bombers and long-range cruise missiles;
- a limit of 1,200 on the total number of launchers of MIRVed ballistic missiles; and
- a limit on MIRVed ICBMs of 820.⁴⁸¹

In addition to these numerical limits, the agreement included bans on 1) construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers, 2) heavy mobile ICBM launchers, 3) flight-testing or

⁴⁸⁰ Jimmy Carter: "Vienna Summit Meeting Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Communiqué," June 18, 1979. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=32497>.

⁴⁸¹ Department of State, "SALT-II."

deployment of new types of ICBMs, 4) increasing the number of warheads on existing types of ICBMs, and 5) a limit of 10 warheads on the one new type of ICBM permitted to each side.⁴⁸² The agreement also imposed “ceilings on the launch-weight and throw-weight of strategic ballistic missiles and a ban on the conversion of light ICBM launchers to launchers of heavy ICBMs; a ban on the Soviet SS-16 ICBM and a ban on rapid reload ICBM systems. The treaty also prohibited any new kind of strategic offensive system that may be technologically possible but had not been deployed yet. These included long-range ballistic missiles on surface ships, and ballistic and cruise missile launchers on the seabed.⁴⁸³

Each side was responsible for verification of the treaty. This meant that the use of photo-reconnaissance satellites, usually referred to as “national technical means” was the primary mechanism of verification. The parties agreed they would not interfere with each other’s “national technical means of verification” and would not deliberately conceal sites to deny verification.⁴⁸⁴ As required by the Memorandum of Understanding, the parties exchanged data on the numbers of weapons in SALT delimited categories, and agreed to regular updates at each session of the Standing Consultative Commission created by the treaty to facilitate continuing arms control discussions.⁴⁸⁵ The Joint Statement of Principles set out the general goals for SALT III; a significant and substantial reduction in the number of strategic offensive arms, and additional qualitative limitations on strategic offensive

⁴⁸² Department of State, “SALT-II.”

⁴⁸³ Department of State, “SALT-II.”

⁴⁸⁴ Department of State, “SALT-II.”

⁴⁸⁵ Department of State, “SALT-II.”

arms.⁴⁸⁶ It also detailed that “cooperative measures” might be used to ensure verification. This new element in the understanding between the parties created an opening to discussions of verification and treaty compliance by on-the-ground assets such as remote monitoring stations or embedded personnel, in addition to reliance on traditional national technical means (satellites) for verification.⁴⁸⁷

Presenting the treaty in an address before a Joint Session of Congress to report on the Vienna Summit, Mr. Carter described the history of American efforts to make the world safe in the age of nuclear weapons:

While the United States still had an absolute nuclear monopoly, President Truman sought to place control of the atomic bomb under international authority. President Eisenhower made the first efforts to control nuclear testing. President Kennedy negotiated with the Soviet Union prohibition against atmospheric testing of nuclear explosives. President Johnson broadened the area of negotiations for the first time to include atomic weapons themselves. President Nixon concluded the first strategic arms limitation agreement, SALT I. President Ford negotiated the Vladivostok accords. You can see that this is a vital and a continuing process.⁴⁸⁸

The lack of trust and issues of verification remained a primary concern of the United States as Mr. Carter pledged that,

...SALT II is not based on trust. Compliance will be assured by our own Nation's means of verification, including extremely sophisticated satellites, powerful electronic systems, and a vast intelligence network. Were the Soviet Union to take enormous risk of trying to violate this treaty in any way that might affect the

⁴⁸⁶ Department of State, “SALT-II.”

⁴⁸⁷ Department of State, “SALT-II.”

⁴⁸⁸ Jimmy Carter: "Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Vienna Summit Meeting," June 18, 1979. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=32498>.

strategic balance, there is no doubt that we would discover it in time to respond fully and effectively.⁴⁸⁹

On November 4, 1979 in Tehran, Iran, students and militants acting in support of Ayatollah Khomeini's Iranian revolution took over the United States Embassy. For the remainder of Mr. Carter's term in office they held 52 American staff members they found on the grounds inside the compound as hostages. In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. While neither event directly addressed US-Soviet relations or US-Saudi relations, the demonstration of the Soviet Union's continued willingness to use force in international affairs, and the threat posed by a radicalize regime in Iran to the stability of Gulf oil supplies for the United States and Western Europe, dramatically changed the nature of the world situation faced by the United States. Richard Rhodes writes that, "The event that finished off detente, even for Carter, was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979."⁴⁹⁰

After the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, Mr. Carter addressed the nation on Radio and television from the Oval Office on January 4, 1980 about the United States response to what he termed a "callous violation of international law" and "a deliberate effort of a powerful atheistic government to subjugate an independent Islamic people."⁴⁹¹

⁴⁸⁹ Carter: "Address on the Vienna Summit Meeting."

⁴⁹⁰ Rhodes, *Arsenals Of Folly*, 135.

⁴⁹¹ Jimmy Carter: "Address to the Nation on the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan," January 4, 1980. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=32911>.

Speaking of the effect on the invasion on the SALT II treaty then awaiting ratification before the Senate he said,

The successful negotiation of the SALT II treaty has been a major goal and a major achievement of this administration, and we Americans, the people of the Soviet Union, and indeed the entire world will benefit from the successful control of strategic nuclear weapons through the implementation of this carefully negotiated treaty.

However, because of the Soviet aggression, I have asked the United States Senate to defer further consideration of the SALT II treaty so that the Congress and I can assess Soviet actions and intentions and devote our primary attention to the legislative and other measures required to respond to this crisis. As circumstances change in the future, we will, of course, keep the ratification of SALT II under active review in consultation with the leaders of the Senate.⁴⁹²

His letter to Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd repeated this reasoning as he requested a delay, but not a renunciation, of the treaty with this language,

In light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, I request that you delay consideration of the SALT II Treaty on the Senate floor.

The purpose of this request is not to withdraw the Treaty from consideration, but to defer the debate so that the Congress and I as President can assess Soviet actions and intentions, and devote our primary attention to the legislative and other measures required to respond to this crisis.

As you know, I continue to share your view that the SALT II Treaty is in the national security interest of the United States and the entire world, and that it should be taken up by the Senate as soon as these more urgent issues have been addressed.⁴⁹³

The SALT II Treaty was never ratified. Mr. Carter believed that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which was a complete surprise, was the reason that SALT II ratification stalled. He had requested a delay of Senate consideration the treaty.⁴⁹⁴

⁴⁹² Carter: "Address on the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan."

⁴⁹³ Jimmy Carter: "Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty Letter to the Majority Leader of the Senate Requesting a Delay in Senate Consideration of the Treaty. ," January 3, 1980. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33072>.

In Presidential Directive PD/NSC-59, Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy, issued on July 25, 1980, Mr. Carter reiterated that, “The most fundamental objective of our strategic policy remains nuclear deterrence.”⁴⁹⁵ But the world Mr. Carter faced as president was far different from the one in which he graduated from the Naval Academy in 1946, a world of overwhelming American military superiority. In the summer of 1980 he directed that,

To continue to deter in an era of strategic equivalence, is it necessary to have nuclear (as well as conventional) forces such that in considering aggression against our interests any adversary would recognize that no plausible outcome would represent a victory or any plausible definition of victory. To this end and so as to preserve the possibility of bargaining effectively to terminate the war on acceptable terms that are as favorable as practicable, if deterrence fails initially, we must be capable of fighting successfully so that the adversary would not achieve his war aims and would suffer costs that are unacceptable, or in any event greater than his gains, from having initiated an attack.⁴⁹⁶

Richard Rhodes writes that,

On 25 July 1980, Carter added further to Soviet fears by promulgating a new presidential directive, PD-59, that included an argument for fighting extended nuclear wars rather than attacking at the outset with everything in the arsenal, an early Lemay strategy that was till enshrined in the SIOP. “If deterrence initially fails,” PD-59 argued, “we must be capable of fighting successfully so that the adversary will not achieve his war aims and would suffer costs that are unacceptable, or in any event greater than his gains, from having initiated an attack.” The Republican national convention that had just nominated Ronald Reagan as its candidate for the presidency had also endorsed preparing to fight prolonged nuclear wars. The Republican platform, and PD-59 together presented the Soviet Union with a solid front in favor of a new and more threatening US nuclear posture.⁴⁹⁷

⁴⁹⁴ Rhodes, *Arsenals Of Folly*, 136.

⁴⁹⁵ Jimmy Carter, “Presidential Directive/NSC-59, Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy,” July 25, 1980, *The National Security Archive*, George Washington University, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pd/pd59.pdf> .

⁴⁹⁶ Carter, PD/NSC-59.

⁴⁹⁷ Rhodes, *Arsenals Of Folly*, 146.

On January 23, 1980 Carter addressed the uncertain state of the world in his State of the Union address. Stating the he was “determined that the United States will remain the strongest of all nations,” he described,

Three basic developments have helped to shape our challenges: the steady growth and increased projection of Soviet military power beyond its own borders; the overwhelming dependence of the Western democracies on oil supplies from the Middle East; and the press of social and religious and economic and political change in the many nations of the developing world, exemplified by the revolution in Iran.⁴⁹⁸

Concerning SALT II he said,

Preventing nuclear war is the foremost responsibility of the two superpowers. That's why we've negotiated the strategic arms limitation treaties—SALT I and SALT II. Especially now, in a time of great tension, observing the mutual constraints imposed by the terms of these treaties will be in the best interest of both countries and will help to preserve world peace. I will consult very closely with the Congress on this matter as we strive to control nuclear weapons. That effort to control nuclear weapons will not be abandoned.⁴⁹⁹

In the 1980 presidential contest, both major party nominees favored increased defense spending and a more confrontational attitude towards the Soviet Union. The choice, as summarized by Anne Cahn was,

...the choice in foreign and defense policy was between that of the Carter administration, which favored the [MIRVed, ten warhead] MX missile, the Trident submarine, a rapid deployment force, a ‘stealth’ bomber, cruise missiles, counterforce targeting leading to a first-strike capability, and a 5% increase in defense spending, and the Republicans under Ronald Reagan, who favored all of this

⁴⁹⁸ Jimmy Carter: "The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress," January 23, 1980. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33079>.

⁴⁹⁹ Carter, "State of the Union" January 23, 1980.

plus the neutron bomb, anti-ballistic missiles, the B-1 bomber, civil defense, and an 8% increase in defense spending.”⁵⁰⁰

In his final State of the Union message to Congress on January 16, 1981 Mr. Carter noted that his foreign policy had been directed at three particular challenges:

The steady growth and increased projection abroad of Soviet military power-power that has grown faster than our own over the past two decades

The overwhelming dependence of Western nations, which not increasingly includes the United States, on vital oil supplies from the Middle East

The pressures of change in many nations of the developing world, in Iran and uncertainty about the future stability of many developing countries⁵⁰¹

Addressing America’s goals in the 1980s, Mr. Carter wrote that his first goal was to continue the buildup of American military strength. Mr. Carter did not seek nuclear superiority but in the shadow to the un-ratified SALT II agreement he wrote that the United States defense program should ensure “that our strategic nuclear forces will be equivalent to those of the Soviet Union and that deterrence against nuclear war will be maintained.”⁵⁰²

He remained committed to arms control in the same conditional way American presidents had from the beginning of the nuclear age, it must be mutual and verifiable. He wrote that,

...we remain deeply committed to the process of mutual and verifiable arms control, particularly to the effort to prevent the spread and further development of nuclear weapons. Our decision to defer, but not abandon our efforts to secure ratification of the SALT II Treaty reflects our firm conviction that the United States has a profound

⁵⁰⁰ Anne Hessing Cahn, *Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA* (University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 49 cited in Rhodes, *Arsenals Of Folly*, 137.

⁵⁰¹ Jimmy Carter: "The State of the Union Annual Message to the Congress," January 16, 1981. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=44541>.

⁵⁰² Carter, "State of the Union," January 16, 1981.

national security interest in the constraints on Soviet nuclear forces which only that treaty can provide.⁵⁰³

Consistent with the emerging acceptance of the idea of a balance of force between the superpowers was the embryonic idea of common security. Egon Bahr an adviser to West German Chancellor Willy Brandt and a member of the Bundestag summarize the idea of common security simply with this description: "Security can now only be achieved in common. No longer against each other, but only with each other, shall we be secure." ⁵⁰⁴

Carter and Oil

Discussing the nation's economic performance in his first State of the Union Address to Congress on January 19, 1978 Mr. Carter described the key problem that "every day we spend more than \$120 million on foreign oil."⁵⁰⁵ Later when discussing "world economic growth and stability" as a foreign policy issue, Mr. Carter emphasized that, "last fall, with the help of others, we succeeded in our vigorous efforts to maintain the stability of the price of oil."⁵⁰⁶ Richard Rhodes reports that,

In his State of the Union address on 23 January 1980, Carter extended US military protection (and implicit hegemony) over the Persian Gulf and proposed increasing the US defense budget by 5%, which would amount to \$20 billion in real growth in 1981 and 1982 (about \$102 billion in 2006 dollars.)⁵⁰⁷

⁵⁰³ Carter, "State of the Union," January 16, 1981.

⁵⁰⁴ Rhodes, *Arsenals Of Folly*, 189.

⁵⁰⁵ Carter: "State of the Union," January 19, 1978.

⁵⁰⁶ Carter: "State of the Union," January 19, 1978.

⁵⁰⁷ Rhodes, *Arsenals Of Folly*, 136.

Two years later, in the State of the Union on January 23, 1980 when discussing the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and the larger strategic implications of the United States, Mr. Carter was blunt:

The implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could pose the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War. ...

While this invasion continues, we and the other nations of the world cannot conduct business as usual with the Soviet Union. ...

The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance: It contains more than two-thirds of the world's exportable oil. The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz, a waterway through which most of the world's oil must flow. The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position, therefore, that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil.⁵⁰⁸

The Carter Doctrine was his answer:

Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.⁵⁰⁹

Carter established that the "skyrocketing prices of OPEC oil" were the primary cause of inflation in the United States economy and imposed an import ceiling of 8.2 million barrels a day for the year 1980.

In Presidential Directive PD/NSC-62 drafted by National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and issued on January 15, 1981 five days before he left the White House, Mr. Carter directed a modification in U. S. National Strategy to build a security framework in the Persian Gulf. Europe remained the center-point of the United States confrontation with the

⁵⁰⁸ Carter, "State of the Union" January 23, 1980.

⁵⁰⁹ Carter, "State of the Union" January 23, 1980.

Soviet Union, but the administration believed there was an “increased projection of Soviet Power which threatens U.S. vital interest in the Persian Gulf region.”⁵¹⁰

The United States, Europe and Japan were vulnerable to Soviet move to dominate the Persian Gulf Oil fields. Mr. Carter ordered that,

Given the danger that Soviet success in asserting influence over the oil producing status of the Persian Gulf region could undermine the viability of NATO and Japan and cause enormous economic disruptions in Europe, Japan, and the United States, Higher priority must be given to developing adequate strategic lift, general purpose forces and facilities access for Persian Gulf contingencies.⁵¹¹

In Presidential Directive/NSC-63, dated January 15, 1981 and titled Persian Gulf Security Framework, Mr. Carter directed action to protect the Strait of Hormuz, including “building up our own capabilities to project force into the region while maintaining a credible presence there.”⁵¹² The directive separately analyzed the military, foreign policy, economic and intelligence issues involved. In discussing foreign policy the directive ordered the Department of State to assist countries on the Arabian Peninsula to enhance their internal security and counter soviet influence.⁵¹³ In the analysis of economic issues, the Departments of Treasury, State and Energy were directed to pursue,

Oil Policy, to ensure availability of oil at reasonable prices and reduce Western dependence on Gulf Oil.

... and ...

⁵¹⁰ Jimmy Carter, “Presidential Directive/NSC-62, Modifications is U.S. National Strategy,” January 15, 1981, *The National Security Archive*, George Washington University, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pd/pd62.pdf> .

⁵¹¹ Carter, PD/NSC-62.

⁵¹² Carter, PD/NSC-62.

⁵¹³ Carter, PD/NSC-62.

Saudi and other Gulf States cooperation in financing of regional security needs in which we seek a more comprehensive, region-wide use of Saudi and other peninsular capabilities to meet regional security needs⁵¹⁴

In his final State of the Union Message to Congress on January 16, 1981, Mr. Carter noted that although “our dependence on foreign oil is decreasing,” the United States energy position was still vulnerable and that “the world oil market is increasingly tight.”⁵¹⁵ He continued his analysis,

...there is little doubt that the healthy growth of our American and world economies will depend for many years on continued safe access to the Persian Gulf's oil production. The denial of these oil supplies would threaten not only our own but world security.

The potent new threat from an advancing Soviet Union, against the background of regional instability of which it can take advantage, requires that we reinforce our ability to defend our regional friends and to protect the flow of oil.⁵¹⁶

Despite concerns about over dependence and price, the core United States policy was clear in the Carter Doctrine. Persian Gulf oil, from Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf oil states would remain available to the United States at whatever price the market would set.

Analysis: Ford to Carter

During both the Ford and Carter administrations, anarchy continued as the dominant condition of the international situation with no central organizing authority available to resolve disputes between member states. The various international organizations, the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, the Warsaw Pact and others were either completely dominated by one set of

⁵¹⁴ Carter, PD/NSC-63.

⁵¹⁵ Carter, "State of the Union," January 16, 1981.

⁵¹⁶ Carter, "State of the Union," January 16, 1981.

interests or were ineffective. Each international organization mentioned above was dependent upon the strength of member states and unable and even unwilling to control the behavior of its most powerful members.

The foreign policy activities examined here were made and executed in public. The United States used identifiable decision making for the creation and execution foreign policy, through the President, National Security Council and the Departments of State and Defense. The President continued to speak for the United States in matters of national security. Both Mr. Ford and Mr. Carter treated nuclear weapons as a vital national survival issue.

The relative capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union remained roughly equivalent. The Vladivostok agreement shows a clear willingness to manage nuclear weapons on an equal footing in an effort to control the risks of nuclear war and manage the enormous costs of the arms race that created weapons that were designed not to be used, but instead to perpetuate a strategic stalemate.

At the end of the Ford administration the policy about nuclear weapons was:

1. The United States has nuclear weapons at the ready, and without absolutely reliable, verifiable inspections to ensure against any cheating by any party; we will not give them up.
2. The United States will use nuclear weapons if attacked.
3. The United States has not renounced the right to the first use of nuclear weapons.
4. To ensure the destruction of any foe after a surprise attack, the United States will maintain a nuclear arsenal sufficient for that purpose.

Mr. Carter was more ambitious in his desire for deeper cuts in the numbers of weapons called for in the Vladivostok agreement but he finally accepted those numbers as a basis for SALT II. The Carter administration the policy about nuclear weapons, after his initial attempt at a larger cut was rejected by the Soviets in 1977 was essentially identical to the Mr. Ford's policy:

1. The United States has nuclear weapons at the ready, and absent reliable, verifiable inspections to ensure against any cheating by any party; we will not give them up.
2. The United States will use nuclear weapons if attacked.
3. The United States has not renounced the right to the first use of nuclear weapons.
4. To ensure the destruction of any foe after a surprise attack, the United States will maintain a nuclear arsenal superior in strength and numbers over any prospective enemy.

Both Mr. Ford and Mr. Carter treated access to the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia and its oil as a vital national security issue. At the end of the Ford administration the policy about Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf oil was:

- 1) Access to Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf oil by the United States was a vital national security interest,
- 2) The United States, while not yet explicitly committed to the use of force, left every indication that it would deploy and if necessary use military force to keep the oil flowing,

3) The United States would use diplomatic pressure and persuasion with the Saudis over the issue of price, but was unwilling to intervene with sufficient force to allow Washington set the price.

The Carter administration's policy about Saudi Arabia and oil was virtually the same as Mr. Ford's. But Mr. Carter made the explicit declaration of the Carter Doctrine, promising that the United States would use armed force to defend its access to the oil fields surrounding the Persian Gulf, saying that

An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.⁵¹⁷

No substantial contradictory evidence concerning the unitary actor assumption appears in this transition concerning nuclear weapons. Concerning oil and Saudi Arabia no substantial contradictory evidence appears in this transition which contradicts the unitary actor assumption.

In the context of United States policy towards nuclear weapons, disarmament proposals and the Soviet Union, the analysis of the transition from Mr. Ford to Mr. Carter supports the unitary actor assumption. In the context of United States policy towards imported crude oil and Saudi Arabia, the analysis of the transition from Mr. Ford to Mr. Carter supports the unitary actor assumption.

Carter, Democrat to Reagan, Republican: January 20, 1981

Reagan and Nuclear Weapons

⁵¹⁷ Carter, "State of the Union" January 23, 1980.

Ronald Reagan entered the White House in 1981 with a foreign policy based on military strength, and a willingness to confront the Soviet Union on a worldwide basis. The American economy was experiencing a dependence on foreign oil that required an ever expanding involvement in managing the intractable conflict in the Middle East so as to keep the Arab-Israeli conflicts sufficiently under control so that the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf continued unabated.

In their platform in 1980 the Democrats re-nominating Mr. Carter, said,

... Democrats have been and remain committed to arms control, especially to strategic arms limitations, and to maintain a firm and balanced relationship with the Soviet Union. Our resolve to pursue this goal remains as strong as ever.

To avoid the danger to all mankind from an intensification of the strategic arms competition, and to curb a possible acceleration of the nuclear arms race while awaiting the ratification of the SALT II Treaty, we endorse the policy of continuing to take no action which would be inconsistent with its object and purpose, so long as the Soviet Union does likewise,

Arms control and strategic arms limitation are of crucial importance to us and to all other people. The Salt II Agreement is a major accomplishment of the Democratic Administration. It contributes directly to our national security, and we will seek its ratification at the earliest feasible time.⁵¹⁸

Mr. Carter further criticized the Republicans in blunt language accusing them of living in a “make-believe world” saying,

The new leaders of the Republican Party, in order to close the gap between their rhetoric and their record, have now promised to launch an all-out nuclear arms race. This would negate any further effort to negotiate a strategic arms limitation agreement. There can be no winners in such an arms race, and all the people of the Earth can be the losers.

⁵¹⁸ Democratic Party Platforms: "Democratic Party Platform of 1980," August 11, 1980. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29607>.

The Republican nominee advocates abandoning arms control policies which have been important and supported by every Democratic President since Harry, Truman, and also by every Republican President since Dwight D. Eisenhower.⁵¹⁹

In response the Republicans promised,

The foreign policy of the United States should reflect a national strategy of peace through strength. The general principles and goals of this strategy would be:

To inspire, focus, and unite the national will and determination to achieve peace and freedom;

To achieve overall military and technological superiority over the Soviet Union;

To create a strategic and civil defense which would protect the American people against nuclear war at least as well as the Soviet population is protected;

To accept no arms control agreement which in any way jeopardizes the security of the United States or its allies, or which locks the United States into a position of military inferiority;⁵²⁰

The Republicans further rejected the policy of mutually assured destruction and offered the alternative scenario of being prepared to fight a nuclear war in a more limited manner:

An administration that can defend its interest only by threatening the mass extermination of civilians, as Mr. Carter implied in 1979, dooms itself to strategic, and eventually geo-political, paralysis. Such a strategy is simply not credible and, therefore is ineffectual. Yet the declining survivability of the U.S. ICBM force in the early 1980s will make this condition unavoidable unless prompt measures are taken. Our objective must be to assure the survivability of U.S. forces possessing an unquestioned, prompt, hard-target counterforce capability sufficient to disarm Soviet military targets in a second strike. We reject the mutual-assured-destruction (MAD) strategy of the Carter Administration which limits the President during crises to a Hobson's choice between mass mutual suicide and surrender. We propose, instead, a

⁵¹⁹ Jimmy Carter: "Remarks Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the 1980 Democratic National Convention in New York," August 14, 1980. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=44909>.

⁵²⁰ Republican Party Platforms: "Republican Party Platform of 1980," July 15, 1980. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25844>.

credible strategy which will deter a Soviet attack by the clear capability of our forces to survive and ultimately to destroy Soviet military targets.⁵²¹

In a single sentence in the platform the Republicans indicated a repositioning of arms control from a national security priority in and of itself to simply another tool of national defense. They titled a section of their platform,

The Role of Arms Control in Defense Policy

The Republican approach to arms control has been markedly different from that of the Democratic Party. It has been based on three fundamental premises:

First, before arms control negotiations may be undertaken, the security of the United States must be assured by the funding and deployment of strong military forces sufficient to deter conflict at any level or to prevail in battle should aggression occur;

Second, negotiations must be conducted on the basis of strict reciprocity of benefits—unilateral restraint by the U.S. has failed to bring reductions by the Soviet Union; and

Third, arms control negotiations, once entered, represent an important political and military undertaking that cannot be divorced from the broader political and military behavior of the parties.⁵²²

On October 1, 1981 the White House issued National Security Decision Directive 12 outlining the Strategic Forces Modernization Program. It outlined the program for the long-term development of American strategic forces that would, "help redress the deteriorating strategic balance with the Soviet Union."⁵²³

⁵²¹ Republican Party, "Republican Party Platform of 1980."

⁵²² Republican Party, "Republican Party Platform of 1980."

⁵²³ Ronald Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive Number 12, Strategic Forces Modernization Program" (Washington, October 1, 1981) Online by *Federation of American Scientists* <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-12.pdf>.

The modernization program was designed with five primary parts, 1) “making our strategic communications and command systems more survivable,” 2) “modernizing the strategic bomber force by the addition of two new types of bombers,” 3) “increasing accuracy and payload of our submarine launched ballistic missiles,” 4) “improving strategic defenses,” and 5) “deploying a new larger more accurate LAN-based ballistic missile.”⁵²⁴ In an early hint of Mr. Reagan's controversial Strategic Defense Initiative program, the paper called for a "vigorous research and development program... on ballistic missile defense systems."⁵²⁵

In October 1981, responding to Soviet propaganda efforts concerning United States intentions towards the military defense of Western Europe, Mr. Reagan issued a Statement on United States Strategic Policy that read in part,

American policy toward deterring conflict in Europe has not changed for over 20 years. Our strategy remains as it has been, one of flexible response: maintaining an assured military capability to deter the use of force -conventional or nuclear- by the Warsaw Pact at the lowest possible level.... The suggestion that the United States could even consider fighting a nuclear war at Europe's expense is an outright deception. The essence of US nuclear strategy is that no aggressor should believe that the use of nuclear weapons in Europe could reasonably be limited to Europe.⁵²⁶

Mr. Reagan announced the beginning of his new program for arms control talks with the Soviet Union, renamed the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in a speech to the National Press Club in Washington on November 18, 1981. Deterrence he maintained was achieved

⁵²⁴ Reagan, NSDD-12.

⁵²⁵ Reagan, NSDD-12.

⁵²⁶ Ronald Reagan: "Statement on United States Strategic Policy," October 21, 1981. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43163>

by, "forces strong enough to ensure that any aggressor would lose more from an attack than you could possibly gain."⁵²⁷ He was particularly concerned with three new intermediate range Soviet missiles, the SS20, the SS-4, and the SS-5. In a statement about these new Soviet missiles that reflected the classic realist approach of thinking of nations as short-term rational actors pursuing national interests, he said,

Now, the only answer to these systems is a comparable threat to Soviet threats, to Soviet targets; in other words, a deterrent preventing the use of these Soviet weapons by a counter threat of a like response against their own territory.⁵²⁸

In the new START negotiations, Mr. Reagan said, "The United States proposes the mutual reduction of conventional intermediate range nuclear and strategic forces."⁵²⁹ The goal would be force levels that were, "equal and verifiable."⁵³⁰

Among the policy options not embraced or even seriously considered by Mr. Carter or by Mr. Reagan was the idea credited to Randall Forsberg a disarmament researcher of a "Nuclear Freeze." This is described as, "a mutual freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons and of missiles, and new aircraft designed primarily to deliver nuclear weapons."⁵³¹ The Nuclear Freeze became a serious policy option advocated

⁵²⁷ Ronald Reagan: "Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and Nuclear Weapons," November 18, 1981. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43264>.

⁵²⁸ Reagan: "Remarks to the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and Nuclear Weapons."

⁵²⁹ Reagan: "Remarks to the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and Nuclear Weapons."

⁵³⁰ Reagan: "Remarks to the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and Nuclear Weapons."

⁵³¹ David Adams, *The American Peace Movements* (New Haven: Advocate Press, 1985) 15, at <http://www.culture-of-peace.info/apm/chapter6-15.html>.

by the Democrats in the 1984 election. The 1984 Democratic Party platform advocated a freeze in these terms

These steps should lead promptly to the negotiation of a comprehensive, mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of all nuclear weapons.⁵³²

Consider this exchange between journalist Marvin Kalb and former Vice President Walter Mondale in the October 21, 1984 presidential debate in Kansas City

Mr. Kalb. Mr. Mondale, in this general area, sir, of arms control, President Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, said, "A nuclear freeze is a hoax." Yet the basis of your arms proposals, as I understand them, is a mutual and verifiable freeze on existing weapons systems. In your view, which specific weapons systems could be subject to a mutual and verifiable freeze, and which could not?

Mr. Mondale. Every system that is verifiable should be placed on the table for negotiations for an agreement. I would not agree to any negotiations or any agreement that involved conduct on the part of the Soviet Union that we couldn't verify every day. I would not agree to any agreement in which the United States security interest was not fully recognized and supported. That's why we say mutual and verifiable freezes. Now, why do I support the freeze? Because this ever-rising arms race madness makes both nations less secure. It's more difficult to defend this nation. It's putting a hair-trigger on nuclear war. This administration, by going into the Star Wars system, is going to add a dangerous new escalation.⁵³³

Mr. Reagan rejected the idea of a nuclear freeze in a radio address to the nation in April 1982, where he argued that deterrence had worked and that,

Since the end of World War II, there's not been another world conflict. But there have been and are wars going on in various other parts of the world.

⁵³² Democratic Party Platforms: "Democratic Party Platform of 1984," July 16, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29608>.

⁵³³ Walter Mondale: "Debate Between the President and Former Vice President Walter F. Mondale in Kansas City, Missouri," October 21, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39296>.

This stretch of 37 years since World War II has been the result of our maintaining a balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the strategic nuclear capabilities of either side. As long as this balance has been maintained, both sides have been given an overwhelming incentive for peace.

In the 1970's, the United States altered that balance by, in effect, unilaterally restraining our own military defenses while the Soviet Union engaged in an unprecedented buildup of both its conventional and nuclear forces.⁵³⁴

His answer to the nuclear freeze was simply no, not in our current strategic position,

Many have been attracted to the idea of a nuclear freeze. Now, that would be fine if we were equal in strategic capability. We're not. We cannot accept an agreement which perpetuates current disparities.⁵³⁵

On May 2, 1982 on the eve of a major trip to Europe Mr. Reagan discussed his policy for dealing with the Soviet Union in the Commencement Address to the graduating class at Eureka College in Illinois, noting his own graduation there 50 years before his speech. In a reflection of how he viewed this speech, he told the Eureka College Alumni Association Dinner that night that in discussing with his staff where to make this speech that he was going to make a speech in Illinois and reminded them of "Churchill making a speech at a little college in Missouri some years ago in which he coined the term 'Iron Curtain'"⁵³⁶

The fate of the United States was "directly linked to that of our sister democracies in Western Europe," and the single major issue facing the alliance was relations with the Soviet

⁵³⁴ Ronald Reagan: "Radio Address to the Nation on Nuclear Weapons ," April 17, 1982. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42414>.

⁵³⁵ Reagan: "Radio Address to the Nation on Nuclear Weapons."

⁵³⁶ Ronald Reagan: "Remarks at the Eureka College Alumni Association Dinner in Illinois ," May 9, 1982. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42502>.

Union.⁵³⁷ In order to establish a sound framework for East-West relations it was first necessary to understand the “nature of the Soviet system,” and his description was blunt and pessimistic:

The Soviet Union is a huge empire ruled by an elite that holds all power and all privilege, and they hold it tightly because, as we've seen in Poland, they fear what might happen if even the smallest amount of control slips from their grasp. They fear the infectiousness of even a little freedom, and because of this in many ways their system has failed. The Soviet empire is faltering because it is rigid—centralized control has destroyed incentives for innovation, efficiency, and individual achievement. Spiritually, there is a sense of malaise and resentment.

But in the midst of social and economic problems, the Soviet dictatorship has forged the largest armed force in the world. It has done so by preempting the human needs of its people, and, in the end, this course will undermine the foundations of the Soviet system. Harry Truman was right when he said of the Soviets that, "When you try to conquer other people or extend yourself over vast areas you cannot win in the long run."

Yet Soviet aggressiveness has grown as Soviet military power has increased.⁵³⁸

Mr. Reagan bluntly rejected détente as a failed effort of accommodation with the Soviets

If East-West relations in the détente era in Europe have yielded disappointment, détente outside of Europe has yielded a severe disillusionment for those who expected a moderation of Soviet behavior.⁵³⁹

The “realistic, durable” policy Mr. Reagan proposed consisted of “five points: military balance, economic security, regional stability, arms reduction, and dialog.”⁵⁴⁰ As he reemphasized that he had given up on the SALT talks and he announced that he intended to

⁵³⁷ Ronald Reagan: "Address at Commencement Exercises at Eureka College in Illinois," May 9, 1982. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42501>.

⁵³⁸ Reagan: "Address at Commencement Exercises at Eureka College in Illinois."

⁵³⁹ Reagan: "Address at Commencement Exercises at Eureka College in Illinois."

⁵⁴⁰ Reagan: "Address at Commencement Exercises at Eureka College in Illinois."

pursue an entirely new policy of seeking an agreement with the Soviets to “achieve a stable nuclear balance at the lowest possible level.”⁵⁴¹ But he remained suspicious about Soviet behavior:

And yet, so far, the Soviet Union has used arms control negotiations primarily as an instrument to restrict U.S. defense programs and, in conjunction with their own arms buildup, a means to enhance Soviet power and prestige.⁵⁴²

Seeking an agreement that was “verifiable, equitable and militarily significant” Mr. Reagan contended that the “the main threat to peace posed by nuclear weapons today is the growing instability of the nuclear balance.”⁵⁴³ He instructed his negotiators in Geneva that he expected “ballistic missile warheads, the most serious threat we face to be reduced to equal levels, equal ceilings at least a third below the current levels” within a “practical, phased reduction Plan” for strategic nuclear weapons.⁵⁴⁴

He described his objective as

Therefore, our goal is to enhance deterrence and achieve stability through significant reductions in the most destabilizing nuclear systems, ballistic missiles, and especially the giant intercontinental ballistic missiles, while maintaining a nuclear capability sufficient to deter conflict, to underwrite our national security, and to meet our commitment to allies and friends.⁵⁴⁵

Coupled with a defense buildup that Mr. Reagan claimed was necessary to address the strategic imbalance that had occurred in the detente years of his predecessors this

⁵⁴¹ Reagan: "Address at Commencement Exercises at Eureka College in Illinois."

⁵⁴² Reagan: "Address at Commencement Exercises at Eureka College in Illinois."

⁵⁴³ Reagan: "Address at Commencement Exercises at Eureka College in Illinois."

⁵⁴⁴ Reagan: "Address at Commencement Exercises at Eureka College in Illinois."

⁵⁴⁵ Reagan: "Address at Commencement Exercises at Eureka College in Illinois."

constituted the core of his nuclear arms policy towards the Soviet Union, a combination of the carrot and the very big stick.

Five days later in Top Secret directions to the START negotiators Mr. Reagan wrote in NSDD 33 that,

The main threat to peace posed by nuclear weapons today is the growing instability of the nuclear balance... The goal the United States sets for itself in strategic arms negotiations is to enhance deterrence and to achieve stability through significant reductions in the most destabilizing nuclear weapons systems ballistic missiles and especially ICBMs...⁵⁴⁶

Mr. Reagan instructed his negotiators to make a distinction between the high speed weapons delivery systems, especially ballistic missiles, which, once launched significantly compressed the decision time for the target country, destabilizing the situation and creating the specter of the responding country launching their own missiles at the first sign of an attack, a “use them or lose them” Hobson’s choice.⁵⁴⁷ As always he insisted on adequate verification which so far the Soviets had been unwilling or unable to agree.

Mr. Reagan’s presidency spanned the most significant change in Soviet leadership since the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953. Between 1981 and 1985, he faced four separate Soviet leaders, Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, Konstantin Chernenko and Mikhail Gorbachev.

Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party had been the leader of the Soviet Union since October 1964 when Mr. Reagan was inaugurated. Brezhnev died in

⁵⁴⁶ Ronald Reagan, “National Security Decision Directive Number 33, U.S. Approach to START Negotiations,” (Washington, May 14, 1982) available online, *Federation of American Scientists* <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-033.htm>.

⁵⁴⁷ Reagan, “NSDD-33.”

office and without a designated successor on November 10, 1982. On November 12, 1982 leadership of the Soviet Union passed to Yuri Andropov. Andropov served until his death on February 9, 1984. On February 13, 1984 Konstantin Chernenko succeeded Andropov and served until his death on March 10, 1985. On March 11, 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary and later President on the Soviet Union and served until the dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991.

In its ongoing confrontation with an often changing Soviet leadership who consistently pursued the twin Brezhnev aims of a strategic arms buildup and the invasion of Afghanistan, the Reagan administration attempted to maintain a consistent approach to national security issues. On May 20, 1982, the President issued National Security Decision Directive Number 32, an eight page paper titled, U.S. National Security Strategy, and classified top secret. It is a quintessential Cold War strategy memo focusing on U.S. Soviet relations, with reference to threats from any other source, including the “increasing scarcity of resources, such as oil” only viewed and described through the prism of the East-West confrontation.⁵⁴⁸ The description of the international situation was almost apocalyptic.

Unstable governments, weak political institutions, inefficient economies, and the persistence of traditional conflicts creates opportunities for Soviet expansion in many parts of the developing world...increasing terrorism, the dangers of nuclear proliferation, uncertainties in Soviet political succession, reticence on the part of a number of Western countries and the growing assertiveness of Soviet foreign policy all contribute to the unstable international environment. For these reasons, the decade of the eighties will likely pose the greatest challenge to our survival and well-being since World War II and our response could result in a fundamentally different East West relationship by the end of the decade.⁵⁴⁹

⁵⁴⁸ Ronald Reagan, “National Security Decision Directive Number 32, U.S. National Security Strategy,” (Washington, May 20, 1982) Online by *Federation of American Scientists* <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-032.htm>.

⁵⁴⁹ Reagan, “NSDD-32.”

The first global objective mentioned was

To deter military attack by the USSR and its allies against the U.S., its allies, and other important countries across the spectrum of conflict; and to defeat such attack should deterrence fail.⁵⁵⁰

Echoing the classic Kennan formulation of Containment and then going further, past the goals of NSC-68, the strategy proposed a further objective,

To contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout the world, and to increase the costs of Soviet support and use of proxy, terrorist and subversive forces.⁵⁵¹

The description to the mechanism of deterrence was classic,

Deterrence can best be achieved if our defense posture makes Soviet Assessment of war outcomes, under any contingency, so dangerous and uncertain as to remove any incentive for initiating attack.⁵⁵²

The key threat to national security was described bluntly and pessimistically as,

The key military threats to U.S. National Security during the 1980s will continue to be posed by the Soviet Union and its allies and clients. Despite increasing pressures on its economy and the growing vulnerabilities of its empire, The Soviet military will continue to expand and modernize.⁵⁵³

To respond the growing Soviet Military threat required a three pronged approach,

...limit Soviet military capabilities by strengthening the U.S. military, by pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control agreements, and by preventing the flow of militarily significant technologies and resources to the Soviet Union.⁵⁵⁴

⁵⁵⁰ Reagan, "NSDD-32."

⁵⁵¹ Reagan, "NSDD-32."

⁵⁵² Reagan, "NSDD-32."

⁵⁵³ Reagan, "NSDD-32."

⁵⁵⁴ Reagan, "NSDD-32."

The security of Europe, where Mr. Reagan had at the end of his presidency, his first success at arms control; remained “vital to the defense of the United States.”⁵⁵⁵

NSDD-32 contained some very direct language about nuclear conflict. It made “the achievement of parity with the Soviet Union” a “first priority” in rebuilding American military strength.⁵⁵⁶ But Mr. Reagan went further as he directed his team to prepare to fight a protracted nuclear war.

The United States will enhance its strategic nuclear deterrent by developing a capacity to sustain protracted nuclear conflict... The U.S. will retain a capable and credible strategic triad of land-based ballistic missiles, manned bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. While each leg of this triad should be as survivable as possible, the existence of all three precludes the destruction of more than one by surprise attack and guards against technical surprises which could similarly remove one leg of the triad.⁵⁵⁷

Whether the strategic triad was the result of a considered policy or only the result of inter-service rivalries and the insistence of the “airplane drivers” in the newly independent air force for new bombers to fly in the 1950s, Reagan now explicitly readopted it as doctrine.⁵⁵⁸

At this point Mr. Reagan’s policy has some interesting comparisons with Mr. Eisenhower, the first post-war Republican president. Like Mr. Eisenhower, Mr. Reagan specifically reserved the right to use nuclear weapons if necessary and does not adopt the policy often advocated in the 1980s of “No First Use.” Unlike Eisenhower’s balanced

⁵⁵⁵ Reagan, “NSDD-32.”

⁵⁵⁶ Reagan, “NSDD-32.”

⁵⁵⁷ Reagan, “NSDD-32.”

⁵⁵⁸ Rhodes, *Arsenals of Folly*, 92.

budget approach to governing, the Reagan defense budgets provided for a deterrent in conventional and nuclear capabilities. NSDD 32 directs that,

Deterrence is dependent on both nuclear and conventional capabilities. Nuclear forces will not be viewed as a lower-cost alternative to conventional forces. At the same time, the possible use of nuclear weapons must remain an element in our overall strategy.⁵⁵⁹

The SALT process was dead. Mr. Reagan understood that his policy of refraining from any action that would undercut the SALT II treaty as long as the Soviets did likewise could be seen as an argument that if we were complying with the agreement it should be ratified. On May 25, 1982 in NSDD 36 he directed that,

SALT II is not an acceptable foundation for a final equal and verifiable arms reduction agreement...it would be a major mistake to attempt to formalize the SALT II agreement's high ceilings and serious inequalities.⁵⁶⁰

The importance of the pursuit of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty was reduced by the President in NSDD-51, issued August 10, 1982 titled U.S. Nuclear Testing Limitations Policy. Mr. Reagan acknowledged that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was a long term goal of the United States but directed that priority effort should go into achieving effective verification measures for the Threshold Test Ban and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaties.”⁵⁶¹ He wrote that,

⁵⁵⁹ Reagan, “NSDD-32.”

⁵⁶⁰ Ronald Reagan, “National Security Decision Directive Number 36, U.S. Approach to START Negotiations-II,” (Washington, May 25, 1982) Online by *Federation of American Scientists* <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-036.htm>.

⁵⁶¹ Ronald Reagan, “National Security Decision Directive Number 51, U.S. Nuclear Testing Limitations Policy,” (Washington, August 10, 1982) Online by *Federation of American Scientists* <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-051.htm>.

Nuclear testing is indispensable to a credible nuclear deterrent...even assuming Soviet complaisance, there are reasons to believe that a comprehensive Test Ban could create asymmetries in the Soviet Union's favor.⁵⁶²

While continuing to adhere to the Threshold Test Ban he opened the door to an outright rejection of the agreement.” Over the long term, high yield tests may be necessary to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent.”⁵⁶³ He did not offer an explanation or description of the specific facts that led him to this position.

The Reagan administration found a new issue to add to the problems of arms control negotiators that summer in the problem they described as non-deployed Soviet ICBMs. The non-deployed missiles created an additional nuclear war fighting capability, which could be used after a first wave of strike and counter strike and created new problems for verification and compliance. In NSDD 53 issued September 1, 1982, he wrote that,

The principle threats posed by the non-deployed missiles are as reserve forces for use in a protracted nuclear war of for large scale breakout through new deployments should a treaty expire or be violated or abrogated.⁵⁶⁴

Adequate verification now required an on-site presence

Effective verification will require that we go beyond national technical means alone by incorporating means including active cooperative measures to monitor compliance...The United States should cede access to the ICBM complexes to ensure compliance especially with the limits placed on the number of non-deployed missiles permitted at such facility.⁵⁶⁵

⁵⁶² Reagan, “NSDD-51.”

⁵⁶³ Reagan, “NSDD-51.”

⁵⁶⁴ Ronald Reagan, “National Security Decision Directive Number 53, U.S. Approach to Start Negotiations-IV,” (Washington, September 1, 1982) Online by *Federation of American Scientists* <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-053.htm>.

⁵⁶⁵ Reagan, “NSDD-53.”

On November 22, 1982, he explained his approach on a televised address to the nation. The policy as he described it was a “search for peace along two parallel paths: deterrence and arms reduction.”⁵⁶⁶ The issue driving the new concerns was the growing strategic imbalance:

The combination of the Soviets spending more and the United States spending proportionately less changed the military balance and weakened our deterrent. Today, in virtually every measure of military power, the Soviet Union enjoys a decided advantage.

This chart shows the changes in the total number of intercontinental missiles and bombers. You will see that in 1962 and in 1972, the United States forces remained about the same—even dropping some by 1982. But take a look now at the Soviet side. In 1962, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviets could not compare with us in terms of strength. In 1972, when we signed the SALT I treaty, we were nearly equal. But in 1982—well, that red Soviet bar stretching above the blue American bar tells the story.⁵⁶⁷

He explained the policy of deterrence as

What do we mean when we speak of "nuclear deterrence"? Certainly, we don't want such weapons for their own sake. We don't desire excessive forces or what some people have called "overkill." Basically, it's a matter of others knowing that starting a conflict would be more costly to them than anything they might hope to gain. And, yes, it is sadly ironic that in these modern times, it still takes weapons to prevent war. I wish it did not.⁵⁶⁸

The current problem with deterrence was described as,

Now, while the policy of deterrence has stood the test of time, the things we must do in order to maintain deterrence have changed. You often hear that the United States

⁵⁶⁶ Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation on Strategic Arms Reduction and Nuclear Deterrence,” November 22, 1982. Online by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42030>.

⁵⁶⁷ Reagan, “Address on Strategic Arms Reduction and Nuclear Deterrence.”

⁵⁶⁸ Reagan, “Address on Strategic Arms Reduction and Nuclear Deterrence.”

and the Soviet Union are in an arms race. Well, the truth is that while the Soviet Union has raced, we have not.⁵⁶⁹

On January 17, 1983 a week before the state of the Union address Mr. Reagan issued NSDD-75 titled U.S. Relations with the USSR in which he set out his administration's policy for dealing with what he saw as an aggressive and expansionistic Soviet Union:

U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union will consist of three elements: external resistance to Soviet imperialism; internal pressure on the USSR to weaken the sources of Soviet imperialism; and negotiations to eliminate on the basis of strict reciprocity outstanding disagreements.⁵⁷⁰

To discharge this policy effectively he set out three tasks for the United States, first to "contain and reverse Soviet expansionism," second to "promote...change within the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic political and economic system," and third to negotiate and "attempt to reach agreements which enhance and protect U.S. interests."⁵⁷¹ The directive "recognizes that Soviet aggressiveness has deep roots in the internal system" but it does not specify whether the source of those roots lay in the history of the Russian nation or the Marxist-Leninist ideology to the Soviet Communist Party.⁵⁷² Arms control agreements were not an end for their own sake but a "means for enhancing national security and global stability."⁵⁷³

⁵⁶⁹ Reagan, "Address on Strategic Arms Reduction and Nuclear Deterrence."

⁵⁷⁰ Ronald Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive Number 75, U.S. Relations with the USSR," (Washington, January 17, 1983) Online by *Federation of American Scientists* <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-053.htm>.

⁵⁷¹ Reagan, "NSDD-75."

⁵⁷² Reagan, "NSDD-75."

⁵⁷³ Reagan, "NSDD-75."

As Mr. Reagan described it in his State of the Union address to Congress on January 25, 1983 the policy of the United States concerning nuclear weapons agreements with the Soviet Union was well settled. Arms control had two basic goals, strategic equality and reliable verification. He said,

For our part, we're vigorously pursuing arms reduction negotiations with the Soviet Union. Supported by our allies, we've put forward draft agreements proposing significant weapon reductions to equal and verifiable lower levels. We insist on an equal balance of forces. And given the overwhelming evidence of Soviet violations of international treaties concerning chemical and biological weapons, we also insist that any agreement we sign can and will be verifiable.⁵⁷⁴

On March 23, 1983 Mr. Reagan introduced his personal contribution to the arms control issue with his call for a massive defense program to create the capability to intercept and destroy enemy ballistic missiles, formally known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (herein also referred to as SDI) and more popularly called Star Wars, especially by its critics. At that time the idea of a nuclear freeze was being promoted and Mr. Reagan flatly rejected the freeze:

I know too that many of you seriously believe that a nuclear freeze would further the cause of peace. But a freeze now would make us less, not more, secure and would raise, not reduce, the risks of war. It would be largely unverifiable and would seriously undercut our negotiations on arms reduction. It would reward the Soviets for their massive military buildup while preventing us from modernizing our aging and increasingly vulnerable forces. With their present margin of superiority, why should they agree to arms reductions knowing that we were prohibited from catching up?⁵⁷⁵

⁵⁷⁴ Ronald Reagan: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 25, 1983. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41698>.

⁵⁷⁵ Ronald Reagan, "Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security," March 23, 1983. Online by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41093>.

He introduced the Strategic Defense initiative with this question,

What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?⁵⁷⁶

He continued,

... I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.... Tonight, consistent with our obligations of the ABM treaty and recognizing the need for closer consultation with our allies, I'm taking an important first step. I am directing a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles.⁵⁷⁷

For Mr. Reagan this was an attempt to escape from the policy of mutually assured destruction which he saw as a trap. Later in 1986 during his remarks at high school graduation at Glassboro, New Jersey he described his efforts to move away from massive retaliation to a new technical solution to the problem of the arms race. This is his most expansive and optimistic description of the Strategic Defense Initiative which would protect the United States as a solid shelter from the anarchy of an uncertain and chaotic world:

Let us leave behind, too, the defense policy of mutual assured destruction, or MAD, as it's called, and seek to put in its place a defense that truly defends. You know—let me interrupt right here and say that possibly you haven't considered much about this system. This MAD policy, as it's called—and incidentally, MAD stands for mutual assured destruction, but MAD is also a description of what the policy is. It means that if we each keep enough weapons that we can destroy each other, then maybe we'll both have enough sense not to shoot those weapons off. Well, that's not exactly the way for the world to go on, with these massed terribly destructive weapons aimed at each other and the possibility that someday a madman somewhere may push a

⁵⁷⁶ Reagan, "Address on Defense and National Security."

⁵⁷⁷ Reagan, "Address on Defense and National Security."

button and the next day the world starts to explode. Even now we're performing research as part of our Strategic Defense Initiative that might one day enable us to put in space a shield that missiles could not penetrate, a shield that could protect us from nuclear missiles just as a roof protects a family from rain.⁵⁷⁸

While the Strategic Defense Initiative never realized Mr. Reagan's dreams of a solid roof over the United States it did become a major issue between the United States and the Soviet Union, leading in part the failure to reach an agreement at the Reykjavik meeting with Gorbachev in 1986.

In the fall of 1983 Mr. Reagan instructed his negotiators at Round V of the START negotiations to introduce a new concept the "build-down initiative." A build-down in terms of nuclear weapons is "A systematic numerical reduction, especially of nuclear weapons, in which more than one weapon or warhead is destroyed for every new one that is built."⁵⁷⁹ His instructions to the START negotiators were set out in National Security Decision Directive 106 issued October 4, 1983 and directed that,

The United States will introduce into the START negotiations in Round V a proposal for a mutual, guaranteed build-down designed to encourage stabilizing systems using variable rations linked to modernization and a guaranteed annual percentage build-down (approximately 5% mandatory build-down).⁵⁸⁰

The arms control and reduction negotiations with the Soviet Union during the 1980s were always conducted in an atmosphere of extreme distrust between the parties.

Emblematic of that distrust is National Security Decision Directive 121 issued January 14,

⁵⁷⁸ Ronald Reagan: "Remarks at the High School Commencement Exercises in Glassboro, New Jersey," June 19, 1986. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=37493>.

⁵⁷⁹ *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, 4th ed., s.v. "bulldown."

⁵⁸⁰ Ronald Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive Number 106, U.S. Approach to START Negotiations –VII," (Washington, October 4, 1983) Online by *Federation of American Scientists* <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-106.htm>.

1984. The paper, titled Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements, listed seven areas where the administration judged the Soviet behavior to be in contradiction to their international obligations under existing treaties. Among the violations were a failure to live up to pre-notification for troop maneuvers in the Helsinki Final Act, encryption of Soviet missile telemetry, construction of a new radar at Krasnoyarsk in violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, nuclear testing in violation of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the deployment of the SS-16 ICBM.⁵⁸¹

As time progressed and the Soviet Union drifted under the leadership of the remnants of the Brezhnev generation, the effect of the Strategic Defense Initiative on relations between the two countries became clearer. In National Security Decision Directive 153, Instructions for the Schultz-Gromyko Meeting in Geneva, issued January 1, 1985 Mr. Reagan referring to SDI, noted that the recent Soviet actions had been devoted to “intimidation to move us off our sound course.”⁵⁸² Concerning SDI he wrote that

Another important factor influencing Soviet behavior, especially in returning to nuclear arms reduction negotiations, is the Soviet desire to block our Strategic Defense Initiative as soon as possible.⁵⁸³

The Soviet response to SDI had focused on “preventing the militarization of space,” which Mr. Reagan saw as an effort to preserve a Soviet strategic advantage

⁵⁸¹ Ronald Reagan, “National Security Decision Directive Number 121, Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements,” (Washington, January 14, 1984) Online by *Federation of American Scientists* <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-121.htm>.

⁵⁸² Ronald Reagan, “National Security Decision Directive Number 153, Instructions for the Schultz-Gromyko Meeting in Geneva,” (Washington, January 1, 1985) Online by *Federation of American Scientists* <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-153.htm>.

⁵⁸³ Reagan, “NSDD-153.”

...its focus on space reflects an attempt to confine future U.S. defensive activity within more traditional areas which are consistent with the long term patters of soviet investment and where the Soviet Union now holds a competitive advantage.⁵⁸⁴

In his public statements at the beginning of his second administration in 1985 Mr. Reagan was still arguing for a move from the doctrine of massive retaliation and mutually assured destruction to his vision of a new capability to protect the nation from strategic ballistic missile attacks, SDI. As he argued to Congress in the 1985 State of the Union address,

For the past 20 years we've believed that no war will be launched as long as each side knows it can retaliate with a deadly counterstrike. Well, I believe there's a better way of eliminating the threat of nuclear war. It is a Strategic Defense Initiative aimed ultimately at finding a nonnuclear defense against ballistic missiles. It's the most hopeful possibility of the nuclear age. But it's not very well understood.⁵⁸⁵

On March 11, 1985, following the death of Konstantin Chernenko, Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist party and leader to the Soviet Union. Leadership in the Soviet Union had finally passed to a new generation. Mr. Reagan and Gorbachev finally met in person on November 19-20, 1985 in Geneva Switzerland. No treaty was signed and SDI was, as expected, a major point of contention. After the meeting Mr. Reagan reported to the nation:

Mr. Gorbachev insisted that we might use a strategic defense system to put offensive weapons into space and establish nuclear superiority. I made it clear that SDI has

⁵⁸⁴ Reagan, "NSDD-153."

⁵⁸⁵ Ronald Reagan: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," February 6, 1985. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=38069>.

nothing to do with offensive weapons; that, instead, we are investigating nonnuclear defense systems that would only threaten offensive missiles, not people.⁵⁸⁶

In general terms, after his traditional warning about the nature of the Soviet Union Mr.

Reagan did report to Congress and the nation some progress:

Suffice it to say that the United States cannot afford illusions about the nature of the U.S.S.R. We cannot assume that their ideology and purpose will change; this implies enduring competition. Our task is to assure that this competition remains peaceful... Specifically, we agreed in Geneva that each side should move to cut offensive nuclear arms by 50 percent in appropriate categories. In our joint statement we called for early progress on this, turning the talks toward our chief goal—offensive reductions. We called for an interim accord on intermediate-range nuclear forces, leading, I hope, to the complete elimination of this class of missiles—and all of this with tough verification.⁵⁸⁷

The stalemate continued and the negotiations went nowhere. On February 26, 1986, Mr.

Reagan repeated the themes of a realist approach to foreign policy:

George Washington's words may seem hard and cold today, but history has proven him right again and again. "To be prepared for war," he said, "is one of the most effective means of preserving peace." Well, to those who think strength provokes conflict, Will Rogers had his own answer. He said of the world heavyweight champion of his day: "I've never seen anyone insult Jack Dempsey."⁵⁸⁸

He praised the United States strategic arms buildup:

We set out to narrow the growing gaps in our strategic deterrent, and we're beginning to do that. Our modernization program—the MX, the Trident submarine, the B-1 and Stealth bombers—represents the first significant improvement in America's strategic

⁵⁸⁶ Ronald Reagan: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress Following the Soviet-United States Summit Meeting in Geneva," November 21, 1985. Online by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=38088>.

⁵⁸⁷ Reagan, "Address Following the Summit Meeting in Geneva."

⁵⁸⁸ Ronald Reagan: "Address to the Nation on National Security," February 26, 1986. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=36927>.

deterrent in 20 years. Those who speak so often about the so-called arms race ignore a central fact: In the decade before 1981, the Soviets were the only ones racing⁵⁸⁹

And he stood fast on his commitment to SDI:

But while SDI offers hope for the future, we have to consider today's world. For too long, we and our allies have permitted nuclear weapons to be a crutch, a way of not having to face up to real defense needs. We must free ourselves from that crutch. Our goal should be to deter and, if necessary, to repel any aggression without a resort to nuclear arms.⁵⁹⁰

The arms control negotiations between Mr. Reagan and Gorbachev at Reykjavik on October 11 and 12, 1986 failed in a dispute over the word "laboratory." Both sides agreed in principle to reduce and then eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles within a ten year time frame. But, Gorbachev insisted that the United States also confine development and testing to the Strategic Defense Initiative technologies to the laboratory.⁵⁹¹ While the details are fascinating history they do not impact the unitary actor theory tested in this study.⁵⁹² The core policy of the United States remained the same. First was equality of strategic nuclear arms at whatever level can be negotiated and if no deal is possible then a buildup until such equality is achieved. Second, the United States insisted on full and complete verification of Soviet compliance with any agreement. The third prong of the triad of U.S. policy at this point was a serious preference for almost any other delivery system over the fast-flying, non-recallable, and ultimately destabilizing intercontinental ballistic missile. All of this was

⁵⁸⁹ Reagan, "Address to the Nation on National Security."

⁵⁹⁰ Reagan, "Address to the Nation on National Security."

⁵⁹¹ Ronald Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive Number 250, Post Reykjavik Follow-Up," (Washington, November 3, 1986) Online by *Federation of American Scientists* <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-250.htm>.

⁵⁹² The interested reader can find an excellent description of the Reykjavik meeting in Richard Rhodes book, *Arsenals of Folly, The Making of the Nuclear Arms Race*.

grounded in the continued use of the theory of deterrence for which no serious competitor existed.⁵⁹³

Finally, at the December 1987 summit at Washington when Gorbachev visited the White House, Mr. Reagan at last had an arms control deal to sign. The Intermediate and Short Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was signed on December 8, 1987. As Mr. Reagan proudly told the nation this is the first arms control agreement to eliminate an entire class of weapons and provide real verification of compliance with the agreement.

I believe this treaty represents a landmark in postwar history, because it is not just an arms control but an arms reduction agreement. Unlike treaties of the past, this agreement does not simply establish ceilings for new weapons: It actually reduces the number of such weapons. In fact, it altogether abolishes an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles.

The verification measures in this treaty are also something new with far-reaching implications. On-site inspections and short-notice inspections will be permitted within the Soviet Union. Again, this is a first-time event, a breakthrough, and that's why I believe this treaty will not only lessen the threat of war, it can also speed along a process that may someday remove that threat entirely.⁵⁹⁴

The treaty provided that,

ARTICLE I

In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty which includes the Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols which form an integral part thereof, each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, not have such systems thereafter, and carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty.⁵⁹⁵

⁵⁹³ Reagan, "NSDD-250."

⁵⁹⁴ Ronald Reagan: "Address to the Nation on the Soviet-United States Summit Meeting," December 10, 1987. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33806>.

⁵⁹⁵ Ronald Reagan: "Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate- Range and Shorter-Range Missiles ," December 8, 1987. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33796>.

The definitions of “intermediate-range missile” and “shorter-range missile” were,

5. The term "intermediate-range missile" means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers.

6. The term "shorter-range missile" means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers.⁵⁹⁶

But the real breakthrough came in the inspection and verification provisions:

ARTICLE XI

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct on-site inspections. The Parties shall implement on-site inspections in accordance with this Article, the Protocol on Inspection and the Protocol on Elimination.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections provided for by this Article both within the territory of the other Party and within the territories of basing countries.

3. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at all missile operating bases and missile support facilities specified in the Memorandum of Understanding other than missile production facilities, and at all elimination facilities included in the initial data update required by paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty. These inspections shall be completed no later than 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty.⁵⁹⁷

Reagan and Oil

In their 1980 party platform the Democrats bragged that,

⁵⁹⁶ Reagan: "Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- Range and Shorter-Range Missiles."

⁵⁹⁷ Reagan: "Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- Range and Shorter-Range Missiles."

Energy—Our dependence on foreign oil has decreased—in 1977 we imported 8.8 million barrels of oil per day, and our nation is now importing approximately 6.5 million per day, a decline of 26 percent.⁵⁹⁸

In his acceptance speech at the Democratic convention in New York, Mr. Carter proudly claimed that,

We've reversed decades of dangerous and growing dependence on foreign oil. We are now importing 20 percent less oil—that is 1 1/2 million barrels of oil every day less than the day I took office.⁵⁹⁹

Unfortunately for Mr. Carter and the Democrats, the 120% increase in the price of oil in the year preceding the election and the decline in productivity produced a very weak economy in 1980.⁶⁰⁰

Without directly mentioning Saudi Arabia by name the Republicans asserted a right to oil from the Persian Gulf with this declaration,

While reemphasizing our commitment to Israel, a Republican Administration will pursue close ties and friendship with moderate Arab states. We will initiate the economic and military framework for assuring long-term stability in the internal development of regional states and an orderly marketplace for the area's resources. We will make clear that any re-imposition of an oil embargo would be viewed as a hostile act.⁶⁰¹

⁵⁹⁸ Democratic Party Platforms: "Democratic Party Platform of 1980," August 11, 1980. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29607>.

⁵⁹⁹ Jimmy Carter: "Remarks Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the 1980 Democratic National Convention in New York," August 14, 1980. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=44909>.

⁶⁰⁰ Democratic Party Platform, 1980.

⁶⁰¹ Republican Party Platforms: "Republican Party Platform of 1980," July 15, 1980. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25844>.

In his acceptance speech to the Republican convention in Detroit on July 17, 1980, in an oblique nod to the problems of America's security interest with Persian Gulf oil, Mr. Reagan said,

...we see an equally sorry chapter on the record of the present administration.
— As Soviet combat brigade trains in Cuba, just 90 miles from our shores.
— A Soviet army of invasion occupies Afghanistan, further threatening our vital interests in the Middle East.⁶⁰²

In 1981, when Ronald Reagan was inaugurated the price of oil was \$37.96 per barrel. In 1972, it had been \$1.90. This was a 2000% increase in eight years.⁶⁰³ Saudi Arabia continued to be concerned about a Soviet Union that looked more like a country “on the move” rather than a rotting empire a decade away from collapse. Moving towards the U.S. on the Israeli-Palestinian question, the Saudis explicitly recognized the right of Israel to exist alongside a Palestinian state in 1981 with the Fahd Plan named after King Fahd, which was formally presented to the Arab Summit in Fez.⁶⁰⁴

Under President Reagan, Saudi military purchases gained momentum even if the process was frustrating and in Saudi eyes degrading to a faithful ally of the United States. Within the Congress and the administration, Israel and its supporters fought those arms sales.

Mr. Reagan announced on October 1, 1981 that he was moving forward with plans to sell to Saudi Arabia both AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) airplanes and

⁶⁰² Ronald Reagan: "Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention in Detroit," July 17, 1980. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25970>.

⁶⁰³ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 152.

⁶⁰⁴ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 155, see also <http://www.kingfahdbinabdulaziz.com/main/1507.htm>.

enhancements for the Saudi's F-15 fighter aircraft. He justified the sale as in America's national security interest, securing the safety of Saudi Arabia and its oil. In his press conference making the announcement he dismissed the idea that the sale posed a threat to Israel and said to reporters

This morning Congress was notified of our intention to sell AWACS aircraft and F-15 enhancement items to Saudi Arabia. I have proposed this sale because it significantly enhances our own vital national security interests in the Middle East. By building confidence in the United States as a reliable security partner, the sale will greatly improve the chances of our working constructively with Saudi Arabia and other states of the Middle East toward our common goal—a just and lasting peace. It poses no threat to Israel, now or in the future. Indeed, by contributing to the security and stability of the region, it serves Israel's long-range interests.

Further, this sale will significantly improve the capability of Saudi Arabia and the United States to defend the oil fields on which the security of the free world depends.⁶⁰⁵

When asked directly about the effects of the Iranian revolution and threats to Saudi Arabia, the question and answer went like this

Q. Mr. President, you said a few minutes ago that you would not allow, you would not permit what happened in Iran several years ago to happen in Saudi Arabia. How would you prevent that? Would you take military intervention if that was necessary to prevent it?

The President. I'm not going to talk about the specifics of how we would do it, except to say that in Iran, I think the United States has to take some responsibility for what happened there—with some very shortsighted policies that let a situation come to a boiling point, that there was no need to do that.

But in Saudi Arabia, I just would call to your attention that it's not only the United States, it's the whole Western World. There is no way, as long as Saudi Arabia and the OPEC nations there in the East—and Saudi Arabia's the most important—provide the bulk of the energy that is needed to turn the wheels of industry in the

⁶⁰⁵ Ronald Reagan: "The President's News Conference," October 1, 1981. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=44327>.

Western World, there's no way that we could stand by and see that taken over by anyone that would shut off that oil.⁶⁰⁶

On October 21, 1981 the Senate refused to block a sale of AWACS aircraft and components for Saudi Arabia's F-15 fighter aircraft, but the vote was close, 52-48 to allow the sale to proceed.⁶⁰⁷ The Saudis welcomed Reagan's more confrontational stance towards the Soviets having never been comfortable with Détente, and they backed up that welcome with financial aid in places and on issues where the American government could not go.⁶⁰⁸

Once in the White House, Mr. Reagan and his team endorsed the basic thrust of the Carter doctrine and made that position clear in public as well as in their private deliberations. On March 5, 1981, Secretary of State Alexander Haig gave an interview to Time magazine in which he explicitly endorsed the Carter Doctrine saying in a question and answer format that,

Q. The Carter Doctrine says the U.S. will go to war to defend the oil flow from the Persian Gulf. How can we defend the region?

A. I am always repelled by such extreme simplifications. Western industrialized societies are largely dependent on the oil resources of the Middle East region and a threat to access to that oil would constitute a grave threat to the vital national interest. That must be dealt with; and that does not exclude the use of force if that is necessary.⁶⁰⁹

⁶⁰⁶ Reagan: "The President's News Conference," October 1, 1981.

⁶⁰⁷ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 161.

⁶⁰⁸ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 168.

⁶⁰⁹ "An Interview with Haig." *Time*, March 16, 1981, 26.

At home King Fahd used the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Shi'a rioting in Saudi Arabia's eastern province and the siege at the Grand Mosque to mobilize domestic support along religious lines.⁶¹⁰

The beginnings of the Islamic fundamentalist jihad against the developed western civilizations and especially the United States (when it became the sole remaining superpower at the end of the Cold War) lie in the Afghan war against the Soviet invasion. Under Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979 and stayed until the final withdrawal on February 15, 1989. The final troop withdrawal started under the last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on May 15, 1988. The war ended without any vestige of success, progress or increased international security for the Soviet Union. It was described by some observers as the "Soviet Viet Nam."

Professor Gregory Gause a Middle East expert at the University of Vermont puts it this way,

...the crucible of the development of bin Ladenism was the jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Among the Arab volunteers there, the retrograde social views and the theological intolerance of Saudi Wahhabism came to blend with the revolutionary political doctrines developed in the 1960s by Muslim Brotherhood thinkers, particularly in Egypt.⁶¹¹

Out of this stew of resentment, certainty of religious faith and revolutionary politics; comes the Jihad that threatens the Saud family's hold on the Arabian Peninsula.

Mr. Reagan viewed the Soviet activities in Afghanistan and elsewhere as a threat to the United States interests in the Persian Gulf. In NSDD-288 titled My Objectives at the

⁶¹⁰ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 170.

⁶¹¹ Gregory Gause, "Saudi Arabia and the War on Terrorism" in *A Practical Guide To Winning The War On Terrorism*, ed. A. Garfinkle, (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 2004) 92. Available online http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/0817945423_89.pdf.

Summit, issued November 10, 1987 before his December 1987 meeting with Gorbachev in Washington he wrote that,

We should make clear our grave concern about the turn for the worse in Soviet policy toward the Persian Gulf—shielding Iran from a second UNSC Resolution as Iran’s behavior towards us and the Gulf Arabs becomes more belligerent...⁶¹²

Mr. Reagan always framed United States policy towards Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf oil through the prism of U.S.-Soviet relations. It was clear the continued U.S. presence in the Gulf, the American guarantee of support for the House of Saud and the policy of guaranteed American access to Saudi oil at whatever price world market set continued throughout his presidency.

Analysis: Carter to Reagan

Before directly discussing the transition from Democrat Jimmy Carter to Republican Ronald Reagan we should review their vastly different perspectives on the position of the United States in the world. Mr. Carter, who is often perceived in history as a pessimist and a stern scold for the nation’s and the world’s failings, writes as an optimist. For him the United States is strong and vital and he correctly perceived the various disadvantages of the Soviet Union and its system. He saw the United States as dealing from a position of strength. In Presidential Directive/NSC-18 he writes that,

...the United States continues to enjoy a number of critical advantages: it has more creative technological and economic system, its political structure can adapt more easily to popular demands and relies on freely given popular support, and it is supported internationally by allies and friends who genuinely share similar aspirations. In contrast, though successfully acquiring military power matching that of the United States, the Soviet Union continues to face major internal economic

⁶¹² Ronald Reagan, “National Security Decision Directive Number 288, My Objectives at the Summit,” (Washington, November 10, 1987) Online by *Federation of American Scientists* <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-288.htm>.

difficulties, and externally it has few genuinely committed allies while lately suffering setbacks in its relations with China, parts of Africa, and India ⁶¹³

Mr. Reagan, optimistic, sunny and always confident in public that “America’s best days were yet to come”⁶¹⁴ writes to his national security team a very pessimistic view of the conflict,

Unstable governments, weak political institutions, inefficient economies, and the persistence of traditional conflicts creates opportunities for Soviet expansion in many parts of the developing world...increasing terrorism, the dangers of nuclear proliferation, uncertainties in Soviet political succession, reticence on the part of a number of Western countries and the growing assertiveness of Soviet foreign policy all contribute to the unstable international environment. For these reasons, the decade of the eighties will likely pose the greatest challenge to our survival and well-being since World War II and our response could result in a fundamentally different East West relationship by the end of the decade.⁶¹⁵

During the terms of Mr. Carter and Mr. Reagan, anarchy continued as the defining condition of the international environment. No central organizing authority was present which held the power to resolve disputes between states. Each international organization was dependent upon the strength of member states and was unable or unwilling to control the behavior of its most powerful members. The United States possessed clear and identifiable decision making for the creation and execution foreign policy, through the President and the National Security Council and the Departments of State and Defense. The foreign policy activities examined here were made and executed in public. The President

⁶¹³ Jimmy Carter, “PD/NSC-18 U.S. National Security,” (Washington, August 24, 1977) Online by *Federation of American Scientists* <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pd/pd18.pdf>.

⁶¹⁴ Ronald Reagan: "Address to the Republican National Convention in Houston," August 17, 1992. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=74028>.

⁶¹⁵ Reagan, “NSDD 32.”

continued to speak for the United States in matters of national security. Both Mr. Carter and Mr. Reagan treated nuclear weapons as a vital national survival issue.

The relative military capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union, the capacity for utter destruction of human civilization and lack of a clear ability (on either side) to fight and win a nuclear conflict, remained fairly consistent during Mr. Carter's and Mr. Reagan's administrations. The United States sought a significant increase in its strategic offensive capability by proceeding with an arms buildup begun under Mr. Carter and accelerated by Mr. Reagan in response to the perceived Soviet threat and demonstrated capacity of international aggression displayed in the invasion of Afghanistan.

When the political rhetoric is set aside, the Reagan administration's the policy about nuclear weapons was practically identical to Mr. Carter's policy:

1. The United States has nuclear weapons at the ready, and any arms agreement must contain absolutely reliable, verifiable inspections to ensure against any cheating by any party.
2. The United States will use nuclear weapons if attacked.
3. The United States has not renounced the right to the first use of nuclear weapons.
4. To ensure the destruction of any foe after a surprise attack, the United States will maintain a nuclear arsenal sufficient for that purpose.

While Mr. Reagan entertained dreams of eliminating all nuclear weapons he never acted upon those dreams. The Strategic Defense Initiative, a proposal that if built could result in a massive change in capabilities, never even came close to fruition so as to cause

any meaningful change in the arsenal of the United States or the balance of strategic nuclear power with the Soviet Union.

While not directly a part of this transition analysis it is important to note here that there was a change in the attitude and posture of the United States towards the Soviet Union during Mr. Carter's presidency. The basic United States policy of containment and deterrence of the Soviet Union, tempered with an engagement through the process of detente remained unchanged through the transition from Mr. Ford and Mr. Carter. But Mr. Carter left office with a far more confrontational approach to the Soviet Union than Mr. Ford had held or that Mr. Carter had anticipated when he entered the White House. The event that changed the international situation as well as the attitude and policy of the United States, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan occurred after the signing of the SALT II treaty but before its ratification. In fact the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan effectively ended the opportunity that the United States Senate would ratify SALT II.

This change from détente under President Ford to President Carter's more confrontational approach after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan can be examined from an analysis of "balance of threats," a refinement of the unitary actor assumption first articulated by Stephen Walt.⁶¹⁶ "Balance of threats" helps explain both the continuity of policy of détente from Mr. Ford to Mr. Carter and the hostility to the Soviet Union clearly on display by both Mr. Carter and Mr. Reagan in 1980. That hostility was grounded in real concern about Soviet intentions based on the Soviets unprovoked invasion of Afghanistan. If states

⁶¹⁶ Stephen Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power," *International Security*, 9 no. 4 (Spring 1985): 2-43.

behave as unitary actors, a threat analysis explains America's change in attitudes towards the Soviets during President Carter's term as the Soviet's demonstrated capabilities did not change so much as their international behavior changed. Other states had to respond to the new Soviet attitude, offensive posture and demonstrated willingness to use military force. The unitary actor assumption is not strictly limited to describing responses to changes in capabilities, but also includes the ability to describe a response to a change based on a state's behavior. In this context, the unitary actor assumption explains Mr. Carter's shift in attitude.

Both Mr. Carter and Mr. Reagan treated Saudi oil as a vital national survival issues. Mr. Reagan and Secretary of State Alexander Haig explicitly reaffirmed the Carter doctrine in their public statements. At the end of the Reagan administration the policy about Saudi Arabia and its oil was the same as Mr. Carter's policy:

1. Access to Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf oil by the United States was a vital matter of national security.
2. The US would deploy and if necessary use military force to keep the oil flowing even to the extent of commencing combat operations before the oil flow had stopped.
3. The US would use diplomatic pressure and persuasion on the Saudis over the issue of price but was unwilling to intervene with sufficient force to achieve the control necessary to allow Washington set the price. Washington would live with the world price of oil.

No substantial contradictory evidence concerning the unitary actor assumption appears in this transition concerning nuclear weapons. No substantial contradictory evidence concerning the unitary actor assumption appears in this transition concerning oil.

In the context of United States policy towards nuclear weapons, disarmament proposals and the Soviet Union, the analysis of the transition from the Carter to the Reagan administration supports the unitary actor assumption. Concerning the issue of Saudi Arabia and imported crude oil the analysis of the transition from the Carter to the Reagan administration transition also supports the unitary actor assumption.

Bush, Republican To Clinton, Democrat: January 20, 1993

Bush and Nuclear Weapons

George H. W. Bush was the only sitting Vice President elected to the presidency in the twentieth century and the fourth person to achieve that leap since John Adams was elected to succeed George Washington in 1796. His one term contains three momentous changes in the international environment. The first was the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989 followed by the collapse of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, which significantly affected the capabilities and responsibilities of the Soviet Union in its global confrontation with the United States. The second change was the establishment of an American military presence in Kuwait at the northern end of the Persian Gulf, and Saudi Arabia; protecting them and the United States interests in Persian Gulf oil. The third change was the creation by treaty of a new set of capabilities and responsibilities for both the Soviet Union and the United States with the implementation of on-site inspection in both countries

to monitor compliance with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty which entered into force on December 11, 1990.

In the documents from the administration of Mr. Bush we begin to see significant redactions of classified information in the National Security Directives and the National Security Review memorandums that have been released to the public. Although the passage of time may reveal additional information and shed light on the internal details of the policy apparatus, a review of what is publicly known yields sufficient information to determine United States policy on both nuclear weapons and oil.

In his acceptance speech to the Republican Convention in New Orleans on August 18, 1988, referring to foreign affairs and the rapidly changing Soviet Union Mr. Bush said,

We have a new relationship with the Soviet Union. The INF treaty - the beginning of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan - the beginning of the end of the Soviet proxy war in Angola and with it the independence of Namibia. Iran and Iraq move toward peace.

It is a watershed.

It is no accident.

It happened when we acted on the ancient knowledge that strength and clarity lead to peace - weakness and ambivalence lead to war. Weakness and ambivalence lead to war. Weakness tempts aggressors. Strength stops them. I will not allow this country to be made weak again.

The tremors in the Soviet world continue. The hard earth there has not yet settled. Perhaps what is happening will change our world forever. Perhaps what is happening will change our world forever. Perhaps not. A prudent skepticism is in order.⁶¹⁷

⁶¹⁷ George Bush: "Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention in New Orleans," August 18, 1988. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25955>.

His opponent Governor Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts in his acceptance of the Democratic nomination on July 21, 1988 in Atlanta Georgia, while referring to Mr. Reagan's foreign and defense policies with approval, offered only the vaguest reference to defense and the Soviets:

President Reagan has set the stage for deep cuts in nuclear arms--and I salute him for that. He has said that we should judge the Soviet Union not by what it says, but by what it does--and I agree with that.⁶¹⁸

In their debate on September 25, 1988 Mr. Bush and Governor Dukakis argued their positions on defense spending and the Soviet, Union attempting to distinguish themselves from each other. The following excerpts from the debate illustrate the gap between their positions and consequently the broad range of options open to Mr. Bush after his inauguration:

MASHEK: Mr. Vice President, the governor has suggested that you've never met a weapons system that you didn't like or want. Are you prepared to tell the voters one system in this time of tight budgetary restraints and problems at the Pentagon that you'd be willing to cut or even eliminate that wouldn't endanger national security?

BUSH: I don't think it's a question of eliminating. I can tell him some I'm against. A-6F, for example. DIVAD. And I can go on and on. Minuteman III, penetration systems. I mean, there's plenty of them that I oppose, but what I am not going to do, when we are negotiating with the Soviet Union, sitting down talking to Mr. Gorbachev about how we achieve a 50 percent reduction in our strategic weapons, I'm not going to give away a couple of aces in that very tough card game. I'm simply not going to do that.

....

DUKAKIS: Well, first let me say with respect to the freeze, that back in the spring of 1982 Mr. Bush was a lot more sympathetic to the freeze than he seems to be today. As a matter of fact, he said it was not and should not be subject to partisan demagoguery because it was too important for the United States or for the world. I didn't hear, John, exactly where he was going to cut and what he was going to do.

⁶¹⁸ Michael S. Dukakis: "'A New Era of Greatness for America': Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Democratic National Convention in Atlanta," July 21, 1988. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsba.edu/ws/?pid=25961>.

But I know this, we have serious financial problems in this country. We've piled up over a trillion dollars in debt and the next president of the United States is going to have to make some choices.

Mr. Bush wants to spend billions on Star Wars. He apparently wants to spend billions on the MX on railroad cars, a weapons system we don't need and can't afford. I thought the administration was opposed to the Midgetman. I thought the administration was at the negotiating table in Geneva suggesting that we ban mobile missile systems entirely. But those are the choices the next president of the United States is going to have to make.

I'm for the Stealth, I'm for the D-5, I'm for going ahead with the advanced Cruise missile. But I don't think we need these other systems. I don't think we need them to remain strong. We've got to move ahead with the strategic arms negotiation process, with the comprehensive test ban treaty and with negotiations leading to conventional force reduction in Europe with deeper cuts on the Soviet side and Senator Bentsen and I will pursue that policy.

...
BUSH: ...But where I differ with my opponent is I am not going to make unilateral cuts in our strategic defend systems or support some freeze when they have superiority. I'm not going to do that, because I think the jury is still out on the Soviet experiment.

...
DUKAKIS: ...You have to make choices. We're not making those choices. And to spend billions and billions of dollars as Mr. Bush apparently wants to, although, he, himself has been all over the lot on this issue lately—on Star Wars—in my judgment makes no sense at all. We need a strong, credible, effective nuclear deterrent. We have 13,000 strategic nuclear warheads right now on land, on sea and in the air, enough to blow up the Soviet Union forty times over. They have about 12,000. So, we've got to move forward with those negotiations, get the level of strategic weapons down.

....
BUSH: He's got to get this thing more clear. Why do you spend a billion dollars on something you think is a fantasy and a fraud? I will fully research it, go forward as fast as we can. We've set up the levels of funding and when it is deployable, I will deploy it. That is my position on SDI and it's never wavered a bit.⁶¹⁹

⁶¹⁹ Presidential Candidates Debates: "Presidential Debate at the University of California in Los Angeles," October 13, 1988. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29412>.

In his Inaugural address Mr. Bush mentioned the Soviet Union by name. This had not been a common occurrence during the Cold War, and it is an indicator of the primary importance of the U.S.-Soviet relationship at this time. The changing capabilities of a re-arming United States military, the deteriorating condition of the Soviet economy and its growing inability to support the Soviet military establishment, as well as the ever increasing dependence of the United States on imported oil made the single term of George H. W. Bush a point of historical change in the international arena unlike anything seen since 1948.

The tenor of his first address to Congress on February 9, 1989, 10 months before the fall of the Berlin Wall was hopeful and optimistic. Mr. Bush lauded the “time of great change in the world and especially in the Soviet Union.”⁶²⁰ Regarding the Soviets he said that,

Prudence and common sense dictate that we try to understand the full meaning of the change going on there, review our policies, and then proceed with caution. ...The fundamental facts remain that the Soviets retain a very powerful military machine in the service of objectives which are still too often in conflict with ours. So, let us take the new openness seriously, but let's also be realistic. And let's always be strong.⁶²¹

The ebbing of the Cold War also marked the beginning of the nuclear weapons plant cleanup efforts. He called for beginning what he said was a,

...massive task in cleaning up the waste left from decades of environmental neglect at America's nuclear weapons plants. Clearly, we must modernize these plants and operate them safely. That's not at issue; our national security depends on it.⁶²²

⁶²⁰ George Bush: "Address on Administration Goals before a Joint Session of Congress," February 9, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16660>.

⁶²¹ Bush: "Address on Administration Goals," February 9, 1989.

⁶²² Bush: "Address on Administration Goals," February 9, 1989.

In a move very different from his predecessor, while he remained committed to “vigorously pursue the Strategic Defense Initiative,” he proposed, “a 1 year freeze in the military budget.”⁶²³ He saw a peace dividend on the horizon.

On March 3, 1989 in National Security Review 12, Mr. Bush ordered a review of national defense strategy. The language charging his national security team with this task was unabashedly realist and a clear assertion that the doctrine of containment was the central organizing principle leading to the expected triumph of the United States in the Cold War. The review begins with this language,

Throughout the post-war era, we have successfully provided for the security of the United States and for the furtherance of our security interests in the world by following a broad national defense strategy of containment...Central to this broad strategy have been the concepts of deterrence and flexible response. To deter potential adversaries we have had to make clear that we, and our allies, have the means and the will to respond effectively to coercion or aggression...and U.S. nuclear forces have served as the ultimate guarantors of our security.⁶²⁴

Citing, “Changes in Soviet domestic and foreign policies, including some announced but not yet implemented” Mr. Bush orders a “review of our basic national defense strategy.”⁶²⁵ He cautions his team not to take this order as a request to invent a new strategy, writing that

...I believe that our fundamental purposes and enduring and that the broad elements of our current strategy – our Alliances, our military capabilities – remain sound.⁶²⁶

⁶²³ Bush: "Address on Administration Goals," February 9, 1989.

⁶²⁴ George H.W. Bush, “National Security Review-12, Review of National Defense Strategy,” (Washington, March 3, 1989) Online by *Federation of American Scientists* <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsr/nsr12.pdf>.

⁶²⁵ Bush, “NSR-12.

⁶²⁶ Bush, “NSR-12.

But, it is clear that he is asking for some in depth consideration of what he sees as a changing world, particularly in the area of nuclear weapons. The depth of the review he orders is significant. It is quoted here at length to give the reader a sense of the range of possibilities Mr. Bush sees confronting the United States. He asks,

How have previous U.S. efforts with respect to nuclear arms control reinforced or undercut the proper role of nuclear weapons in our deterrent strategy? What contribution will nuclear weapons (including theater nuclear weapons) make in our defense strategy over time – in Europe, in other contingencies? What do we need for maintaining strategic deterrence? This discussion should include: (1) what the U.S. must be able to hold at risk in order to deter successfully a Soviet strategic nuclear attack; (2) the degree to which each leg of the triad must be survivable, given (a) strategic warning, (b) tactical warning, or (c) no warning; (3) the impact on strategic stability of “deMIRVing”; (4) the role of the strategic bomber force and air-launched cruise missiles; (5) the significance or emphasizing air breathing systems over ballistic ones; (6) the degree to which long term stability and deterrence would be enhanced or degraded by the elimination of nuclear-armed, land-attack, sea-launched cruise missiles from the arsenals of the U.S. and the Soviet Union; and (7) the adequacy of the projected number of SLBM platforms.⁶²⁷

He is looking for the “most effective deterrent” within his proposed 4 year budget and asking for guidance of the appropriate balance “between resources devoted to nuclear and conventional forces.”⁶²⁸

In the National Security Review 14 dated April 3, 1989 titled Review of United States Arms Control Policies, Mr. Bush specifically asked for a review on existing positions including the current negotiation structure and,

... (b) the existing U.S. position on the linkage between conclusion of a START treaty and resolution of existing space and defense treaty issues and (c) the existing U.S. Position that no new treaties in this area can be concluded with the resolution

⁶²⁷ Bush, “NSR-12.

⁶²⁸ Bush, “NSR-12.

of the Soviet violations of the ABM treaty, especially the large phased array radar at Krasnoyarsk.⁶²⁹

The Krasnoyarsk radar had been a sticking point between the parties for some time and according to some commentators was used by the conservatives during the Reagan administration as an example of Soviet duplicity and untrustworthiness. But, the world was on the verge of a rapid change that would soon render the Cold War prism for understanding U.S.-Soviet relations out-of-date.

The pause in United States Soviet negotiations on nuclear weapons occasioned by Mr. Bush's extensive review of policy towards the Soviet Union including arms control negotiations came to a close when Mr. Bush addressed the cadets of Texas A & M University at the commencement ceremony in College Station, Texas on May 12, 1989. Mr. Bush reviewed the history of the doctrine of containment and pronounced it a success saying that,

Wise men -- Truman and Eisenhower, Vandenberg and Rayburn, Marshall, Acheson, and Kennan -- crafted the strategy of containment. They believed that the Soviet Union, denied the easy course of expansion, would turn inward and address the contradictions of its inefficient, repressive, and inhumane system. And they were right -- the Soviet Union is now publicly facing this hard reality. Containment worked.⁶³⁰

In the contest of the unitary actor assumption it is worth noting the bi-partisan nature of this list of containment's founders. He then called for something new:

⁶²⁹ George H.W. Bush, "National Security Review-14, Review of United States Arms Control Policies," (Washington, April 3, 1989) Online by *Federation of American Scientists* <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsr/nsr14.pdf>.

⁶³⁰ George Bush: "Remarks at the Texas A&M University Commencement Ceremony in College Station," May 12, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17022>.

Our review indicates that 40 years of perseverance have brought us a precious opportunity, and now it is time to move beyond containment to a new policy for the 1990's -- one that recognizes the full scope of change taking place around the world and in the Soviet Union itself. In sum, the United States now has as its goal much more than simply containing Soviet expansionism. We seek the integration of the Soviet Union into the community of nations. And as the Soviet Union itself moves toward greater openness and democratization, as they meet the challenge of responsible international behavior, we will match their steps with steps of our own. Ultimately, our objective is to welcome the Soviet Union back into the world order.⁶³¹

But any move to a new policy, “beyond containment,” must begin with a clear-eyed and objective assessment of the Soviet Union’s most worrying element, “We must not forget that the Soviet Union has acquired awesome military capabilities.”⁶³² To fulfill the vision of a truly new Soviet-American relationship, Mr. Bush required significant changes in Soviet behavior:

First, reduce Soviet forces. Although some small steps have already been taken, the Warsaw Pact still possesses more than 30,000 tanks, more than twice as much artillery, and hundreds of thousands more troops in Europe than NATO. They should cut their forces to less threatening levels, in proportion to their legitimate security needs.

Second, adhere to the Soviet obligation, promised in the final days of World War II, to support self-determination for all the nations of Eastern Europe and central Europe. ... In short, tear down the Iron Curtain.

And third, work with the West in positive, practical -- not merely rhetorical -- steps toward diplomatic solution to these regional disputes around the world. I welcome the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the Angola agreement....

And fourth, achieve a lasting political pluralism and respect for human rights.⁶³³

On arms control Mr. Bush said,

⁶³¹ Bush: "Remarks at the Texas A&M University."

⁶³² Bush: "Remarks at the Texas A&M University."

⁶³³ Bush: "Remarks at the Texas A&M University."

We seek verifiable, stabilizing arms control and arms reduction agreements with the Soviet Union and its allies. However, arms control is not an end in itself but a means of contributing to the security of America and the peace of the world...

Our basic approach is clear. In the strategic arms reductions talks, we wish to reduce the risk of nuclear war. And in the companion defense and space talks, our objective will be to preserve our options to deploy advanced defenses when they're ready. In nuclear testing, we will continue to seek the necessary verification improvements in existing treaties to permit them to be brought into force... fundamental to all of these objectives is simple openness.⁶³⁴

On September 22, 1989, Mr. Bush signed National Security Directive 23. The subject was United States Relations with the Soviet Union. Before examining the central thrust of this analysis, the last National Security Council examination of Soviet conduct during the Cold-War, it is useful to review the events of that fall in Europe.

On September 10, 1989 Hungary gave permission to East Germans who had traveled onto Hungary to proceed out of Hungary and into West Germany. On September 11, 1989 that exodus began in earnest. NSD-23 was issued on September 22, 1989. On September 23, 1989 Mr. Bush announced a U.S.-Soviet summit meeting in the spring or early summer. On November 9, 1989 the Berlin Wall fell and Germans crossed freely all across Berlin for the first time since the end of World War II. The event marks the end of the Cold War.

When considered from our historical vantage point, NSD-23 reads like a valedictory speech for the doctrine of containment, the strategy that enabled the United States to prevail over the Soviet Union in the Cold War.

For forty years the United States has committed its power and will to containing the military and ideological threat of Soviet Communism. Containment was never an end in itself; it was a strategy born of the conditions of the postwar world... Those who crafted the strategy of containment also believed that the Soviet Union, denied

⁶³⁴ Bush: "Remarks at the Texas A&M University."

the course of external expansion, would ultimately have to face and react to the internal contradictions of its own inefficient, repressive and inhumane system.⁶³⁵

This strategy provided an enduring pillar for the growth of Western democracy and free enterprise. While the most important goal of containment has been met – the development of free and prosperous societies in Western Europe and in other parts of the world – the Soviet military threat has not diminished. Rather, in the last two decades the Soviet Union has increased its military power across a spectrum of capabilities...The Soviet Union has stood apart from the international order and often worked to undermine it.⁶³⁶ ,

Mr. Bush was aware that major changes in the Soviet Union would happen very soon. He was hopeful those changes were, both in the short term and the long term, for the better. He wrote, “The character of the changes taking place in the Soviet Union leads to the possibility that a new era may now be upon us.”⁶³⁷ But even with that understanding, “We are in a period of uncertainty and transition,” his hopes were that the effects of this change on the character and behavior of the Soviet Union would be profound:

The transformation of the Soviet Union from a source of instability to a productive force within the family of nations is a long-term goal that can only be pursued from a position of American strength and with patience and creativity. Our policy is not designed to help a particular leader or set of leaders in the Soviet Union. We seek, instead, fundamental alterations in the Soviet Military force structure, institutions, and practices which can only be reversed at great cost, economically and politically to the Soviet Union.⁶³⁸

What Mr. Bush sought was a victory in the Cold War, including a “renunciation of the principle that class conflict is a source on international tension,” renunciation of the

⁶³⁵ George H.W. Bush, “National Security Directive-23, United States Relations with the Soviet Union,” (Washington, September 22, 1989), Online by *Federation of American Scientists* <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd23.pdf>

⁶³⁶ Bush, “NSD-23.”

⁶³⁷ Bush, “NSD-23.”

⁶³⁸ Bush, “NSD-23.”

“Brezhnev Doctrine” and real “self-determination of the countries of East-Central Europe.”⁶³⁹

At this juncture Mr. Bush was an optimist. While following his predecessor’s policy of dealing with the Soviets based on their capabilities and actions; unlike Mr. Reagan who worried America was behind or barely catching up to the Soviets, Mr. Bush believed the United States began from a position of strength. He wrote that,

The United States must maintain modern military forces that strengthen deterrence and enhance the security of our allies and friends. The United States will seek to protect and sustain its military-technological advantages.⁶⁴⁰

Arms control remained a serious issue as Mr. Bush sought “verifiable arms control agreements” which would,

Contribute to stability at lower numerical levels, where desirable, and encourage restructuring of Soviet forces to a less threatening posture.

Emphasize transparency in our military relationship with the Soviet Union, The goal of greater transparency will be served through verification and confidence building measures...⁶⁴¹

In his State of the Union address to Congress on January 31, 1990 Mr. Bush lauded the results of containment, “For more than 40 years, America and its allies held communism in check and ensured that democracy would continue to exist.”⁶⁴² Mr. Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative continued to survive despite the changing U.S.-Soviet relationship. For

⁶³⁹ Bush, “NSD-23.”

⁶⁴⁰ Bush, “NSD-23.”

⁶⁴¹ Bush, “NSD-23.”

⁶⁴² George Bush: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 31, 1990. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18095>.

Mr. Bush the policy choices for protecting America's national security were based on cautious skepticism of Soviet behavior and intentions, not hope for new behaviors from a new generation of Soviet leaders. He said about those hopes that,

We are in a period of great transition, great hope, and yet great uncertainty. We recognize that the Soviet Military threat in Europe is diminishing, but we see little change in Soviet Strategic modernization. Therefore, we must sustain our own strategic offense modernization and the Strategic Defense Initiative.⁶⁴³

Progress in technology also drives the expansion and interconnectedness of the capabilities of both the Soviet Union and the United States in the nuclear arms race and the negotiations for an arms control agreement. National Security Directive 40 issued May 14, 1990 discussing START issues begins with an analysis of the United States position on both modern air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles, weapons that did not impact the arsenals of the superpowers until the 1980s.⁶⁴⁴ NSD-40 also addressed the issue of verifying non-deployed mobile missile production which was had become an issue given the technological advances that allowed the rapid deployment of mobile, nuclear-armed missiles.

A further expansion of capabilities for both the United States and the Soviet Union occurred as the concept of on-site inspections to verify compliance with arms control agreement became a reality. On May 29, 1990, in National Security Directive 41, Mr. Bush expanded the mission of the On-Site Inspection Agency and ordered that it prepare for

⁶⁴³ Bush, "State of the Union," January 31, 1990.

⁶⁴⁴ George H.W. Bush, "National Security Directive-40, Decisions on START Issues," (Washington, May 14, 1990) <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd40.pdf>. The German V-1 "Buzz Bomb" was a terror weapon in the Second World War but was uncontrolled after launch. Only in the 1980's did the technology begin to develop sufficiently to accurately guide these missiles to their targets with in-flight course adjustments and ground following radar.

activities to support verification of not only the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty as initially ordered by President Reagan in National Security Decision Directive 296, but also future agreements currently being negotiated. He wrote that

On-site inspection will be a major element of future arms control agreements, including Conventional Forces in Europe, Chemical Weapons, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, and Nuclear Testing Talks.⁶⁴⁵

At the meeting between Mr. Bush and Gorbachev in June 1990 the parties made significant progress towards a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and announced an agreement in principle on a number of issues. Deep cuts in arms appeared possible and verification, long the issue upon which such agreement floundered would no longer scuttle the hopes of the negotiators. As set out in the "Soviet-United States Joint Statement on the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms," June 1, 1990, deep cuts were in the offing with each side agreeing that,

The total number of deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers and heavy bombers will be reduced to no more than 1600; within this total deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers will be reduced to no more than 154;

The total number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and heavy bombers will be reduced to no more than 6000. Of these, no more than 4900 will be warheads on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs, no more than 1540 will be warheads on heavy ICBMs, and no more than 1100 will be warheads on mobile ICBMs⁶⁴⁶

On verification the parties agreed that,

⁶⁴⁵ George H.W. Bush, "National Security Directive-41, Organizing to Manage Onsite Inspections for Arms Control," (Washington, May 29, 1990) Online by *Federation of American Scientists* <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd41.pdf>.

⁶⁴⁶ George Bush: "Soviet-United States Joint Statement on the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms," June 1, 1990. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18540>.

The far-reaching reductions and other constraints contained in the Treaty will be accompanied by the most thorough and innovative verification provisions ever negotiated. ..The verification regime under development includes:

On-site inspections: For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the Treaty, each side will, on the basis of reciprocity, conduct twelve kinds of on-site inspections, as well as continuous monitoring of mobile ICBM production facilities, in accordance with agreed procedures. Inter alia, each side will conduct short-notice inspections at facilities related to strategic offensive arms, including inspections to verify the numbers of reentry vehicles on deployed ballistic missiles, inspections to verify elimination of strategic offensive arms and facilities related to them, suspect site inspections, and various exhibitions.

National technical means of verification: For the purpose of ensuring verification, each side will use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law. The Treaty will include a series of cooperative measures to enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification. There will be a ban on interference with such means;

Ban on denial of telemetric information: The sides agreed to make on-board technical measurements on ICBMs and SLBMs and to broadcast all telemetric information obtained from such measurements. Except for strictly limited exceptions, there will be a ban on any practice, including the use of encryption, encapsulation or jamming, that denies full access to telemetric information;

Information exchange: Before signature of the Treaty the sides will exchange data on the numbers, locations and technical characteristics of their strategic offensive arms. These data will be updated on a regular basis throughout the lifetime of the Treaty;

A comprehensive agreement on the manner of deployment of mobile ICBM launchers and their associated missiles and appropriate limitations on their movements so as to ensure effective verification of adherence to the numerical limitations provided for in the Treaty. In addition, the number of non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers will be limited and mobile ICBMs will be subject to identification through the application of unique identifiers, or tags.⁶⁴⁷

On July 18, 1990 Mr. Bush issued National Security Directive 44, titled “Organizing to Manage On-Site Verification of Nuclear Testing,” further elaborating his instructions for

⁶⁴⁷ Bush: "Soviet-United States Joint Statement on the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms."

the expanded mission of the On-Site Inspection Agency set out in National Security Directive 41. Discussing the Threshold Test ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty which were expected to come into effect shortly, he wrote that,

Verification protocols to the TTBT and the PNET provide for on-site hydrodynamic yield measurements, in-country seismic measurements, and on-site inspections procedures for certain U.S. and Soviet nuclear explosions. Once such treaties come into force, and depending on the nature of the Soviet test program, the U.S. may require the frequent, relatively long term, presence of U.S. personnel at the Soviet Nuclear test site. Given U.S. nuclear testing requirements, frequent and relatively long-term presence of Soviet personnel at the Nevada Test Site is likely... Depending on the future of the soviet peaceful nuclear explosion program, U.S. inspectors may be required at other remote locations in the Soviet Union.⁶⁴⁸

For Mr. Bush, arms control remained a matter of national security and he never relied on a potential adversary to act in anything but a realist manner seeking its own advantage. Caution rather than faith in the new Soviet leadership remained the guiding principle of U.S. policy as he described that,

Monitoring of nuclear tests is not a cooperative venture, but is rather part of an adversarial process of verification. U.S. inspectors must obtain the necessary technical information to allow the United States to make independent judgments of Soviet compliance...⁶⁴⁹

Further Soviet presence in the United States must be managed carefully,

Soviet monitoring of U.S. tests at the Nevada Test Site presents a complex situation with conflicting requirements among test operations, statutory responsibilities, and U.S. treaty obligations. Successful implementation of the treaty – granting the Soviets the access allowed by the treaty while protecting classified information and minimizing interference in the U.S. test program – will require careful and close cooperation among U.S. agencies.⁶⁵⁰

⁶⁴⁸ George H. W. Bush, “National Security Directive-44, Organizing to Manage Onsite Verification of Nuclear Testing,” (Washington, July 18, 1990), <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd44.pdf>

⁶⁴⁹ Bush, “NSD-44.”

⁶⁵⁰ Bush, “NSD-44.”

While the existence of such a capability is a negotiated occurrence, it nevertheless enables each party to an agreement to accept measures that are otherwise impracticable or unthinkable. Should an on-site inspection be obstructed or revoked, that action in and of itself would provide useful and relevant information about the non-cooperating nation's intentions and capabilities. The logical inference about the intentions of the obstructing/revoking party is that the agreement is or will soon be abrogated or breached in a significant manner. The logical inferences about the capability of an obstructing/revoking party are: 1) that the behavior that will breach the agreement is detectable by on-site inspection, and 2) that the obstructing/revoking party believes this new capability is of such significance that the newly acquired advantage in the relationship is worth the cost of the loss of their on-site inspection rights and the entire agreement itself. Given the probable time interval from breach of the agreement to effective military deployment of a new or improved weapon; a breach to the existing agreement the inspections by itself may be regarded as an effective early warning system. Not only is the on-site inspection agreement a warning system it also raises the political cost of research and deployments which breach the agreement. In such a relationship between parties with a functioning and verifiable arms control agreement, technological advantage over an adversary becomes harder to achieve. Furthermore, given the nature of technological change and the constant flow of scientific knowledge around the world, such technological advantage will only last for an unknown and finite period of time. Thus a strategic technological advantage becomes less useful to policy makers seeking to preserve national security when compared with the relative

stability offered by an arms control agreement which gives national leaders a level of confidence that no breach will go unnoticed.

In his State of the Union address to Congress on January 29, 1991, Mr. Bush hailed the end of the Cold War. He explained “The end of the Cold War has been a victory for all humanity.”⁶⁵¹ In light of the improving relationship with the Soviet Union and the newly demonstrated threats of missile terror attacks against civilians as seen in Israel and Saudi Arabia he refocused the Strategic Defense Initiative:

Looking forward, I have directed that the SDI program be refocused on providing protection from limited ballistic missile strikes, whatever their source. Let us pursue an SDI program that can deal with any future threat to the United States, to our forces overseas and to our friends and allies.⁶⁵²

On July 31, 1991, Mr. Bush signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in Moscow. The core of the treaty was based on the agreement he and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev had concluded in principle at their meeting in Washington in June 1990. The treaty was complex and detailed,

The treaty we sign today is a most complicated one—the most complicated of contracts governing the most serious of concerns. Its 700 pages stand as a monument to several generations of U.S. and Soviet negotiators...and it represents a major step forward for our mutual security and the cause of world peace.⁶⁵³

⁶⁵¹ George Bush: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 29, 1991. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19253>.

⁶⁵² Bush: "State of the Union," January 29, 1991.

⁶⁵³ George Bush: "Remarks by President Gorbachev and President Bush at the Signing Ceremony for the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty in Moscow", July 31, 1991. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19853>.

The treaty provided for a reduction in nuclear arms, on-site verification and deep cuts for the most dangerous and destabilizing weapons the large multiple warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Events then began to move in ways few observers had predicted. On August 19, 1991 hardliners in the Soviet Union attempted a coup against President Gorbachev. When the coup was thwarted by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Gorbachev returned to Moscow but the power of the Soviet state was broken.

As the Soviet Union floundered during the fall of 1991 it was apparent that the strategic calculus that had dominated American nuclear doctrine since the beginnings of the Cold War needed revision. Mr. Bush delivered an Address to the Nation on Reducing United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons on September 27, 1991. It was time for a new approach:

A year ago, I described a new strategy for American defenses, reflecting the world's changing security environment. That strategy shifted our focus away from the fear that preoccupied us for 40 years, the prospect of a global confrontation. Instead, it concentrated more on regional conflicts, such as the one we just faced in the Persian Gulf.

I spelled out a strategic concept, guided by the need to maintain the forces required to exercise forward presence in key areas, to respond effectively in crises, to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent, and to retain the national capacity to rebuild our forces should that be needed.⁶⁵⁴

⁶⁵⁴ George Bush: "Address to the Nation on Reducing United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons", September 27, 1991. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=20035>.

He ordered the, "United States eliminate its entire worldwide inventory of ground-launched, short-range, that is, theater nuclear weapons."⁶⁵⁵ Claiming he was using "START as a springboard to achieve additional stabilizing changes," he also ordered,

First, to further reduce tensions, I am directing that all United States strategic bombers immediately standdown from their alert posture. As a comparable gesture, I call upon the Soviet Union to confine its mobile missiles to their garrisons, where they will be safer and more secure.

Second, the United States will immediately standdown from alert all intercontinental ballistic missiles scheduled for deactivation under START. Rather than waiting for the treaty's reduction plan to run its full 7 year course, we will accelerate elimination of these systems, once START is ratified. I call upon the Soviet Union to do the same.

Third, I am terminating the development of the mobile Peacekeeper ICBM as well as the mobile portions of the small ICBM program. The small single-warhead ICBM will be our only remaining ICBM modernization program. And I call upon the Soviets to terminate any and all programs for future ICBM's with more than one warhead, and to limit ICBM modernization to one type of single warhead missile, just as we have done.

Fourth, I am cancelling the current program to build a replacement for the nuclear short-range attack missile for our strategic bombers.

Fifth, as a result of the strategic nuclear weapons adjustments that I've just outlined, the United States will streamline its command and control procedures, allowing us to more effectively manage our strategic nuclear forces.⁶⁵⁶

For Mr. Bush, even at the end of the Cold War, caution was the policy choice in an uncertain and changing world. Some nuclear force remained necessary and he explicitly retained two significant programs:

We can safely afford to take the steps I've announced today, steps that are designed to reduce the dangers of miscalculation in a crisis. But to do so, we must also pursue vigorously those elements of our strategic modernization program that serve the

⁶⁵⁵ Bush: "Reducing United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons."

⁶⁵⁶ Bush: "Reducing United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons."

same purpose. We must fully fund the B - 2 and SDI program. We can make radical changes in the nuclear postures of both sides to make them smaller, safer, and more stable. But the United States must maintain modern nuclear forces including the strategic triad and thus ensure the credibility of our deterrent.⁶⁵⁷

Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the presidents of the Soviet republics of Ukraine and Belarus met secretly on December 22, 1991. They agreed to dissolve the Soviet Union and replace it with a voluntary union to be known as the Commonwealth of Independent States. Gorbachev was virtually powerless in the face of these events. He resigned as President of the Soviet Union and declared its formal end on December 25, 1991.

In his State of the Union Address to Congress on January 28, 1992, Mr. Bush claimed victory in the Cold War saying, "...the biggest thing that has happened in the world in my life, in our lives, is this: By the grace of God, America won the Cold War."⁶⁵⁸ In this new environment, with the Soviet Union now gone into history, he continued to urge passage of his version of the Strategic Defense Initiative:

I remind you this evening that I have asked for your support in funding a program to protect our country from limited nuclear missile attack. We must have this protection because too many people in too many countries have access to nuclear arms. And I urge you again to pass the Strategic Defense Initiative, SDI.⁶⁵⁹

He did make other changes, cancelling the B-2 bomber, the Peacekeeper missile and offering Russian President Boris Yeltsin even further reductions in arms,

Tonight I can tell you of dramatic changes in our strategic nuclear force. These are actions we are taking on our own because they are the right thing to do. After

⁶⁵⁷ Bush: "Reducing United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons."

⁶⁵⁸ George Bush: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 28, 1992. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=20544>.

⁶⁵⁹ Bush: "State of the Union," January 28, 1992.

completing 20 planes for which we have begun procurement, we will shut down further production of the B - 2 bombers. We will cancel the small ICBM program. We will cease production of new warheads for our sea-based ballistic missiles. We will stop all new production of the Peacekeeper missile. And we will not purchase any more advanced cruise missiles.

This weekend I will meet at Camp David with Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation. I've informed President Yeltsin that if the Commonwealth, the former Soviet Union, will eliminate all land-based multiple-warhead ballistic missiles, I will do the following: We will eliminate all Peacekeeper missiles. We will reduce the number of warheads on Minuteman missiles to one and reduce the number of warheads on our sea-based missiles by about one-third. And we will convert a substantial portion of our strategic bombers to primarily conventional use. President Yeltsin's early response has been very positive, and I expect our talks at Camp David to be fruitful.⁶⁶⁰

Mr. Bush was the epitome of the post World War II realist consensus in foreign policy which created and executed the successful strategies of containment to confront an expansionist Soviet communism and the deterrence of nuclear war by maintaining the capability to respond to any attack at a cost to the attacker that would make any attack prohibitively costly and foolish. The realist emphasis on capabilities of other states in an anarchic international system was the core of Mr. Bush's establishment consensus thinking on foreign and defense issues. For Example, in pursuit of an agreement on chemical weapons with the Soviet Union Mr. Bush was willing to hedge on the issue of verification because of his concerns about chemical weapons proliferation. Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbot reported this conversation between Mr. Bush and his National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft which illustrates the President's realist position:

Bush told Scowcroft to press ahead with the negotiations anyway. The general replied. "You know that this means that we're kicking the can of verification down the road." The president said, "Yeah, I know. But my gut tells me that the danger of

⁶⁶⁰ Bush: "State of the Union," January 28, 1992.

proliferation” – that is, the chance that poison gas weapons might find their way into other countries’ arsenals – “is more important than the risk of Soviet cheating.”⁶⁶¹

For Mr. Bush, it was his concern about the possible chemical weapons capabilities of other states, more than the possibilities of Soviet noncompliance that held the greatest threat to the national security of the United States.

Bush and Oil

Mr. Bush’s term in office was dominated by his response Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and the threat that action posed to the massive oil reserves in Saudi Arabia. This crisis culminated in the liberation of Kuwait, destruction of an Iraqi Army and the introduction of American military forces on the ground in the Persian Gulf in Operation Desert Storm sometimes referred to as Gulf War I. In the 1988 campaign this development was not even on the remotest of the candidate’s political horizons.

In his acceptance speech on August 18, 1988 in New Orleans, Mr. Bush barely made mention of oil. While calling for a thousand points of light he neglected to mention how those lights would be powered as and the nation were unaware that he was heading into a term that would see the exercise of American military might in the Persian Gulf in defense of American access to Kuwaiti and Saudi oil fields. What he did say was not a pledge to defend foreign oil but a promise of tax relief to domestic oil producers,

I will put incentives back into the domestic energy industry, for I know from personal experience there is no security for the United States in further dependence on foreign oil.⁶⁶²

⁶⁶¹ Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Levels, the Inside Story of the End of the Cold War* (Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1993) 120.

In his acceptance speech at the Democratic convention in Atlanta, Georgia, the Democratic nominee, Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis made no mention of oil or energy problems in the United States. In the Presidential debate while discussing energy and oil Mr. Bush said,

I believe that we must use clean, safe nuclear power. I believe that the more dependent we become on foreign oil, the less our national security is enhanced. And therefore, I've made some proposals to strengthen the domestic oil industry by more incentive going in to look for, and find, and produce oil; made some incentives in terms of secondary and tertiary production. But we're going to have to use more gas, more coal and more safe nuclear power for our energy base. So I am one who believes that we can.⁶⁶³

During the Cold War the U.S.-Saudi relationship rested on three pillars: oil, religion and geography. Before the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War the Saudi's tolerance for and promotion of a fundamentalist Wahhabi Islam was not seen as a significant problem as Saudi Arabia was virulently anti-communist.⁶⁶⁴ The Saud family's relationship to the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam dates back to 1744, and the allegiance sworn between Muhammad ibn Saud, patriarch of the House of Saud and Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab an ascetic religious cleric who was committed to a literal interpretation of the Quran.⁶⁶⁵ For 200 years the relationship was one of interdependence laced with religious

⁶⁶² George Bush: "Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention in New Orleans," August 18, 1988. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25955>.

⁶⁶³ Presidential Candidates Debates: "Presidential Debate at the University of California in Los Angeles," October 13, 1988. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29412>.

⁶⁶⁴ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 22.

⁶⁶⁵ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 28.

tension. In 1929 at the Battle of Sibila, the House of Saud led by Abdul Aziz defeated the religious extremists of the Ikhwan to establish complete Saudi control over the bulk of the Arabian Peninsula but even then the tensions between the political Saud family and the religion establishment was evident.⁶⁶⁶ Ambassador Parker Hart sheds some light on the crucial issue of the religious interpretation of Islam with the description of “Wahhabism” as an ultraconservative religious outlook, “a sort of Cromwellian Puritanism of Islam.”⁶⁶⁷ This was the state of Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf’s largest oil kingdom when Mr. Bush took office.

On October 2, 1989 in “National Security Directive 26: U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf,” Mr. Bush addressed America’s national security interest in imported oil:

Access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to U.S. national security. The United States remains committed to defend its vital interest in the region, if necessary and appropriate through the use of U.S. military force, against the Soviet Union or any other regional power with interests inimical to our own.⁶⁶⁸

On arms sales, specifically mentioning the security interests of Israel and Saudi Arabia as a prospective recipient of U.S. arms Mr. Bush directed that,

The United States will sell U.S. military equipment to help friendly regional states meet their legitimate defense requirements, so long as such sales do not present a security threat to Israel.

⁶⁶⁶ Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 32.

⁶⁶⁷ Parker Hart, *Saudi Arabia and the United States*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998) 7.

⁶⁶⁸ George H.W. Bush, “National Security Directive-26, U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf,” (Washington, October 2, 1989) Online by *Federation of American Scientists* <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd26.pdf>.

The Secretaries of State and Defense should develop a strategy for a long term program of arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states that serves our national interest but does not increase Israel's security burden.⁶⁶⁹

Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Mr. Bush condemned the invasion. When reporting to the American people that he had ordered U.S. military forces to deploy in Saudi Arabia to protect the Saudis from Iraq, he drew a line that included Saudi Arabia within the definition of vital America interests. He said that,

The sovereign independence of Saudi Arabia is of vital interest to the United States. This decision, which I shared with the congressional leadership, grows out of the longstanding friendship and security relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. U.S. forces will work together with those of Saudi Arabia and other nations to preserve the integrity of Saudi Arabia and to deter further Iraqi aggression.⁶⁷⁰

On August 20, 1990 Mr. Bush issued "National Security Directive 45, U.S. Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait," in which he bluntly stated that access to oil was a vital national security issue and military force would be used to protect that access in this language,

U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf are vital to the national security. These interests include access to oil and the security and stability of key friendly states in the region. The United States will defend its vital interests in the area, through the use of U.S. military force if necessary and appropriate, against any power with interests inimical to our own.⁶⁷¹

Mr. Bush set out,

⁶⁶⁹ Bush, "NSD-26."

⁶⁷⁰ George Bush: "Address to the Nation Announcing the Deployment of United States Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia," August 8, 1990. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18750>.

⁶⁷¹ George H.W. Bush, "National Security Directive-45, U.S. Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait," (Washington, August 20, 1990), Online by *Federation of American Scientists* <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd23.pdf>.

Four principles will guide U.S. policy during this crisis:
-- the immediate , complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait;
-- the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government to replace the puppet regime installed by Iraq;
-- a commitment to the security and stability of the Persian gulf; and,
--the protection of the lives of American citizens abroad.⁶⁷²

When discussing the energy situation occasioned by the invasion he said,

The United States now imports nearly half the oil it consumes and, as a result of the current crisis, could face a major threat to its economy.⁶⁷³

The geo-political and military aims were clear although the desire to protect the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf was not explicitly detailed. The language makes clear that the aim of the United States is to restore the status quo in the Persian Gulf, returning the Gulf states to the business of reliably supplying oil to the industrialized world. Mr. Bush said,

To protect U.S. interests in the Gulf and in response to requests from the King of Saudi Arabia and the Amir of Kuwait, I have ordered U.S. military forces deployed to the region for two purposes: to deter and, if necessary, defend Saudi Arabia and other friendly states in the Gulf region from further Iraqi aggression; and to enforce the mandatory Chapter 7 sanctions under Article 51 of the UN Charter and UNSC Resolutions 660 and 661.⁶⁷⁴

On January 15, 1991 in "National Security Directive 54: Responding to Iraqi Aggression in the Gulf," Mr. Bush wrote, "I hereby authorize military actions designed to

⁶⁷² Bush, "NSD-45."

⁶⁷³ Bush, "NSD-45."

⁶⁷⁴ Bush, "NSD-54."

bring about Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait."⁶⁷⁵ Mr. Bush reiterated the United States interest in the Persian Gulf and directly addressed oil saying,

Access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to U.S. national security...the United States remains committed to defending its vital interests in the region, if necessary through the use of military force, against any power with interests inimical to our own.⁶⁷⁶

The stated military goal of the war was the liberation of Kuwait. But, the safety of the free flow of Persian Gulf oil was the vital national interest at stake. The list of possible adversaries was consistently described in the broadest possible language as, "any power with interests inimical to our own."⁶⁷⁷ Operation Desert Storm, the first offensive American military action in the Persian Gulf region began on January 16, 1991 with initial American airstrikes on Iraqi targets in Iraq and Kuwait.

In his State of the Union address to Congress on January 29, 1991, Mr. Bush explained the rationale for the American actions in the Persian Gulf:

Our purpose in the Persian Gulf remains constant: to drive Iraq out of Kuwait, to restore Kuwait's legitimate government, and to ensure the stability and security of this critical region. Let me make clear what I mean by the region's stability and security...We seek a Persian Gulf where conflict is no longer the rule, where the strong are neither tempted nor able to intimidate the weak. Most Americans know instinctively why we are in the Gulf. They know we had to stop Saddam Hussein now, not later...They know we must make sure that control of the world's oil resources does not fall into his hands only to finance further aggression.⁶⁷⁸

⁶⁷⁵ George H.W. Bush, "National Security Directive-54, Responding to Iraqi Aggression in the Gulf," (Washington, January 15, 1991) Online by *Federation of American Scientists* <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd54.pdf>.

⁶⁷⁶ Bush, "NSD-54."

⁶⁷⁷ Bush, "NSD-54."

⁶⁷⁸ George Bush: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 29, 1991. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19253>.

The interesting admission in this speech is the Mr. Bush's reference to what may be the unspoken consensus of American public opinion about oil, the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. That consensus is: no other power is allowed to obstruct or threaten American access to Persian Gulf oil, for which Americans will pay the market price and if necessary the United States will fight to maintain its access to that oil supply.

Clinton and Nuclear Weapons

Bill Clinton was elected President in 1992 with only 43% of the popular vote in a three way race with incumbent President George H. W. Bush and self-funded political gadfly Ross Perot. Mr. Clinton began his presidency focused on domestic issues, paying less substantive attention to the international situation in his first two years in office than any of his recent predecessors.

In the 1992 Democratic Party Platform, the sense that the world at large was safe and America could turn its attention inward is evident in the placement of the plank on "Preserving our National Security" after sections on "The Arts," "Combating Crime and Drugs," "Agriculture," "Lifelong Learning," "Welfare Rights" and "Making Schools Work."⁶⁷⁹ Harkening back to the beginnings of the Cold War, the Democrats claimed credit for the success of the doctrine of containment:

Under President Truman, the United States led the world into a new era, redefining global security with bold approaches to tough challenges: containing communism with the NATO alliance and in Korea...⁶⁸⁰

⁶⁷⁹ Democratic Party Platforms: "Democratic Party Platform of 1992," July 13, 1992. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29610>.

⁶⁸⁰ Democratic Party Platform 1992.

The platform endorsed in fairly standard language the concepts of deterrence, arms control and the need to respond with conventional forces where appropriate:

A military structure for the 1990's and beyond must be built on four pillars: First, a survivable nuclear force to deter any conceivable threat, as we reduce our nuclear arsenals through arms control negotiations and other reciprocal action. Second, conventional forces shifted toward projecting power wherever our vital national interests are threatened...⁶⁸¹

The 1992 Republican Party Platform began with the victory in the Cold War mentioning the fall of the Berlin Wall in the fourth paragraph of their preamble; although not as an endorsement of containment, deterrence or the Reagan-Bush foreign policy of the last 12 years but as an attack on their favorite bogeyman, big government. The Republicans rechristened containment and deterrence as "Peace through Strength" an explicitly Republican plan of Presidents Reagan and Bush.⁶⁸² While endorsing the idea of arms control and reduction in nuclear arsenals, the Republican Platform was still enamored with Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative which had changed with the times:

Transformed by the collapse of Communism, our Strategic Defense Initiative is now designed to provide the U. S. and our allies with global defenses against limited ballistic missile attacks. SDI is the greatest investment in peace we could ever make. This system will be our shield against technoterrorism. Russia has agreed to be our partner in it, sharing early warning information and jointly moving forward to stop those who would rain death upon the innocent.

We will use missile defenses to assure threatened nations that they do not need to acquire ballistic missiles of their own. We will move beyond the ABM Treaty to

⁶⁸¹ Democratic Party Platform 1992.

⁶⁸² Republican Party Platforms: "Republican Party Platform of 1992," August 17, 1992. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25847>.

deploy effective defenses with the goal of someday eliminating, not merely reducing, the threat of nuclear holocaust.⁶⁸³

The traditional nuclear triad was endorsed with this language:

Because the U.S. will rely on a smaller force of offensive nuclear weapons to deter aggression in the post-Cold War era, we will maintain the triad of land, sea, and air-based strategic forces. We will continue to test the safety, reliability, and effectiveness of our nuclear weapons.⁶⁸⁴

Interestingly the Republicans also endorse “democratic peace theory” without much hesitation, presenting it as an established and known fact of international life.

We support efforts to reduce armaments, both conventional and otherwise, but the most effective arms control of all over the long run is democracy. Free nations do not attack one another. That is why the promotion of democracy on every continent is an essential part of the Republican defense agenda⁶⁸⁵.

In his acceptance speech, Mr. Bush, while tying the Democrats to the untried idea of a nuclear freeze, claimed credit for ending the nuclear nightmare of the Cold War but said little of substance about how to address the remaining nuclear stockpiles. He claimed that,

My opponents say I spend too much time on foreign policy, as if it didn't matter that schoolchildren once hid under their desks in drills to prepare for nuclear war. I saw the chance to rid our children's dreams of the nuclear nightmare, and I did.⁶⁸⁶

For Mr. Clinton the end of the Cold War was not only a victory of American values, “The Cold War is over. Soviet communism has collapsed and our values -- freedom, democracy, individual rights, free enterprise- they have triumphed...” it was an opportunity

⁶⁸³ Republican Party Platform 1992.

⁶⁸⁴ Republican Party Platform 1992.

⁶⁸⁵ Republican Party Platform 1992.

⁶⁸⁶ George Bush: "Remarks Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention in Houston," August 20, 1992. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=21352>.

to focus on domestic issues.⁶⁸⁷ His acceptance speech does not contain much discussion of foreign affairs. The end of the Cold War was an opportunity to focus on domestic policy:

The end of the Cold War permits us to reduce defense spending while still maintaining the strongest defense in the world, but we must plow back every dollar of defense cuts into building American jobs right here at home. I know well that the world needs a strong America, but we have learned that strength begins at home.⁶⁸⁸

At the first presidential debate that fall, while discussing foreign affairs as Mr. Clinton endorsed continuing efforts at arms control. He also articulated democratic peace theory with this answer:

We need to continue the negotiations to reduce nuclear arsenals in the Soviet Union, the former Soviet Union, and the United States. We need to stop this proliferation of weapons of mass destruction... Finally, we ought to be promoting the democratic impulses around the world. Democracies are our partners. They don't go to war with each other. They're reliable friends in the future...⁶⁸⁹

In his Inaugural Address on January 20, 1993 Mr. Clinton referred to his generation as "raised in the shadow of the Cold War."⁶⁹⁰ He argued that,

There is no longer a clear division between what is foreign and what is domestic. The world economy, the world environment, the world AIDS crisis, the world arms race: they affect us all. Today, as an older order passes, the new world is more free but less stable. Communism's collapse has called forth old animosities and new dangers.⁶⁹¹

⁶⁸⁷ William J. Clinton: "Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Democratic National Convention in New York," July 16, 1992. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25958>.

⁶⁸⁸ Clinton, "Accepting the Nomination," July 16, 1992.

⁶⁸⁹ Bill Clinton: "Presidential Debate in St. Louis," October 11, 1992. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=21605>.

⁶⁹⁰ William J. Clinton: "Inaugural Address," January 20, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46366>.

⁶⁹¹ Clinton, "Inaugural Address" January 20, 1993.

After his inauguration, in his Address to a Joint Session of Congress on Administration Goals on February 17, 1993, discussing what he saw as “new threats in the post-Cold War world” Mr. Clinton proclaimed “We are the world’s only superpower. This is still a dangerous and uncertain time...”⁶⁹²

“Presidential Review Directive/NSC-31: U.S. Policy on Ballistic Missile Defenses and the Future of the ABM Treaty,” was issued April 26, 1993 signed by Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. It sets out a new strategic situation that confronted the beginning of the Clinton administration, a serious contrast to the classic Cold War situation, which confronted all previous presidents since the end of World War II:

From March 1983 to January 1991, US ballistic missile defense (BMD) policy was focused primarily on providing a defense against a massive nuclear first strike emanating from the Soviet Union. In January 1991, US BMD policy was reoriented in light of the reduced to Soviet threat toward protecting the United States, its forces deployed abroad, and its friends and allies against accidental, unauthorized and/or limited ballistic missile strikes-- the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes System (GPALS).⁶⁹³

Lake noted Russian President Boris Yeltsin's desire to "create and jointly operate a global system of defense in place of SDI," but also reported that “Moscow did not accept the need to modify the ABM treaty, on the ground that the relevant threat was of intermediate rather than strategic range.”⁶⁹⁴ In this memo, we also see increased concern over the evolving threat from China and the issues of accidental or unauthorized launch, particularly from any

⁶⁹² William Clinton: “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on Administration Goals,” February 17, 1993 On line by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47232>.

⁶⁹³ Anthony Lake, “Presidential Review Directive/NSC-31, U.S. Policy on Ballistic Missile Defenses and the Future of the ABM Treaty,” (Washington, April 26, 1993) Online by *Federation of American Scientists*
<http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/prd/prd-31.pdf>.

⁶⁹⁴ Lake, “Presidential Review Directive/NSC-31.”

new nuclear power or any of the newly independent nations that succeeded to the arsenal of the old Soviet Union. There is little discussion from Mr. Lake concerning the doctrines of deterrence and containment. It is clear that at this point, the Clinton administration was now focused on a different level of nuclear threat from new sources.

On July 3, 1993, the administration issued "Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-11: Moratorium on Nuclear Testing." The text is not yet available to researchers. The press release noted the president was committed to achieving a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and had begun a process aimed at beginning those negotiations with Russia and our allies and other states at an early date. Therefore, the President, "decided to extend the current moratorium on US nuclear testing at least to September of next year as long as no other nation tests." The press release went on to note that President would decide sometime during 1994 whether to extend the "no first test" policy beyond September 1994.⁶⁹⁵

On December 11, 1993 Mr. Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-17 as a result of the review process mandated by Presidential Review Directive/NSC-31. The president approved a "fundamental restructuring of BMD programs" with the aim that ballistic missile defense programs be redirected to address,

..., to critical dangers to US security: regional threats to US interests and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In general our TMD forces should:

-- Provide highly effective protection against Limited tactical ballistic missile attacks for a forward deployed and concentrated or disbursed expeditionary elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and forth facilities and forces her friends and allies of the United States.

⁶⁹⁵ Office of the Press Secretary, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-11 (Washington, July 3, 1993) Online by *Federation of American Scientists* <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd11.htm>.

-- Effectively protect allied population centers. This protection could provide the opportunity for US/allies to execute military options in support of national objectives with minimum interference from enemy missile forces.⁶⁹⁶

The president ordered that the United States pursue an effort to multi-lateralize the ABM treaty to include the states of Georgia and Azerbaijan. In addition, he discussed ballistic missile defense cooperation in three areas:

(1) sharing of ballistic missile early warning information, (2) planning for the use of ATBM forces and (3) employing technology cooperation to assist in forging a positive security relationship between the United States and Russia...⁶⁹⁷

Specifically concerning Russia, he wrote,

In the specific case of Russia, the extent to which we would pursue missile defense technology cooperation would depend on their continued progress in political and economic reform; adherence to arms control agreements and the missile control technology regimes; and a willingness to enter into and abide by a bilateral agreement on cooperative activities.⁶⁹⁸

The directive contains two specific limits on cooperative programs. Each of these limiting paragraphs is designed to restrict any technology transfer that might increase the capabilities of the Russian military, a realist assessment of the risks of such cooperation:

The United States will, however, limit these cooperative programs with Russia in two important ways:

- First the technology development should be generic and not involve direct cooperation in any current US system development...
- Second, the United States should focus on jointly developing new technology products rather than transferring existing technology.⁶⁹⁹

⁶⁹⁶ William Clinton, "Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-17, U.S. Policy on Ballistic Missile Defenses and the Future of the ABM Treaty," (Washington, December 11, 1993) Online by *Federation of American Scientists* <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-17.pdf>

⁶⁹⁷ Clinton, "PDD/NSC-17."

⁶⁹⁸ Clinton, "PDD/NSC-17."

⁶⁹⁹ Clinton, "PDD/NSC-17."

On January 24, 1994, in his State of the Union Address to Congress Mr. Clinton noted the changing international order and the changing nature of the threats he saw the security of the United States:

This is a promising moment. Because of the agreements we have reached this year, last year, Russia's strategic nuclear missiles soon will no longer be pointed at the United States, nor will we point ours at them. Instead of building weapons in space, Russian scientists will help us to build the international space station.

Of course, there are still dangers in the world: rampant arms proliferation, bitter regional conflicts, ethnic and nationalist tensions in many new democracies, severe environmental degradation the world over, and fanatics who seek to cripple the world's cities with terror. As the world's greatest power, we must, therefore, maintain our defenses and our responsibilities.

This year, we secured indictments against terrorists and sanctions against those who harbor them. We worked to promote environmentally sustainable economic growth. We achieved agreements with Ukraine, with Belarus, with Kazakhstan to eliminate completely their nuclear arsenal.⁷⁰⁰

Again, he specifically endorsed democratic peace theory which was becoming the new defining paradigm of American foreign policy. For Mr. Clinton democratic peace theory was the idea that democracies were inherently inclined to live in peace with one another.

Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don't attack each other. They make better trading partners and partners and diplomacy.⁷⁰¹

While the collapse of the Soviet Union and the improving relationship with the post-communist Russian Federation made the strategy of containment unnecessary; the strategy of deterrence in an uncertain world remained unchanged. What changed for the Clinton Administration was the new and emerging uncertainty of just who is being deterred. In

⁷⁰⁰ William Clinton, "State of the Union Address to Congress," January 24, 1994. Online by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50409>.

⁷⁰¹ Clinton, "State of the Union" January 24, 1994.

“Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-30: U.S. Nuclear Posture and Policy on the Nuclear Arms Control Beyond the START I and START II Treaties,” dated September 21, 1994, when discussing the role of nuclear weapons and ensuring the security United States. Mr. Clinton wrote that,

... the United States will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. Therefore, we will continue to maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size and capability to hold at risk a broad range of assets of value by such political and military leaders.⁷⁰²

Mr. Clinton continued to press for ratification of the START II Treaty and said in his State of the Union message to Congress on January 24, 1995 that,

... tonight, this is the first State of the Union Address ever delivered since the beginning of the Cold War when not a single Russian missile is pointed at the children of America. And along with the Russians, we're on our way to destroying the missiles and the bombers that carry 9,000 nuclear warheads. We've come so far so fast in this post-cold-war world that it's easy to take the decline of the nuclear threat for granted. But it's still there, and we aren't finished yet. This year I'll ask the Senate to approve START II to eliminate weapons that carry 5,000 more warheads. The United States will lead the charge to extend indefinitely the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to enact a comprehensive nuclear test ban, and to eliminate chemical weapons.⁷⁰³

Mr. Clinton made a trip in Moscow in May 1995 to meet with Russian President Boris Yeltsin. While he was there on May 10, 1995, the two presidents issued a "Joint

⁷⁰² William J. Clinton, “Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-30, U.S. Nuclear Posture and Policy on Nuclear Arms Control Beyond the START I and START II Treaties,” (Washington, September 21, 1994) Online by *Federation of American Scientists* <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-30.pdf>.

⁷⁰³ William J. Clinton: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 24, 1995. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=51634>.

Statement on the Transparency and Irreversibility of the Process of Reducing Nuclear Weapons." In a statement the presidents pledged to,

Reaffirm the commitment of the United States of America and the Russian Federation to the goal of nuclear disarmament and their desire to pursue further measures to improve confidence in and increase the transparency and irreversibility of the process of nuclear arms reduction, as they agreed in January and September 1994;⁷⁰⁴

Continuing with the emerging faith between the parties and the importance and reliability of verification, the presidents also agreed that,

The United States of America and the Russian Federation will negotiate agreements to increase the transparency and irreversibility of nuclear arms reduction that, *inter alia*, establish:

—An exchange on a regular basis of detailed information on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear warheads, on stocks of fissile materials and on their safety and security;
—A cooperative arrangements for reciprocal monitoring at storage facilities of fissile materials removed from nuclear warheads and declared to be excess to national security requirements to help confirm the irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons, recognizing that progress in this area is linked to progress in implementing the joint U.S.-Russian program for the fissile material storage facility at Mayak; and other cooperative measures, as necessary to enhance confidence in the reciprocal declarations of fissile material stockpiles.⁷⁰⁵

Concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the presidents said that,

The United States and Russia are each committed to the ABM Treaty, a cornerstone of strategic stability.

Both sides must have the option to establish and to deploy effective theater missile defense systems. Such activity must not lead to violation or circumvention of the ABM Treaty.

Theater missile defense systems may be deployed by each side which (1) will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other side and (2) will not be tested to give such systems that capability.

⁷⁰⁴ William J. Clinton: "Joint Statement on the Transparency and Irreversibility of the Process of Reducing Nuclear Weapons," May 10, 1995. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=51341>.

⁷⁰⁵ Clinton: "Transparency and Irreversibility of the Process of Reducing Nuclear Weapons."

Theater missile defense systems will not be deployed by the sides for use against each other.⁷⁰⁶

Negotiations concerning Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty continued that summer. On

August 11, 1995, Mr. Clinton announced the “true zero yield” option.

The United States will now insist on a test ban that prohibits any nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. I am convinced this decision will speed the negotiations so that we can achieve our goal of signing a comprehensive test ban next year.⁷⁰⁷

Mr. Clinton continued to press for the ratification of START II. During his State of the Union address on January 23, 1996, he rejected any return to isolationism in the post-Cold War world saying,

All over the world, even after the Cold War, people still look to us and trust us to help them seek the blessings of peace and freedom. But as the Cold War fades into memory, voices of isolation say America should retreat from its responsibilities. I say they are wrong.⁷⁰⁸

Addressing himself to the Senators present he called for the ratification of START II and pointed toward the goal of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty saying,

The START II treaty with Russia will cut our nuclear stockpiles by another 25 percent. I urge the Senate to ratify it now. We must end the race to create new nuclear weapons by signing a truly comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty this year.⁷⁰⁹

⁷⁰⁶ William J. Clinton: "Russia-United States Joint Statement on Missile Systems," May 10, 1995. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=51337>.

⁷⁰⁷ William J. Clinton: "Remarks Announcing Comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Test Ban Negotiations," August 11, 1995. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=51731>.

⁷⁰⁸ William J Clinton: "State of the Union Address to Congress," January 23, 1996. Online by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53091>.

⁷⁰⁹ Clinton, "State of the Union," January 23, 1996.

In his acceptance speech in 1996 Mr. Clinton focused on domestic issues and the only real mention he made about nuclear weapons was when he said,

And I am proud to say that tonight there is not a single Russian nuclear missile pointed at an American child. Now we must enforce and ratify without delay measures that further reduce nuclear arsenals, banish poison gas, and ban nuclear tests once and for all.⁷¹⁰

During the fall campaign Mr. Clinton continued to press for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. When the United Nations General Assembly voted for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty on September 10, 1996, Mr. Clinton linked his position to a long chain of his successors of both parties in a discussion with reporters in Kansas City when he said,

This has been a dream of American leaders going back to Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. They long worked for a safer world at home and abroad. By banning all nuclear tests for all time, the treaty will constrain any nation from improving its existing nuclear arsenal and end the development of advanced nuclear weapons and help to stop their spread.⁷¹¹

Again in the debate in the 1996 election Mr. Clinton linked international progress and peaceful behavior with democratic a form of government. When discussing arms control progress with Russia he said,

We have done the following things: Number one, we've managed the aftermath of the Cold War, supporting a big drop in nuclear weapons in Russia, the removal of Russian troops from the Baltics, the integration of Central and Eastern European

⁷¹⁰ William J Clinton: "Acceptance Speech to the Democratic National Convention," August 26, 1996. Online by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53253>.

⁷¹¹ William J Clinton: "Remarks on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and an Exchange with Reporters in Kansas City", September 10, 1996. Online by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53317>.

democracies into a new partnership with NATO and, I might add, with a democratic Russia.⁷¹²

At the State of the Union Address on February 4, 1997 the agenda had changed from securing a victory in the Cold War to securing a peaceful future for Europe. For Mr. Clinton, that meant securing the future of the western alliance's Cold War institutions in a post-Cold War era. Mr. Clinton said,

Fifty years ago, a farsighted America led in creating the institutions that secured victory in the Cold War and built a growing world economy... Now we stand at another moment of change and choice and another time to be farsighted, to bring America 50 more years of security and prosperity. In this endeavor, our first task is to help to build, for the very first time, an undivided, democratic Europe... To that end, we must expand NATO by 1999, so that countries that were once our adversaries can become our allies... And we must build a stable partnership between NATO and a democratic Russia. An expanded NATO is good for America, and a Europe in which all democracies define their future not in terms of what they can do to each other but in terms of what they can do together for the good of all—that kind of Europe is good for America.⁷¹³

At the end of the speech he drew a connection to the bi-partisan consensus that had its beginnings at the dawn of the Cold War:

Almost exactly 50 years ago, in the first winter of the Cold War, President Truman stood before a Republican Congress and called upon our country to meet its responsibilities of leadership. This was his warning; he said, "If we falter, we may endanger the peace of the world, and we shall surely endanger the welfare of this Nation." That Congress, led by Republicans like Senator Arthur Vandenberg, answered President Truman's call. Together, they made the commitments that strengthened our country for 50 years. Now let us do the same. Let us do what it takes to remain the indispensable nation, to keep America strong, secure, and prosperous for another 50 years.⁷¹⁴

⁷¹² William J. Clinton: "Presidential Debate in Hartford," October 6, 1996. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=52060>.

⁷¹³ William J. Clinton: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," February 4, 1997. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53358>.

⁷¹⁴ Clinton: "State of the Union," February 4, 1997.

In a joint statement after a meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin on March 21, 1997, Mr. Clinton and Mr. Yeltsin urged the ratification of START II and set out their expectations for the START III agreement:

Once START II enters into force, the United States and Russia will immediately begin negotiations on a START III agreement, which will include, among other things, the following basic components:

- Establishment, by December 31, 2007, of lower aggregate levels of 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear warheads for each of the parties.
- Measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads and any other jointly agreed technical and organizational measures, to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads.
- Resolving issues related to the goal of making the current START treaties unlimited in duration.
- Placement in a deactivated status of all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles which will be eliminated under START II by December 31, 2003, by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other jointly agreed steps.⁷¹⁵

At that same meeting the presidents also discussed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

Hanging over the future of the ABM treaty was the issue of the importance of the treaty in the new post cold-war context of the party's reductions in strategic offensive arms and the emerging concerns about effective theater missile defense (TMD) systems and defenses against rogue states. The presidents agreed that,

The United States and Russia are each committed to the ABM Treaty, a cornerstone of strategic stability.

⁷¹⁵ William J. Clinton: "Russia-United States Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reduction in Nuclear Forces," March 21, 1997. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53895>.

Both sides must have the option to establish and to deploy effective theater missile defense systems. Such activity must not lead to violation or circumvention of the ABM Treaty.

Theater missile defense systems may be deployed by each side which (1) will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other side and (2) will not be tested to give such systems that capability.

Theater missile defense systems will not be deployed by the sides for use against each other.⁷¹⁶

“Presidential Decision Directive/NSC 60: Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy Guidance” was issued in November 1997. Deterrence continued to be the mission of U.S. nuclear forces. The strategic triad continued as the key deployment mechanism, created to ensure that a nuclear force capable of deterrence would survive any first strike from any aggressor. The text remains classified and only a summary is available from the Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program. The summary speaks of maintaining nuclear deterrence and states that,

The directive indicates that the United States must maintain the assured response capability to inflict "unacceptable damage" against those assets a potential enemy values most. It also posits that the U.S. must continue to plan a range of options to insure that the U.S. can respond to aggression in a manner appropriate to the provocation, rather than being left with an "all or nothing" response. The new guidance also continues the policy that the U.S. will not rely on "launch on warning," but will maintain the capability to respond promptly to any attack, thus complicating an adversary's calculations. However, the new guidance eliminates previous Cold War rhetoric including references to "winning a protracted nuclear war."

The directive reaffirms that the United States should have a triad of strategic deterrent forces to complicate an adversary's attack and defense planning. It also notes that deterrent forces and their associated command and control should be flexible and survivable, to insure that the U.S. will be able to make an adequate and appropriate response.

⁷¹⁶ Clinton: "Russia-United States Joint Statement Concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty", March 21, 1997.

While the directive does not address arms control issues, per se, analysis undertaken in accordance with the new guidance shows that the U.S. strategic deterrent can be maintained at the 2,000 to 2,500 strategic weapon level envisioned for START III as agreed in the 1997 Helsinki accord.⁷¹⁷

In his 1998 State of the Union address to Congress, Mr. Clinton asked the Senate to ratify the long standing American dream for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty:

This year, for decades after it was first proposed by President Eisenhower, a comprehensive nuclear test ban is within reach. By ending nuclear testing, we can help prevent the development of new and more dangerous weapons and make it more difficult for nonnuclear states to build them.... I ask the Senate to approve it this year.⁷¹⁸

A year later at the 1999 State of the Union Mr. Clinton continued to urge reduction in strategic arsenals and non-proliferation efforts:

With Russia, we must continue to reduce our nuclear arsenals. The START II treaty and the framework we have already agreed to for START III could cut them by 80 percent from their Cold War height.

It's been 2 years since I signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. If we don't do the right thing, other nations won't either. I ask the Senate to take this vital step: Approve the treaty now, to make it harder for other nations to develop nuclear arms, and to make sure we can end nuclear testing forever.⁷¹⁹

⁷¹⁷ William J. Clinton, "Presidential Decision Directive/NSC 60 Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy Guidance, (Washington, November 1997) Online by *Federation of American Scientists* <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd60.htm> [NOTE: the actual text of this document is classified TS/ESI [TOP SECRET / EXTREMELY SENSITIVE INFORMATION] and is likely to remain so for many years to come.]

⁷¹⁸ William J. Clinton: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 27, 1998. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=56280>.

⁷¹⁹ William J. Clinton: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 19, 1999. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57577>.

Containment had now passed into the realm of a proven strategy for dealing with America's enemies. The president promised to use the same basic doctrine that succeeded against the Soviet Union containment on a new American enemy what he said that

For nearly a decade, Iraq has defied its obligations to destroy its weapons of terror and the missiles to deliver them. America will continue to contain Saddam, and we will work for the day when Iraq has a Government worthy of its people.⁷²⁰

In the 2000 State of the Union message, Mr. Clinton continued to push for the Comprehensive Nuclear Ban Treaty and to “encourage our former adversaries, Russia and China, to emerge as stable, prosperous, democratic nations.”⁷²¹ On April 14, 2000 he praised the Russian State Duma for approval of the Start II Treaty saying that such approval

...clearly advances the interests of both countries. Together with the start one treaty, it will result in a two thirds reduction in the strategic nuclear weapons that the Soviet Union and the United States maintained at the height of the Cold War. Start two will make our people safer under a partnership of a democratic Russia stronger.⁷²²

In June, Mr. Clinton traveled to Moscow to meet with Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin. The Presidents issued a Joint Statement on Principles of Strategic Stability.

Deterrence remained a key part the agreements:

...capability for deterrence has been and remains a key aspect of stability and predictability in the international security environment.

3. The Presidents, welcoming the ratification of START-II Treaty and related documents by the Russian Federation, look forward to the completion of the ratification process in the United States.

⁷²⁰ Clinton, “State of the Union,” January 19, 1999.

⁷²¹ William J. Clinton: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 19, 1999. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57577>.

⁷²² William J Clinton: “Statement on Russian State Duma Action on the Start II Treaty,” April 14, 2000. Online by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58377>.

4. They announce that discussions will intensify on further reductions in the strategic forces of the United States and Russia within the framework of a future START-III Treaty, and on ABM issues, in accordance with the Moscow Statement of 1998 and Cologne Statement of 1999 by the Presidents.

5. They agree on the essential contribution of the ABM Treaty to reductions in offensive forces, and reaffirm their commitment to that Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability.

6. They agree that the international community faces a dangerous and growing threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction ...⁷²³

Furthermore, the Presidents continued to agree that, "issues of strategic offensive arms cannot be considered in isolation from issues of strategic defensive arms and vice versa – an interrelationship that is reflected in the ABM treaty..."⁷²⁴

On July 21, 2000, at talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Okinawa, the Presidents issued the, "Russia-United States Joint Statement on Cooperation on Strategic Stability." That statement provides in part that,

The United States and Russia have begun intensified discussions on the earliest entry into force of the START II Treaty, on further reductions in strategic forces within the framework of a future START III Treaty and on ABM issues.

The United States and Russia are dedicated to the search for new ways of cooperation to control the spread of missiles and missile technology. They will work together on a new mechanism to supplement the Missile Technology Control Regime...

The United States and Russia reaffirm their commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the foundation of the international nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament regime...

⁷²³ William J. Clinton: "Russia-United States Joint Statement on Principles of Strategic Stability," June 4, 2000. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58585>.

⁷²⁴ Clinton: "Russia-United States Joint Statement on Principles of Strategic Stability."

Broadening their cooperation for the purpose of strengthening stability, the United States and Russia will apply their efforts toward creating, and placing into operation within the year, a joint U.S.-Russian center for exchange of data from early warning systems and notification of launches...

The United States and Russia are prepared to renew and expand their cooperation in the area of theater missile defenses, and consider the possibility of involving other states.⁷²⁵

In New York on September 6, 2000, Mr. Clinton and Russian President Vladimir Putin met again. Their statement reaffirmed their commitment to the ABM treaty as a critical element in strategic stability, pledged to cooperate in theater missile defense issues and called for the implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.⁷²⁶ It is worth noting at the end of the Clinton administration that even with the demise of the Soviet Unions and the end of the Cold War; deterrence and the ABM treaty remained key elements promoting strategic stability between the United States and Russia.

Clinton and Oil

The political party platforms of 1992 America's dependence on imported oil discuss the issue in comfortable and familiar terms. Considering the issue in the aftermath of the first Gulf war that saw an American army deployed into Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to protect access to Persian Gulf oil as a vital American national security interest, the Democrats

⁷²⁵ William J. Clinton: "Russia-United States Joint Statement on Cooperation on Strategic Stability," July 21, 2000. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=1577>.

⁷²⁶ William J. Clinton: "Joint Statement: Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative Between the United States of America and Russian Federation," September 6, 2000. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=1392>.

looked first to energy efficiency and sustainable development, while the Republicans advocated expansion of domestic production. Neither party came to grips with the issue in a way that proposed an achievable path to energy independence. Both platforms were silent on the clear American consensus from the Carter administration forward, that access to Persian Gulf oil was a vital national security interest of the United States and that American military power would ensure that interest was protected. That consensus was clear. The policy fight was at the margins, subsidizing oil conservation efforts or creating additional tax incentives to promote domestic drilling. From the Democratic Party Platform we hear,

We reject the Republican myth that energy efficiency and environmental protection are enemies of economic growth. We will make our economy more efficient, by using less energy, reducing our dependence on foreign oil, and producing less solid and toxic waste. We will adopt a coordinated transportation policy, with a strong commitment to mass transit; encourage efficient alternative-fueled vehicles; increase our reliance on clean natural gas; promote clean coal technology; invest and strengthen efforts to prevent air and water pollution; support incentives for domestic oil and gas operations; and push for revenue-neutral incentives that reward conservation, prevent pollution and encourage recycling.⁷²⁷

The Republicans argued for deregulation and expanded domestic drilling:

The domestic oil and gas industry saves us from total dependence on unreliable foreign imports. But over the past decade, it has lost more than 300,000 jobs. Drilling rigs are still. Crippled by environmental rules and taxes, independent producers have been devastated and major companies are moving operations overseas. We will reverse that situation by allowing access, under environmental safeguards, to the Coastal Plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, possibly one of the largest petroleum reserves in our country, and to selected areas of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). We support incentives to encourage domestic investment for onshore and OCS oil and gas exploration and development, including relief from the alternative minimum tax, credits for enhanced oil recovery and geological

⁷²⁷ Democratic Party Platforms: "Democratic Party Platform of 1992," July 13, 1992. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29610>.

exploration under known geological oil fields and producing geological structures, and modified percentage depletion rules to benefit marginal production.⁷²⁸

In his Inaugural Address on January 20, 1993, Mr. Clinton made explicit reference to the willingness of the United States to use force to defend what it consider a vital national interest and he defined that interest to include the Persian Gulf:

When our vital interests are challenged or the will and conscience of the international community is defied, we will act, with peaceful diplomacy whenever possible, with force when necessary. The brave Americans serving our Nation today in the Persian Gulf, in Somalia, and wherever else they stand are testament to our resolve.⁷²⁹

But, the subject matter of oil and energy was not a priority. A month later, in his “Address to a Joint Session of Congress on Administration Goals” on February 17, 1993, Mr. Clinton made no mention of oil or the need to protect foreign sources of energy the fueled the United States economy.⁷³⁰

On January 24, 1994, in his State of the Union Address to Congress Mr. Clinton did not mention Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf, oil or energy. The status quo of the Bush administration deployments after the liberation of Kuwait prevailed without comment or notice.⁷³¹ This continued into 1995 when once again the Mr. Clinton made no mention of

⁷²⁸ Republican Party Platforms: "Republican Party Platform of 1992," August 17, 1992. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25847>.

⁷²⁹ William J. Clinton: "Inaugural Address," January 20, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46366>.

⁷³⁰ William J. Clinton: "Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on Administration Goals," February 17, 1993. Online by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47232>.

⁷³¹ William J. Clinton: "State of the Union Address to Congress," January 24, 1994. Online by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50409>.

oil, energy Saudi Arabia or the Persian Gulf in his State of the Union message to Congress on January 24, 1995.

Coasting through the decade of the 1990s on the flow of Persian Gulf oil again the Mr. Clinton made no mention of oil, energy, or Saudi Arabia in his 1996 State of the Union message. His only mention of the Persian Gulf that year was to nominate General Barry McCaffrey, “a hero of the Persian Gulf war” as America's new drug czar.⁷³²

In the State of the Union Address in both the 1997 and 1998 speeches, neither oil, nor Saudi Arabia, nor the Persian Gulf was mentioned by Mr. Clinton. In 1999 he referred to clean energy in the context of environmental concerns but again did not mention oil, Saudi Arabia, or the Persian Gulf. In 2000 again the issue of imported foreign oil from Saudi Arabia and the Middle East was not controversial enough to be mentioned in the State of the Union address. This does not indicate that the issue had been resolved but only that with the American military presence in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait enforcing the Iraq No-Fly zone the ability and willingness of United States to use armed force to defend its access to Saudi and Persian Gulf Oil was not even a matter of contention in American foreign policy circles.

Analysis: Bush 41 to Clinton

During the terms of Mr. Bush to Mr. Clinton anarchy continued as the defining condition of the international environment. Despite the existence of international organizations, no central organizing authority was present with the power to resolve disputes between member states. Each international organization was dependent upon the strength of

⁷³² William J. Clinton: “State of the Union Address to Congress,” January 23, 1996. Online by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53091>.

its member states and was unable and even unwilling to control the behavior of its most powerful members. The United States possessed clear and identifiable decision making for the creation and execution of foreign policy, through the President and the National Security Council and the Departments of State and Defense. The foreign policy activities examined here were made and executed in public. The President continued to speak for the United States in matters of national security. Both Mr. Bush and Mr. Clinton treated nuclear weapons as a vital national survival issue.

The relative capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union changed a great deal during Mr. Bush's (41) presidency with the demise of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Russian Federation. The two nations' relative military capabilities began to change. The breakup of the Soviet Union ended bipolar world conflict over capitalism versus communism. The United States emerged as the dominant military power in the world. The end of the Cold War was marked by the fall of the Berlin wall in November 10, 1989, followed by the final breakup of the Soviet Union on December 31, 1991.

At the end of the Bush administration the policy about nuclear weapons was still practically identical to Mr. Eisenhower's policy:

1. The United States has nuclear weapons at the ready, and any arms agreement must contain absolutely reliable, verifiable inspections to ensure against any cheating by any party.
2. The United States will use nuclear weapons if attacked.
3. The United States has not renounced the right to the first use of nuclear weapons.

4. To ensure the destruction of any foe after a surprise attack, the United States will maintain a nuclear arsenal sufficient for that purpose.

Here we find a continuation of a small modification in Mr. Eisenhower's policy. Mr. Kennedy rejected the necessity of numerical superiority in nuclear weapons. Mr. Bush like every president from Mr. Kennedy through Mr. Reagan sought a nuclear force sufficient to achieve the nation's strategic goals. For the presidents from Mr. Kennedy to Mr. Bush numerical superiority in nuclear weapons was not a strategic goal. This is evidence of a continuation of policy which is consistent with the unitary actor assumption.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the decreasing Russian capability to produce and deploy nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, the character of the nuclear threat to the national security of the United States began to change in significant aspects during the years of the Bush presidency. The new threats were rogue nations, failed states, and non-state actors none of whom was subject to the calculus of deterrence that had worked since 1948. Mr. Bush's advocacy of a revised strategic defense initiative to intercept the single terrorist missile was a response to such a threat.

Saudi Arabia and its oil were a major part of Mr. Bush's presidency. In the Iraq war the United States deployed an army into the Persian Gulf, primarily based in Saudi Arabia which led an international coalition to liberate Kuwait, destroy the Iraqi army and establish no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq. At the end of the Bush administration the policy about Saudi Arabia and its oil was basically the same as Mr. Carter's policy:

1. Access to Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf oil by the United States was a vital matter of national security.

2. The United States would deploy and if necessary use military force to keep the oil flowing even to the extent of commencing combat operations before the oil flow had stopped.
3. The US would use diplomatic pressure and persuasion on the Saudis over the issue of price but was unwilling to intervene with sufficient force to set the price of oil in the world market.

While Mr. Clinton did not face any national security challenges in terms of Saudi Arabia, oil or the Persian Gulf comparable to those faced by Mr., Bush, he maintained the United States military presence in Saudi Arabia and the Iraqi no-fly zones and proposed no new policy initiatives which would contradict the unitary actor assumption in terms of Saudi Arabia and its oil in the context of this transition.

In summary, no substantial contradictory evidence concerning the unitary actor assumption appears in this transition concerning nuclear weapons. No substantial contradictory evidence concerning the unitary actor assumption appears in this transition concerning oil.

In the context of United States policy towards nuclear weapons, disarmament proposals and the Soviet Union and its successor states primarily the Russian Federation, the analysis of the Bush to Clinton transition supports the unitary actor assumption. Concerning the issue of Saudi Arabia and imported crude oil the analysis of the Bush to Clinton transition also supports the unitary actor assumption.

Clinton, Democrat to Bush (43), Republican: January 20, 2001

Bush (43) and Nuclear Weapons

George W. Bush lost the popular vote in 2000 and won the presidency in the electoral college after a 5-4 Supreme Court ruling along starkly partisan lines halted the bitterly contested recount of votes in the State of Florida. Mr. Bush (43) began his administration with the nuclear armed Cold War standoff with the Soviet Union only a memory and an American economy more dangerously dependent on the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia than most Americans understood.⁷³³ The end of the Cold War and the prosperity of the Clinton years created a domestic issues focus in American politics and an illusion of an expanded range of options in foreign affairs as the United States presided over a unipolar world order.

The Republican Party Platform of 2000 continued to emphasize the threats in a dangerous and uncertain world as attention turned away from Russia to new competitors on the world stage:

Ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction threaten the world's future. America is currently without defense against these threats. The administration's failure to guard America's nuclear secrets is allowing China to modernize its ballistic missile force, thereby increasing the threat to our country and to our allies. The theft of vital nuclear secrets by China represents one of the greatest security defeats in the history of the United States. The next Republican president will protect our nuclear secrets and aggressively implement a sweeping reorganization of our nuclear weapons program.⁷³⁴

⁷³³ George W. Bush the 43rd President is referred to in this study as "Mr. Bush (43)" to distinguish him from his father, George H.W. Bush, the 41st President who is also discussed herein.

⁷³⁴ Republican Party Platforms: "Republican Party Platform of 2000," July 31, 2000. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25849>.

For the Republicans, these threats came from actors too small too seriously threaten the existence of the United States as the old Soviet Union had done, but who possessed or were trying to obtain the capability to strike at the United States:

Over two dozen countries have ballistic missiles today. A number of them, including North Korea, will be capable of striking the United States within a few years, and with little warning. America is now unable to counter the rampant proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their missile delivery systems around the world.⁷³⁵

Missile defense came to replace the strategic triad as the critical weapons concept in

American defense thinking:

The new Republican president will deploy a national missile defense for reasons of national security; but he will also do so because there is a moral imperative involved: The American people deserve to be protected. It is the president's constitutional obligation.⁷³⁶

The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty negotiated and signed by a Republican president was no longer a key to strategic stability in a bilateral Cold War standoff with the Soviets, but was now a relic obstructing national defense:

...the administration has become hopelessly entangled in its commitment to an obsolete treaty signed in 1972 with a Soviet Union that no longer exists while it is constrained by its failure to explore vigorously the technological possibilities. In order to avoid the need for any significant revisions to the ABM Treaty, the administration supports an inadequate national missile defense design based on a single site, instead of a system based on the most effective means available.⁷³⁷

⁷³⁵ Republican Party Platform 2000.

⁷³⁶ Republican Party Platform 2000.

⁷³⁷ Republican Party Platform 2000.

The needs and capabilities of our allies were merely mentioned in the platform, a concern which did not become part of actual foreign policy practice within the administration of Mr. Bush (43):

Their approach does not defend America's allies, who must be consulted as U.S. plans are developed. Their concept is a symbolic political solution designed on a cynical political timetable. It will not protect America.⁷³⁸

The 1972 ABM treaty was dead and the Republican president would either negotiate substantive significant changes as yet unspecified but clearly including multiple sites for missile defense, or the United States under a Republican president would leave the treaty completely:

We will seek a negotiated change in the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that will allow the United States to use all technologies and experiments required to deploy robust missile defenses. ... If Russia refuses to make the necessary changes, a Republican president will give prompt notice that the United States will exercise the right guaranteed to us in the treaty to withdraw after six months.⁷³⁹

New thinking about Russia and offensive weapons systems was also on the

Republican agenda:

Clear thinking about defensive systems must be accompanied by a fresh strategy for offensive ones too. The Cold War logic that led to the creation of massive stockpiles of nuclear weapons on both sides is now outdated and actually enhances the danger of weapons or nuclear material falling into the hands of America's adversaries. Russia is not the great enemy. The age of vast hostile armies in the heart of Europe deterred by the threat of U.S. nuclear response is also past. American security need no longer depend on the old nuclear balance of terror.⁷⁴⁰

In response the Democratic platform offered that,

⁷³⁸ Republican Party Platform 2000.

⁷³⁹ Republican Party Platform 2000.

⁷⁴⁰ Republican Party Platform 2000.

...Republicans want America to act unilaterally. They attack the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty - even at the risk of precipitating a new nuclear arms race. They voted down the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, threatening both our security and our global leadership. They have attempted to sabotage the Clinton-Gore administration's efforts to negotiate with other nations by declaring that any arms control agreement - regardless of content - would be "dead on arrival."⁷⁴¹

Democrats supported missile defense but in a limited manner that preserved the ABM treaty and the continued reduction in nuclear arsenals:

Al Gore and the Democratic Party support the development of the technology for a limited national missile defense system that will be able to defend the U.S. against a missile attack from a state that has acquired weapons of mass destruction despite our efforts to block their proliferation. ... The Democratic Party places a high value on ensuring that any such system is compatible with the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. We also support continued work in significantly reducing strategic and other nuclear weapons, recognizing that the goal is strategic nuclear stability at progressively lower levels.⁷⁴²

In their acceptance speeches, Mr. Bush (43) claimed credit for the Republicans for ending the Cold War, and Vice-President Al Gore reminded the nation of his long running interest in nuclear issues. But, neither framed a policy choice in any greater detail than their respective party platforms. The range of options available to the new president in a unipolar world of 2001 appeared to be as large as the original choices that confronted Mr. Truman during the United States nuclear weapons monopoly from 1945 to 1949.

In his Address before a Joint Session of Congress on February 27, 2001 Mr. Bush reflected the rhetoric of the 2000 Republican Party Platform on nuclear issues:

Our Nation also needs a clear strategy to confront the threats of the 21st century, threats that are more widespread and less certain. They range from terrorists who

⁷⁴¹ Democratic Party Platforms: "Democratic Party Platform of 2000," August 14, 2000. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29612>.

⁷⁴² Democratic Party Platform 2000.

threaten with bombs to tyrants in rogue nations intent upon developing weapons of mass destruction. To protect our own people, our allies, and friends, we must develop and we must deploy effective missile defenses. And as we transform our military, we can discard Cold War relics and reduce our own nuclear forces to reflect today's needs.⁷⁴³

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon in Virginia, and United Airlines Flight 93 profoundly altered the United States' perception of its physical security and the nature and source of the threats to the national security of the United States. Two months after those attacks, on November 13, 2001, Mr. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a "Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia on a New Relationship between the United States and Russia" which laid out their vision of a future between their two countries:

Our countries are embarked on a new relationship for the 21st century, founded on a commitment to the values of democracy, the free market, and the rule of law. The United States and Russia have overcome the legacy of the Cold War. Neither country regards the other as an enemy or threat...

We affirm our determination to meet the threats to peace in the 21st century. Among these threats are terrorism, the new horror of which was vividly demonstrated by the evil crimes of September 11, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, militant nationalism, ethnic and religious intolerance, and regional instability. These threats endanger the security of both countries and the world at large. Dealing with these challenges calls for the creation of a new strategic framework to ensure the mutual security of the United States and Russia, and the world community.

We have agreed that the current levels of our nuclear forces do not reflect the strategic realities of today. Therefore, we have confirmed our respective commitments to implement substantial reductions in strategic offensive weapons. On strategic defenses and the ABM Treaty, we have agreed, in light of the changing

⁷⁴³ George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress on Administration Goals," February 27, 2011. Online by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29643>.

global security environment, to continue consultations within the broad framework of the new strategic relationship...⁷⁴⁴

A month later after discussions with Russian President Vladimir Putin and over Mr. Putin's objections, Mr. Bush announced the United States was withdrawing from the 1972 ABM treaty. In his statement he said:

... the ABM Treaty hinders our Government's ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks.

The 1972 ABM Treaty was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union at a much different time, in a vastly different world... Today, as the events of September the 11th made all too clear, the greatest threats to both our countries come not from each other or other big powers in the world but from terrorists who strike without warning or rogue states who seek weapons of mass destruction.

...the United States and Russia have developed a new, much more hopeful and constructive relationship. We are moving to replace mutually assured destruction with mutual cooperation.

I reiterate our pledge to reduce our own nuclear arsenal between 1,700 and 2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons. President Putin and I have also agreed that my decision to withdraw from the treaty will not, in any way, undermine our new relationship or Russian security.

As President Putin said in Crawford, we are on the path to a fundamentally different relationship. The Cold War is long gone. Today we leave behind one of its last vestiges.⁷⁴⁵

Missile defense continued as a priority in an age where the terrorists were hiding in caves and abandoning their satellite phones and other advanced technology. In the 2002

⁷⁴⁴ George W. Bush: "Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia on a New Relationship between the United States and Russia," November 13, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=63384>.

⁷⁴⁵ George W. Bush, "Remarks Announcing the United States Withdrawal From the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty," December 13, 2001. Online by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73491>.

State of the Union Address, announcing a Bush Doctrine of preventive action against perceived threats, Mr. Bush said

We will develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect America and our allies from sudden attack. And all nations should know: America will do what is necessary to ensure our Nation's security.

We'll be deliberate; yet, time is not on our side. I will not wait on events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons.⁷⁴⁶

The Bush Doctrine has at various times referred to several different ideas. Among them are an initial version of unipolar realism as reflected in the Republican platforms proposed abandonment of the ABM treaty, preventive action without waiting for attack and various iterations of democratic peace theory, used to demonstrate the necessity of bringing democracy to Iraq. The best example of the doctrine and the one used in this paper is set out in the 2006 National Security Strategy:

The security environment confronting the United States today is radically different from what we have faced before. Yet the first duty of the United States Government remains what it always has been: to protect the American people and American interests. It is an enduring American principle that this duty obligates the government to anticipate and counter threats, using all elements of national power, before the threats can do grave damage. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. There are few greater threats than a terrorist attack with WMD.

To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense. The United States will not resort to force in all cases to preempt emerging threats. Our

⁷⁴⁶ George W Bush, "State of the Union Address to a Joint Session of Congress," January 29, 2002. Online by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29644>.

preference is that nonmilitary actions succeed. And no country should ever use preemption as a pretext for aggression.⁷⁴⁷

This is the Bush Doctrine to which I refer, the strategy that it is not only the size of the threat, but also and more importantly than the imminent nature of the threat, which determines the timing and size of the response.

On May 24, 2002 on a visit to Moscow Mr. Bush signed his own nuclear arms control treaty with the Russian Federation, which he referred to as the Moscow Treaty. That same day he and President Putin issued a statement titled, "Joint Declaration by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on the New Strategic Relationship between the United States of America and the Russian Federation." Before discussing the Moscow Treaty, the joint statement deserves a brief look. The joint statement was issued by the presidents in light of events that solidified their "belief that new global challenges and threats require a qualitatively new foundation for our relationship"⁷⁴⁸ They said,

We are achieving a new strategic relationship. The era in which the United States and Russia saw each other as an enemy or strategic threat has ended. We are partners and we will cooperate to advance stability, security, and economic integration, and to jointly counter global challenges and to help resolve regional conflicts.⁷⁴⁹

⁷⁴⁷ National Security Council: "Summary of National Security Strategy 2002" The National Security Strategy of the United States. The White House (March 2006) available online <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/print/sectionV.html>.

⁷⁴⁸ George W. Bush: "Joint Declaration by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on the New Strategic Relationship Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation," May 24, 2002. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73311>.

⁷⁴⁹ George W. Bush: "Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation."

The statement acknowledged that the United States and Russia were already acting as allies in the “global struggle against international terrorism.”⁷⁵⁰ Concerning missile defense and the rapidly withering strategic contest between them the parties said,

The United States and Russia are taking steps to reflect, in the military field, the changed nature of the strategic relationship between them. The United States and Russia acknowledge that today's security environment is fundamentally different than during the Cold War.

In this connection, the United States and Russia have agreed to implement a number of steps aimed at strengthening confidence and increasing transparency in the area of missile defense, including the exchange of information on missile defense programs and tests in this area, reciprocal visits to observe missile defense tests, and observation aimed at familiarization with missile defense systems.⁷⁵¹

Mr. Bush’s nuclear arms control treaty with the Russian Federation, which he referred to as the Moscow Treaty was his major contribution to nuclear weapons control. The formal title is “Treaty between the United States Of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions.” The White House referred to it as the “Moscow Treaty” or SORT (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty). The treaty required that each party reduce its arsenal and imposed a limit on strategic nuclear warheads of between 1700 – 2200, which limit had to be achieved on or before December 31, 2012. In itself the title of this treaty is an indicator of an important departure from previous arms control agreement:

⁷⁵⁰ George W. Bush: "Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation."

⁷⁵¹ George W. Bush: "Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation."

...this treaty focuses on reductions in strategic nuclear warheads, rather than on “strategic offensive arms,” which traditionally have been considered to be delivery vehicles and launchers.⁷⁵²

Unlike any of the previous detailed and comprehensive nuclear weapons agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation which preceded it, the Moscow/SORT Treaty is very brief. It is worth reviewing its major provisions verbatim:

Article I

Each Party shall reduce and limit strategic nuclear warheads, as stated by the President of the United States of America on November 13, 2001 and as stated by the President of the Russian Federation on November 13, 2001 and December 13, 2001 respectively, so that by December 31, 2012 the aggregate number of such warheads does not exceed 1700-2200 for each Party. Each Party shall determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms, based on the established aggregate limit for the number of such warheads.

Article II

The Parties agree that the START Treaty remains in force in accordance with its terms.

Article III

For purposes of implementing this Treaty, the Parties shall hold meetings at least twice a year of a Bilateral Implementation Commission.

Article IV

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.
2. This Treaty shall remain in force until December 31, 2012 and may be extended by agreement of the Parties or superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement.
3. Each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, may withdraw from this Treaty upon three months written notice to the other Party.⁷⁵³

⁷⁵² George W. Bush, “Letter of Transmittal and Article-by-Article Analysis of the Treaty,” June 20, 2002, Online by Arms Control Association <http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1078>.

⁷⁵³ “Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions” Online by Arms Control Association, <http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/sort>.

What issues the Moscow/SORT Treaty did not address are as important and interesting as the single day strategic nuclear warhead limit it imposed. The treaty did not specify the composition and structure of the strategic nuclear force on either side, leaving it to each of the parties to decide and change as they desired the exact numbers of nuclear warheads deliverable by ICBM, manned aircraft, and submarine launched missile. Those changes could be made at any time during the life of the treaty, and could be made multiple times. No notice to the other party of any such change was required. Indeed such a notice would be of little use since the only operational number in the treaty was the upper limit of 2200 strategic nuclear warheads, a term itself undefined, and that limit had to be reached only by December 31, 2012, the date the treaty expired by its own terms. The treaty limited warheads but not delivery vehicles and did not count warheads on delivery vehicles not currently operational, such as a ballistic missile submarine in port for repairs or refitting. The treaty did not repeal or amend the existing limits on delivery vehicles which still remained in force.

The treaty did not contain any intermediate steps and did not contain any timetable for progress by the parties towards their only and final goal. The treaty specifically provided that the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) agreed to in 1991, including not only the United States and the Soviet Union but also the successor states to the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, remained in full force and effect. This was intended to serve as the verification procedure. In their joint statement Mr. Bush and Mr. Putin explained the relationship between START and the new SORT/Moscow Treaty:

In this connection, both sides proceed on the basis that the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, remains in force in accordance with its terms and that its provisions will provide the foundation for providing confidence, transparency, and predictability in further strategic offensive reductions, along with other supplementary measures, including transparency measures, to be agreed.⁷⁵⁴

The immediate plans for treaty compliance by the United States were outline in a “Fact Sheet” issued by the White House that stated,

As outlined in the Department of Defense's Nuclear Posture Review submitted to Congress earlier this year, the United States plans to retire all 50 of its ten-warhead Peacekeeper ICBMs and convert four Trident submarines from strategic to conventional service. Additional steps to reduce the number of U.S. operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to the 1700-2200 level will be decided subsequently.

Some of the warheads which are removed from deployment will be used as spares, some will be stored, and some will be destroyed. The United States will continue to deploy land-, sea- and air-based strategic forces.⁷⁵⁵

A Congressional Research Service Report to Congress titled “Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty,” dated January 18, 2008 provides an overview of the effects of the treaty and its unprecedented departure from previous arms control agreements.

... this new treaty differs from past arms control treaties, and it does not contain any detail definitions come counting rooms come with a nation procedures or monitoring and verification provisions that have become common in treaty signed since the late 1980s. Consequently, a simple comparison warhead levels counted under START

⁷⁵⁴ George W. Bush: "Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation."

⁷⁵⁵ George W. Bush: "Fact Sheet: Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions," May 24, 2002. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=79584>.

and the warhead levels permitted under the new treaty does not provide a complete view of the likely effects of the new treaty.⁷⁵⁶

In a reversal of previous roles the Russians,

...entered the negotiations seeking a “legally binding document” that would contain limits, definitions, counting rules and elimination rules that resembled those in the START treaties...The United States preferred a less formal process...⁷⁵⁷

During the negotiations, differences between United States and Russia over elimination rules and counting rules were some of the major issues between the parties:

The United States did not plan to use the START counting rules and elimination rules to calculate the number of "operationally deployed" warheads. Under the U.S. formula delivery vehicles that were not deployed with nuclear warheads - either because they were in overhaul or assigned to non-nuclear missions - would not count against the limits. Warheads that had been removed from deployed systems also would not count under the limits. The parties would not have to eliminate or destroy delivery vehicles or stored warheads to reduce the number of warheads they counted under the agreement.⁷⁵⁸

The Moscow Treaty was also new in that the parties counted actual warheads.

Previously, under START delivery vehicles were counted when they were deployed, and a counting rule was used to calculate the number of warheads on each type of delivery vehicle for purposes of treaty compliance. Citing James Dao’s article, "Nuclear Deal Called Closer After Powell Meets Russian," in the *New York Times*, on May 4, 2002 the report describes another reversal of roles; it was the Russians who,

... apparently wanted a formal system of inspections and data exchanges, while the United States preferred a less elaborate system that called for cooperation, more

⁷⁵⁶ Amy F. Woolf, “Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty,” Congressional Research Service, Order Code RL31448, (Washington D.C. January 18, 2008).

⁷⁵⁷ Woolf, “Nuclear Arms Control.”

⁷⁵⁸ Woolf, “Nuclear Arms Control.”

generally, it is said of specifying numbers and types of inspections permitted at specific facilities.⁷⁵⁹

The Moscow/SORT Treaty also incorporated substantially different withdrawal provisions than previous arms control agreements. The withdrawal provision in Article IV is different from previous agreements in two significant aspects. First, while other previous treaties, including the ABM treaty, START I and START II, required a six month notice before party could withdraw, the Moscow Treaty allowed withdrawal after notice of only three months. The second difference is the lack of any language requiring a particular reason or a significant event to justify the withdrawal. The previous treaties required some assertion or a representation by the withdrawing party that events related to the subject matter of the treaty had changed in an unprecedented or extraordinary manner such as to justify the withdrawal based on the supreme interests of the party withdrawing. While President Bush would use events of September 11, and the dangers of terrorism and rogue states, armed with weapons of mass distraction to justify withdrawing from the ABM treaty; no such justification is necessary to withdraw from the Moscow/SORT Treaty.

Mr. Bush's positions in the negotiations at the conclusion of a Moscow/SORT Treaty do not represent a departure from the unitary actor assumption, but rather the recognition of a new state of strategic affairs between the United States and the Russian Federation within an international environment fraught with emerging threats from rogue or failed states and non-state actor terrorist networks. No longer worried about war with each other, the United States and Russia now sought a rough strategic parity. The Congressional Research Service report notes that,

⁷⁵⁹ Woolf, "Nuclear Arms Control."

... Russia can be assured that, as Russia reduces its nuclear forces in response to economic pressures the United States will also reduce its nuclear forces so that they were to retain a rough nuclear parity.⁷⁶⁰

The report further indicates that the Russians may in fact be responding in a realist mode to their changing circumstances and that the traditional Russian goal of respect from the West and the United States in particular, remains unchanged in the 21st century.

More important, according to Russian officials, the signing of the Treaty indicates that the United States and Russia remain equal partners in the arms control process, even though Russia can no longer claim to be a military or economic equal to the United States. Many analysts believe that retaining this "seat at the table" was a key objective for President Putin, because it demonstrated to his critics at home that Russia will benefit from his new, more accommodating policies towards the United States and the West.⁷⁶¹

For Mr. Bush, the key objective in these negotiations with the Russians was to maintain a broad range of options. Facing an unprecedented new set of threats primarily in the form of international non-state actor terrorist organizations, Mr. Bush believed that flexibility in designing United States nuclear forces and ballistic missile defenses to meet these new challenges, was of greater practical value than a traditional, detailed and delivery vehicle oriented arms-control treaty with Russia:

The Bush administration reportedly acquiesced to Russia's demand for a formal treaty for three reasons. First, the administration ensured, by standing firm on U.S. negotiating positions, that the treaty would reflect the U.S. objective of maintaining force structure flexibility. The form of the document ultimately became unimportant when it was clear that the substance would not undermine current U.S. plans. Second, key U.S. senators had pressured the administration to conclude a treaty.

⁷⁶⁰ Woolf, "Nuclear Arms Control."

⁷⁶¹ Sanfrovo, Ivan. "Now There Simply Cannot be any Recoil; Interview with First Deputy Chief of General Staff." *Kommersant*. May 7, 2002. Translated in FBIS CEP20020527000221. See also, Sergey Rogov. "Capitulation or Move toward Partnership? Moscow Must Use the 'Window of Opportunity.'" *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*. May 24, 2002 Translated in FBIS CEP20020524000146. Quoted in Woolf, "Nuclear Arms Control."

Third, the U.S. concession on signing a treaty would strengthen Putin's ability to cooperate with the United States in other areas of security policy.⁷⁶²

On June 13, 2002, Mr. Bush (43) issued his Statement of Formal Withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. His argument was that the world had changed, and, "As the events of September 11 made clear, we no longer live in the Cold War world for which the ABM treaty was designed."⁷⁶³ Ten years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the relationship of the United States the Russian Federation was fundamentally different from the old balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union that existed in 1972:

Last month, President Vladimir Putin and I agreed that Russia and the United States would look for ways to cooperate on missile defenses, including expanding military exercises, sharing early warning data, and exploring potential joint research and development of missile defense technologies. Over the past year, our countries have worked hard to overcome the legacy of the Cold War and to dismantle its structures. The United States and Russia are building a new relationship based on common interests and, increasingly, common values.⁷⁶⁴

Mr. Bush (43) saw significant change in capabilities threatening the United States, especially those capabilities which did not emanate directly from Russia. He sought to protect America, its military, and our allies, from an attack from a terrorist organization, rogue state, non-state actor or any other source of "the growing missile threats we face."⁷⁶⁵ Under the ABM Treaty any significant work alone or with other nations on ballistic missile

⁷⁶² Woolf, "Nuclear Arms Control."

⁷⁶³ George W Bush, "Statement of Formal Withdrawal From The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty," June 13, 2002. Online by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73037>.

⁷⁶⁴ Bush, "Withdrawal From The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty."

⁷⁶⁵ Bush, "Withdrawal From The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty."

defense systems was prohibited and thus for Mr. Bush (43), withdrawal from the treaty was became a matter of national security.

When he transmitted the new Moscow Treaty to the Senate for ratification, in his message to the Senate, Mr. Bush (43) argued that,

The Moscow Treaty is emblematic of our new, cooperative relationship with Russia... The Moscow Treaty reflects this new relationship with Russia. Under it, each party retains the flexibility to determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms, and how reductions are made. This flexibility allows each party to determine how a best to respond to future security challenges. There is no longer the need to narrowly regulate every step we take, as did Cold War treaties founded on mutual suspicion and an adversarial relationship.⁷⁶⁶

The traditional concerns of the United States in arms control negotiations about verification and transparency were not directly addressed in the Moscow/SORT Treaty, but they were not completely abandoned either. These issues were ultimately managed by reference to prior arms control agreements making use of their previously agreed upon, and proven through experience, verification regimes from agreements made during the Cold War:

It is important for there to be sufficient openness, so that the United States and Russia can each be confident that the other is fulfilling its reductions commitment. The parties will use the comprehensive verification regime of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the "START Treaty") to provide the foundation for confidence, transparency and predictability in future strategic offensive reductions.⁷⁶⁷

Much of the core of Mr. Bush's (43) new thinking was set out in his public statements, but the internal documents provide a more detailed and explicit analysis than the

⁷⁶⁶ George W Bush, "Message To The Senate Transmitting The Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Russian Federation On Strategic Offensive Reductions," June 20, 2002. Online by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64794>.

⁷⁶⁷ George W Bush, "Message To The Senate On Strategic Offensive Reductions."

public rhetoric. In National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-23 issued on December 16, 2002 on the subject of “National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense” we find a very complete description of the new environment as Mr. Bush (43) saw it:

As the events of September 11 demonstrated, the security environment is more complex and less predictable than in the past. We face growing threats from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the hands of states or non-state actors, threats that range from terrorism to ballistic missiles intended to intimidate and coerce us by holding the U.S. and our friends and allies hostage to WMD attack.⁷⁶⁸

The lack of an effective missile defense was now thought to be a source of weakness instead of the guarantor of strategic balance it had been in the Cold War:

...one of the factors that make long-range ballistic missiles attractive as a delivery vehicle for weapons of mass destruction is that the United States and our allies lack effective defenses against this threat.⁷⁶⁹

Mr. Bush (43) found a new logic of national security in the post 9-11 world. This is worth considering in detail as it is the reasoning for actions that may be considered as a departure from the continuity we have seen in past administrations. The issue we must consider here is whether Mr. Bush’s new policies and actions, clearly inconsistent with prior arms control policy are a refutation of the unitary actor assumption or simply a realistic response to an anarchic international environment in which new actors have displayed a new set of capabilities to threaten the national security of the United States. He wrote that,

The contemporary and emerging missile threat from hostile states is fundamentally different from that of the Cold War and requires a different approach to deterrence and new tools for defense. The strategic logic of the past may not apply to these new threats, and we cannot be wholly dependent on our capability to deter them.

Compared to the Soviet Union, their leaderships often are more risk prone. These are

⁷⁶⁸ George W. Bush, “National Security Presidential Directive-23, National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense” (Washington, December 16, 2002) Online by *Federation of American Scientists* <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-23.htm>.

⁷⁶⁹ George W. Bush, “NSPD-23.”

leaders that also see WMD as weapons of choice, not of last resort. Weapons of mass destruction are their most lethal means to compensate for our conventional strength and to allow them to pursue their objectives through force, coercion, and intimidation.⁷⁷⁰

Deterrence had also evolved and in a reversal of roles it was now the United States that was being deterred:

...the dynamics of deterrence are different than in the Cold War when we sought to keep the Soviet Union from expanding outward. What our new adversaries seek is to keep us out of their region, leaving them free to support terrorism and to pursue aggression against their neighbors. By their own calculations, these leaders may believe they can do this by holding a few of our cities hostage. Our adversaries seek enough destructive capability to blackmail us from coming to the assistance of our friends...⁷⁷¹

Democratic peace theory continued its ascension as the new paradigm in United States world view while the Cold War doctrines of containment and deterrence faded into memory. In his 2004 acceptance speech Mr. Bush (43) explicitly linked democracy of fighting terror when he said:

Free societies in the Middle East will be hopeful societies which no longer feed resentments and breed violence for export. Free governments in the Middle East will fight terrorists instead of harboring them, and that helps us keep the peace. So our mission in Afghanistan and Iraq is clear: We will help new leaders to train their armies and move toward elections and get on the path of stability and democracy as quickly as possible.⁷⁷²

And he described the theory as a continuation of American ideals stretching back to the beginnings of the Cold War and President Truman:

⁷⁷⁰ George W. Bush, "NSPD-23."

⁷⁷¹ George W. Bush, "NSPD-23."

⁷⁷² George W. Bush: "Remarks Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention in New York City," September 2, 2004. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=72727>.

...a resolute President named Truman who, with the American people, persevered, knowing that a new democracy at the center of Europe would lead to stability and peace.⁷⁷³

In the 2004 Republican Platform the issues of Russia and nuclear weapons were addressed in these terms:

President Bush is forging a new relationship with Russia based on the central reality that the United States and Russia are no longer strategic adversaries. We hail the President's visionary leadership in reassessing the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which was a relic of the Cold War and treated Russia as an enemy. The President has strengthened this new relationship by concluding the historic Moscow Treaty on Strategic Reductions, which will reduce the nuclear arsenals of our two nations to their lowest levels in decades.⁷⁷⁴

The consistent new paradigm showed up in Mr. Bush's (43) 2005 Inaugural Address:

The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world...So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.⁷⁷⁵

A clear statement of Mr. Bush's (43) policy towards nuclear weapons, Russia and the emerging threat of ballistic missile attack from terrorists or rogue states is set out in his address to the National Defense University on October 23, 2007. He said that,

The ballistic missile threat to America has been growing for decades. In 1972, just nine countries had ballistic missiles. Today, that number has grown to 27, and it includes hostile regimes with ties to terrorists. When I took office, our Nation had no capability to defend the American people against long-range ballistic missile attacks. Our research, development, and testing program was hampered by a lack of funding.

⁷⁷³ George W. Bush: "Accepting the Presidential Nomination," September 2, 2004.

⁷⁷⁴ Republican Party Platforms: "Republican Party Platform of 2004," August 30, 2004. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25850>.

⁷⁷⁵ George W. Bush: "Inaugural Address," January 20, 2005. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58745>.

Our efforts to develop and deploy missile defense were constrained by the ABM Treaty, a 30-year-old agreement negotiated with a Soviet Union that no longer existed.⁷⁷⁶

Going further he reported that,

Russia did not agree with my decision to withdraw. Yet President Putin declared that the decision at the time "does not pose a threat to Russia." And far from a new arms race, he announced that Russia would join the United States in making historic reductions in our deployed offensive nuclear arsenals.⁷⁷⁷

Finally all of this was made possible by a new relationship with Russia:

Moreover, the missile defenses we will deploy are intended to deter countries who would threaten us with ballistic missile attacks. We do not consider Russia such a country. The Cold War is over. Russia is not our enemy. We're building a new security relationship, whose foundation does not rest on the prospect of mutual annihilation.⁷⁷⁸

Ultimately, Mr. Bush (43) argued that the Moscow treaty was the final piece of the puzzle cementing the new relationship and helping put the Cold War behind both nations as they looked into an even more uncertain future:

...in 2001, I directed the Department of Defense to achieve a credible deterrent--a credible deterrent--with the lowest number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs, including our obligations to our allies. These reductions were eventually codified in the Moscow Treaty, which commits the United States and Russia to reduce our operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 within 5 years from now.

Since the Moscow Treaty took effect, the United States has retired all of our Peacekeeper ICBMs and reduced our operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads from more than 6,000 when I took office to fewer than 3,800 today. When the rest of the reductions we have set in motion are completed, the total U.S. nuclear

⁷⁷⁶ George W. Bush: "Remarks at the National Defense University", October 23, 2007. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=75953>.

⁷⁷⁷ George W. Bush: "Remarks at the National Defense University."

⁷⁷⁸ George W. Bush: "Remarks at the National Defense University."

stockpile will be one-quarter its size at the end of the Cold War, the lowest level since the Eisenhower administration.⁷⁷⁹

Bush (43) and Oil

In their acceptance speeches to their respective conventions in 2000, neither Mr. Bush (43) nor Vice President Gore took up the issue of imported oil, Saudi Arabia's role in controlling the price of oil or the dependence of the United States economic engine on oil imported from the Persian Gulf. The nominees let their platforms do the talking on this subject. The Democratic Party Platform of 2000 made only a brief mention of the oil dependency issue:

We should invest in roads, bridges, light rail systems, cleaner buses, the aviation system, our national passenger railroad, Amtrak, and high-speed trains that would give Americans choices - freeing them from traffic, smog-choked cities, and being held hostage to foreign oil.⁷⁸⁰

Directly referring to the administration of the first President Bush the Republican Platform for the year 2000 said that when the last Republican administration was in the White House,

The oil cartel was in retreat; gasoline was affordable, even as automotive progress reduced emissions from cars. Today, gas prices have skyrocketed, and oil imports are at all-time highs. Foreign oil now accounts for one-third of our total trade deficit.⁷⁸¹

The Republicans added that,

In the Middle East, the advancement of U.S. national interests requires clear and consistent priorities as well as close cooperation with America's friends and

⁷⁷⁹ George W. Bush: "Remarks at the National Defense University."

⁷⁸⁰ Democratic Party Platform 2000.

⁷⁸¹ Republican Party Platform 2000.

allies...we must protect our economic interests and ensure the reliable flow of oil from the Persian Gulf.⁷⁸²

In his first speech before a Joint Session of Congress on February 27, 2001 Mr. Bush made only the briefest mention of energy and did not address imported oil directly when he said that,

As we meet tonight, many citizens are struggling with the high cost of energy. We have a serious energy problem that demands a national energy policy. The West is confronting a major energy shortage that has resulted in high prices and uncertainty.⁷⁸³

On February 25, 2002, in remarks at the White House, Mr. Bush addressed the issue of imported oil saying,

Any sound, comprehensive energy policy must both increase production and reduce consumption. It's important for Americans to remember that as we debate an energy bill, as we have a discussion about an energy plan, that America imports more than 50 percent of its oil—more than 10 million barrels a day. And the figure is rising.

This is dependence on foreign oil. And this dependence is a challenge to our economic security, because dependence can lead to price shocks and fuel shortages. And this dependence on foreign oil is a matter of national security. To put it bluntly, sometimes we rely upon energy sources from countries that don't particularly like us.⁷⁸⁴

He recommended his energy bill including tax incentives for those who purchase fuel efficient cars and new technology such as fuel cells and hybrid cars. No direct mention was made of the source of the oil upon which the nation was so dangerously dependent.

⁷⁸² Republican Party Platform 2000.

⁷⁸³ George W. Bush: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on Administration Goals," February 27, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29643>.

⁷⁸⁴ George W. Bush: "Remarks on a Comprehensive Energy Policy," February 25, 2002. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=72977>.

One of Mr. Bush's (43) most direct and unequivocal statements concerning Saudi Arabia and imported oil is contained in a Joint Statement by President George W Bush and Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia issued on April 25, 2005. In a reference to personal relationships the statement begins with a reminder to the long history between the two countries:

Sixty years ago, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's founder King Abdulaziz Al Saud held a historic meeting upon a sturdy ship at the Great Bitter Lake in the Suez Canal. In six hours President Bush's predecessor and the Crown Prince's father established a strong personal bond that set the tone for decades of close relations between our two nations.⁷⁸⁵

This long term and fairly stable relationship between not just the original leaders but each their successors over two generations may be argued as a demonstration of the strength of the unitary actor assumption on this issue. While the 2005 statement was crafted to avoid any embarrassment to the Saudi Government by referring to American military might as a supporting element ensuring the freedom and security of the Kingdom, the reliance of the United States on crude oil imported from Saudi Arabia was directly addressed:

Both nations pledge to continue their cooperation so that the oil supply from Saudi Arabia will be available and secure. The United States appreciates Saudi Arabia's strong commitment to accelerating investment and expanding its production capacity to help provide stability and adequately supply the market.⁷⁸⁶

A year later in the State of the Union address for 2006 in discussing energy Mr. Bush (43) acknowledged a dependence on foreign oil:

⁷⁸⁵ George W. Bush: "Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia," April 25, 2005. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73627>.

⁷⁸⁶ George W. Bush: "Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and Crown Prince Abdullah."

Keeping America competitive requires affordable energy. And here we have a serious problem: America is addicted to oil, which is often imported from unstable parts of the world. The best way to break this addiction is through technology.⁷⁸⁷

In the 2007 State of the Union address Mr. Bush (43) continued the discussion of the effect of American dependency on foreign oil and his recommendation of a technological solution:

For too long, our Nation has been dependent on foreign oil. And this dependence leaves us more vulnerable to hostile regimes and to terrorists who could cause huge disruptions of oil shipments and raise the price of oil and do great harm to our economy...It's in our vital interest to diversify America's energy supply. The way forward is through technology.⁷⁸⁸

In his final State of the Union address Mr. Bush (43) was explicit about the security of the United States which would “require reducing our dependence on oil” and he made plain the continuing policy of the United States to use force in necessary to preserve it access to foreign oil with these words directed towards the Iranians,

...America will confront those who threaten our troops; we will stand by our allies; and we will defend our vital interests in the Persian Gulf.⁷⁸⁹

In this manner the United States continued its consistent policy since the end of World War II that the supply of oil from the Persian Gulf, including as all observers clearly understood from Saudi Arabia, the Gulf’s largest oil exporter, would be defended by the military might

⁷⁸⁷ George W. Bush: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 31, 2006. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65090>.

⁷⁸⁸ George W. Bush: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 23, 2007. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=24446>.

⁷⁸⁹ George W. Bush: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 28, 2008. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=76301>.

of the United States when necessary, although the price of that oil would be set by the world market.

Analysis: Clinton to Bush (43)

During the transition from Mr. Clinton to Mr. Bush (43) anarchy continued as the defining condition of the international environment. No central organizing authority was present with the power to resolve disputes between states. Each international organization was dependent upon the strength of its member states and was unable and even unwilling to control the behavior of its most powerful members. The United States possessed clear and identifiable decision making for the creation and execution foreign policy, through the President and the National Security Council and the Departments of State and Defense. The foreign policy activities examined here were made and executed in public. The President continued to speak for the United States in matters of national security. Both Mr. Clinton and Mr. Bush (43) treated nuclear weapons as a vital national survival issue.

The relative capabilities of the United States and the Russian Federation as successor to the Soviet Union changed a great deal from Mr. Clinton's inauguration to Mr. Bush's (43) departure from the White House 16 years later. During Mr. Clinton's presidency following the demise of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the independent Russian Federation, the two nation's relative military capabilities continued the changes begun as the breakup of the Soviet Union ended bipolar world conflict over capitalism versus communism. The rise of the threats of failed or rogue states and non-state actor sponsored terrorism continued unabated through Mr. Clinton terms and reached a historic milestone with the terror attacks of 9-11. Mr. Bush's (43) presidency was framed and defined by his response to those

attacks. The new world disorder of terror attacks and fears of a single ballistic missile with a single nuclear warhead aimed at one city was to many Americans a more frightening thought than the bipolar balance of power that had defined the Cold War world from 1945 to 1991.

At the end of the Clinton administration the policy about nuclear weapons was still practically identical to Mr. Eisenhower's policy:

1. The United States has nuclear weapons at the ready, and any arms agreement must contain absolutely reliable, verifiable inspections to ensure against any cheating by any party.

2. The United States will use nuclear weapons if attacked.

3. The United States has not renounced the right to the first use of nuclear weapons.

4. To ensure the destruction of any foe after a surprise attack, the United States will maintain a nuclear arsenal sufficient for that purpose.

In Mr. Bush's (43) presidency we find a significant departure from policies and positions that had their origins with Mr. Eisenhower. Gone was the concern over reliable and verifiable inspections and concerns over Soviet/Russian cheating. Legally binding agreements were no longer of interest to the United States but were now of great importance to Russia. The structure and composition of Russian strategic nuclear forces was no longer the subject of treaty obligations. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty a cornerstone of the bipolar balance of power negotiated by Republican president and supported without exception by his successors of both parties for 30 years, was now, not just an inconvenience, but an impediment to national security. The 1972 ABM treaty was considered by Mr. Bush

(43) such a threat to the ability of the nation to defend itself that he risked the United States' new and warming relationship with the Russian Federation by a withdraw from the treaty to pursue the creation of an untested ballistic missile defense technology.

The Moscow/SORT Treaty signed by Mr. Bush (43) and the procedure surrounding it negotiation is also evidence that calls into question the unitary actor assumption. Mr. Bush (43) virtually abandoned the traditional arms control process in the context of this treaty. Verification and onsite inspections were no longer of importance to the United States. Time tables for compliance were no longer important. Definitions, the very essence of an agreement which are necessary to avoid misunderstandings or cheating (especially where the parties speak two very different languages) were not included in the treaty text or protocols. The only numerical limit on arms set out in the treaty was to be achieved by the same day the treaty expired on its own terms, thus the treaty's agreement had an effective life of only one day. Composition and force structure issues were not even addressed leaving each side to continue to adjust their nuclear arsenals until the last day of the agreement. It appears from the evidence that Mr. Bush's (43) primary purpose in signing the Moscow/SORT Treaty was to please Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin and provide him with a foreign policy achievement that would strengthen his hand inside Russia.

Whether the renunciation of the ABM treaty and the signing of the Moscow/SORT treaty by Mr. Bush (43) are evidence of a realist response to changes in the international situation that fit the paradigm of the unitary actor assumption or a policy change driven by some other consideration, is the subject of this paper. In the context of this study addressing partisan changes between presidents, the enormous changes in the post-Cold War

international environment and the emerging threats from new sources not even considered at the beginning of the Cold War provide ample evidence that the United States under Mr. Bush (43) was still clearly operating within the unitary actor assumption. The world had changed. The threats to the national security of the United States had changed. United States policy changed in response to the new world and the new threats. This evidence confirms the unitary actor assumption.

Saudi Arabia and its oil were a major part of Mr. Bush's (43) presidency. The 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States and the deployment of an army of occupation in that country through the end of Mr. Bush's (43) term in office clearly asserted the protection of the United States military over the free flow of oil from Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf onto the world oil market. At the end of the Bush (43) administration the policy about Saudi Arabia and its oil was basically the same as Mr. Carter's policy:

1. Access to Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf oil by the United States was a vital matter of national security.
2. The United States would deploy and if necessary use military force to keep the oil flowing even to the extent of commencing combat operations before the oil flow had stopped.
3. The US would use diplomatic pressure and persuasion on the Saudis over the issue of price but was unwilling to intervene with sufficient force to achieve the control necessary to allow Washington set the price at the pump.

While Mr. Bush faced national security challenges in terms of extremist Islamic terrorist attacks directed by and committed by former and current Saudi citizens acting

through the Al Qaeda, he maintained the United States military presence in Saudi Arabia, expanded the military presence in the Persian Gulf and in neighboring Iraq and took no actions or proposed any new policy initiatives which would contradict the unitary actor assumption in terms of Saudi Arabia and its oil in the context of this transition.

On the surface substantial evidence contradicting the unitary actor assumption appears in the context of this transition concerning nuclear weapons and the Russian Federation as successor to the Soviet Union. This evidence, principally the United States withdrawal from the ABM treaty, new bargaining positions concerning weapons instead of delivery vehicles in the SORT talks and the abandonment of long sought goals of verification and transparency help by prior administrations of both parties in arms control negotiations, can be reconciled to the unitary actor assumption. An analysis of changes in the international situation and changes in the relative capabilities of the parties after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the terror attacks in New York and Washington on 9-11 provides that reconciliation. The impact of the terror attacks of 9-11 demonstrating new (or at least previously unseen) capabilities in the hands of the nation's enemies and the new cast of characters comprising those enemies explains Mr. Bush's (43) policies within the unitary actor assumption.

No substantial contradictory evidence concerning the unitary actor assumption appears in this transition concerning Saudi Arabia and oil.

With regard to United States policy towards nuclear weapons, with specific reference to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and nuclear arms control agreements with the Russian Federation; this analysis of the evidence from the Clinton to Bush (43) transition

does not support the unitary actor assumption. Concerning the issue of the relationship of the United States to Saudi Arabia and imported crude oil the analysis of the Clinton to Bush (43) transition supports the unitary actor assumption.

CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Analysis and Recommendations

An examination of the vast array of information detailing an administration's internal deliberations before a decision is made is not necessary here. However, testing the unitary actor assumption by a detailed examination of the decision making process behind a significant policy shift appears to be a promising area for further inquiry. For example, a review of the internal discussions detailing the change in attitude toward defense spending and the Soviet Union in general during Mr. Carter's time in office might shed light on the policy maker's responsiveness to the international situation after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The centrality of the focus of realist analysis on the capabilities of other states leads the researcher to evidence that suggests that there may be another side of the coin of capabilities in the unitary actor analysis, that of the international responsibilities of the state. Under this expanded unitary actor analysis national leaders are reacting not only to the capabilities of other states but to their own responsibilities as well. A state's responsibilities, real or only perceived, to allies or to the world in general, may also affect international behavior in the realist model. For example, treaty obligations and the needs of allies in Europe certainly influenced the negotiating position of the United States with regard to the strategic calculus that confronted Mr. Nixon at the beginning of the SALT negotiations. It

was not just the assessment of the capabilities of the Soviet Union but also a consideration of the United States' responsibilities to people and places outside United States borders that drove Mr. Nixon's policy. This is a level of analysis beyond the mere preservation of domestic sovereignty. If we consider the Soviet Union, once it was relieved of its responsibility to (or dominion over) the Eastern European states of the Warsaw Pact, the possibility of arms control and nuclear and conventional military force reductions became a reality. What had changed here were not the capabilities of the United States but Russian (formerly Soviet) responsibilities. The sovereignty of Poland, which had been Moscow's problem and responsibility as long as it was a Warsaw pact vassal state to the Soviet Union, was now Poland's problem so long as it does not threaten Russia.

Responsibilities may not be treaty or ally oriented, but may consist of duties imposed by physical proximity to a location of importance. Consider the responsibility of Egypt for the Suez Canal, Britain and Spain for Gibraltar, and Panama and the United States at the Panama Canal. For the United States the security of the Panama Canal is a treaty obligation as well as a vital national interest. For Egypt the Suez Canal is an unavoidable fact of life. The Saudis and other Persian Gulf oil countries have a responsibility for the Strait of Hormuz, which may drive their realist policies in terms of relations with the United States as the only naval power with enough muscle to keep the peace in the region and the strait open and operating. The United States naval presence in the Persian Gulf is an example of how a nation may assume an obligation for reasons of vital national interest, even when that obligation may constrain its freedom of action elsewhere.

A state's international responsibilities can change without regard to its domestic politics, and that change may drive a change in the state's foreign policy. For a national leader making foreign policy, national responsibility is the companion element that must accompany the analysis of a foreign actor's capabilities to produce an effective policy. Within the unitary actor assumption, if capabilities are understood as the range of actions available to a national leader, responsibilities are constraints on those actions. They are the two sides of the realist coin.

An interesting study testing the unitary actor assumption may be undertaken using the Soviet archives that concern the period 1981-1988 when four separate Soviet leaders faced Ronald Reagan in the White House. The question the Soviet archives may answer is, "Was the change in the Soviet Union's position on ballistic nuclear missile reductions and acceptance of on-site inspections a change in policy driven by the new strategic calculus created by the Reagan arms buildup, or was this change a reflection of a new generation of Soviet leaders driven by the succession from Brezhnev to Andropov to Chernenko (the World War II generation) and finally to Gorbachev?"

It may be that the unitary actor assumption examined here was uniquely suited to, or conditioned for, a Cold War world of stable adversaries, existential struggle, combat through proxy states and minimal levels of non-state-actor activity. But, the historical record since the end of the Cold War, a mere twenty-one years of human experience, is still so fresh and recent that it is difficult to analyze dispassionately at this time. The results of a further review of the unitary actor assumption, in the current environment of potential nuclear terrorism and other existential threats in today's unipolar world, will shed further light on

the usefulness of the theory beyond what is considered here. If such a study were conducted, the results might give policy makers an additional valuable tool for understanding the behaviors of states in the international anarchy that surrounds them all.

This review of the relations of the United States and Saudi Arabia within the framework of the need for United States to maintain unfettered access to oil from Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf shows some limits to the unitary actor assumption when it is used in relation to an international relations problem that directly involves economics and markets. Saudi Arabian and Persian Gulf oil are a “supply to the world market” issue for all producers and consumers. It is difficult to use the unitary actor assumption to evaluate the United States in terms of a bilateral relationship to Saudi Arabia. The true nature of the United States national security interest is not the behavior of Saudi Arabia directed to the United States, but how Saudi Arabia affects the world’s supply and price of oil. This is an area for further study where the academic disciplines of Political Science and Economics overlap. This analysis does support the idea of an enhanced unitary actor assumption assessing not only capabilities but also responsibilities. The United States military presence in the Persian Gulf is not only a matter of national security but also a discharge of a United States responsibility to its allies to keep the Strait of Hormuz open and Saudi/Persian Gulf crude flowing to the oil markets in Europe and Japan as well as North America.

Conclusion

Knowledge in the social sciences will never be validated with the same certainty as knowledge of a fact in the physical sciences, perfectly isolating a single variable and individually testing the reaction of that variable through multiple experiments. This is not to say the effort to study human social life is futile, it is simply different.

With the specific caveat that the actions of the United States during the administration of George W. Bush constituted either an unexplained outlier or a realist response to a radically different international environment is not the direct subject of this study, the evidence assembled above tends to verify the unitary actor assumption in structural realist theory of international relations.

Albert Einstein is credited with saying that as a circle of knowledge expands so does the circumference of darkness around it. If this study has affirmed the unitary actor assumption in the context of partisan changes between presidents of the United States, but raised more questions than it has answered, then it has done its job.

The use of this knowledge is left to the individuals in and out of government with the caveat that all theories must be constantly subjected to the test of real world experience. The use of any theory without constant re-verification against current evidence is a fool's errand.

Appendices

1) List of Nuclear Arms Control Treaties and Agreements to which the United States and the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation are party: 1945 to 2008

1. Antarctic Treaty, signed 1959, entered into force 1961
2. Partial Test Ban Treaty, signed and entered into force 1963
3. Outer Space Treaty, signed and entered into force 1967
4. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed 1968, entered into force 1970
5. Seabed Arms Control Treaty, signed 1971, entered into force 1972
6. Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), signed and ratified 1972, in force 1972-1977
7. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, signed and entered into force 1972, terminated following U.S. withdrawal 2002
8. Threshold Test Ban Treaty, signed 1974, entered into force 1990
9. SALT II signed 1979, never entered into force
10. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, signed 1987, entered into force 1988
11. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), signed 1991, entered into force 1994, expired 2009 [5]
12. START II, signed 1993, ratified 1996 (United States) and 2000 (Russia), terminated following Russian withdrawal 2002
13. Open Skies Treaty, signed 1992, entered into force 2002
14. Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), signed 2002, entered into force 2003, expires 2012

"A Report to the National Security Council - NSC 68", April 12, 1950.
President's Secretary's File, Truman Papers.

The President

~~TOP SECRET~~

NSC 68

COPY NO. 1



A REPORT
TO THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

by

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

on

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

DECLASSIFIED by authority of:

April 14, 1950

HENRY A. KISSINGER - ASST. TO THE

PRES. FOR NATL. SECURITY AFFAIRS

FEBRUARY 27, 1975

WASHINGTON

Signature

H.A.

Date

4-8-75

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

C O P Y

April 12, 1950

Dear Mr. Lay:

After consideration of the Report by the Secretaries of State and Defense, dated April 7, 1950, re-examining our objectives in peace and war and the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans, I have decided to refer that Report to the National Security Council for consideration, with the request that the National Security Council provide me with further information on the implications of the Conclusions contained therein. I am particularly anxious that the Council give me a clearer indication of the programs which are envisaged in the Report, including estimates of the probable cost of such programs.

Because of the effect of these Conclusions upon the budgetary and economic situation, it is my desire that the Economic Cooperation Administrator, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, participate in the consideration of this Report by the Council, in addition to the regular participation of the Secretary of the Treasury.

Pending the urgent completion of this study, I am concerned that action on existing programs should not be postponed or delayed. In addition, it is my desire that no publicity be given to this Report or its contents without my approval.

Sincerely yours,

(SIGNED)

HARRY S. TRUMAN

DECLASSIFIED by authority of:

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
Washington, D. C.

*HENRY A. KISSINGER - ASST. TO THE
PRES. FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
FEBRUARY 27, 1975*

Signature
H.C.

Date 4-8-75

NSC 68

- 1 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
PURSUANT TO THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTIVE
OF JANUARY 31, 1950

April 7, 1950

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#

TERMS OF REFERENCE

The following report is submitted in response to the President's directive of January 31 which reads:

"That the President direct the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans, in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union."

The document which recommended that such a directive be issued reads in part:

"It must be considered whether a decision to proceed with a program directed toward determining feasibility prejudices the more fundamental decisions (a) as to whether, in the event that a test of a thermonuclear weapon proves successful, such weapons should be stockpiled, or (b) if stockpiled, the conditions under which they might be used in war. If a test of a thermonuclear weapon proves successful, the pressures to produce and stockpile such weapons to be held for the same purposes for which fission bombs are then being held will be greatly increased. The question of use policy can be adequately assessed only as a part of a general reexamination of this country's strategic plans and its objectives in peace and war. Such reexamination would need to consider national policy not only with respect to possible thermonuclear weapons, but also with respect to fission weapons--viewed in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and the possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union. The moral, psychological, and political questions involved in this problem would need to be taken into account and be given due weight. The outcome of this reexamination would have a crucial bearing on the further question as to whether there should be a revision in the nature of the agreements, including the international control of atomic energy, which we have been seeking to reach with the U.S.S.R."

ANALYSISI. BACKGROUNDS OF THE PRESENT WORLD CRISIS

Within the past thirty-five years the world has experienced two global wars of tremendous violence. It has witnessed two revolutions--the Russian and the Chinese--of extreme scope and intensity. It has also seen the collapse of five empires--the Ottoman, the Austro-Hungarian, German, Italian and Japanese--and the drastic decline of two major imperial systems, the British and the French. During the span of one generation, the international distribution of power has been fundamentally altered. For several centuries it had proved impossible for any one nation to gain such preponderant strength that a coalition of other nations could not in time face it with greater strength. The international scene was marked by recurring periods of violence and war, but a system of sovereign and independent states was maintained, over which no state was able to achieve hegemony.

Two complex sets of factors have now basically altered this historical distribution of power. First, the defeat of Germany and Japan and the decline of the British and French Empires have interacted with the development of the United States and the Soviet Union in such a way that power has increasingly gravitated to these two centers. Second, the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. Conflict has, therefore, become endemic and is waged, on the part of the Soviet Union, by violent or nonviolent methods in accordance with the dictates of expediency.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

The President
~~TOP SECRET~~

June 1, 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL HOLDERS OF NSC 68:

Attached hereto is a copy of corrected page 4 of NSC 68. It is requested that this page be substituted for the page 4 now in the document, and that the latter be destroyed by burning.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

~~TOP SECRET~~

ANALYSISI. BACKGROUNDS OF THE PRESENT WORLD CRISIS

Within the past thirty-five years the world has experienced two global wars of tremendous violence. It has witnessed two revolutions --the Russian and the Chinese--of extreme scope and intensity. It has also seen the collapse of five empires--the Ottoman, the Austro-Hungarian, German, Italian and Japanese--and the drastic decline of two major imperial systems, the British and the French. During the span of one generation, the international distribution of power has been fundamentally altered. For several centuries it had proved impossible for any one nation to gain such preponderant strength that a coalition of other nations could not in time face it with greater strength. The international scene was marked by recurring periods of violence and war, but a system of sovereign and independent states was maintained, over which no state was able to achieve hegemony.

Two complex sets of factors have now basically altered this historical distribution of power. First, the defeat of Germany and Japan and the decline of the British and French Empires have interacted with the development of the United States and the Soviet Union in such a way that power has increasingly gravitated to these two centers. Second, the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. Conflict has, therefore, become endemic and is waged, on the part of the Soviet Union, by violent or non-violent methods in accordance with the dictates of expediency. With the development of increasingly terrifying weapons of mass destruction, every individual faces the ever-present possibility of annihilation should the conflict enter the phase of total war.

On the one hand, the people of the world yearn for relief from the anxiety arising from the risk of atomic war. On the other hand, any substantial further extension of the area under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled. It is in this context that this Republic and its citizens in the ascendancy of their strength stand in their deepest peril.

The issues that face us are momentous, involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself. They are issues which will not await our deliberations. With conscience and resolution this Government and the people it represents must now take new and fateful decisions.

II. FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE OF THE UNITED STATES

The fundamental purpose of the United States is laid down in the Preamble to the Constitution: "...to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." In essence, the fundamental purpose is to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual.

Three realities emerge as a consequence of this purpose: Our determination to maintain the essential elements of individual freedom, as set forth in the Constitution and Bill of Rights; our determination to create conditions under which our free and democratic system can live and prosper; and our determination to fight if necessary to defend our way of life, for which as in the Declaration of Independence, "with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor."

III. FUNDAMENTAL DESIGN OF THE KREMLIN

The fundamental design of those who control the Soviet Union and the international communist movement is to retain and solidify their absolute power, first in the Soviet Union and second in the areas now under their control. In the minds of the Soviet leaders, however, achievement of this design requires the dynamic extension of their authority and the ultimate elimination of any effective opposition to their authority.

The design, therefore, calls for the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world and their replacement by an apparatus and structure subservient to and controlled from the Kremlin. To that end Soviet efforts are now directed toward the domination of the Eurasian land mass. The United States, as the principal center of power in the non-Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion, is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design.

IV. THE UNDERLYING CONFLICT IN THE REALM OF IDEAS
AND VALUES BETWEEN THE U. S. PURPOSE AND THE
KREMLIN DESIGN

A. Nature of conflict:

The Kremlin regards the United States as the only major threat to the achievement of its fundamental design. There is a basic conflict between the idea of freedom under a government of laws, and the idea of slavery under the grim oligarchy of the Kremlin, which has come to a crisis with the polarization of power described in Section I, and the exclusive possession of atomic weapons by the two protagonists. The idea of freedom, moreover, is peculiarly and intolerably subversive of the idea of slavery. But the converse is not true. The implacable purpose of the slave state to eliminate the challenge of freedom has placed the two great powers at opposite poles. It is this fact which gives the present polarization of power the quality of crisis.

The free society values the individual as an end in himself, requiring of him only that measure of self discipline and self restraint which make the rights of each individual compatible with the rights of every other individual. The freedom of the individual has as its counterpart, therefore, the negative responsibility of the individual not to exercise his freedom in ways inconsistent with the freedom of other individuals and the positive responsibility to make constructive use of his freedom in the building of a just society.

From this idea of freedom with responsibility derives the marvelous diversity, the deep tolerance, the lawfulness of the free society. This is the explanation of the strength of free men. It constitutes the integrity and the vitality of a free and democratic system. The free society attempts to create and maintain an environment in which every individual has the opportunity to realize his creative powers. It also explains why the free society tolerates those within it who would use their freedom to destroy it. By the same token, in relations between nations, the prime reliance of the free society is on the strength and appeal of its idea, and it feels no compulsion sooner or later to bring all societies into conformity with it.

For the free society does not fear, it welcomes, diversity. It derives its strength from its hospitality even to antipathetic ideas. It is a market for free trade in ideas, secure in its faith that free men will take the best wares, and grow to a fuller and better realization of their powers in exercising their choice.

The idea of freedom is the most contagious idea in history, more contagious than the idea of submission to authority. For the breath of freedom cannot be tolerated in a society which has come under the domination of an individual or group of individuals with a will to absolute power. Where the despot holds absolute power--the absolute power of the absolutely powerful will--all other wills must be subjugated in an act of willing submission, a degradation willed by the individual upon himself under the compulsion of a perverted faith. It is the first article of this faith that he finds and can only find the meaning of his existence in serving the ends of the system. The system becomes God, and submission to the will of God becomes submission to the will of the system. It is not enough to yield outwardly to the system--even Ghandian non-violence is not acceptable--for the spirit of resistance and the devotion to a higher authority might then remain, and the individual would not be wholly submissive.

The same compulsion which demands total power over all men within the Soviet state without a single exception, demands total power over all Communist Parties and all states under Soviet domination. Thus Stalin has said that the theory and tactics of Leninism as expounded by the Bolshevik party are mandatory for the proletarian parties of all countries. A true internationalist is defined as one who unhesitatingly upholds the position of the Soviet Union and in the satellite states true patriotism is love of the Soviet Union. By the same token the "peace policy" of the Soviet Union, described at a Party Congress as "a more advantageous form of fighting capitalism", is a device to divide and immobilize the non-Communist world, and the peace the Soviet Union seeks is the peace of total conformity to Soviet policy.

The antipathy of slavery to freedom explains the iron curtain, the isolation, the autarchy of the society whose end is absolute power. The existence and persistence of the idea of freedom is a permanent and continuous threat to the foundation of the slave society; and it therefore regards as intolerable the long continued existence of freedom in the world. What is new, what makes the continuing crisis, is the polarization of power which now inescapably confronts the slave society with the free.

The assault on free institutions is world-wide now, and in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere. The shock we sustained in the destruction of Czechoslovakia was not in the measure of Czechoslovakia's material importance to us. In a material sense, her capabilities were already at Soviet disposal. But when the integrity of Czechoslovak institutions was destroyed, it was in the intangible scale of values that we registered a loss more damaging than the material loss we had already suffered.

Thus unwillingly our free society finds itself mortally challenged by the Soviet system. No other value system is so wholly irreconcilable with ours, so implacable in its purpose to destroy ours, so capable of turning to its own uses the most dangerous and divisive trends in our own society, no other so skillfully and powerfully evokes the elements of irrationality in human nature everywhere, and no other has the support of a great and growing center of military power.

B. Objectives:

The objectives of a free society are determined by its fundamental values and by the necessity for maintaining the material environment in which they flourish. Logically and in fact, therefore, the Kremlin's challenge to the United States is directed not only to our values but to our physical capacity to protect their environment. It is a challenge which encompasses both peace and war and our objectives in peace and war must take account of it.

1. Thus we must make ourselves strong, both in the way in which we affirm our values in the conduct of our national life, and in the development of our military and economic strength.

2. We must lead in building a successfully functioning political and economic system in the free world. It is only by practical affirmation, abroad as well as at home, of our essential values, that we can preserve our own integrity, in which lies the real frustration of the Gremlin design.

3. But beyond thus affirming our values our policy and actions must be such as to foster a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system, a change toward which the frustration of the design is the first and perhaps the most important step. Clearly it will not only be less costly but more effective if this change occurs to a maximum extent as a result of internal forces in Soviet society.

In a shrinking world, which now faces the threat of atomic warfare, it is not an adequate objective merely to seek to check the Kremlin design, for the absence of order among nations is becoming less and less tolerable. This fact imposes on us, in our own interests, the responsibility of world leadership. It demands that we make the attempt, and accept the risks inherent in it, to bring about order and justice by means consistent with the principles of freedom and democracy. We should limit our requirement of the Soviet Union to its participation with other nations on the basis of equality and respect for the rights of others. Subject to this requirement, we must with our allies and the former subject peoples seek to create a world society based on the principle of consent. Its framework cannot be inflexible. It will consist of many national communities of great and varying

abilities and resources, and hence of war potential. The seeds of conflicts will inevitably exist or will come into being. To acknowledge this is only to acknowledge the impossibility of a final solution. Not to acknowledge it can be fatally dangerous in a world in which there are no final solutions.

All these objectives of a free society are equally valid and necessary in peace and war. But every consideration of devotion to our fundamental values and to our national security demands that we seek to achieve them by the strategy of the cold war. It is only by developing the moral and material strength of the free world that the Soviet regime will become convinced of the falsity of its assumptions and that the pre-conditions for workable agreements can be created. By practically demonstrating the integrity and vitality of our system the free world widens the area of possible agreement and thus can hope gradually to bring about a Soviet acknowledgement of realities which in sum will eventually constitute a frustration of the Soviet design. Short of this, however, it might be possible to create a situation which will induce the Soviet Union to accommodate itself, with or without the conscious abandonment of its design, to coexistence on tolerable terms with the non-Soviet world. Such a development would be a triumph for the idea of freedom and democracy. It must be an immediate objective of United States policy.

There is no reason, in the event of war, for us to alter our over-all objectives. They do not include unconditional surrender, the subjugation of the Russian peoples or a Russia shorn of its economic potential. Such a course would irrevocably unite the Russian people behind the regime which enslaves them. Rather these objectives contemplate Soviet acceptance of the specific and limited conditions requisite to an international environment in which free institutions can flourish, and in which the Russian peoples will have a new chance to work out their own destiny. If we can make the Russian people our allies in this enterprise we will obviously have made our task easier and victory more certain.

The objectives outlined in NSC 20/4 (November 23, 1948) and quoted in Chapter X, are fully consistent with the objectives stated in this paper, and they remain valid. The growing intensity of the conflict which has been imposed upon us, however, requires the changes of emphasis and the additions that are apparent. Coupled with the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union, the intensifying struggle requires us to face the fact that we can expect no lasting abatement of the crisis unless and until a change occurs in the nature of the Soviet system.

C. Means:

The free society is limited in its choice of means to achieve its ends.

Compulsion is the negation of freedom, except when it is used to enforce the rights common to all. The resort to force, internally or externally, is therefore a last resort for a free society. The act is permissible only when one individual or groups of individuals within it threaten the basic rights of other individuals or when another society seeks to impose its will upon it. The free society cherishes and protects as fundamental the rights of the minority against the will of a majority, because these rights are the inalienable rights of each and every individual.

The resort to force, to compulsion, to the imposition of its will is therefore a difficult and dangerous act for a free society, which is warranted only in the face of even greater dangers. The necessity of the act must be clear and compelling; the act must commend itself to the overwhelming majority as an inescapable exception to the basic idea of freedom; or the regenerative capacity of free men after the act has been performed will be endangered.

The Kremlin is able to select whatever means are expedient in seeking to carry out its fundamental design. Thus it can make the best of several possible worlds, conducting the struggle on those levels where it considers it profitable and enjoying the benefits of a pseudo-peace on those levels where it is not ready for a contest. At the ideological or psychological level, in the struggle for men's minds, the conflict is world-wide. At the political and economic level, within states and in the relations between states, the struggle for power is being intensified. And at the military level, the Kremlin has thus far been careful not to commit a technical breach of the peace, although using its vast forces to intimidate its neighbors, and to support an aggressive foreign policy, and not hesitating through its agents to resort to arms in favorable circumstances. The attempt to carry out its fundamental design is being pressed, therefore, with all means which are believed expedient in the present situation, and the Kremlin has inextricably engaged us in the conflict between its design and our purpose.

We have no such freedom of choice, and least of all in the use of force. Resort to war is not only a last resort for a free society, but it is also an act which cannot definitively end the fundamental conflict in the realm of ideas. The idea of slavery can only be overcome by the timely and persistent demonstration of the superiority of the idea of freedom. Military victory alone would only partially and perhaps only temporarily affect the fundamental conflict, for although the ability of the Kremlin to threaten our security might be for a time destroyed, the resurgence of totalitarian forces and the re-establishment of the Soviet system or its equivalent would not be long delayed unless great progress were made in the fundamental conflict.

Practical and ideological considerations therefore both impel us to the conclusion that we have no choice but to demonstrate the

superiority of the idea of freedom by its constructive application, and to attempt to change the world situation by means short of war in such a way as to frustrate the Kremlin design and hasten the decay of the Soviet system.

For us the role of military power is to serve the national purpose by deterring an attack upon us while we seek by other means to create an environment in which our free society can flourish, and by fighting, if necessary, to defend the integrity and vitality of our free society and to defeat any aggressor. The Kremlin uses Soviet military power to back up and serve the Kremlin design. It does not hesitate to use military force aggressively if that course is expedient in the achievement of its design. The differences between our fundamental purpose and the Kremlin design, therefore, are reflected in our respective attitudes toward and use of military force.

Our free society, confronted by a threat to its basic values, naturally will take such action, including the use of military force, as may be required to protect those values. The integrity of our system will not be jeopardized by any measures, covert or overt, violent or non-violent, which serve the purposes of frustrating the Kremlin design, nor does the necessity for conducting ourselves so as to affirm our values in actions as well as words forbid such measures, provided only they are appropriately calculated to that end and are not so excessive or misdirected as to make us enemies of the people instead of the evil men who have enslaved them.

But if war comes, what is the role of force? Unless we so use it that the Russian people can perceive that our effort is directed against the regime and its power for aggression, and not against their own interests, we will unite the regime and the people in the kind of last ditch fight in which no underlying problems are solved, new ones are created, and where our basic principles are obscured and compromised. If we do not in the application of force demonstrate the nature of our objectives we will, in fact, have compromised from the outset our fundamental purpose. In the words of the Federalist (No. 28) "The means to be employed must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief." The mischief may be a global war or it may be a Soviet campaign for limited objectives. In either case we should take no avoidable initiative which would cause it to become a war of annihilation, and if we have the forces to defeat a Soviet drive for limited objectives it may well be to our interest not to let it become a global war. Our aim in applying force must be to compel the acceptance of terms consistent with our objectives, and our capabilities for the application of force should, therefore, within the limits of what we can sustain over the long pull, be congruent to the range of tasks which we may encounter.

V. SOVIET INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIESA. Political and Psychological

The Kremlin's design for world domination begins at home. The first concern of a despotic oligarchy is that the local base of its power and authority be secure. The massive fact of the iron curtain isolating the Soviet peoples from the outside world, the repeated political purges within the U.S.S.R. and the institutionalized crimes of the MVD are evidence that the Kremlin does not feel secure at home and that "the entire coercive force of the socialist state" is more than ever one of seeking to impose its absolute authority over "the economy, manner of life, and consciousness of people", (Vyshinski, "The Law of the Soviet State", P. 74). Similar evidence in the satellite states of Eastern Europe leads to the conclusion that this same policy, in less advanced phases, is being applied to the Kremlin's colonial areas.

Being a totalitarian dictatorship, the Kremlin's objectives in these policies is the total subjective submission of the peoples now under its control. The concentration camp is the prototype of the society which these policies are designed to achieve, a society in which the personality of the individual is so broken and perverted that he participates affirmatively in his own degradation.

The Kremlin's policy toward areas not under its control is the elimination of resistance to its will and the extension of its influence and control. It is driven to follow this policy because it cannot, for the reasons set forth in Chapter IV, tolerate the existence of free societies; to the Kremlin the most mild and inoffensive free society is an affront, a challenge and a subversive influence. Given the nature of the Kremlin, and the evidence at hand, it seems clear that the ends toward which this policy is directed are the same as those where its control has already been established.

The means employed by the Kremlin in pursuit of this policy are limited only by considerations of expediency. Doctrine is not a limiting factor; rather it dictates the employment of violence, subversion and deceit, and rejects moral considerations. In any event, the Kremlin's conviction of its own infallibility has made its devotion to theory so subjective that past or present pronouncements as to doctrine offer no reliable guide to future actions. The only apparent restraints on resort to war are, therefore, calculations of practicality.

With particular reference to the United States, the Kremlin's strategic and tactical policy is affected by its estimate that we are not only the greatest immediate obstacle which stands between

it and world domination, we are also the only power which could release forces in the free and Soviet worlds which could destroy it. The Kremlin's policy toward us is consequently animated by a peculiarly virulent blend of hatred and fear. Its strategy has been one of attempting to undermine the complex of forces, in this country and in the rest of the free world, on which our power is based. In this it has both adhered to doctrine and followed the sound principle of seeking maximum results with minimum risks and commitments. The present application of this strategy is a new form of expression for traditional Russian caution. However, there is no justification in Soviet theory or practice for predicting that, should the Kremlin become convinced that it could cause our downfall by one conclusive blow, it would not seek that solution.

In considering the capabilities of the Soviet world, it is of prime importance to remember that, in contrast to ours, they are being drawn upon close to the maximum possible extent. Also in contrast to us, the Soviet world can do more with less, - it has a lower standard of living, its economy requires less to keep it functioning and its military machine operates effectively with less elaborate equipment and organization.

The capabilities of the Soviet world are being exploited to the full because the Kremlin is inescapably militant. It is inescapably militant because it possesses and is possessed by a world-wide revolutionary movement, because it is the inheritor of Russian imperialism and because it is a totalitarian dictatorship. Persistent crisis, conflict and expansion are the essence of the Kremlin's militancy. This dynamism serves to intensify all Soviet capabilities.

Two enormous organizations, the Communist Party and the secret police, are an outstanding source of strength to the Kremlin. In the Party, it has an apparatus designed to impose at home an ideological uniformity among its people and to act abroad as an instrument of propaganda, subversion and espionage. In its police apparatus, it has a domestic repressive instrument guaranteeing under present circumstances the continued security of the Kremlin. The demonstrated capabilities of these two basic organizations, operating openly or in disguise, in mass or through single agents, is unparalleled in history. The party, the police and the conspicuous might of the Soviet military machine together tend to create an overall impression of irresistible Soviet power among many peoples of the free world.

The ideological pretensions of the Kremlin are another great source of strength. Its identification of the Soviet system with communism, its peace campaigns and its championing of colonial peoples may be viewed with apathy, if not cynicism, by the oppressed

totalitarian of the Soviet world, but in the free world these ideas find favorable responses in vulnerable segments of society. They have found a particularly receptive audience in Asia, especially as the Asiatics have been impressed by what has been plausibly portrayed to them as the rapid advance of the U.S.S.R. from a backward society to a position of great world power. Thus, in its pretensions to being (a) the source of a new universal faith and (b) the model "scientific" society, the Kremlin cynically identifies itself with the genuine aspirations of large numbers of people, and places itself at the head of an international crusade with all of the benefits which derive therefrom.

Finally, there is a category of capabilities, strictly speaking neither institutional nor ideological, which should be taken into consideration. The extraordinary flexibility of Soviet tactics is certainly a strength. It derives from the utterly amoral and opportunistic conduct of Soviet policy. Combining this quality with the elements of secrecy, the Kremlin possesses a formidable capacity to act with the widest tactical latitude, with stealth and with speed.

The greatest vulnerability of the Kremlin lies in the basic nature of its relations with the Soviet people.

That relationship is characterized by universal suspicion, fear and denunciation. It is a relationship in which the Kremlin relies, not only for its power but its very survival, on intricately devised mechanisms of coercion. The Soviet monolith is held together by the iron curtain around it and the iron bars within it, not by any force of natural cohesion. These artificial mechanisms of unity have never been intelligently challenged by a strong outside force. The full measure of their vulnerability is therefore not yet evident.

The Kremlin's relations with its satellites and their peoples is likewise a vulnerability. Nationalism still remains the most potent emotional-political force. The well-known ills of colonialism are compounded, however, by the excessive demands of the Kremlin that its satellites accept not only the imperial authority of Moscow but that they believe in and proclaim the ideological primacy and infallibility of the Kremlin. These excessive requirements can be made good only through extreme coercion. The result is that if a satellite feels able to effect its independence of the Kremlin, as Tito was able to do, it is likely to break away.

In short, Soviet ideas and practices run counter to the best and potentially the strongest instincts of men, and deny their most fundamental aspirations. Against an adversary which effectively affirmed the constructive and hopeful instincts of men and was capable of fulfilling their fundamental aspirations, the Soviet system might prove to be fatally weak.

The problem of succession to Stalin is also a Kremlin vulnerability. In a system where supreme power is acquired and held through violence and intimidation, the transfer of that power may well produce a period of instability.

In a very real sense, the Kremlin is a victim of its own dynamism. This dynamism can become a weakness if it is frustrated, if in its forward thrusts it encounters a superior force which halts the expansion and exerts a superior counterpressure. Yet the Kremlin cannot relax the condition of crisis and mobilization, for to do so would be to lose its dynamism, whereas the seeds of decay within the Soviet system would begin to flourish and fructify.

The Kremlin is, of course, aware of these weaknesses. It must know that in the present world situation they are of secondary significance. So long as the Kremlin retains the initiative, so long as it can keep on the offensive unchallenged by clearly superior counter-force--spiritual as well as material--its vulnerabilities are largely inoperative and even concealed by its successes. The Kremlin has not yet been given real reason to fear and be diverted by the rot within its system.

B. Economic

The Kremlin has no economic intentions unrelated to its overall policies. Economics in the Soviet world is not an end in itself. The Kremlin's policy, in so far as it has to do with economics, is to utilize economic processes to contribute to the overall strength, particularly the war-making capacity of the Soviet system. The material welfare of the totalitariat is severely subordinated to the interests of the system.

As for capabilities, even granting optimistic Soviet reports of production, the total economic strength of the U.S.S.R. compares with that of the U.S. as roughly one to four. This is reflected not only in gross national product (1949: U.S.S.R. \$65 billion; U.S. \$250 billion), but in production of key commodities in 1949:

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>U.S.S.R.</u>	<u>U.S.S.R. and European Orbit Combined</u>
Ingot Steel (Million Met. tons)	80.4	21.5	28.0
Primary aluminum (thousands Met. tons)	617.6	130-135	140-145
Electric power (billion kwh.)	410	72	112
Crude oil (million Met. tons)	276.5	33.0	38.9

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Assuming the maintenance of present policies, while a large U.S. advantage is likely to remain, the Soviet Union will be steadily reducing the discrepancy between its overall economic strength and that of the U.S. by continuing to devote proportionately more to capital investment than the U.S.

But a full-scale effort by the U.S. would be capable of precipitately altering this trend. The U.S.S.R. today is on a near maximum production basis. No matter what efforts Moscow might make, only a relatively slight change in the rate of increase in overall production could be brought about. In the U.S., on the other hand, a very rapid absolute expansion could be realized. The fact remains, however, that so long as the Soviet Union is virtually mobilized, and the United States has scarcely begun to summon up its forces, the greater capabilities of the U.S. are to that extent inoperative in the struggle for power. Moreover, as the Soviet attainment of an atomic capability has demonstrated, the totalitarian state, at least in time of peace, can focus its efforts on any given project far more readily than the democratic state.

In other fields--general technological competence, skilled labor resources, productivity of labor force, etc.-- the gap between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. roughly corresponds to the gap in production. In the field of scientific research, however, the margin of United States superiority is unclear, especially if the Kremlin can utilize European talents.

C. Military

The Soviet Union is developing the military capacity to support its design for world domination. The Soviet Union actually possesses armed forces far in excess of those necessary to defend its national territory. These armed forces are probably not yet considered by the Soviet Union to be sufficient to initiate a war which would involve the United States. This excessive strength, coupled now with an atomic capability, provides the Soviet Union with great coercive power for use in time of peace in furtherance of its objectives and serves as a deterrent to the victims of its aggression from taking any action in opposition to its tactics which would risk war.

Should a major war occur in 1950 the Soviet Union and its satellites are considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be in a sufficiently advanced state of preparation immediately to undertake and carry out the following campaigns.

- a. To overrun Western Europe, with the possible exception of the Iberian and Scandinavian Peninsulas; to drive toward the oil-bearing areas of the Near and

Middle East; and to consolidate Communist gains in the Far East;

b. To launch air attacks against the British Isles and air and sea attacks against the lines of communications of the Western Powers in the Atlantic and the Pacific;

c. To attack selected targets with atomic weapons, now including the likelihood of such attacks against targets in Alaska, Canada, and the United States. Alternatively, this capability, coupled with other actions open to the Soviet Union, might deny the United Kingdom as an effective base of operations for allied forces. It also should be possible for the Soviet Union to prevent any allied "Normandy" type amphibious operations intended to force a re-entry into the continent of Europe.

After the Soviet Union completed its initial campaigns and consolidated its positions in the Western European area, it could simultaneously conduct:

a. Full-scale air and limited sea operations against the British Isles;

b. Invasions of the Iberian and Scandinavian Peninsulas;

c. Further operations in the Near and Middle East, continued air operations against the North American continent, and air and sea operations against Atlantic and Pacific lines of communication; and

d. Diversionary attacks in other areas.

During the course of the offensive operations listed in the second and third paragraphs above, the Soviet Union will have an air defense capability with respect to the vital areas of its own and its satellites' territories which can oppose but cannot prevent allied air operations against these areas.

It is not known whether the Soviet Union possesses war reserves and arsenal capabilities sufficient to supply its satellite armies or even its own forces throughout a long war. It might not be in the interest of the Soviet Union to equip fully its satellite armies, since the possibility of defections would exist.

It is not possible at this time to assess accurately the finite disadvantages to the Soviet Union which may accrue through the implementation of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. It should be expected that, as this implementation progresses, the internal security situation of the recipient nations should improve concurrently. In addition, a strong United States military position, plus increases in the armaments of the nations of Western Europe, should strengthen the determination of the recipient nations to counter Soviet moves and in event of war could be considered as likely to delay operations and increase the time required for the Soviet Union to overrun Western Europe. In all probability, although United States backing will stiffen their determination, the armaments increase under the present aid programs will not be of any major consequence prior to 1952. Unless the military strength of the Western European nations is increased on a much larger scale than under current programs and at an accelerated rate, it is more than likely that those nations will not be able to oppose even by 1960 the Soviet armed forces in war with any degree of effectiveness. Considering the Soviet Union military capability, the long-range allied military objective in Western Europe must envisage an increased military strength in that area sufficient possibly to deter the Soviet Union from a major war or, in any event, to delay materially the overrunning of Western Europe and, if feasible, to hold a bridgehead on the continent against Soviet Union offensives.

We do not know accurately what the Soviet atomic capability is but the Central Intelligence Agency intelligence estimates, concurred in by State, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Atomic Energy Commission, assign to the Soviet Union a production capability giving it a fission bomb stockpile within the following ranges:

By mid-1950	10- 20
By mid-1951	25- 45
By mid-1952	45- 90
By mid-1953	70- 135
By mid-1954	200

This estimate is admittedly based on incomplete coverage of Soviet activities and represents the production capabilities of known or deducible Soviet plants. If others exist, as is possible, this estimate could lead us into a feeling of superiority in our atomic stockpile that might be dangerously misleading, particularly with regard to the timing of a possible Soviet offensive. On the other hand, if the Soviet Union experiences operating difficulties, this estimate would be reduced. There is some evidence that the Soviet Union is acquiring certain materials essential to research on and development of thermonuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union now has aircraft able to deliver the atomic bomb. Our intelligence estimates assign to the Soviet Union an atomic bomber capability already in excess of that needed to deliver available bombs. We have at present no evaluated estimate regarding the Soviet accuracy of delivery on target. It is believed that the Soviets cannot deliver their bombs on target with a degree of accuracy comparable to ours, but a planning estimate might well place it at 40-60 percent of bombs sortied. For planning purposes, therefore, the date the Soviets possess an atomic stockpile of 200 bombs would be a critical date for the United States for the delivery of 100 atomic bombs on targets in the United States would seriously damage this country.

At the time the Soviet Union has a substantial atomic stockpile and if it is assumed that it will strike a strong surprise blow and if it is assumed further that its atomic attacks will be met with no more effective defense opposition than the United States and its allies have programmed, results of those attacks could include:

- a. Laying waste to the British Isles and thus depriving the Western Powers of their use as a base;
- b. Destruction of the vital centers and of the communications of Western Europe, thus precluding effective defense by the Western Powers; and
- c. Delivering devastating attacks on certain vital centers of the United States and Canada.

The possession by the Soviet Union of a thermonuclear capability in addition to this substantial atomic stockpile would result in tremendously increased damage.

During this decade, the defensive capabilities of the Soviet Union will probably be strengthened particularly by the development and use of modern aircraft, aircraft warning and communications devices, and defensive guided missiles.

VI. U.S. INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES--ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL

A. Political and Psychological

Our overall policy at the present time may be described as one designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish. It therefore rejects the concept of isolation and affirms the necessity of our positive participation in the world community.

This broad intention embraces two subsidiary policies. One is a policy which we would probably pursue even if there were no Soviet threat. It is a policy of attempting to develop a healthy international community. The other is the policy of "containing" the Soviet system. These two policies are closely interrelated and interact on one another. Nevertheless, the distinction between them is basically valid and contributes to a clearer understanding of what we are trying to do.

The policy of striving to develop a healthy international community is the long-term constructive effort which we are engaged in. It was this policy which gave rise to our vigorous sponsorship of the United Nations. It is of course the principal reason for our long continuing endeavors to create and now develop the Inter-American system. It, as much as containment, underlay our efforts to rehabilitate Western Europe. Most of our international economic activities can likewise be explained in terms of this policy.

In a world of polarized power, the policies designed to develop a healthy international community are more than ever necessary to our own strength.

As for the policy of "containment", it is one which seeks by all means short of war to (1) block further expansion of Soviet power, (2) expose the falsities of Soviet pretensions, (3) induce a retraction of the Kremlin's control and influence and (4) in general, so foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system that the Kremlin is brought at least to the point of modifying its behavior to conform to generally accepted international standards.

It was and continues to be cardinal in this policy that we possess superior overall power in ourselves or in dependable combination with other like-minded nations. One of the most important ingredients of power is military strength. In the concept of "containment", the maintenance of a strong military posture is deemed to be essential for two reasons: (1) as an ultimate guarantee of our national security and (2) as an indispensable backdrop to the conduct of the policy of "containment". Without

superior aggregate military strength, in being and readily mobilizable, a policy of "containment"--which is in effect a policy of calculated and gradual coercion--is no more than a policy of bluff.

At the same time, it is essential to the successful conduct of a policy of "containment" that we always leave open the possibility of negotiation with the U.S.S.R. A diplomatic freeze--and we are in one now--tends to defeat the very purposes of "containment" because it raises tensions at the same time that it makes Soviet retractions and adjustments in the direction of moderated behavior more difficult. It also tends to inhibit our initiative and deprives us of opportunities for maintaining a moral ascendancy in our struggle with the Soviet system.

In "containment" it is desirable to exert pressure in a fashion which will avoid so far as possible directly challenging Soviet prestige, to keep open the possibility for the U.S.S.R. to retreat before pressure with a minimum loss of face and to secure political advantage from the failure of the Kremlin to yield or take advantage of the openings we leave it.

We have failed to implement adequately these two fundamental aspects of "containment". In the face of obviously mounting Soviet military strength ours has declined relatively. Partly as a by-product of this, but also for other reasons, we now find ourselves at a diplomatic impasse with the Soviet Union, with the Kremlin growing bolder, with both of us holding on grimly to what we have and with ourselves facing difficult decisions.

In examining our capabilities it is relevant to ask at the outset--capabilities for what? The answer cannot be stated solely in the negative terms of resisting the Kremlin design. It includes also our capabilities to attain the fundamental purpose of the United States, and to foster a world environment in which our free society can survive and flourish.

Potentially we have these capabilities. We know we have them in the economic and military fields. Potentially we also have them in the political and psychological fields. The vast majority of Americans are confident that the system of values which animates our society--the principles of freedom, tolerance, the importance of the individual and the supremacy of reason over will--are valid and more vital than the ideology which is the fuel of Soviet dynamism. Translated into terms relevant to the lives of other peoples--our system of values can become perhaps a powerful appeal to millions who now seek or find in authoritarianism a refuge from anxieties, bafflement and insecurity.

Essentially, our democracy also possesses a unique degree of unity. Our society is fundamentally more cohesive than the Soviet

system, the solidarity of which is artificially created through force, fear and favor. This means that expressions of national consensus in our society are soundly and solidly based. It means that the possibility of revolution in this country is fundamentally less than that in the Soviet system.

These capabilities within us constitute a great potential force in our international relations. The potential within us of bearing witness to the values by which we live holds promise for a dynamic manifestation to the rest of the world of the vitality of our system. The essential tolerance of our world outlook, our generous and constructive impulses, and the absence of covetousness in our international relations are assets of potentially enormous influence.

These then are our potential capabilities. Between them and our capabilities currently being utilized is a wide gap of un-actualized power. In sharp contrast is the situation of the Soviet world. Its capabilities are inferior to those of our Allies and to our own. But they are mobilized close to the maximum possible extent.

The full power which resides within the American people will be evoked only through the traditional democratic process: This process requires, firstly, that sufficient information regarding the basic political, economic and military elements of the present situation be made publicly available so that an intelligent popular opinion may be formed. Having achieved a comprehension of the issues now confronting this Republic, it will then be possible for the American people and the American Government to arrive at a consensus. Out of this common view will develop a determination of the national will and a solid resolute expression of that will. The initiative in this process lies with the Government.

The democratic way is harder than the authoritarian way because, in seeking to protect and fulfill the individual, it demands of him understanding, judgment and positive participation in the increasingly complex and exacting problems of the modern world. It demands that he exercise discrimination: that while pursuing through free inquiry the search for truth he knows when he should commit an act of faith; that he distinguish between the necessity for tolerance and the necessity for just suppression. A free society is vulnerable in that it is easy for people to lapse into excesses--the excesses of a permanently open mind wishfully waiting for evidence that evil design may become noble purpose, the excess of faith becoming prejudice, the excess of tolerance degenerating into indulgence of conspiracy and the excess of resorting to suppression when more moderate measures are not only more appropriate but more effective.

In coping with dictatorial governments acting in secrecy and with speed, we are also vulnerable in that the democratic process necessarily operates in the open and at a deliberate tempo. Weaknesses in our situation are readily apparent and subject to immediate exploitation. This Government therefore cannot afford in the face of the totalitarian challenge to operate on a narrow margin of strength. A democracy can compensate for its natural vulnerability only if it maintains clearly superior overall power in its most inclusive sense.

The very virtues of our system likewise handicap us in certain respects in our relations with our allies. While it is a general source of strength to us that our relations with our allies are conducted on a basis of persuasion and consent rather than compulsion and capitulation, it is also evident that dissent among us can become a vulnerability. Sometimes the dissent has its principal roots abroad in situations about which we can do nothing. Sometimes it arises largely out of certain weaknesses within ourselves, about which we can do something--our native impetuosity and a tendency to expect too much from people widely divergent from us.

The full capabilities of the rest of the free world are a potential increment to our own capabilities. It may even be said that the capabilities of the Soviet world, specifically the capabilities of the masses who have nothing to lose but their Soviet chains, are a potential which can be enlisted on our side.

Like our own capabilities, those of the rest of the free world exceed the capabilities of the Soviet system. Like our own they are far from being effectively mobilized and employed in the struggle against the Kremlin design. This is so because the rest of the free world lacks a sense of unity, confidence and common purpose. This is true in even the most homogeneous and advanced segment of the free world--Western Europe.

As we ourselves demonstrate power, confidence and a sense of moral and political direction, so those same qualities will be evoked in Western Europe. In such a situation, we may also anticipate a general improvement in the political tone in Latin America, Asia and Africa and the real beginnings of awakening among the Soviet totalitariat.

In the absence of affirmative decision on our part, the rest of the free world is almost certain to become demoralized. Our friends will become more than a liability to us; they can eventually become a positive increment to Soviet power.

In sum, the capabilities of our allies are, in an important sense, a function of our own. An affirmative decision to summon up the potential within ourselves would evoke the potential strength within others and add it to our own.

B. Economic

1. Capabilities. In contrast to the war economy of the Soviet world (cf. Ch. V-B), the American economy (and the economy of the free world as a whole) is at present directed to the provision of rising standards of living. The military budget of the United States represents 6 to 7 percent of its gross national product (as against 13.8 percent for the Soviet Union). Our North Atlantic Treaty allies devoted 4.8 percent of their national product to military purposes in 1949.

This difference in emphasis between the two economies means that the readiness of the free world to support a war effort is tending to decline relative to that of the Soviet Union. There is little direct investment in production facilities for military end-products and in dispersal. There are relatively few men receiving military training and a relatively low rate of production of weapons. However, given time to convert to a war effort, the capabilities of the United States economy and also of the Western European economy would be tremendous. In the light of Soviet military capabilities, a question which may be of decisive importance in the event of war is the question whether there will be time to mobilize our superior human and material resources for a war effort (cf. Chs. VIII and IX).

The capability of the American economy to support a build-up of economic and military strength at home and to assist a build-up abroad is limited not, as in the case of the Soviet Union, so much by the ability to produce as by the decision on the proper allocation of resources to this and other purposes. Even Western Europe could afford to assign a substantially larger proportion of its resources to defense, if the necessary foundation in public understanding and will could be laid, and if the assistance needed to meet its dollar deficit were provided.

A few statistics will help to clarify this point.

Percentage of Gross Available Resources
Allocated to Investment, National Defense,
and Consumption in East & West, 1949.

(in percent of total)

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>GROSS INVESTMENT</u>	<u>DEFENSE</u>	<u>CONSUMPTION</u>
U.S.S.R.	25.4	13.8	60.8
Soviet Orbit	22.0 a/	4.0 b/	74.0 a/

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<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>GROSS INVESTMENT</u>	<u>DEFENSE</u>	<u>CONSUMPTION</u>
U.S.	13.6	6.5	79.9
European NAP countries	20.4	4.8	74.8

a/ Crude estimate.

b/ Includes Soviet Zone of Germany; otherwise 5 percent.

The Soviet Union is now allocating nearly 40 percent of its gross available resources to military purposes and investment, much of which is in war-supporting industries. It is estimated that even in an emergency the Soviet Union could not increase this proportion to much more than 50 percent, or by one-fourth. The United States, on the other hand, is allocating only about 20 percent of its resources to defense and investment (or 22 percent including foreign assistance), and little of its investment outlays are directed to war-supporting industries. In an emergency the United States could allocate more than 50 percent of its resources to military purposes and foreign assistance, or five to six times as much as at present.

The same point can be brought out by statistics on the use of important products. The Soviet Union is using 14 percent of its ingot steel, 47 percent of its primary aluminum, and 18.5 percent of its crude oil for military purposes, while the corresponding percentages for the United States are 1.7, 8.6, and 5.6. Despite the tremendously larger production of these goods in the United States than the Soviet Union, the latter is actually using, for military purposes, nearly twice as much steel as the United States and 8 to 26 percent more aluminum.

Perhaps the most impressive indication of the economic superiority of the free world over the Soviet world which can be made on the basis of available data is provided in the following comparisons (based mainly on the Economic Survey of Europe, 1948):

Comparative Statistics on Economic
Capabilities of East and West

	<u>U.S. 1948-9</u>	<u>European NAT Countries 1948-9</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>USSR (1950 Plan)</u>	<u>Satel- lites 1948-9</u>	<u>Total</u>
Population (millions)	149	173	322	198 a/	75	273
Employment in non-Agricultural Establishments (millions)	45	--	--	31 a/	--	--
Gross National Production (billion dollars)	250	84	334	65 a/	21	86
National Income per capita (current dollars)	1700	480	1040	330	280	315
Production Data ^{b/} :						
Coal (million tons)	582	306	888	250	88	338
Electric Power (billion KWH)	356	124	480	82	15	97
Crude Petroleum (million tons)	277	1	278	35	5	40
Pig Iron (million tons)	55	24	79	19.5	3.2	22.7
Steel (million tons)	80	32	112	25	6	31
Cement (million tons)	35	21	56	10.5	2.1	12.6
Motor Vehicles (thousands)	5273	580	5853	500	25	525

a/ 1949 data.

b/ For the European NAT countries and for the satellites,
the data include only output by major producers.

It should be noted that these comparisons understate the relative position of the NAT countries for several reasons: (1) Canada is excluded because comparable data were not available; (2) the data for the U.S.S.R. are the 1950 targets (as stated in the fourth five-year plan) rather than actual rates of production and are believed to exceed in many cases the production actually achieved; (3) the data for the European NAT countries are actual data for 1948, and production has generally increased since that time.

Furthermore, the United States could achieve a substantial absolute increase in output and could thereby increase the allocation of resources to a build-up of the economic and military strength of itself and its allies without suffering a decline in its real standard of living. Industrial production declined by 10 percent between the first quarter of 1948 and the last quarter of 1949, and by approximately one-fourth between 1944 and 1949. In March 1950 there were approximately 4,750,000 unemployed, as compared to 1,070,000 in 1943 and 670,000 in 1944. The gross national product declined slowly in 1949 from the peak reached in 1948 (\$262 billion in 1948 to an annual rate of \$256 billion in the last six months of 1949), and in terms of constant prices declined by about 20 percent between 1944 and 1948.

With a high level of economic activity, the United States could soon attain a gross national product of \$300 billion per year, as was pointed out in the President's Economic Report (January 1950). Progress in this direction would permit, and might itself be aided by, a build-up of the economic and military strength of the United States and the free world; furthermore, if a dynamic expansion of the economy were achieved, the necessary build-up could be accomplished without a decrease in the national standard of living because the required resources could be obtained by siphoning off a part of the annual increment in the gross national product. These are facts of fundamental importance in considering the courses of action open to the United States (cf. CH. IX).

2. Intentions. Foreign economic policy is a major instrument in the conduct of United States foreign relations. It is an instrument which can powerfully influence the world environment in ways favorable to the security and welfare of this country. It is also an instrument which, if unwisely formulated and employed, can do actual harm to our national interests. It is an instrument uniquely suited to our capabilities, provided we have the tenacity of purpose and the understanding requisite to a realization of its potentials. Finally, it is an instrument peculiarly appropriate to the cold war.

The preceding analysis has indicated that an essential element in a program to frustrate the Kremlin design is the develop-

ment of a successfully functioning system among the free nations. It is clear that economic conditions are among the fundamental determinants of the will and the strength to resist subversion and aggression.

United States foreign economic policy has been designed to assist in the building of such a system and such conditions in the free world. The principal features of this policy can be summarized as follows:

- (1) assistance to Western Europe in recovery and the creation of a viable economy (the European Recovery Program);
- (2) assistance to other countries because of their special needs arising out of the war or the cold war and our special interests in or responsibility for meeting them (grant assistance to Japan, the Philippines, and Korea, loans and credits by the Export-Import Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Bank to Indonesia, Yugoslavia, Iran, etc.);
- (3) assistance in the development of under-developed areas (the Point IV program and loans and credits to various countries, overlapping to some extent with those mentioned under 2);
- (4) military assistance to the North Atlantic Treaty countries, Greece, Turkey, etc.;
- (5) restriction of East-West trade in items of military importance to the East;
- (6) purchase and stockpiling of strategic materials; and
- (7) efforts to re-establish an international economy based on multilateral trade, declining trade barriers, and convertible currencies (the GATT-ITO program, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program, the IMF-IBRD program, and the program now being developed to solve the problem of the United States balance of payments).

In both their short and long term aspects, these policies and programs are directed to the strengthening of the free world and therefore to the frustration of the Kremlin design. Despite certain inadequacies and inconsistencies, which are now being studied in connection with the problem of the United States balance of payments, the United States has generally pursued a foreign economic policy which has powerfully supported its overall objectives. The question must nevertheless be asked whether current and currently projected programs will adequately support this policy in the future, in terms both of need and urgency.

The last year has been indecisive in the economic field. The Soviet Union has made considerable progress in integrating the satellite economies of Eastern Europe into the Soviet economy, but still faces very large problems, especially with China. The free nations have important accomplishments to record, but also have tremendous problems still ahead. On balance, neither side can claim any great advantage in this field over its relative position a year ago. The important question therefore becomes: what are the trends?

Several conclusions seem to emerge. First, the Soviet Union is widening the gap between its preparedness for war and the unpreparedness of the free world for war. It is devoting a far greater proportion of its resources to military purposes than are the free nations and, in significant components of military power, a greater absolute quantity of resources. Second, the Communist success in China, taken with the politico-economic situation in the rest of South and South-East Asia, provides a springboard for a further incursion in this troubled area. Although Communist China faces serious economic problems which may impose some strains on the Soviet economy, it is probable that the social and economic problems faced by the free nations in this area present more than offsetting opportunities for Communist expansion. Third, the Soviet Union holds positions in Europe which, if it maneuvers skillfully, could be used to do great damage to the Western European economy and to the maintenance of the Western orientation of certain countries, particularly Germany and Austria. Fourth, despite (and in part because of) the Titoist defection, the Soviet Union has accelerated its efforts to integrate satellite economy with its own and to increase the degree of autarchy within the areas under its control.

Fifth, meanwhile Western Europe, with American (and Canadian) assistance, has achieved a record level of production. However, it faces the prospect of a rapid tapering off of American assistance without the possibility of achieving, by its own efforts, a satisfactory equilibrium with the dollar area. It has also made very little progress toward "economic integration", which would in the long run tend to improve its productivity and to provide an economic environment conducive to political stability. In particular, the movement towards economic integration does not appear to be rapid enough to provide Western Germany with adequate economic opportunities in the West. The United Kingdom still faces economic problems which may require a moderate but politically difficult decline in the British standard of living or more American assistance than is contemplated. At the same time, a strengthening of the British position is needed if the stability of the Commonwealth is not to be impaired and if it is to be a focus of resistance to Communist expansion in South and South-East Asia. Improvement of the British position is also vital in building

up the defensive capabilities of Western Europe.

Sixth, throughout Asia the stability of the present moderate governments, which are more in sympathy with our purposes than any probable successor regimes would be, is doubtful. The problem is only in part an economic one. Assistance in economic development is important as a means of holding out to the peoples of Asia some prospect of improvement in standards of living under their present governments. But probably more important are a strengthening of central institutions, an improvement in administration, and generally a development of an economic and social structure within which the peoples of Asia can make more effective use of their great human and material resources.

Seventh, and perhaps most important, there are indications of a let-down of United States efforts under the pressure of the domestic budgetary situation, disillusion resulting from excessively optimistic expectations about the duration and results of our assistance programs, and doubts about the wisdom of continuing to strengthen the free nations as against preparedness measures in light of the intensity of the cold war.

Eighth, there are grounds for predicting that the United States and other free nations will within a period of a few years at most experience a decline in economic activity of serious proportions unless more positive governmental programs are developed than are now available.

In short, as we look into the future, the programs now planned will not meet the requirements of the free nations. The difficulty does not lie so much in the inadequacy or misdirection of policy as in the inadequacy of planned programs, in terms of timing or impact, to achieve our objectives. The risks inherent in this situation are set forth in the following chapter and a course of action designed to reinvigorate our efforts in order to reverse the present trends and to achieve our fundamental purpose is outlined in Chapter IX.

C. Military

The United States now possesses the greatest military potential of any single nation in the world. The military weaknesses of the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, however, include its numerical inferiority in forces in being and in total manpower. Coupled with the inferiority of forces in being, the United States also lacks tenable positions from which to employ its forces in event of war and munitions power in being and readily available.

It is true that the United States armed forces are now stronger than ever before in other times of apparent peace; it is also true that there exists a sharp disparity between our actual military strength and our commitments. The relationship of our strength to our present commitments, however, is not alone the governing factor. The world situation, as well as commitments, should govern; hence, our military strength more properly should be related to the world situation confronting us. When our military strength is related to the world situation and balanced against the likely exigencies of such a situation, it is clear that our military strength is becoming dangerously inadequate.

If war should begin in 1950, the United States and its allies will have the military capability of conducting defensive operations to provide a reasonable measure of protection to the Western Hemisphere, bases in the Western Pacific, and essential military lines of communication; and an inadequate measure of protection to vital military bases in the United Kingdom and in the Near and Middle East. We will have the capability of conducting powerful offensive air operations against vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity.

The scale of the operations listed in the preceding paragraph is limited by the effective forces and material in being of the United States and its allies vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Consistent with the aggressive threat facing us and in consonance with overall strategic plans, the United States must provide to its allies on a continuing basis as large amounts of military assistance as possible without serious detriment to United States operational requirements.

If the potential military capabilities of the United States and its allies were rapidly and effectively developed, sufficient forces could be produced probably to deter war, or if the Soviet Union chooses war, to withstand the initial Soviet attacks, to stabilize supporting attacks, and to retaliate in turn with even greater impact on the Soviet capabilities. From the military point of view alone, however, this would require not only the generation of the necessary military forces but also the development and stockpiling of improved weapons of all types.

Under existing peacetime conditions, a period of from two to three years is required to produce a material increase in military power. Such increased power could be provided in a somewhat shorter period in a declared period of emergency or in wartime through a full-out national effort. Any increase in military power in peacetime, however, should be related both to its probable military role in war, to the implementation of immediate and long-term United States foreign policy vis-a-vis the

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Soviet Union and to the realities of the existing situation. If such a course of increasing our military power is adopted now, the United States would have the capability of eliminating the disparity between its military strength and the exigencies of the situation we face; eventually of gaining the initiative in the "cold" war and of materially delaying if not stopping the Soviet offensives in war itself.

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VII. PRESENT RISKSA. General

It is apparent from the preceding sections that the integrity and vitality of our system is in greater jeopardy than ever before in our history. Even if there were no Soviet Union we would face the great problem of the free society, accentuated many fold in this industrial age, of reconciling order, security, the need for participation, with the requirements of freedom. We would face the fact that in a shrinking world the absence of order among nations is becoming less and less tolerable. The Kremlin design seeks to impose order among nations by means which would destroy our free and democratic system. The Kremlin's possession of atomic weapons puts new power behind its design, and increases the jeopardy to our system. It adds new strains to the uneasy equilibrium-without-order which exists in the world and raises new doubts in men's minds whether the world will long tolerate this tension without moving toward some kind of order, on somebody's terms.

The risks we face are of a new order of magnitude, commensurate with the total struggle in which we are engaged. For a free society there is never total victory, since freedom and democracy are never wholly attained, are always in the process of being attained. But defeat at the hands of the totalitarian is total defeat. These risks crowd in on us, in a shrinking world of polarized power, so as to give us no choice, ultimately, between meeting them effectively or being overcome by them.

B. Specific

It is quite clear from Soviet theory and practice that the Kremlin seeks to bring the free world under its dominion by the methods of the cold war. The preferred technique is to subvert by infiltration and intimidation. Every institution of our society is an instrument which it is sought to stultify and turn against our purposes. Those that touch most closely our material and moral strength are obviously the prime targets, labor unions, civic enterprises, schools, churches, and all media for influencing opinion. The effort is not so much to make them serve obvious Soviet ends as to prevent them from serving our ends, and thus to make them sources of confusion in our economy, our culture and our body politic. The doubts and diversities that in terms of our values are part of the merit of a free system, the weaknesses and the problems that are peculiar to it, the rights and privileges that free men enjoy, and the disorganization and destruction left in the wake of the last attack on our freedoms, all are but opportunities for the Kremlin to do its evil work. Every advantage is taken of the fact that our means of prevention and retaliation

are limited by those principles and scruples which are precisely the ones that give our freedom and democracy its meaning for us. None of our scruples deter those whose only code is, "morality is that which serves the revolution".

Since everything that gives us or others respect for our institutions is a suitable object for attack, it also fits the Kremlin's design that where, with impunity, we can be insulted and made to suffer indignity the opportunity shall not be missed, particularly in any context which can be used to cast dishonor on our country, our system, our motives, or our methods. Thus the means by which we sought to restore our own economic health in the '30's, and now seek to restore that of the free world, come equally under attack. The military aid by which we sought to help the free world was frantically denounced by the Communists in the early days of the last war, and of course our present efforts to develop adequate military strength for ourselves and our allies are equally denounced.

At the same time the Soviet Union is seeking to create overwhelming military force, in order to back up infiltration with intimidation. In the only terms in which it understands strength, it is seeking to demonstrate to the free world that force and the will to use it are on the side of the Kremlin, that those who lack it are decadent and docmed. In local incidents it threatens and encroaches both for the sake of local gains and to increase anxiety and defeatism in all the free world.

The possession of atomic weapons at each of the opposite poles of power, and the inability (for different reasons) of either side to place any trust in the other, puts a premium on a surprise attack against us. It equally puts a premium on a more violent and ruthless prosecution of its design by cold war, especially if the Kremlin is sufficiently objective to realize the improbability of our prosecuting a preventive war. It also puts a premium on piecemeal aggression against others, counting on our unwillingness to engage in atomic war unless we are directly attacked. We run all these risks and the added risk of being confused and immobilized by our inability to weigh and choose, and pursue a firm course based on a rational assessment of each.

The risk that we may thereby be prevented or too long delayed in taking all needful measures to maintain the integrity and vitality of our system is great. The risk that our allies will lose their determination is greater. And the risk that in this manner a descending spiral of too little and too late, of doubt and recrimination, may present us with ever narrower and more desperate alternatives, is the greatest risk of all. For example, it is clear that our present weakness would prevent us from

offering effective resistance at any of several vital pressure points. The only deterrent we can present to the Kremlin is the evidence we give that we may make any of the critical points which we cannot hold the occasion for a global war of annihilation.

The risk of having no better choice than to capitulate or precipitate a global war at any of a number of pressure points is bad enough in itself, but it is multiplied by the weakness it imparts to our position in the cold war. Instead of appearing strong and resolute we are continually at the verge of appearing and being alternately irresolute and desperate; yet it is the cold war which we must win, because both the Kremlin design, and our fundamental purpose give it the first priority.

The frustration of the Kremlin design, however, cannot be accomplished by us alone, as will appear from the analysis in Chapter IX, B. Strength at the center, in the United States, is only the first of two essential elements. The second is that our allies and potential allies do not as a result of a sense of frustration or of Soviet intimidation drift into a course of neutrality eventually leading to Soviet domination. If this were to happen in Germany the effect upon Western Europe and eventually upon us might be catastrophic.

But there are risks in making ourselves strong. A large measure of sacrifice and discipline will be demanded of the American people. They will be asked to give up some of the benefits which they have come to associate with their freedoms. Nothing could be more important than that they fully understand the reasons for this. The risks of a superficial understanding or of an inadequate appreciation of the issues are obvious and might lead to the adoption of measures which in themselves would jeopardize the integrity of our system. At any point in the process of demonstrating our will to make good our fundamental purpose, the Kremlin may decide to precipitate a general war, or in testing us, may go too far. These are risks we will invite by making ourselves strong, but they are lesser risks than those we seek to avoid. Our fundamental purpose is more likely to be defeated from lack of the will to maintain it, than from any mistakes we may make or assault we may undergo because of asserting that will. No people in history have preserved their freedom who thought that by not being strong enough to protect themselves they might prove inoffensive to their enemies.

VIII. ATOMIC ARMAMENTS

A. Military Evaluation of U. S. and U.S.S.R. Atomic Capabilities.

1. The United States now has an atomic capability, including both numbers and deliverability, estimated to be adequate, if effectively utilized, to deliver a serious blow against the war-making capacity of the U.S.S.R.. It is doubted whether such a blow, even if it resulted in the complete destruction of the contemplated target systems, would cause the U.S.S.R. to sue for terms or prevent Soviet forces from occupying Western Europe against such ground resistance as could presently be mobilized. A very serious initial blow could, however, so reduce the capabilities of the U.S.S.R. to supply and equip its military organization and its civilian population as to give the United States the prospect of developing a general military superiority in a war of long duration.

2. As the atomic capability of the U.S.S.R. increases, it will have an increased ability to hit at our atomic bases and installations and thus seriously hamper the ability of the United States to carry out an attack such as that outlined above. It is quite possible that in the near future the U.S.S.R. will have a sufficient number of atomic bombs and a sufficient deliverability to raise a question whether Britain with its present inadequate air defense could be relied upon as an advance base from which a major portion of the U. S. attack could be launched.

It is estimated that, within the next four years, the U.S.S.R. will attain the capability of seriously damaging vital centers of the United States, provided it strikes a surprise blow and provided further that the blow is opposed by no more effective opposition than we now have programmed. Such a blow could so seriously damage the United States as to greatly reduce its superiority in economic potential.

Effective opposition to this Soviet capability will require among other measures greatly increased air warning systems, air defenses, and vigorous development and implementation of a civilian defense program which has been thoroughly integrated with the military defense systems.

In time the atomic capability of the U.S.S.R. can be expected to grow to a point where, given surprise and no more effective opposition than we now have programmed, the possibility of a decisive initial attack cannot be excluded.

3. In the initial phases of an atomic war, the advantages of initiative and surprise would be very great. A police state living behind an iron curtain has an enormous advantage in maintaining the necessary security and centralization of decision required to capitalize on this advantage.

4. For the moment our atomic retaliatory capability is probably adequate to deter the Kremlin from a deliberate direct military attack against ourselves or other free peoples. However, when it calculates that it has a sufficient atomic capability to make a surprise attack on us, nullifying our atomic superiority and creating a military situation decisively in its favor, the Kremlin might be tempted to strike swiftly and with stealth. The existence of two large atomic capabilities in such a relationship might well act, therefore, not as a deterrent, but as an incitement to war.

5. A further increase in the number and power of our atomic weapons is necessary in order to assure the effectiveness of any U. S. retaliatory blow, but would not of itself seem to change the basic logic of the above points. Greatly increased general air, ground and sea strength, and increased air defense and civilian defense programs would also be necessary to provide reasonable assurance that the free world could survive an initial surprise atomic attack of the weight which it is estimated the U.S.S.R. will be capable of delivering by 1954 and still permit the free world to go on to the eventual attainment of its objectives. Furthermore, such a build-up of strength could safeguard and increase our retaliatory power, and thus might put off for some time the date when the Soviet Union could calculate that a surprise blow would be advantageous. This would provide additional time for the effects of our policies to produce a modification of the Soviet system.

6. If the U.S.S.R. develops a thermonuclear weapon ahead of the U. S., the risks of greatly increased Soviet pressure against all the free world, or an attack against the U. S., will be greatly increased.

7. If the U. S. develops a thermonuclear weapon ahead of the U.S.S.R., the U. S. should for the time being be able to bring increased pressure on the U.S.S.R..

B. Stockpiling and Use of Atomic Weapons.

1. From the foregoing analysis it appears that it would be to the long-term advantage of the United States if atomic weapons were to be effectively eliminated from national peacetime armaments; the additional objectives which must be secured if there is to be a reasonable prospect of such effective elimination of atomic weapons are discussed in Chapter IX. In the absence of such elimination and the securing of these objectives, it would appear that we have no alternative but to increase our atomic capability as rapidly as other considerations make appropriate. In either case, it appears to be imperative to increase as rapidly as possible our general air, ground and sea strength and that of our allies to a point where we are militarily not so heavily dependent on atomic weapons.

2. As is indicated in Chapter IV, it is important that the United States employ military force only if the necessity for its use is clear and compelling and commends itself to the overwhelming majority of our people. The United States cannot therefore engage in war except as a reaction to aggression of so clear and compelling a nature as to bring the overwhelming majority of our people to accept the use of military force. In the event war comes, our use of force must be to compel the acceptance of our objectives and must be congruent to the range of tasks which we may encounter.

In the event of a general war with the U.S.S.R., it must be anticipated that atomic weapons will be used by each side in the manner it deems best suited to accomplish its objectives. In view of our vulnerability to Soviet atomic attack, it has been argued that we might wish to hold our atomic weapons only for retaliation against prior use by the U.S.S.R.. To be able to do so and still have hope of achieving our objectives, the non-atomic military capabilities of ourselves and our allies would have to be fully developed and the political weaknesses of the Soviet Union fully exploited. In the event of war, however, we could not be sure that we could move toward the attainment of these objectives without the U.S.S.R.'s resorting sooner or later to the use of its atomic weapons. Only if we had overwhelming atomic superiority and obtained command of the air might the U.S.S.R. be deterred from employing its atomic weapons as we progressed toward the attainment of our objectives.

In the event the U.S.S.R. develops by 1954 the atomic capability which we now anticipate, it is hardly conceivable that, if war comes, the Soviet leaders would refrain from the use of atomic weapons unless they felt fully confident of attaining their objectives by other means.

In the event we use atomic weapons either in retaliation for their prior use by the U.S.S.R. or because there is no alternative method by which we can attain our objectives, it is imperative that the strategic and tactical targets against which they are used be appropriate and the manner in which they are used be consistent with those objectives.

It appears to follow from the above that we should produce and stockpile thermonuclear weapons in the event they prove feasible and would add significantly to our net capability. Not enough is yet known of their potentialities to warrant a judgment at this time regarding their use in war to attain our objectives.

3. It has been suggested that we announce that we will not use atomic weapons except in retaliation against the prior use of such weapons by an aggressor. It has been argued that such a declaration would decrease the danger of an atomic attack against the United States and its allies.

In our present situation of relative unpreparedness in conventional weapons, such a declaration would be interpreted by the U.S.S.R. as an admission of great weakness and by our allies as a clear indication that we intended to abandon them. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether such a declaration would be taken sufficiently seriously by the Kremlin to constitute an important factor in determining whether or not to attack the United States. It is to be anticipated that the Kremlin would weigh the facts of our capability far more heavily than a declaration of what we proposed to do with that capability.

Unless we are prepared to abandon our objectives, we cannot make such a declaration in good faith until we are confident that we will be in a position to attain our objectives without war, or, in the event of war, without recourse to the use of atomic weapons for strategic or tactical purposes.

C. International Control of Atomic Energy.

1. A discussion of certain of the basic considerations involved in securing effective international control is necessary to make clear why the additional objectives discussed in Chapter IX must be secured.

2. No system of international control could prevent the production and use of atomic weapons in the event of a prolonged war. Even the most effective system of international control could, of itself, only provide (a) assurance that atomic weapons had been eliminated from national peacetime armaments and (b) immediate notice of a violation. In essence, an effective international control system would be expected to assure a certain amount of time after notice of violation before atomic weapons could be used in war.

3. The time period between notice of violation and possible use of atomic weapons in war which a control system could be expected to assure depends upon a number of factors.

The dismantling of existing stockpiles of bombs and the destruction of casings and firing mechanisms could by themselves give little assurance of securing time. Casings and firing mechanisms are presumably easy to produce, even surreptitiously, and the assembly of weapons does not take much time.

If existing stocks of fissionable materials were in some way eliminated and the future production of fissionable materials effectively controlled, war could not start with a surprise atomic attack.

In order to assure an appreciable time lag between notice of violation and the time when atomic weapons might be available in quantity, it would be necessary to destroy all plants capable of making large amounts of fissionable material. Such action would, however, require a moratorium on those possible peacetime uses which call for large quantities of fissionable materials.

Effective control over the production and stockpiling of raw materials might further extend the time period which effective international control would assure. Now that the Russians have learned the technique of producing atomic weapons, the time between violation of an international control agreement and production of atomic weapons will be shorter than was estimated in 1946, except possibly in the field of thermonuclear or other new types of weapons.

4. The certainty of notice of violation also depends upon a number of factors. In the absence of good faith, it is to be doubted whether any system can be designed which will give certainty of notice of violation. International ownership of raw materials and fissionable materials and international ownership and operation of dangerous facilities, coupled with inspection based on continuous unlimited freedom of access to all parts of the Soviet Union (as well as to all parts of the territory of other signatories to the control agreement) appear to be necessary to give the requisite degree of assurance against secret violations. As the Soviet stockpile of fissionable materials grows, the amount which the U.S.S.R. might secretly withhold and not declare to the inspection agency grows. In this sense, the earlier an agreement is consummated the greater the security it would offer. The possibility of successful secret production operations also increases with developments which may reduce the size and power consumption of individual reactors. The development of a thermonuclear bomb would increase many fold the damage a given amount of fissionable material could do and would, therefore, vastly increase the danger that a decisive advantage could be gained through secret operations.

5. The relative sacrifices which would be involved in international control need also to be considered. If it were possible to negotiate an effective system of international control the United States would presumably sacrifice a much larger stockpile of atomic weapons and a much larger production capacity than would the U.S.S.R. The opening up of national territory to international inspection involved in an adequate control and inspection system would have a far greater impact on the U.S.S.R. than on the United States. If the control system involves the destruction of all large reactors and thus a moratorium on certain possible peacetime uses, the U.S.S.R. can be expected to argue that it, because of greater need for new sources of energy, would be making a greater sacrifice in this regard than the United States.

6. The United States and the peoples of the world as a whole desire a respite from the dangers of atomic warfare. The chief difficulty lies in the danger that the respite would be short and that we might not have adequate notice of its pending termination. For such an arrangement to be in the interest of the United States, it is essential that the agreement be entered into in good faith by both sides and the probability against its violation high.

7. The most substantial contribution to security of an effective international control system would, of course, be the opening up of the Soviet Union, as required under the U. N. plan. Such opening up is not, however, compatible with the maintenance of the Soviet system in its present rigor. This is a major reason for the Soviet refusal to accept the U. N. plan.

The studies which began with the Acheson-Lilienthal committee and culminated in the present U. N. plan made it clear that inspection of atomic facilities would not alone give the assurance of control; but that ownership and operation by an international authority of the world's atomic energy activities from the mine to the last use of fissionable materials was also essential. The delegation of sovereignty which this implies is necessary for effective control and, therefore, is as necessary for the United States and the rest of the free world as it is presently unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

It is also clear that a control authority not susceptible directly or indirectly to Soviet domination is equally essential. As the Soviet Union would regard any country not under its domination as under the potential if not the actual domination of the United States, it is clear that what the United States and the non-Soviet world must insist on, the Soviet Union must at present reject.

The principal immediate benefit of international control would be to make a surprise atomic attack impossible, assuming the elimination of large reactors and the effective disposal of stockpiles of fissionable materials. But it is almost certain that the Soviet Union would not agree to the elimination of large reactors, unless the impracticability of producing atomic power for peaceful purposes had been demonstrated beyond a doubt. By the same token, it would not now agree to elimination of its stockpile of fissionable materials.

Finally, the absence of good faith on the part of the U.S.S.R. must be assumed until there is concrete evidence that there has been a decisive change in Soviet policies. It is to be doubted whether such a change can take place without a change in the nature of the Soviet system itself.

The above considerations make it clear that at least a major change in the relative power positions of the United States and the Soviet Union would have to take place before an effective system of international control could be negotiated. The Soviet Union would have had to have moved a substantial distance down the path of accommodation and compromise before such an arrangement would be conceivable. This conclusion is supported by the Third Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, May 17, 1948, in which it is stated that "...the majority of the Commission has been unable to secure...their acceptance of the

nature and extent of participation in the world community required of all nations in this field... . As a result, the Commission has been forced to recognize that agreement on effective measures for the control of atomic energy is itself dependent on cooperation in broader fields of policy."

In short, it is impossible to hope that an effective plan for international control can be negotiated unless and until the Kremlin design has been frustrated to a point at which a genuine and drastic change in Soviet policies has taken place.

IX. POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION

Introduction. Four possible courses of action by the United States in the present situation can be distinguished. They are:

a. Continuation of current policies, with current and currently projected programs for carrying out these policies;

b. Isolation;

c. War; and

d. A more rapid building up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world than provided under a, with the purpose of reaching, if possible, a tolerable state of order among nations without war and of preparing to defend ourselves in the event that the free world is attacked.

The role of negotiation. Negotiation must be considered in relation to these courses of action. A negotiator always attempts to achieve an agreement which is somewhat better than the realities of his fundamental position would justify and which is, in any case, not worse than his fundamental position requires. This is as true in relations among sovereign states as in relations between individuals. The Soviet Union possesses several advantages over the free world in negotiations on any issue:

a. It can and does enforce secrecy on all significant facts about conditions within the Soviet Union, so that it can be expected to know more about the realities of the free world's position than the free world knows about its position;

b. It does not have to be responsive in any important sense to public opinion;

c. It does not have to consult and agree with any other countries on the terms it will offer and accept; and

d. It can influence public opinion in other countries while insulating the peoples under its control.

These are important advantages. Together with the unfavorable trend of our power position, they militate, as is shown in Section A below, against successful negotiation of a general settlement at this time. For although the United States probably now possesses, principally in atomic weapons, a force adequate to deliver a powerful blow upon the Soviet Union and to open the road to victory in a long war, it is not sufficient by itself to advance the position of the United States in the cold war.

The problem is to create such political and economic conditions in the free world, backed by force sufficient to inhibit Soviet attack, that the Kremlin will accommodate itself to these conditions, gradually withdraw, and eventually change its policies drastically. It has been shown in Chapter VIII that truly effective control of atomic energy would require such an opening up of the Soviet Union and such evidence in other ways of its good faith and its intent to co-exist in peace as to reflect or at least initiate a change in the Soviet system.

Clearly under present circumstances we will not be able to negotiate a settlement which calls for a change in the Soviet system. What, then, is the role of negotiation?

In the first place, the public in the United States and in other free countries will require, as a condition to firm policies and adequate programs directed to the frustration of the Kremlin design, that the free world be continuously prepared to negotiate agreements with the Soviet Union on equitable terms. It is still argued by many people here and abroad that equitable agreements with the Soviet Union are possible, and this view will gain force if the Soviet Union begins to show signs of accommodation, even on unimportant issues.

The free countries must always, therefore, be prepared to negotiate and must be ready to take the initiative at times in seeking negotiation. They must develop a negotiating position which defines the issues and the terms on which they would be prepared--and at what stages--to accept agreements with the Soviet Union. The terms must be fair in the view of popular opinion in the free world. This means that they must be consistent with a positive program for peace--in harmony with the United Nations' Charter and providing, at a minimum, for the effective control of all armaments by the United Nations or a successor organization. The terms must not require more of the Soviet Union than such behavior and such participation in a world organization. The fact that such conduct by the Soviet Union is impossible without such a radical change in Soviet policies as to constitute a change in the Soviet system would then emerge as a result of the Kremlin's unwillingness to accept such terms or of its bad faith in observing them.

A sound negotiating position is, therefore, an essential element in the ideological conflict. For some time after a decision to build up strength, any offer of, or attempt at, negotiation of a general settlement along the lines of the Berkeley speech by the Secretary of State could be only a tactic.^{1/} Nevertheless, concurrently with

^{1/} The Secretary of State listed seven areas in which the Soviet Union could modify its behavior in such a way as to permit co-existence in reasonable security. These were:

1. Treaties of peace with Austria, Germany, Japan and relaxation of pressures in the Far East;
 2. Withdrawal of Soviet forces and influence from satellite area;
 3. Cooperation in the United Nations;
- (Continued on following page)

a decision and a start on building up the strength of the free world, it may be desirable to pursue this tactic both to gain public support for the program and to minimize the immediate risks of war. It is urgently necessary for the United States to determine its negotiating position and to obtain agreement with its major allies on the purposes and terms of negotiation.

In the second place, assuming that the United States in cooperation with other free countries decides and acts to increase the strength of the free world and assuming that the Kremlin chooses the path of accommodation, it will from time to time be necessary and desirable to negotiate on various specific issues with the Kremlin as the area of possible agreement widens.

The Kremlin will have three major objectives in negotiations with the United States. The first is to eliminate the atomic capabilities of the United States; the second is to prevent the effective mobilization of the superior potential of the free world in human and material resources; and the third is to secure a withdrawal of United States forces from, and commitments to, Europe and Japan. Depending on its evaluation of its own strengths and weaknesses as against the West's (particularly the ability and will of the West to sustain its efforts), it will or will not be prepared to make important concessions to achieve these major objectives. It is unlikely that the Kremlin's evaluation is such that it would now be prepared to make significant concessions.

The objectives of the United States and other free countries in negotiations with the Soviet Union (apart from the ideological objectives discussed above) are to record, in a formal fashion which will facilitate the consolidation and further advance of our position, the process of Soviet accommodation to the new political, psychological, and economic conditions in the world which will result from adoption of the fourth course of action and which will be supported by the increasing military strength developed as an integral part of that course of action. In short, our objectives are to record, where desirable, the gradual withdrawal of the Soviet Union and to facilitate that process by making negotiation, if possible, always more expedient than resort to force.

It must be presumed that for some time the Kremlin will accept agreements only if it is convinced that by acting in bad faith whenever and wherever there is an opportunity to do so with impunity, it

1/ (Continued)

4. Control of atomic energy and of conventional armaments;
5. Abandonment of indirect aggression;
6. Proper treatment of official representatives of the U. S.;
7. Increased access to the Soviet Union of persons and ideas from other countries.

can derive greater advantage from the agreements than the free world. For this reason, we must take care that any agreements are enforceable or that they are not susceptible of violation without detection and the possibility of effective counter-measures.

This further suggests that we will have to consider carefully the order in which agreements can be concluded. Agreement on the control of atomic energy would result in a relatively greater disarmament of the United States than of the Soviet Union, even assuming considerable progress in building up the strength of the free world in conventional forces and weapons. It might be accepted by the Soviet Union as part of a deliberate design to move against Western Europe and other areas of strategic importance with conventional forces and weapons. In this event, the United States would find itself at war, having previously disarmed itself in its most important weapon, and would be engaged in a race to redevelop atomic weapons.

This seems to indicate that for the time being the United States and other free countries would have to insist on concurrent agreement on the control of non-atomic forces and weapons and perhaps on the other elements of a general settlement, notably peace treaties with Germany, Austria, and Japan and the withdrawal of Soviet influence from the satellites. If, contrary to our expectations, the Soviet Union should accept agreements promising effective control of atomic energy and conventional armaments, without any other changes in Soviet policies, we would have to consider very carefully whether we could accept such agreements. It is unlikely that this problem will arise.

To the extent that the United States and the rest of the free world succeed in so building up their strength in conventional forces and weapons that a Soviet attack with similar forces could be thwarted or held, we will gain increased flexibility and can seek agreements on the various issues in any order, as they become negotiable.

In the third place, negotiation will play a part in the building up of the strength of the free world, apart from the ideological strength discussed above. This is most evident in the problems of Germany, Austria and Japan. In the process of building up strength, it may be desirable for the free nations, without the Soviet Union, to conclude separate arrangements with Japan, Western Germany, and Austria which would enlist the energies and resources of these countries in support of the free world. This will be difficult unless it has been demonstrated by attempted negotiation with the Soviet Union that the Soviet Union is not prepared to accept treaties of peace which would leave these countries free, under adequate safeguards, to participate in the United Nations and in regional or broader associations of states consistent with the United Nations' Charter and providing security and adequate opportunities for the peaceful development of their political and economic life.

This demonstrates the importance, from the point of view of negotiation as well as for its relationship to the building up of the strength of the free world (see Section D below), of the problem of closer association--on a regional or a broader basis--among the free countries.

In conclusion, negotiation is not a possible separate course of action but rather a means of gaining support for a program of building strength, of recording, where necessary and desirable, progress in the cold war, and of facilitating further progress while helping to minimize the risks of war. Ultimately, it is our objective to negotiate a settlement with the Soviet Union (or a successor state or states) on which the world can place reliance as an enforceable instrument of peace. But it is important to emphasize that such a settlement can only record the progress which the free world will have made in creating a political and economic system in the world so successful that the frustration of the Kremlin's design for world domination will be complete. The analysis in the following sections indicates that the building of such a system requires expanded and accelerated programs for the carrying out of current policies.

A. The First Course--Continuation of Current Policies, with Current and Currently Projected Programs for Carrying out These Policies.

1. Military aspects. On the basis of current programs, the United States has a large potential military capability but an actual capability which, though improving, is declining relative to the U.S.S.R., particularly in light of its probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability. The same holds true for the free world as a whole relative to the Soviet world as a whole. If war breaks out in 1950 or in the next few years, the United States and its allies, apart from a powerful atomic blow, will be compelled to conduct delaying actions, while building up their strength for a general offensive. A frank evaluation of the requirements, to defend the United States and its vital interests and to support a vigorous initiative in the cold war, on the one hand, and of present capabilities, on the other, indicates that there is a sharp and growing disparity between them.

A review of Soviet policy shows that the military capabilities, actual and potential, of the United States and the rest of the free world, together with the apparent determination of the free world to resist further Soviet expansion, have not induced the Kremlin to relax its pressures generally or to give up the initiative in the cold war. On the contrary, the Soviet Union has consistently pursued a bold foreign policy, modified only when its probing revealed a determination and an ability of the free world to resist encroachment upon it. The relative military capabilities of the free world are declining, with the result that its determination to resist may also decline and that the security of the United States and the free world as a whole will be jeopardized.

From the military point of view, the actual and potential capabilities of the United States, given a continuation of current and projected programs, will become less and less effective as a war deterrent. Improvement of the state of readiness will become more and more important not only to inhibit the launching of war by the Soviet Union but also to support a national policy designed to reverse the present ominous trends in international relations. A building up of the military capabilities of the United States and the free world is a precondition to the achievement of the objectives outlined in this report and to the protection of the United States against disaster.

Fortunately, the United States military establishment has been developed into a unified and effective force as a result of the policies laid down by the Congress and the vigorous carrying out of these policies by the Administration in the fields of both organization and economy. It is, therefore, a base upon which increased strength can be rapidly built with maximum efficiency and economy.

2. Political Aspects. The Soviet Union is pursuing the initiative in the conflict with the free world. Its atomic capabilities, together with its successes in the Far East, have led to an increasing confidence on its part and to an increasing nervousness in Western Europe and the rest of the free world. We cannot be sure, of course, how vigorously the Soviet Union will pursue its initiative, nor can we be sure of the strength or weakness of the other free countries in reacting to it. There are, however, ominous signs of further deterioration in the Far East. There are also some indications that a decline in morale and confidence in Western Europe may be expected. In particular, the situation in Germany is unsettled. Should the belief or suspicion spread that the free nations are not now able to prevent the Soviet Union from taking, if it chooses, the military actions outlined in Chapter V, the determination of the free countries to resist probably would lessen and there would be an increasing temptation for them to seek a position of neutrality.

Politically, recognition of the military implications of a continuation of present trends will mean that the United States and especially other free countries will tend to shift to the defensive, or to follow a dangerous policy of bluff, because the maintenance of a firm initiative in the cold war is closely related to aggregate strength in being and readily available.

This is largely a problem of the incongruity of the current actual capabilities of the free world and the threat to it, for the free world has an economic and military potential far superior to the potential of the Soviet Union and its satellites. The shadow of Soviet force falls darkly on Western Europe and Asia and supports a policy of encroachment. The free world lacks adequate means--in the form of forces in being--to thwart such expansion locally. The United States will therefore be confronted more frequently with the dilemma of reacting totally to a limited extension of Soviet control or of not reacting at all (except with ineffectual protests and half measures). Continuation of present trends is likely to lead, therefore,

to a gradual withdrawal under the direct or indirect pressure of the Soviet Union, until we discover one day that we have sacrificed positions of vital interest. In other words, the United States would have chosen, by lack of the necessary decisions and actions, to fall back to isolation in the Western Hemisphere. This course would at best result in only a relatively brief truce and would be ended either by our capitulation or by a defensive war--on unfavorable terms from unfavorable positions--against a Soviet Empire comprising all or most of Eurasia. (See Section B.)

3. Economic and social aspects. As was pointed out in Chapter VI, the present foreign economic policies and programs of the United States will not produce a solution to the problem of international economic equilibrium, notably the problem of the dollar gap, and will not create an economic base conducive to political stability in many important free countries.

The European Recovery Program has been successful in assisting the restoration and expansion of production in Western Europe and has been a major factor in checking the dry rot of Communism in Western Europe. However, little progress has been made toward the resumption by Western Europe of a position of influence in world affairs commensurate with its potential strength. Progress in this direction will require integrated political, economic and military policies and programs, which are supported by the United States and the Western European countries and which will probably require a deeper participation by the United States than has been contemplated.

The Point IV Program and other assistance programs will not adequately supplement, as now projected, the efforts of other important countries to develop effective institutions, to improve the administration of their affairs, and to achieve a sufficient measure of economic development. The moderate regimes now in power in many countries, like India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines, will probably be unable to restore or retain their popular support and authority unless they are assisted in bringing about a more rapid improvement of the economic and social structure than present programs will make possible.

The Executive Branch is now undertaking a study of the problem of the United States balance of payments and of the measures which might be taken by the United States to assist in establishing international economic equilibrium. This is a very important project and work on it should have a high priority. However, unless such an economic program is matched and supplemented by an equally far-sighted and vigorous political and military program, we will not be successful in checking and rolling back the Kremlin's drive.

4. Negotiation. In short, by continuing along its present course the free world will not succeed in making effective use of its vastly superior political, economic, and military potential to build a

tolerable state of order among nations. On the contrary, the political, economic, and military situation of the free world is already unsatisfactory and will become less favorable unless we act to reverse present trends.

This situation is one which militates against successful negotiations with the Kremlin--for the terms of agreements on important pending issues would reflect present realities and would therefore be unacceptable, if not disastrous, to the United States and the rest of the free world. Unless a decision had been made and action undertaken to build up the strength, in the broadest sense, of the United States and the free world, an attempt to negotiate a general settlement on terms acceptable to us would be ineffective and probably long drawn out, and might thereby seriously delay the necessary measures to build up our strength.

This is true despite the fact that the United States now has the capability of delivering a powerful blow against the Soviet Union in the event of war, for one of the present realities is that the United States is not prepared to threaten the use of our present atomic superiority to coerce the Soviet Union into acceptable agreements. In light of present trends, the Soviet Union will not withdraw and the only conceivable basis for a general settlement would be spheres of influence and of no influence--a "settlement" which the Kremlin could readily exploit to its great advantage. The idea that Germany or Japan or other important areas can exist as islands of neutrality in a divided world is unreal, given the Kremlin design for world domination.

B. The Second Course--Isolation.

Continuation of present trends, it has been shown above, will lead progressively to the withdrawal of the United States from most of its present commitments in Europe and Asia and to our isolation in the Western Hemisphere and its approaches. This would result not from a conscious decision but from a failure to take the actions necessary to bring our capabilities into line with our commitments and thus to a withdrawal under pressure. This pressure might come from our present Allies, who will tend to seek other "solutions" unless they have confidence in our determination to accelerate our efforts to build a successfully functioning political and economic system in the free world.

There are some who advocate a deliberate decision to isolate ourselves. Superficially, this has some attractiveness as a course of action, for it appears to bring our commitments and capabilities into harmony by reducing the former and by concentrating our present, or perhaps even reduced, military expenditures on the defense of the United States.

This argument overlooks the relativity of capabilities. With the United States in an isolated position, we would have to face the probability that the Soviet Union would quickly dominate most of Eurasia, probably without meeting armed resistance. It would thus acquire a potential far superior to our own, and would promptly proceed to develop this potential with the purpose of eliminating our power, which would, even in isolation, remain as a challenge to it and as an obstacle to the imposition of its kind of order in the world. There is no way to make ourselves inoffensive to the Kremlin except by complete submission to its will. Therefore isolation would in the end condemn us to capitulate or to fight alone and on the defensive, with drastically limited offensive and retaliatory capabilities in comparison with the Soviet Union. (These are the only possibilities, unless we are prepared to risk the future on the hazard that the Soviet Empire, because of over-extension or other reasons, will spontaneously destroy itself from within.)

The argument also overlooks the imponderable, but nevertheless drastic, effects on our belief in ourselves and in our way of life of a deliberate decision to isolate ourselves. As the Soviet Union came to dominate free countries, it is clear that many Americans would feel a deep sense of responsibility and guilt for having abandoned their former friends and allies. As the Soviet Union mobilized the resources of Eurasia, increased its relative military capabilities, and heightened its threat to our security, some would be tempted to accept "peace" on its terms, while many would seek to defend the United States by creating a regimented system which would permit the assignment of a tremendous part of our resources to defense. Under such a state of affairs our national morale would be corrupted and the integrity and vitality of our system subverted.

Under this course of action, there would be no negotiation, unless on the Kremlin's terms, for we would have given up everything of importance.

It is possible that at some point in the course of isolation, many Americans would come to favor a surprise attack on the Soviet Union and the area under its control, in a desperate attempt to alter decisively the balance of power by an overwhelming blow with modern weapons of mass destruction. It appears unlikely that the Soviet Union would wait for such an attack before launching one of its own. But even if it did and even if our attack were successful, it is clear that the United States would face appalling tasks in establishing a tolerable state of order among nations after such a war and after Soviet occupation of all or most of Eurasia for some years. These tasks appear so enormous and success so unlikely that reason dictates an attempt to achieve our objectives by other means.

C. The Third Course--War.

Some Americans favor a deliberate decision to go to war against the Soviet Union in the near future. It goes without saying that the idea of "preventive" war--in the sense of a military attack not

provoked by a military attack upon us or our allies--is generally unacceptable to Americans. Its supporters argue that since the Soviet Union is in fact at war with the free world now and that since the failure of the Soviet Union to use all-out military force is explainable on grounds of expediency, we are at war and should conduct ourselves accordingly. Some further argue that the free world is probably unable, except under the crisis of war, to mobilize and direct its resources to the checking and rolling back of the Kremlin's drive for world dominion. This is a powerful argument in the light of history, but the considerations against war are so compelling that the free world must demonstrate that this argument is wrong. The case for war is premised on the assumption that the United States could launch and sustain an attack of sufficient impact to gain a decisive advantage for the free world in a long war and perhaps to win an early decision.

The ability of the United States to launch effective offensive operations is now limited to attack with atomic weapons. A powerful blow could be delivered upon the Soviet Union, but it is estimated that these operations alone would not force or induce the Kremlin to capitulate and that the Kremlin would still be able to use the forces under its control to dominate most or all of Eurasia. This would probably mean a long and difficult struggle during which the free institutions of Western Europe and many freedom-loving people would be destroyed and the regenerative capacity of Western Europe dealt a crippling blow.

Apart from this, however, a surprise attack upon the Soviet Union, despite the provocativeness of recent Soviet behavior, would be repugnant to many Americans. Although the American people would probably rally in support of the war effort, the shock of responsibility for a surprise attack would be morally corrosive. Many would doubt that it was a "just war" and that all reasonable possibilities for a peaceful settlement had been explored in good faith. Many more, proportionately, would hold such views in other countries, particularly in Western Europe and particularly after Soviet occupation, if only because the Soviet Union would liquidate articulate opponents. It would, therefore, be difficult after such a war to create a satisfactory international order among nations. Victory in such a war would have brought us little if at all closer to victory in the fundamental ideological conflict.

These considerations are no less weighty because they are imponderable, and they rule out an attack unless it is demonstrably in the nature of a counter-attack to a blow which is on its way or about to be delivered. (The military advantages of landing the first blow become increasingly important with modern weapons, and this is a fact which requires us to be on the alert in order to strike with our full weight as soon as we are attacked, and, if possible, before the Soviet blow is actually delivered.) If the argument of Chapter IV is accepted, it follows that there is no "easy" solution and that the

only sure victory lies in the frustration of the Kremlin design by the steady development of the moral and material strength of the free world and its projection into the Soviet world in such a way as to bring about an internal change in the Soviet system.

D. The Remaining Course of Action--a Rapid Build-up of political, Economic, and Military Strength in the Free World

A more rapid build-up of political, economic, and military strength and thereby of confidence in the free world than is now contemplated is the only course which is consistent with progress toward achieving our fundamental purpose. The frustration of the Kremlin design requires the free world to develop a successfully functioning political and economic system and a vigorous political offensive against the Soviet Union. These, in turn, require an adequate military shield under which they can develop. It is necessary to have the military power to deter, if possible, Soviet expansion, and to defeat, if necessary, aggressive Soviet or Soviet-directed actions of a limited or total character. The potential strength of the free world is great; its ability to develop these military capabilities and its will to resist Soviet expansion will be determined by the wisdom and will with which it undertakes to meet its political and economic problems.

1. Military aspects. It has been indicated in Chapter VI that U. S. military capabilities are strategically more defensive in nature than offensive and are more potential than actual. It is evident, from an analysis of the past and of the trend of weapon development, that there is now and will be in the future no absolute defense. The history of war also indicates that a favorable decision can only be achieved through offensive action. Even a defensive strategy, if it is to be successful, calls not only for defensive forces to hold vital positions while mobilizing and preparing for the offensive, but also for offensive forces to attack the enemy and keep him off balance.

The two fundamental requirements which must be met by forces in being or readily available are support of foreign policy and protection against disaster. To meet the second requirement, the forces in being or readily available must be able, at a minimum, to perform certain basic tasks:

a. To defend the Western Hemisphere and essential allied areas in order that their war-making capabilities can be developed;

b. To provide and protect a mobilization base while the offensive forces required for victory are being built up;

c. To conduct offensive operations to destroy vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity, and to keep the enemy off balance until the full offensive strength of the United States and its allies can be brought to bear;

d. To defend and maintain the lines of communication and base areas necessary to the execution of the above tasks; and

e. To provide such aid to allies as is essential to the execution of their role in the above tasks.

In the broadest terms, the ability to perform these tasks requires a built-up of military strength by the United States and its allies to a point at which the combined strength will be superior for at least these tasks, both initially and throughout a war, to the forces that can be brought to bear by the Soviet Union and its satellites. In specific terms, it is not essential to match item for item with the Soviet Union, but to provide an adequate defense against air attack on the United States and Canada and an adequate defense against air and surface attack on the United Kingdom and Western Europe, Alaska, the Western Pacific, Africa, and the Near and Middle East, and on the long lines of communication to these areas. Furthermore, it is mandatory that in building up our strength, we enlarge upon our technical superiority by an accelerated exploitation of the scientific potential of the United States and our allies.

Forces of this size and character are necessary not only for protection against disaster but also to support our foreign policy. In fact, it can be argued that larger forces in being and readily available are necessary to inhibit a would-be aggressor than to provide the nucleus of strength and the mobilization base on which the tremendous forces required for victory can be built. For example, in both World Wars I and II the ultimate victors had the strength, in the end, to win though they had not had the strength in being or readily available to prevent the outbreak of war. In part, at least, this was because they had not had the military strength on which to base a strong foreign policy. At any rate, it is clear that a substantial and rapid building up of strength in the free world is necessary to support a firm policy intended to check and to roll back the Kremlin's drive for world domination.

Moreover, the United States and the other free countries do not now have the forces in being and readily available to defeat local Soviet moves with local action, but must accept reverses or make these local moves the occasion for war--for which we are not prepared. This situation makes for great uneasiness among our allies, particularly in Western Europe, for whom total war means, initially, Soviet occupation. Thus, unless our combined strength is rapidly increased, our allies will tend to become increasingly reluctant to support a firm foreign policy on our part and increasingly anxious to seek other solutions, even though they are aware that appeasement means defeat. An important advantage in adopting the fourth course of action lies in its psychological impact--the revival of confidence and hope in the future. It is recognized, of course, that any announce-

ment of the recommended course of action could be exploited by the Soviet Union in its peace campaign and would have adverse psychological effects in certain parts of the free world until the necessary increase in strength had been achieved. Therefore, in any announcement of policy and in the character of the measures adopted, emphasis should be given to the essentially defensive character and care should be taken to minimize, so far as possible, unfavorable domestic and foreign reactions.

2. Political and economic aspects. The immediate objectives--to the achievement of which such a build-up of strength is a necessary though not a sufficient condition--are a renewed initiative in the cold war and a situation to which the Kremlin would find it expedient to accommodate itself, first by relaxing tensions and pressures and then by gradual withdrawal. The United States cannot alone provide the resources required for such a build-up of strength. The other free countries must carry their part of the burden, but their ability and determination to do it will depend on the action the United States takes to develop its own strength and on the adequacy of its foreign political and economic policies. Improvement in political and economic conditions in the free world, as has been emphasized above, is necessary as a basis for building up the will and the means to resist and for dynamically affirming the integrity and vitality of our free and democratic way of life on which our ultimate victory depends.

At the same time, we should take dynamic steps to reduce the power and influence of the Kremlin inside the Soviet Union and other areas under its control. The objective would be the establishment of friendly regimes not under Kremlin domination. Such action is essential to engage the Kremlin's attention, keep it off balance and force an increased expenditure of Soviet resources in counteraction. In other words, it would be the current Soviet cold war technique used against the Soviet Union.

A program for rapidly building up strength and improving political and economic conditions will place heavy demands on our courage and intelligence; it will be costly; it will be dangerous. But half-measures will be more costly and more dangerous, for they will be inadequate to prevent and may actually invite war. Budgetary considerations will need to be subordinated to the stark fact that our very independence as a nation may be at stake.

A comprehensive and decisive program to win the peace and frustrate the Kremlin design should be so designed that it can be sustained for as long as necessary to achieve our national objectives. It would probably involve:

- (1) The development of an adequate political and economic framework for the achievement of our long-range objectives.

(2) A substantial increase in expenditures for military purposes adequate to meet the requirements for the tasks listed in Section D-1.

(3) A substantial increase in military assistance programs, designed to foster cooperative efforts, which will adequately and efficiently meet the requirements of our allies for the tasks referred to in Section D-1-e.

(4) Some increase in economic assistance programs and recognition of the need to continue these programs until their purposes have been accomplished.

(5) A concerted attack on the problem of the United States balance of payments, along the lines already approved by the President.

(6) Development of programs designed to build and maintain confidence among other peoples in our strength and resolution, and to wage overt psychological warfare calculated to encourage mass defections from Soviet allegiance and to frustrate the Kremlin design in other ways.

(7) Intensification of affirmative and timely measures and operations by covert means in the fields of economic warfare and political and psychological warfare with a view to fomenting and supporting unrest and revolt in selected strategic satellite countries.

(8) Development of internal security and civilian defense programs.

(9) Improvement and intensification of intelligence activities.

(10) Reduction of Federal expenditures for purposes other than defense and foreign assistance, if necessary by the deferment of certain desirable programs.

(11) Increased taxes.

Essential as prerequisites to the success of this program would be (a) consultations with Congressional leaders designed to make the program the object of non-partisan legislative support, and (b) a presentation to the public of a full explanation of the facts and implications of present international trends.

The program will be costly, but it is relevant to recall the disproportion between the potential capabilities of the Soviet and non-Soviet worlds (cf. Chapters V and VI). The Soviet Union is currently devoting about 40 percent of available resources (gross

national product plus reparations, equal in 1949 to about \$65 billion) to military expenditures (14 percent) and to investment (26 percent), much of which is in war-supporting industries. In an emergency the Soviet Union could increase the allocation of resources to these purposes to about 50 percent, or by one-fourth.

The United States is currently devoting about 22 percent of its gross national product (\$255 billion in 1949) to military expenditures (6 percent), foreign assistance (2 percent), and investment (14 percent), little of which is in war-supporting industries. (As was pointed out in Chapter V, the "fighting value" obtained per dollar of expenditure by the Soviet Union considerably exceeds that obtained by the United States, primarily because of the extremely low military and civilian living standards in the Soviet Union.) In an emergency the United States could devote upward of 50 percent of its gross national product to these purposes (as it did during the last war), an increase of several times present expenditures for direct and indirect military purposes and foreign assistance.

From the point of view of the economy as a whole, the program might not result in a real decrease in the standard of living, for the economic effects of the program might be to increase the gross national product by more than the amount being absorbed for additional military and foreign assistance purposes. One of the most significant lessons of our World War II experience was that the American economy, when it operates at a level approaching full efficiency, can provide enormous resources for purposes other than civilian consumption while simultaneously providing a high standard of living. After allowing for price changes, personal consumption expenditures rose by about one-fifth between 1939 and 1944, even though the economy had in the meantime increased the amount of resources going into Government use by \$60-\$65 billion (in 1939 prices).

This comparison between the potentials of the Soviet Union and the United States also holds true for the Soviet world and the free world and is of fundamental importance in considering the courses of action open to the United States.

The comparison gives renewed emphasis to the fact that the problems faced by the free countries in their efforts to build a successfully functioning system lie not so much in the field of economics as in the field of politics. The building of such a system may require more rapid progress toward the closer association of the free countries in harmony with the concept of the United Nations. It is clear that our long-range objectives require a strengthened United Nations, or a successor organization, to which the world can look for the maintenance of peace and order in a system based on freedom and justice. It also seems clear that a unifying ideal of this kind might awaken and arouse the latent spiritual energies of free men everywhere and obtain their enthusiastic support for a positive program for peace going far beyond the frustration of the Kremlin design

and opening vistas to the future that would outweigh short-run sacrifices.

The threat to the free world involved in the development of the Soviet Union's atomic and other capabilities will rise steadily and rather rapidly. For the time being, the United States possesses a marked atomic superiority over the Soviet Union which, together with the potential capabilities of the United States and other free countries in other forces and weapons, inhibits aggressive Soviet action. This provides an opportunity for the United States, in cooperation with other free countries, to launch a build-up of strength which will support a firm policy directed to the frustration of the Kremlin design. The immediate goal of our efforts to build a successfully functioning political and economic system in the free world backed by adequate military strength is to postpone and avert the disastrous situation which, in light of the Soviet Union's probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability, might arise in 1954 on a continuation of our present programs. By acting promptly and vigorously in such a way that this date is, so to speak, pushed into the future, we would permit time for the process of accommodation, withdrawal and frustration to produce the necessary changes in the Soviet system. Time is short, however, and the risks of war attendant upon a decision to build up strength will steadily increase the longer we defer it.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONSCONCLUSIONS

The foregoing analysis indicates that the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union have greatly intensified the Soviet threat to the security of the United States. This threat is of the same character as that described in NSC 20/4 (approved by the President on November 24, 1948) but is more immediate than had previously been estimated. In particular, the United States now faces the contingency that within the next four or five years the Soviet Union will possess the military capability of delivering a surprise atomic attack of such weight that the United States must have substantially increased general air, ground, and sea strength, atomic capabilities, and air and civilian defenses to deter war and to provide reasonable assurance, in the event of war, that it could survive the initial blow and go on to the eventual attainment of its objectives. In turn, this contingency requires the intensification of our efforts in the fields of intelligence and research and development.

Allowing for the immediacy of the danger, the following statement of Soviet threats, contained in NSC 20/4, remains valid:

"14. The gravest threat to the security of the United States within the foreseeable future stems from the hostile designs and formidable power of the U.S.S.R., and from the nature of the Soviet system.

"15. The political, economic, and psychological warfare which the U.S.S.R. is now waging has dangerous potentialities for weakening the relative world position of the United States and disrupting its traditional institutions by means short of war, unless sufficient resistance is encountered in the policies of this and other non-communist countries.

"16. The risk of war with the U.S.S.R. is sufficient to warrant, in common prudence, timely and adequate preparation by the United States.

"a. Even though present estimates indicate that the Soviet leaders probably do not intend deliberate armed action involving the United States at this time, the possibility of such deliberate resort to war cannot be ruled out.

"b. Now and for the foreseeable future there is a continuing danger that war will arise either through Soviet miscalculation or the determination of the United

States to use all the means at its command to safeguard its security, through Soviet misinterpretation of our intentions, or through U. S. miscalculation of Soviet reactions to measures which we might take.

"17. Soviet domination of the potential power of Eurasia, whether achieved by armed aggression or by political and subversive means, would be strategically and politically unacceptable to the United States.

"18. The capability of the United States either in peace or in the event of war to cope with threats to its security or to gain its objectives would be severely weakened by internal developments, important among which are:

"a. Serious espionage, subversion and sabotage, particularly by concerted and well-directed communist activity.

"b. Prolonged or exaggerated economic instability.

"c. Internal political and social disunity.

"d. Inadequate or excessive armament or foreign aid expenditures.

"e. An excessive or wasteful usage of our resources in time of peace.

"f. Lessening of U. S. prestige and influence through vacillation or appeasement or lack of skill and imagination in the conduct of its foreign policy or by shirking world responsibilities.

"g. Development of a false sense of security through a deceptive change in Soviet tactics."

Although such developments as those indicated in paragraph 18 above would severely weaken the capability of the United States and its allies to cope with the Soviet threat to their security, considerable progress has been made since 1948 in laying the foundation upon which adequate strength can now be rapidly built.

The Analysis also confirms that our objectives with respect to the Soviet Union, in time of peace as well as in time of war, as stated in NSC 20/4 (para. 19), are still valid, as are the aims and measures stated therein (paras. 20 and 21). Our current security programs and strategic plans are based upon these objectives, aims, and measures:

"19.

"a. To reduce the power and influence of the U.S.S.R. to limits which no longer constitute a threat

to the peace, national independence and stability of the world family of nations.

"b. To bring about a basic change in the conduct of international relations by the government in power in Russia, to conform with the purposes and principles set forth in the U. N. Charter.

"In pursuing these objectives, due care must be taken to avoid permanently impairing our economy and the fundamental values and institutions inherent in our way of life.

"20. We should endeavor to achieve our general objectives by methods short of war through the pursuit of the following aims:

"a. To encourage and promote the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present perimeter areas around traditional Russian boundaries and the emergence of the satellite countries as entities independent of the U.S.S.R.

"b. To encourage the development among the Russian peoples of attitudes which may help to modify current Soviet behavior and permit a revival of the national life of groups evidencing the ability and determination to achieve and maintain national independence.

"c. To eradicate the myth by which people remote from Soviet military influence are held in a position of subservience to Moscow and to cause the world at large to see and understand the true nature of the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet-directed world communist party, and to adopt a logical and realistic attitude toward them.

"d. To create situations which will compel the Soviet Government to recognize the practical undesirability of acting on the basis of its present concepts and the necessity of behaving in accordance with precepts of international conduct, as set forth in the purposes and principles of the U. N. Charter.

"21. Attainment of these aims requires that the United States:

"a. Develop a level of military readiness which can be maintained as long as necessary as a deterrent to Soviet aggression, as indispensable support to our political attitude toward the U.S.S.R., as a source of encouragement to nations resisting Soviet political aggression, and as an adequate basis for immediate military commitments and for rapid mobilization should war prove unavoidable.

"b. Assure the internal security of the United States against dangers of sabotage, subversion, and espionage.

"c. Maximize our economic potential, including the strengthening of our peacetime economy and the establishment of essential reserves readily available in the event of war.

"d. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the non-Soviet nations; and help such of those nations as are able and willing to make an important contribution to U. S. security, to increase their economic and political stability and their military capability.

"e. Place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power and particularly on the relationships between Moscow and the satellite countries.

"f. Keep the U. S. public fully informed and cognizant of the threats to our national security so that it will be prepared to support the measures which we must accordingly adopt."

* * * * *

In the light of present and prospective Soviet atomic capabilities, the action which can be taken under present programs and plans, however, becomes dangerously inadequate, in both timing and scope, to accomplish the rapid progress toward the attainment of the United States political, economic, and military objectives which is now imperative.

A continuation of present trends would result in a serious decline in the strength of the free world relative to the Soviet Union and its satellites. This unfavorable trend arises from the inadequacy of current programs and plans rather than from any error in our objectives and aims. These trends lead in the direction of isolation, not by deliberate decision but by lack of the necessary basis for a vigorous initiative in the conflict with the Soviet Union.

Our position as the center of power in the free world places a heavy responsibility upon the United States for leadership. We must organize and enlist the energies and resources of the free world in a positive program for peace which will frustrate the Kremlin design for world domination by creating a situation in the free world to which the Kremlin will be compelled to adjust. Without such a cooperative effort, led by the United States, we will have to make gradual withdrawals under pressure until we discover one day that we have sacrificed positions of vital interest.

It is imperative that this trend be reversed by a much more rapid and concerted build-up of the actual strength of both the United States and the other nations of the free world. The analysis shows that this will be costly and will involve significant domestic financial and economic adjustments.

The execution of such a build-up, however, requires that the United States have an affirmative program beyond the solely defensive one of countering the threat posed by the Soviet Union. This program must light the path to peace and order among nations in a system based on freedom and justice, as contemplated in the Charter of the United Nations. Further, it must envisage the political and economic measures with which and the military shield behind which the free world can work to frustrate the Kremlin design by the strategy of the cold war; for every consideration of devotion to our fundamental values and to our national security demands that we achieve our objectives by the strategy of the cold war, building up our military strength in order that it may not have to be used. The only sure victory lies in the frustration of the Kremlin design by the steady development of the moral and material strength of the free world and its projection into the Soviet world in such a way as to bring about an internal change in the Soviet system. Such a positive program--harmonious with our fundamental national purpose and our objectives--is necessary if we are to regain and retain the initiative and to win and hold the necessary popular support and cooperation in the United States and the rest of the free world.

This program should include a plan for negotiation with the Soviet Union, developed and agreed with our allies and which is consonant with our objectives. The United States and its allies, particularly the United Kingdom and France, should always be ready to negotiate with the Soviet Union on terms consistent with our objectives. The present world situation, however, is one which militates against successful negotiations with the Kremlin--for the terms of agreements on important pending issues would reflect present realities and would therefore be unacceptable, if not disastrous, to the United States and the rest of the free world. After a decision and a start on building up the strength of the free world has been made, it might then be desirable for the United States to take an initiative in seeking negotiations in the hope that it might facilitate the process of accommodation by the Kremlin to the new situation. Failing that, the unwillingness of the Kremlin to accept equitable terms or its bad faith in observing them would assist in consolidating popular opinion in the free world in support of the measures necessary to sustain the build-up.

In summary, we must, by means of a rapid and sustained build-up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world, and by means of an affirmative program intended to wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union, confront it with convincing evidence of

the determination and ability of the free world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its will. Such evidence is the only means short of war which eventually may force the Kremlin to abandon its present course of action and to negotiate acceptable agreements on issues of major importance.

The whole success of the proposed program hangs ultimately on recognition by this Government, the American people, and all free peoples, that the cold war is in fact a real war in which the survival of the free world is at stake. Essential prerequisites to success are consultations with Congressional leaders designed to make the program the object of non-partisan legislative support, and a presentation to the public of a full explanation of the facts and implications of the present international situation. The prosecution of the program will require of us all the ingenuity, sacrifice, and unity demanded by the vital importance of the issue and the tenacity to persevere until our national objectives have been attained.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That the President:

a. Approve the foregoing Conclusions.

b. Direct the National Security Council, under the continuing direction of the President, and with the participation of other Departments and Agencies as appropriate, to coordinate and insure the implementation of the Conclusions herein on an urgent and continuing basis for as long as necessary to achieve our objectives. For this purpose, representatives of the member Departments and Agencies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff or their deputies, and other Departments and Agencies as required should be constituted as a revised and strengthened staff organization under the National Security Council to develop coordinated programs for consideration by the National Security Council.

DECLASSIFIED by authority of:

Signature

Date

TOP SECRET



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

September 5, 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES POLICY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Significant Actions of the Armed Forces Policy Council at its meeting of 5 September 1950

1. Discussion of NSC-68 (Item #2) (TOP SECRET)

The Secretary suggested, and the Policy Council concurred in, the following time table in connection with the budget for force requirements under NSC 68 (Subject to the approval of the President): The three Chiefs of Staff both individually for their respective Services, and as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the three Secretaries for each of their respective Services and as the Joint Secretaries, will consider the Service-developed monetary requirements today and will furnish General McNarney and Mr. McNeil their decisions later today (September 5, 1950). General McNarney and Mr. McNeil will then work with the departmental budget officers in refining the budget estimates. A consolidated budget program under NSC 68, approved by General McNarney and Mr. McNeil and by the Chiefs and the three Secretaries will be completed by Monday, September 11, or early Tuesday, September 12, at the latest. Final consideration of this consolidated paper will be the subject for discussion by the Armed Forces Policy Council prior to or on next Tuesday, at 10 A. M. The approved budget program will be sent to the National Security Council at the latest by noon Tuesday, September 12.

No information on the budget estimates will be given to persons outside the Department of Defense pending the final determination of the Department of Defense request. The Secretary requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the detailed budget figures with respect to roles and missions compliance.

Note: Subsequent to the Armed Forces Policy Council meeting on September 5, the Secretary obtained the President's approval of this time schedule.

/s/

Ralph M. Stohl
Secretary of the Armed Forces Policy Council

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 1(E) and 1(D), or (F)
DATE letter. 6-24-75
By NLT, 4c, NARS Date 11-7-75

TS2736

April 14, 1950

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on

NSC 68
A report to
the NSC
by
The Executive Sec.
on

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

- References: A. NSC 20/4
- B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated April 14, 1950

The enclosed letter by the President and the Report by the Secretaries of State and Defense referred to therein are transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Economic Cooperation Administrator, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, at the next regularly scheduled meeting of the Council on Thursday, April 20, 1950.

A proposed procedure for carrying out the President's directive as a matter of urgency is being circulated for concurrent consideration in the reference memorandum of April 14.

It is requested that this report be handled with special security precautions in accordance with the President's desire that no publicity be given this report or its contents without his approval.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED by authority of:

HENRY A. KISSINGER - ASST. TO THE

- cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
 - The Economic Cooperation Administrator
 - The Director, Bureau of the Budget
 - The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
- PRES. FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
FEBRUARY 27, 1975

Signature	Date
H.C.	4-8-75



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VITA

Edward Rucker was born in Saint Louis, Missouri on April 20, 1954. He attended public schools and graduated from Webster Groves High School in 1972. In 1975 he received his Bachelors of Arts in Sociology from the University of Missouri at Kansas City. In 1977 he received his Juris Doctor from the University of Missouri at Kansas City School of Law. He was admitted to the Bar of the State of Missouri and the Unites States District Court for Western Missouri on September 10, 1977. In 2002 he returned to school. He received a Masters of Arts in Political Science at University of Missouri at Kansas City in 2008.

He currently serves as City Attorney for the City of Osage Beach, Missouri. In that capacity he led the successful negotiation for the Dierberg's / High Pointe Center Tax Increment Financing Redevelopment Plan and Agreement in 2011. In 2010 he coordinated outside counsel to a victory in *Four Seasons Marina v. City of Osage Beach and J.Q. Hammons Hotels* defending the Hammons Marina View Tax Increment Financing Redevelopment Plan and Agreement.

Ed is the founding board president of Academie Lafayette, Missouri's first and most successful charter public school, now in its 13th year of operation. As principal drafter of the charter for Academie Lafayette he led the negotiations with the University of Central Missouri for a ten year sponsorship of that school which was awarded on December 3, 1998 and has since been renewed. Academie Lafayette is a total immersion French language

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He has been engaged in the practice of law in several capacities since 1977. From 1977 to 2004 he was in private practice in Kansas City, Missouri. From 2004 to 2007 he served as County Counselor for Jackson County Missouri drafting ballot language for a successful 3/8s cent sales tax for 25 years to fund stadium improvements and successfully managing outside counsel in the negotiation of 25 year lease expansions to keep the Kansas City Chiefs and the Kansas City Royals at the Harry S Truman Sports Complex owned by Jackson County. In 1994 he received the President's Award for Service as Chair of the Kansas City Bar Association Solo Practice/ Small Firms committee. He has served on the Missouri Sentencing Commission, the Missouri Public Defender Commission. In 2007 he was admitted to the Bar in the State of Kansas.

During the 2003-2004 academic year, he taught Political Science at Baker University in Baldwin City, Kansas. His courses included Introduction to American Government, American Congress, The Presidency and State and Local Government. In 2007 he served as the Director of Policy and Outreach for the Disability Rights Center of Kansas in Topeka, Kansas the designated Protection and Advocacy agency for people living with disabilities in the State of Kansas.

Ed and his wife Harriett Ann Plowman live in Central Hyde Park in Kansas City, Missouri. They have three children who have attended and graduated from Academie Lafayette.